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**THE
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3. *Psalmen.* By Rudolf Kittel. Article in *Realencyklopädie für Protest. Theologie.* Vol. xvi. Leipzig, 1905.
4. *The Poets of the Old Testament.* By A. R. Gordon. Hodder & Stoughton, 1912.
5. *Das Ich der Psalmen.* By Emil Balla. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1912.
6. *Psalmen and Psalterbuch* (Articles in 'Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.' Vol. iv. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913). By Hermann Gunkel. *Die Psalmen and Die Endhoffnung der Psalmisten.* By the same, in 'Reden und Aufsätze.' Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1913.
7. *Religion in Song, or Studies in the Psalter.* By W. G. Jordan. Clarke & Co. N.D. (? 1915).*

And other works.

THE Hebrew Psalter is one of those books which are unlikely to lose their hold upon the men and women of

* It seems a great pity that an excellent scholar such as Professor Jordan should be willing to allow a work of his to be published (like the other books in the valuable series to which it belongs) *without a date.*

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Europe and of European origin. Its latest hymn is hardly less than two thousand years old, but neither oldest nor youngest shows signs of wear. So long as men's faith in a ruling and benevolent God continues, so long will the Psalter—it is hardly too rash to predict—be a comfort, an inspiration and a help to thousands of human souls. For in simplicity and strength, in tenderness and fervour, in directness and nobility, it would be hard to find, or to create, another hymn-book to surpass it. Its praises have been justly and eloquently sung by many distinguished writers of many different races and creeds. It is unnecessary to attempt to add a new laudation to those already in existence. It suffices to say that whether troubled or happy, whether agitated or at rest, the human heart can obtain from the poems of the Psalter a guidance and impetus for the wonder, the joy, and the comfort, of communion with God.

Yet it is not flawlessness which has produced, and can still produce, these results. The Psalms show various imperfections, both moral and religious. Both the Jewish and the Christian religions have advanced beyond them. It may be partly because of its very imperfections that the Psalter makes its appeal to weak, erring, struggling, tempest-tossed humanity. They are a proof of its sincerity; if the faults are real, so are the greatness, the spirituality, the passionate faith. The most glaring of its imperfections—violent imprecations upon the enemy—has recently been a good deal discussed in relation to the place of the Psalter in the public worship of the Church.* For the Church, unlike the Synagogue, has not discriminated between Psalm and Psalm; it has used the whole book, and made no omissions or selections. But almost all the 'imprecatory' Psalms, while they say things which we must deplore and condemn, also contain passages which we should be loth to lose. Of a truth, these very Psalms often fit in with our present temper and needs, and it is not always quite easy to say where they stiffen our faith and our determination, increasing our hatred of evil and our resolve to put an end to its

* Cf. the valuable pamphlet on 'The Use of the Psalter' by the Rev. C. W. Emmet, the Rev. Dr Burney and the Rev. Dr Sanday. (Oxford University Press, 1918.)

reign, or where they merely sharpen our lower human longing for retribution or revenge.

In circumstances such as these, when the Psalter, in its preponderant greatness and in its occasional weakness, is often in our memories, and when its words are often on our lips, a short survey of some results of recent scholarship in regard to it may not be out of place, or lacking in actuality and interest. Like every other great book, the Psalter is not injured by learning and study. On the contrary, to study it increases its fascination, and opens the eyes to many an additional beauty. It does not, or at least it need not, make us care for the Psalms any the less, that we seek to find out their place in the religious history of Israel or their relation to the religious literature of other ancient races and peoples.

The estimates of scholars concerning the dates of the Psalms have curiously varied. That no reliance can be placed upon the superscriptions is now generally admitted. But this mistrust takes us a very little way. The critical movement of the 19th century began by allowing that at least a few of the seventy-three or seventy-four psalms which the Hebrew text ascribes to David were really composed by him. That, for instance, was the position of Ewald. Gradually the tendency increased to allot all the Psalms to the exilic and post-exilic periods. In England this view was taught by Cheyne and Robertson Smith; and in Germany it became, for a time, with the dominance of Wellhausen and his school, extremely prevalent. Few psalms were even allowed to have been composed during the 'Babylonian captivity'; almost all were held to be the product of the Second Temple. Wellhausen declared that the real question was, not how many psalms were written *after* the exile, but whether any psalms were written before it. A familiar description of the Psalter as the song-book of the Second Temple became interpreted to mean that they were composed for that Temple, or during its existence, which is obviously a very different thing. That a few psalms were of Maccabean origin had long been accepted by various scholars; and, many years before Wellhausen, a theory was learnedly maintained by Olshausen that not merely a few, but a very considerable number of the

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Psalms must be ascribed to the Maccabean era. It is this theory which was pushed to its furthest consequences by Duhm. According to him, hardly a single psalm is anterior to Alexander the Great, while a very large number date from the Maccabean revolt and from the Hasmonean princes and kings. Thus the upper limit for the Psalter would be about 300 B.C., the lower limit about 80 B.C.! We have, indeed, moved far from the times of David.

Duhm's commentary first appeared in 1899. In the works of the best critics and commentators which have been published in the present century, the tide has slowly turned. Baethgen, Gunkel, Staerk and Kittel, four of the best and most recent German commentators, all incline to more conservative and moderate opinions. They even go so far as to concede, with the late Prof. Driver, the possibility that a very few of the psalms may even go back to David himself.* Pre-exilic psalms are now freely admitted. Kittel would, perhaps, claim fewer psalms for the pre-exilic period than the distinguished American scholar, Briggs; but in Kittel's commentary (1912), no less than in that of Briggs (1906), the dogmatic views of Wellhausen are entirely rejected.

With this change as regards the date has gone another change touching the important question of the meaning in the Psalter of the personal pronoun 'I.' It was not, indeed, a new opinion of the critics of the last century that the 'I' was not an individual, but a personification, signifying either the community as a whole, or the true Israel, the party to which the writer belonged. Yet, though an old opinion, it was only in the last century that it both became widely prevalent and was defended by elaborate and learned arguments. Wellhausen and his school adopted it with conviction; and an essay by Smend, published in 1888, seemed to many to settle the question. In its extremest form, the result of the theory was undoubtedly to depreciate, at least to some extent, the religious value of the Psalter. Cheyne and Robertson Smith adopted it, though with many qualifications and reserves. It is by no means out of date even now, and,

* Possible Davidic psalms, according to Kittel, are xxiv, 7-10; xxix, iii, iv, xviii, 8-16; xix, 1-6; viii, and, perhaps, 'some others.'

within carefully drawn limits, it will probably be always admitted to contain its own contribution to truth. The last word, which will also be the word of moderation and reconciliation, may very likely—in this as in many other matters—have been forestalled by Prof. Driver, though it will, perhaps, be presented in a somewhat less tentative and hesitating form.

Meanwhile, in Germany, a violent reaction against the theory of personification has set in. Though an excellent scholar like Baethgen still adheres to it, authorities like Gunkel, Staerk and Kittel reject it more or less entirely. They call it a last remnant of the old, vicious, allegorising tendency. And, though Duhm differs from these three writers as to dates, he is entirely at one with them here; he asserts with characteristic vehemence the view that the 'I' is always an individual. As Smend, in 1888, wrote his much-quoted essay, 'ueber das Ich der Psalmen,' to show that the 'I' is always a personification of the nation, the community, or the pious in Israel, so Balla, in 1912, wrote a long dissertation with the same title to prove that the 'I' is always an individual.

Yet with each swing of the pendulum our knowledge has been enriched. The labours of Smend and others of the same school will not have been in vain. If we allow that the 'I' of the Psalter often means the individual, we shall also have to concede that occasionally it does not, and that in many psalms the writer speaks in a representative character, saying what is not only true of himself and of his own feelings, desires and aspirations, but what is intended to apply also to his party, his fellow-believers or fellow-sufferers, and even to his community as a whole.

So, too, as regards dates. We shall hardly accept the exaggerations of Duhm,* yet we shall probably refuse to acquiesce in Davidic authorship for any existing psalm of our present collection; and, while we shall admit that some psalms are pretty certainly pre-exilic, we shall still assign the greater portion of the Psalter to the Persian and the Greek periods. In other words,

* Cf. Driver, 'An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament,' pp. 390, 391 (9th Ed.).

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scholarship will, we think, be somewhat less generous with pre-exilic psalms than Driver, Briggs and Kirkpatrick, but a good deal less dogmatic and assured about putting all psalms after Nebuchadnezzar than Cheyne, Wellhausen and Duhm.

So far as the period before the exile is concerned, it must be admitted that the researches and arguments of a scholar like Gunkel have put the question upon a new and better footing. The Psalms are a form of Hebrew poetry; and poetry among the Hebrews is as old as the nation itself. Again, there are in the Old Testament psalms, or psalmic fragments, outside the Psalter; and some of these are unquestionably pre-exilic. There is evidence that psalms of various kinds must have formed a portion of public and private worship, and must have been integrally connected with cult and religion, long before the destruction of the Temple in 586 B.C. There are passages in the Psalms themselves (such as some of the allusions to 'kings') which have never been satisfactorily explained upon a post-exilic or Maccabean hypothesis. Lastly, the study of comparative religion has an important word to say. From Egypt, and still more from Babylonia, we have now revealed to us a number of songs and psalms (praises, petitions, penitential hymns, etc.), many of which were written long before David, and which present astonishing parallels, in language and in thought, to the psalms of our existing Psalter. (Babylonian psalms, by the way, use the first person singular, and the 'I' is, apparently, always an individual.) If, then, pious Egyptians and Babylonians of comparatively very early times could write thus, why not Hebrews in the ninth or eighth century B.C.?

To such arguments it must be replied that we have not to deal with possible psalms, but with actual psalms. Doubtless there were Hebrew hymns and songs of all kinds written long before the sixth century B.C. But the question still remains whether any of the hundred and fifty Psalms which form our existing Psalter were composed before that era. The fact that David may have written hymns does not prove that any of David's hymns have been preserved. We must determine that point mainly by our estimate of the religious ideas of the psalms in our actual Psalter, and by judging how far such ideas

are conceivable on David's lips and in David's age; or how far they are the product of, and the response to, teaching which was given many years after his death. It does not follow, because a certain religious idea, in its Babylonian dress and form, can be found in (say) the eleventh century B.C., that it therefore existed and was expressed in an Israelitish dress and form at the same date or even two centuries later.

Moreover, another important point has to be considered—the editing of the Psalter. We know that the views of the ancient Jews about editing differed radically from our own. If we discover an ancient manuscript—document or poem—our object is to publish it exactly as it was originally written. The ancient Jewish editors, generally speaking, thought very differently. Their great object was to 'publish' something which was edifying and acceptable to their own age. Again, the less sacred the document, the less venerable the author, the more justifiable it was to change his wording. When the parts of the Pentateuch had been joined together to form the present Book, when all its laws were regarded as the veritable words of Moses, dictated to him by God, its text was scrupulously preserved without alteration or addition. But how different was the fate of some even of the prophetic books! What a conglomerate, for instance, are the sixty-six chapters of Isaiah! How difficult and delicate a matter it is to disentangle the editors' words from the words of the many original writers whose combined and often mangled utterances now form the substance of the books we know!

The story of the Psalter's gradual evolution is complicated and disputed; it cannot be discussed here. But we may suspect that the various compilers and editors, through whose busy hands our hundred and fifty Psalms have passed, left their mark upon many of them. Prof. Briggs is, perhaps, more sure than he ought to be (I speak with hesitation, for the labour and the time that he has given to the Psalter are enormous) as to the number and character of the various glosses which the Psalms contain. That there are many of these glosses and adaptations is, however, unquestionable, though we may not always be able to detect them with accuracy, and we may sometimes imagine them where they do not

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really exist.* The editors and compilers were not likely either to include any psalm which was too much opposed to their own conceptions, or to refrain from giving to any old psalm which they did desire to preserve a careful religious revision. Thus, as Prof. Briggs says (and he points out that, so far as prayer-books, liturgies and hymns are concerned, even modern editors have acted on similar lines), 'they had greater interest in editing the Psalms for public worship than in preserving their original form and meaning.'† Hence, even if the groundwork of some psalms is, let us say, older than the sixth century, it is very doubtful whether their religious ideas can be rightly used to illustrate an earlier age.

Wellhausen wrote: 'The strong family likeness which runs through the Psalms forbids our distributing them among periods of Israelitish history widely separated in time and fundamentally unlike in character.' This characteristically plain and unqualified statement is somewhat exaggerated; but that, in spite of subordinate varieties of view, there are profounder agreements can hardly be denied.

What, then, and of what nature, are these agreements? To answer this question, whether directly or indirectly, it will be well first to ask another. When we want to estimate the date of any Old Testament book as a whole, or of any portion of such book—the Law, for example, or the Proverbs or the Psalter or 'Kings'—we have first of all to ask: What is the relation of this book, or of any particular section of this book, to the prophets and to their teaching? More especially what is its relation to that group of prophets which extended from

* 'Many of the Psalms in their original form were composed as an expression of private devotion. These features remained even after they were adapted by editorial revision for use in the Synagogues. Many others were composed for use in public worship in the Synagogues (where the ceremonies of religion were reduced to a minimum). . . . Only a few of the Psalms were composed for, or even adapted to, worship in the Temple. . . . Furthermore, local and temporal references were gradually eliminated by editorial revision from the older Psalms, making them more and more appropriate for worship' (Briggs, vol. i, p. xcvi).

† The changes made in the text of Psalms by their being adopted and adapted for use in the Temple (and, perhaps, also in the Synagogues) are well discussed and set forth in detail by Beer in his excellent essay, 'Individual und Gemeindep salmen' (1894)—a book still well worth reading.

Amos to Deutero-Isaiah, or, roughly, from 740 to 540 B.C.? For, unless all our most cherished conclusions are false, it is the prophets who were the great fashioners and creators of the Israelite and Jewish religion; it is *their* doctrines and *their* teaching which have left an indelible mark and stamp upon every other section of the Old Testament scriptures—upon Law, upon History, upon the Psalms, upon the Proverbs.

What, then, in brief and general terms, were the religious achievements of the prophets in those two hundred years from 740 to 540 B.C.? First and foremost comes Monotheism. There is one God not only for Israel, but for the world. He is the Creator and the Ruler of all. And this God is not only one, but unique. He is perfect in righteousness, supremely just, compassionate and loving. Though God of the whole world, He is, in a special sense, the God of Israel. He has chosen the people of Israel for the sake of their ancestors, for His own name's sake, for the spread of His greatness and His oneness. And from the Israelites, His servants and children, He demands a single-hearted and exclusive service. No material representation of Him is permitted. No idols are allowed, no images, whether of Him, the true God, or of any other, false, lesser, or unreal divinity. His true service is not found or rendered in sacrifices or offerings, but in the service of man; in righteousness, in justice, in compassion, in lovingkindness. This one God punishes iniquity and rewards virtue; that is the fundamental principle of His rule; and it is applied to Israel no less than to the nations around Israel. But, while Israel shall be chastised for his sins, a future of glory, of prosperity, and of peace, shall ultimately be his. In those latter days inward virtue and outward happiness shall correspond and abound. Israel shall be predominant in the world, but the nations—or what is left of them—shall all know and reverence Israel's God, and find in the knowledge and in the worship of Him their salvation and their peace.

Now, if we find all these teachings illustrated in the Psalter; if there is hardly a psalm that does not imply or contain one or other of them; if, with certain compromises and weakenings (such as we also observe in the Law), all

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are more or less in evidence, and if some of them are even expanded and developed; then the Psalter, and, for the matter of that, each component part of the Psalter, can hardly be older than the prophets. For it was not the psalmists (so far as we can judge) who were the creators of these high teachings, but the prophets. As Amos spoke, so did *not* speak David.* Nor can we be content to say that the anterior limit for the Psalter, in its present form, must be as early as 750 B.C.; for the teaching of the prophets must be given time to be accepted and absorbed. Hence, if some of our psalms are pre-exilic, they can hardly go back further than about a century before the capture of Jerusalem by the Babylonians in 586. Roughly, then, we may, according to this canon, assign our oldest psalms to the beginning of the seventh century B.C. And, if we allot the youngest to about the years 170-130 B.C., we shall get a stretch of some 550 years for the composition of the whole book. It is probable that no other canons of criticism can be expected greatly to modify or invalidate these two limiting dates.

Driver, the cautious and the learned, himself more or less accepted and laid down the self-same canon:

'When the Psalms are compared with the prophets, the latter seem to show, on the whole, the greater originality; the psalmists, in other words, *follow* the prophets, appropriating and applying the truths which the prophets proclaimed, and bearing witness to the effects which their teaching exerted upon those who came within range of its influence.' †

From somewhat different considerations, derived mainly from a survey of the internal history of Hebrew psalmody, its classes and characteristics, Kittel and Gunkel, however anxious they are to allow the possibility of much older psalms, arrive at practically the same conclusions. A few psalms are, somewhat tentatively, reserved, either in their present, or in their unedited and original (and therefore unknown) form, for

* The possibility that David, from a religious point of view, might have been competent to write some of our existing psalms is very ably, but hardly convincingly, put forward by Kittel in his article 'Psalmen,' in the *Protestantische Realencyklopädie*, xvi, pp. 206-208.

† 'Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament,' 9th Ed. p. 384.

the pre-prophetic period. But the great majority are post-prophetic, while the majority of this majority, says Kittel, belong 'unquestionably' to the post-exilic period, and 'especially to the centuries of Jewish contact with heathen, and above all with Hellenic, ways and life.' With this verdict we may concur.

It is interesting to observe the various ways in which the psalms reflect the teachings of the prophets, or apply them. Monotheism is assumed. The phase of conflict is, broadly speaking, over. In a large number of cases we may trace the influence, and hear the echoes, of Isaiah xl-lv; and, even where this is not the case, the monotheistic basis seems equally secured. Other gods and idols are here and there referred to, but chiefly in irony and derision; the idea of any rival to Yahweh does not enter the writers' minds. The character, moreover, of this one and unique God is represented in accordance with prophetic teaching. The Lord is righteous and loves righteousness; He is good to all, and His mercies are over all His works; He is compassionate: He is loving: He is faithful.

But the psalmists not only reproduce this teaching; they apply it. And it is just here where a real and important difference comes in, according as the 'I' of the Psalter is interpreted to mean what it says, or is given a rigidly 'national' or 'collective' interpretation. Phrases such as, 'My soul pants after Thee, O God, as the hart pants after the water brooks,' mean something very different, and very much less spiritual, if the 'I' is not intended to be the writer, but only the community; the cry, 'Create in me a clean heart, O God,' has a very much poorer significance, if it is not the heart of the writer which thus calls out unto God, but is only a dramatic and fictitious utterance put into the mouth of Israel. In the one case, we have the record of a genuine spiritual experience; in the other, an elegant and ingenious suggestion. Moreover, the very meaning of a pure heart or of a contrite spirit differs according as it is applied to an individual or to a community. We have only to turn to Wellhausen's interpretation of the famous 51st psalm (in the Polychrome or 'Rainbow' Bible) to see to what a comparatively low spiritual level a rigid application of the congregational or collective meaning of the

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'I' has reduced this glorious psalm. Happily the arguments of Kittel, Gunkel, Balla and others can set our minds at rest on this point. Though the 'I' is sometimes representative and sometimes 'collective' (for Balla in his thoroughgoing denials goes too far), yet, in the great spiritual psalms, there need be no doubt that it is not only an individual who has written the poem, but one who is telling of his own experiences and his own personal feelings and convictions.

The psalmists, then, may be said to apply the teaching of the prophets to the religious life of the individual. To the prophets the two responding poles of religion are God and society. To many of the psalmists the two poles are God and the soul. They deal with the intimate relation of the individual man to God, such as the prophets had depicted Him. They experiment with the prophets' God; they have experience of Him.

'The Lord is *my* shepherd,' not merely the shepherd of Israel. And He is not only the soul's shepherd; many other familiar metaphors are used to express His relation to the individual Israelite. He is rock, stronghold, fortress, shield; He is a hiding place and a refuge; under His sheltering wings a man can feel himself secure and at rest. God quenches fear. For, if the Lord is my strength, of whom need I be afraid? God is near and findable; call upon Him, and He will reveal Himself. As a weaned child with his mother, so can the tired spirit repose in God. For He gives peace and composure; He cures fretfulness and restlessness; in the multitude of a man's cares, God's comforts can uplift his soul. He heals the broken-hearted; He binds up their wounds. God is light, and the source of light; in His light we can see light. Above all, God is a joy; to experience His nearness, to commune with Him, is happiness unique and incomparable. He satisfies the longing soul. They who trust in Him are glad. 'In the shadow of Thy wings I rejoice. My soul follows hard after Thee: Thy right hand upholds me.' The omniscient and omnipresent God is also a God whose lovingkindness, faithfulness, and righteousness, extend from heaven to earth.* In His presence is fulness

* 'No sacred book of any nation has solved this fundamental problem of all religion, how to preserve at the same time the Infinity and the

of joy; at His right hand there are pleasures for evermore. Keen as every Hebrew is to live long (for as yet he hardly suspects the possibility of a blissful life beyond the grave), he can, nevertheless, affirm that the divine love is better than life. As a father pities his children, so God pities those that fear Him. 'Whom have I in heaven but Thee?' one singer exclaims in ecstasy; 'and there is nought upon earth that I desire beside Thee. My heart and my flesh may fail; yet God is for ever my rock and my portion.' Truly does Kittel say:

'Here are thoughts of a religious purity and power, before which one stands in silent admiration. It is the greatest achievement which, on this field, has ever entered into a human heart; not surpassed, only attained, and referred to Christ, by Paul in utterances such as Romans viii, 28, *seq.*'

And we may agree with Dr Kirkpatrick when he says, in his admirable commentary, that if, as seems on the whole more probable, we are not to interpret the words, 'Thou wilt afterwards receive me to glory,' as referring to a happy life after death, the Psalmist's faith 'is even grander.'

'He rises victorious over the world of sense and appearance in the inward certainty of the reality of his communion with God, and the absolute conviction that this is the highest good and the truest happiness of which man is capable. Such a knowledge is eternal life; and the possibility of it is in itself a pledge that the communion thus begun cannot suddenly be interrupted by death, but must be carried on to an even fuller perfection.' *

It is true that this profound religious individualism of the Psalter is brought about by the special relation of Israel to his divine Lord. But to say this is not to deny the reality and depth of this individualism; it merely explains its historic genesis. Each Israelite becomes for himself a little Israel. God is not only the God of the nation, but to each member of it He is the adored Ruler

Personality of God, as has the Psalter.' (The Rev. W. T. Davison, in Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible, vol. iv, p. 157.)

* Yet Psalm lxxiii, like xvi, is, as Prof. Kent rightly says, 'an important forerunner of the belief in individual immortality that is for the first time definitely asserted in Daniel xii.' ('The Songs, Hymns and Prayers of the Old Testament,' by C. F. Kent, 1914.)

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and Friend, the trusted and beloved Source of comfort, of happiness, and of strength.

That the God of the prophets became all this to the psalmists is an evidence of their comparatively late date. And yet the psalms which bear the strongest evidence of this spiritual influence must be placed—whether we regard their language, their place in the collection, or other characteristics—rather among the earlier than the later pieces. Consequently the Psalter, as a whole, must be taken to belong to a still more recent epoch.

The same conclusion is arrived at, or confirmed, by the attitude of the Psalms towards the prophetic teaching of the relation of the outward to the inward in true religion and in the service of God. The prophetic doctrine on this matter is laid down with complete definiteness by Amos, the earliest of the band, with his vigorous, 'I hate, I despise your feast days; I take no delight in your solemn assemblies . . . but let justice run down as waters and righteousness as a perpetual stream,' right down to Joel with his curt, 'Rend your hearts and not your garments.' Hosea enunciates the teaching very plainly: 'I delight in loving-kindness and not in sacrifice.' To Amos, Hosea and Isaiah, to Jeremiah too, who spoke and wrote before sacrifices and offerings had become universally recognised as both Mosaic and Divine, there was no difficulty in doctrine of this kind. Outward religion, which they depreciated and despised, consisted of all the ritual and ceremonial of the 'high places' and of the temple; inward and true religion consisted of justice, compassion, loving-kindness. It is highly remarkable that in psalms which were probably not written till during the exile or after the return from Babylon, and were certainly only edited and collected under the domination of the Law, some reflexions of this genuine prophetic teaching should occur, and have been allowed to remain. The truth is that the teachers of the Law had absorbed enough of the prophetic teaching both to appreciate it, and to admit, even themselves, its measure of truth. They too taught that, at any rate, the sacrifices of the wicked are an abomination unto the Lord. The writers of the 40th, 50th and 51st psalms go yet further. In their depreciation of the outward—of sacrifices and burnt offerings—they rise to the highest prophetic level.

'Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it; Thou delightest not in burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not despise.'

But the more interesting point is to follow. The Law came and made a compromise. Though God enjoined justice and mercy and love, He also enjoined sacrifices. And the Temple was no longer the seat of half-heathenous, half-idolatrous practices; it was the recognised official centre of a strictly monotheistic faith. Its servants and ministrants were many of them devout and pure-minded worshippers of God. Moreover, to many a layman the public worship of the Temple, and individual worship *in* the Temple, far from preventing the growth of spiritual religion, helped it. Instead of deflecting people from finding God, it aided them to find Him. Of this change and growth we find evidence in many psalms, which thereby, in all probability, show themselves to belong to the post-exilic period. There was, doubtless, a certain danger in this method of finding the Supreme; but, for the time being, it led to noble results.

Though men knew well enough that in no coarse, material sense did God 'dwell' within the Temple, yet it was believed that His divine presence could be felt there, that it even existed there, in some special and peculiar degree. We may admit that this belief had its limitations and its perils, but just so has some people's conception of a church or chapel as the house of God to-day. Nevertheless, the Temple to the ancient Jew, like a church to some modern Christians, did cause a pure communion with the Divine, and was thus far, and to that extent, an agent in the production of spiritual religion. When the Psalmist, who thirsted after the living God, was cut off from God's house, his thirst could not be assuaged. To another, 'a day in Thy courts was better than a thousand elsewhere.' The poet who declared that the divine loving-kindness was better than life had risen to this rapture when 'seeing' the divine glory in the sanctuary. He who sang that the Lord was his light and his salvation; whom should he fear? that the Lord was the strength of his life; of whom should he be afraid? asked only one thing of Him; that he might dwell in the Lord's house all the days of his life, to behold the beauty of the

Lord, and to meditate in His Temple. Nor were these psalmists above the use of sacrifices; song, praise, prayer, and sacrifice, all might fitly be employed in the adoration of God.

While recognising the dangers to which this passion for the Temple might give rise, may we not, nevertheless, detect in these psalms a certain progress beyond the prophets—an advance not merely in time, but in religious development? In the interests of inward and spiritual religion the prophets denounced the outward; in the interests of inward and spiritual religion the psalmists used the outward. Average man cannot get on without the outward; is it not better, then, that he should be taught *how* to use it? And another curious, mystical feature about the place of the outward in the religion of certain psalmists is that the outward and inward tend to coalesce; or, rather, the outward tends to become a symbol. The visible Temple becomes a metaphor for that greater, diviner house which is not made by human hands, and cannot be seen by human eyes. 'How precious is Thy loving-kindness, O God; the children of men take refuge under the shadow of Thy wings. They satiate themselves with the fatness of Thy house; Thou givest them to drink of the river of Thy pleasures.' The shadow, the wings, the river, are clearly all symbolical or metaphorical. Are not the fatness and the house nearly, or quite, symbolical too? If the table and the oil in the famous 23rd psalm are obviously metaphorical, is the Lord's house in the very next verse to be interpreted with absolute, material literality?

The Temple hardly became the vehicle for spiritual religion before the acceptance and the reign of the complete or priestly Law. And, whether we like it or no, the larger portion of the Psalter is, in a certain, not fantastical sense, the product of this Law. Accepted by many critics, the fact is variously interpreted. Some regard it as an indication that it took some time before the Law crushed out all spiritual religion, as it did in the 'Pharisaic' age. Others, like Duhm, regard it as a sort of reason why there must after all be much less spiritual religion in the Psalms than is commonly imagined; and they proceed to interpret the book

accordingly. A third view, which has not much chance of being widely recognised, is that neither in the Psalmic nor in the Pharisaic age did Legalism necessarily extinguish spiritual aspirations and experiences, but that through the Law, no less than through the Gospel, men could, and did, acquire a passion for God.

We mentioned very cursorily the views of the prophets concerning the material and spiritual future of Israel and of the world. It remains to be seen how, in this branch of religion, too, the psalmists appropriate, reproduce and adapt the ideas of their teachers and predecessors. In their faith, as in the prophets', Israel at the end will be great and victorious. To them, too, Israel's enemies are God's enemies, who will have, at the last, to submit themselves to Israel and to God. To them, too, an essential element of the final Kingdom—the realised Kingdom of God—is not merely its outward prosperity, but its inward peace. For the divine Ruler will make wars to cease unto the ends of the earth; the bow is broken; the spear is cut asunder; the chariot is burnt with fire. 'Loving-kindness and fidelity will meet; righteousness and peace will kiss each other.'

But the great feature, for the psalmists, of the goal of history is the universal praise of God, which will then rise from the throats of all. It is natural that the psalmists, whose essential work is praise, should strike this note loudly. And the praise is not limited to Israel. God is always, and in the future He shall be recognised to be, King of the whole earth; and from all the earth and all the nations of the earth shall resound His praise. 'All nations whom Thou hast made shall come and worship before Thee, O Lord; they shall glorify Thy name.' The result, nay even the purpose of God's mercy unto Israel, are that His way (that is, His truth) may be known upon earth, His salvation among all peoples. Then will the princes of the peoples be gathered together with the people of the God of Abraham. Then will the very heavens declare God's righteousness; then will all the peoples see and confess His glory. This, then, was the Psalmist's picture of the Last Redemption—'a world of faithful worshippers responding with gladness to the salvation of Israel's national God, the only God in all

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the earth.* Moreover, it was not an unwonted or unknown thing for men of alien race to link themselves unto the faith of Israel. Proselytism had already begun, well within the Psalmic period. Sons of the foreigner had arrived, who had joined themselves unto the Lord to love His name and be His servants; and these newcomers, gathered thus unto Israel and Israel's God, had made a late prophet, contemporary of many a psalmist, dream of a noble future in which the Lord's house should be called a house of prayer for all peoples. These proselytes were known as 'they who feared the Lord' (literally, 'the fearers of Yahweh'). They are alluded to in the Psalter as constituting a distinct class. Them, too, God will bless; they, too, are bidden to praise Him.

'O Israel, trust in the Lord;
 He is their help and their shield.
 O House of Aaron, trust in the Lord;
 He is their help and their shield.
Ye that fear the Lord, trust in the Lord;
 He is their help and their shield.
 The Lord has been mindful of us; He will bless,
 He will bless the house of Israel,
 He will bless the house of Aaron;
 He will bless *them that fear the Lord*,
 Both small and great!'

And, again:

'Let Israel now say,
 That His loving-kindness lasts for ever!
 Let the house of Aaron now say,
 That His loving-kindness lasts for ever!
 Let *them that fear the Lord* now say,
 That His loving-kindness lasts for ever!'

In truth the 'foreign settlers' whom the Pentateuchal Law, with such exquisite and peculiar emphasis, had bidden the Israelites cherish and love, were now turning into proselytes, so that the Hebrew term for them, the *Gerim*, was rendered by the Greek translators *προσήλυτοι*, and in Rabbinic Hebrew meant no less. When a late Psalmist declares that the Lord guards the *Gerim*, it is quite possible that the writer is thinking of them as

* McFadyen: 'The Messages of the Psalmists,' p. 283.

adherents to Israel's faith. It is thus, at any rate, that the Midrash understands the utterance.

'The Holy One loves the *Gerim* exceedingly. To what is the matter like? To a King who had a flock of sheep and goats which went forth every morning to the pasture, and returned in the evening to the stable. One day a stag joined the flock, and grazed with the sheep, and returned with them. Then the shepherd said to the King: There is a stag which goes out with the sheep, and grazes with them, and comes home with them. And the King loved the stag exceedingly. And he commanded the shepherd, saying: Give heed unto this stag, that no man beat it. And when the sheep returned in the evening, he would order that the stag should have food and drink. Then the shepherds said unto him: My Lord, thou hast many goats and sheep and kids; yet thou givest us no directions about them; but about this stag thou givest us orders day by day. Then the King replied: It is the custom of the sheep to graze in the pasture, but the stags dwell in the steppe, and it is not their custom to come among men in the cultivated land. So to this stag who has come to us, and lives with us, should we not be grateful, that he has left the great steppe, where many stags and gazelles feed, and has come to live among us? It behoves us to be grateful. So, too, spake the Holy One: I owe great thanks to the *Ger*, in that he has left his family and his father's house, and has come to dwell amongst us. Therefore I order in the Law: Love ye the *Ger*.'

Great as was the love of the psalmists for Jerusalem, it was something loftier than a mere national love. It was more to them than the mere capital of their nation. The city was loved because it included the hill of Zion, because it contained the Temple, because it was the house and innermost centre of Israel's religion. It was the place (in Prof. Jordan's words) 'of God's special presence in the world and the centre of the world's spiritual life.'

'Great is Yahweh, and highly to be praised,
In the city of our God, in His holy mountain,
Beautiful in elevation, the joy of the whole earth,
Is Mount Zion, on the sides of the north,
The city of the Great King.'

* 'Religion in Song,' p. 81.

We have to admit that the psalmists, like all their contemporaries, 'never freed their religion completely from national influences and local limitations.' Yet 'even at this distance of time our hearts are moved by the enthusiastic reverence of the patriot for the ancient city of God.'* And one psalmist at least there was for whom Zion was especially holy and blessed, because she should be, in a still wider sense, a spiritual metropolis, because the widespread votaries of the One and only God would regard Jerusalem as their true religious home.

'Glorious things are spoken of thee,
 Zion, the city of God.
 Rahab and Babel I mention among those that know me,
 Philistia, likewise, and Tyre, with Cush;
 But Zion—she shall be called Mother,
 For each and all were born in her.' †

Not physically born there, not resident there, not even of Israel's race, they yet recognise Zion as their spiritual mother, whom they invoke and whom they honour. So with us, too, if we are touched with the breath of modernism, whether we call ourselves Christians or Jews, when we remember Jerusalem, it is, in Prof. Jordan's excellently chosen words,

'for sorrows endured and services rendered, not as a monopoly or central shrine. It is because the songs of Zion have gone out into the world, and through the centuries gain ever larger meaning, that we turn our eyes, not to the East or the West, but upward to that city of God which is the new Jerusalem and the mother of us all.' ‡

* 'Religion in Song,' pp. 80, 81.

† Prof. Gordon's translation in 'The Poets of the Old Testament,' p. 195.

‡ 'Religion in Song,' p. 121.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

Art. 2.—AN ENGLISH PRISON FROM WITHIN.

THE aim of this article is to give the reader a record of the writer's impressions of our prison system, and, in particular, of its moral and mental effect upon convicted prisoners. It is based upon some twelve months' experience of prison life, of which four months were spent in a large London prison, and nearly eight months in a smaller county gaol.* My offence happened to be that of 'disobedience' to military orders on the ground of conscientious objection to all war; but I do not wish to lay any stress on the nature of the offence, or on the justice of the two successive sentences imposed, except in so far as these considerations gave us a different outlook from the ordinary 'criminals' occupying the adjoining cells. We objectors to conscription were not conscious of any guilt involved in the act for which we were committed to gaol; on the contrary, we were, more or less powerfully, sustained in our endurance by a faith in the righteousness, and, in many cases, in the supremely Christian character of the cause for which we conceived ourselves to be suffering loss of liberty and a measure of persecution. Rightly or wrongly, this was our conviction, and it reacted, of course, upon our impressions of prison, and differentiated them in some important respects from those of a hardened or a penitent 'offender.' But the main tendencies of the system, its general effects on character and mentality, seemed to me to be sufficiently clear, and to be of a similar nature for all prisoners involved. Almost all conscientious objectors court-martialled have received sentences of 'hard labour' (which may be repeated indefinitely) varying from 112 days to two years; and, until the last week of my imprisonment,† we were treated, with a few unimportant exceptions, in the same way as other prisoners undergoing

* In addition, I had two periods of some five weeks each in a regimental detention room. The conditions here were far preferable to prison. The only way in which they concern the subject of this article is that we had opportunities of talking freely to men who had 'done time' for burglary and other offences. Their conversation and bearing helped us to look at prisons from the point of view of the class of offender for whom they are primarily intended.

† I was discharged in December 1917, as the result of the Government's undertaking to release men suffering materially in health.

hard labour in the third division. At the end of 1917, a few privileges were accorded to objectors who had been at least twelve months under sentence; of these the only ones of value are the permission to have books sent in from the outside, and the provision daily of two periods of exercise, at which talking in pairs is allowed.

Each generation of mankind is only too apt to imagine that the particular social conditions under which it happens to live have persisted with but small changes from remote antiquity; and it is well to emphasise the essentially modern and novel character of the prison system, as it exists to-day, with but slight variations, throughout the British Isles. This system seems to have been inaugurated during the second half of the 18th century in one or two local experiments that came to nothing, and to have been given a partial trial at the famous Millbank Penitentiary opened in 1816, but only to have been really developed in the forties of the last century, when the principle of entire separation was adopted by the Government as the result of a Commission of enquiry into the methods of American penitentiaries. During the period 1840-60 some sixty new 'cellular' prisons were built, beginning with the 'model' institution at Pentonville as we have it to-day. Only from 1877, when the Prison Act placed all gaols under the newly-formed board of Prison Commissioners, has the present uniformity of discipline held sway. Before the opening of Millbank, with its 1000, and Pentonville, with its 520 separate cells, indiscriminate herding together of offenders was the general rule. Practically, therefore, the present *régime* of silence and solitude is less than eighty years old. Have its results in any way justified even this term of existence?

It may be premised that the usual hard-labour sentence begins with a month of strict confinement to one's cell (apart from exercise and chapel), accompanied by a fortnight's plank bed and other disabilities, while, after the first month, good conduct secures one the privilege of 'associated' but silent labour during part of the day.

The characteristics of the system, as impressed upon me by many dreary weeks of experience, seemed to group themselves around three main heads, which I propose to illustrate successively: firstly, discomfort for the body

and starvation for the soul; secondly, the attempt to crush out the sense of individuality and the instinct to serve others; and, lastly, entire absence of trust, and government by fear. These characteristics are dominant enough to give the impression that they represent the guiding objects of the system, and they seem to stamp it as essentially deterrent and punitive, without the reformative elements that one would hope to find there.

As might be expected, the most obvious feature of prison is the disappearance of every kind of luxury and comfort, and the restriction of 'supplies' to those required to satisfy the most elementary needs of food, clothing, housing, and cleanliness. To the general principle of this the idealist can take little exception; and, though unpleasant and, in some respects, damaging to health, it need have no terrors to a man who is robust in body and determined in will. But, unfortunately, months of forced abstemiousness seem unable to kill a man's desire for self-indulgence. We found that the solitude and monotony, combined with other circumstances, led us to devour our food with a greed of which we should have been heartily ashamed elsewhere; and a typical inscription on doors or walls was: 'Roll on, another week, and then I'll have a good smoke outside.' The insistence upon the daily cleaning of cell and utensils tends, doubtless, towards good habits; but, to one accustomed to a daily bath, the hurried weekly prison bath, and the wearing of the same underclothing day and night for a fortnight, seemed a mockery reminiscent of 'whitewashed sepulchres' when associated with the requirement of a constant and scrupulous daily polish of the 'tins' which form the cell's chief furniture.

While, however, bodily needs are cared for up to a certain point, social and spiritual needs, so essential for the purposes of reformation, are almost completely neglected. To those of us who were registered as Quakers, our fortnightly half-hour of united worship, and our fortnightly ten minutes with our visiting minister, were brief glimpses of Heaven; and other prisoners who were Catholics or Nonconformists may have had advantages of a similar kind, though far too fragmentary to be of much avail. But the usual prisoner, nominally 'Church of England,' is supposed to subsist

entirely, as far as his soul is concerned, on three or four 'chapels' a week, for the most part formal and unspiritual in character, together with occasional visits from the chaplain, who, it is to be feared, usually finds that the professional nature of his appearances erects insurmountable barriers between him and the occupant of the cell. I say this while rendering an admiring tribute to the efforts which I know some chaplains make to touch the souls of their imprisoned flock. But, in the main, the system neutralises their efforts; and, in all probability, few of them understand the psychology of the prisoner's mind.

The result of this neglect of the soul—and I have more to say which will emphasise this—is well described in a letter written from prison in December last by a friend of mine.

'Men,' he writes, 'are animalised here. The Governor is responsible to the state for keeping the bodies of the men it sends him for the period stated. I have seen the book marked "Body Receipt Book." It took me some time to find a fitting comparison for this well-run machine, clean and regular, but it is that we are treated as bodies without souls. The reforming zeal of John Howard surely did not intend the solitary system to become (I cannot describe it better otherwise) a human dog-kennel.'

This treatment of a man as a dog, or, by an equally apt comparison, as a component part of a machine that needs little or no attention beyond watching and oiling at fixed intervals, leads on naturally to my second point. Nearly every feature of prison life seems deliberately arranged to destroy a man's sense of his own personality, his power of choice and initiative, his possessive instincts, his conception of himself as a being designed to love and to serve his fellow-man. His very name is blotted out, and he becomes a number; A.3.21 and D.2.65 were two of my designations. He and his fellows are elaborately counted, whenever moved about from one location to another, in the characteristic machine-like way:—'15 men, correct,' '38 men, correct;,' so the warder has to report many times in the day. He is continually, of course, under lock and key, ignored

except as an object for spying. When not locked up, he can hardly move a muscle except under orders. There is usually a fixed and unvarying monotony about the daily and weekly round. In default of other interests, one's soul dwells longingly on the few incidents like the weekly bath, the weekly change of socks and towel, the daily dinner and march round the exercising that break the dullness of life. The scanty contents of one's cell must be arranged, subject to the daily inspection, in exact uniformity with the arrangement of every other cell. This does not, it is true, apply to the evening and night-time; and it is a real satisfaction to be able to choose on which portion of one's cement floor the bed board is to be laid down. There is an almost complete denudation of personal property, and of that sense of self-expression and choice in things which is its chief spiritual value. The only articles that I could call absolutely my own were my spectacles, my wife's letters, four small photographs, and two books—the Weymouth New Testament and Fellowship Hymn-book—which are allowed to Quakers. Otherwise everything is on loan, usually for short periods, until mending or washing is required or until one is shifted to another, but barely distinguishable cell.

Still more detrimental than this more than monastic suppression of self is the deliberate removal of all a man's opportunities to serve his fellow, to do him a good turn, to interchange thoughts and greetings with him. On a large printed card, which forms one of the chief features of the cell-landscape, there is written:—‘Rule 1. Prisoners must observe silence. Rule 2. They must not communicate, or attempt to do so, with one another.’ Two other keystones of the system, which appear lower down, read to the effect that no prisoner must ‘leave his cell or other appointed location without permission;’ and that no prisoner may, ‘without express authority, hand to, or receive from, another prisoner any article whatever.’ Even apart from the specific mental injuries caused by the enforced silence, it is clear how completely these rules destroy the healthy, normal activities of human intercourse. Designed to prevent collusion and conspiracy among the prisoners, and to make it difficult for them to corrupt one another, they succeed in making

courtesy, friendliness, and acts of goodwill either an impossibility or a crime.

One instance, within my own experience, will give an idea of the monstrous folly of such regulations. Since April, 1917, the prison rations have been severely curtailed; and there is good evidence to show that many men are suffering seriously from underfeeding. Nearly all of us constantly knew what hunger means; and an extra crust of dry bread would be to most a great prize. A friend of mine was seen by one of the warders handing to another prisoner, who, as he doubtless supposed, needed it more than himself, a piece of bread. He was reported to the Governor for breaking the last rule quoted above. (To do warders justice, I believe most of them would wink at such an offence.) And for this crime my friend had all his 'privileges' suspended; his term of imprisonment was prolonged by a day or two; and he was awarded three days of solitary confinement in his cell on a diet of bread and water, the cell being absolutely stripped of every movable thing except his stool and his bible. The receiver of the bread suffered a similar punishment. What are we to think of a system which treats as crimes, requited by savage penalties, acts that, outside a prison, are among the most lovable and beautiful that human life can show?

It is needless to say that this prohibition of intercourse, this driving of a man back exclusively upon himself, his own defects, his own grievances, his own needs, promotes the habit of selfishness to a most grievous extent. I found myself that almost the only outlet for the altruistic instincts was praying for others; a fine art in which, it is to be feared, the majority of ordinary prisoners have not been taught any proficiency. And prayer without scope for action is woefully insufficient.

At the same time, the cruel contempt with which one appeared to be treated roused bitter and aggrieved feelings which it needed a great effort to suppress. Apart from actual brutality, harsh words sunk in deep. I remember one Sunday so foggy that my small window did not admit enough light for either sewing or reading. As it happened, we had no morning chapel, and there was nothing to do except pace mournfully round one's

shilly cell. On remonstrating in the evening with a friendly warder for not having given us some artificial light, he answered smilingly, 'You aren't worth it; it's not a work day.' And this rebuff chanced to come immediately after evening chapel, at which I allowed myself to get hopelessly self-conscious and irritable, because, while I was singing the *Te Deum* and looking round about me to get a sense of fellowship with the other faces, the warder's harsh voice broke in with 'Number Two Sixty-five, look to your front.' It is a hard struggle for men to keep back bitter thoughts, when almost the only breaks to the deadly monotony are such remarks as these.

There are, it is true, one or two redeeming features, which must be mentioned, so as not to exaggerate this aspect of my subject. Out of every thirty or forty men, one fortunate man, selected as 'cleaner,' has freedom to move about his landing and do small things for the various occupants of the cells, e.g. empty their slops and fill their water-tins, and assist the warder in the distribution of rations. There was one such man whom I was tempted to consider something of a materialist. His philosophy of life was 'to be honest with oneself.' But then he told me that by being 'honest with himself' he meant, e.g., not putting aside one of the larger pieces of bread for his own consumption, when handing them out at meal time, although hunger sorely tempted him to do so at the expense of some other prisoner. And there are a few, but very few, other privileged occupations in prison which afford opportunities for active goodwill.

Again, what I said above as to the absence of the power of choice and the sense of possession must be qualified in two or three ways. First there is a certain amount of choice allowed as regards the library and 'educational' books, which may be changed weekly. Then, some outlet for one's feelings is supplied by the possession of a slate on which inscriptions may be made and erased at one's pleasure; and—of much greater value—there are the monthly visits from the outside world, and the monthly letters in and out, which are allowed, under restrictions, after the first three months. The brightest ornaments of one's cell are one's little pile of books, the photographs of family and friends, of which

four may be sent in, and the letters from home, for which, by a flash of rare illumination, the Prison Commissioners provide a little wooden rack. But these few exceptions do not touch the tendency of the whole system, though they represent small but praiseworthy efforts to redeem it. The vast majority of men work away mechanically at their mat-making or mail-bag sewing, and have no opportunities such as those of the 'cleaner' or library-assistant. And I am afraid that a considerable proportion of ordinary prisoners have not learnt to aspire to any books beyond a sensational novel or magazine, and have no homes capable of acting as sources of inspiration to the monthly letter or visit.

It will be readily inferred from what I have already said that prisons are characterised by an almost complete absence of trust in the honour or obedience of the prisoner; and that the warders and Governor rule not by love but by the fear which punishment and the threat to punish inspires. The regulations that hang on the wall of each cell give a portentous list of some twenty or thirty different forms of activity, for which punishment is prescribed; and the attempt to indulge in any one of these is punishable equally with the activity itself. As we were moved about to and from chapel or workshop or exercise-ring, warders were stationed at different vantage points, with the object of cutting off every effort to communicate with the next man. 'Keep that tongue quiet or you'll soon be having a change of diet,' was a frequent exhortation. Every step and action is watched and spied upon. The gardening gang, for instance, has to move about as if they were roped together. Whenever one man has the smallest job in another part of the garden, e.g. emptying out some weeds or fetching some vegetables for replanting, the whole party has to down tools and accompany him; otherwise the warder in charge would be temporarily out of sight or hearing of one portion or other of his gang. The whole effect is ridiculous in the extreme, and not calculated to produce good work.

Compared with this constant and wearying bondage outside one's cell, the stern walls, barred windows and locked door of that small chamber furnish a certain sense of freedom. But even here there is no true privacy.

About once a month there is a surprise search of everything in one's cell and of one's clothing, to detect forbidden articles. One's person is searched too on the return from the laundry or the garden, lest a piece of soap or a raw vegetable should be hidden there—and, in fact, so hungry were we, that I have seen many a root grabbed from the soil surreptitiously at exercise or while gardening. Every cell door is provided with a glass spy-hole, through which the inmate can be inspected at any hour of the day or night. The warder walks about outside in soft slippers like a cat, and noiselessly slips aside the spy-hole's cover. In this way, even when one's daily task is fully completed, one may be threatened with punishment by a harsh voice for lying down before bedtime or for standing upon one's stool to gaze longingly out of the scanty and heavily-barred window—an action which exposes one to the suspicion of attempting to communicate with the man in one of the adjoining cells.

The want of confidence in the prisoners is accompanied by a corresponding want of confidence in the warders. These officers are also spied upon by the Chief Warder and Governor; and such is the fear of collusion or bribery, that a warder is forbidden to engage in 'familiar' conversation with a prisoner, and is not supposed to say anything to him that does not bear upon his work or the prison rules. This rule is largely disregarded, but, as warders themselves have complained to me, it makes it practically impossible for them to exercise a lasting reformatory or uplifting influence on a prisoner. Yet, if any one could help to reform him, it would be, not the Chaplain or Governor, but the warder, who has to supply all his needs, direct his work, and control his movements. The harshness and solitude of prison make one peculiarly sensitive to any token of kindness or compassion that breaks through the machine-like routine; and I have often poured blessings inwardly upon a warder for some kindly look or word. I have heard the better warders denounce the present system as 'tyranny' from their point of view also, and express regret, on grounds of humanity, that they ever entered the prison service. Considering the nature of the tasks imposed upon them, it is less surprising that some of them should become harsh task-masters than

that others should preserve, in spite of it all, so much of the milk of human kindness. The only criticism one can make of most warders—and that only tentatively—is that they remain in a profession in which daily actions of direct or indirect harshness to their fellow-beings are inseparable from the routine of duty.

I will add one little incident to show that the trouble usually lies much less with the character of the warders than with the system which they have to enforce. At one of the monthly visits allowed after the first three months of a sentence, I was given the exceptional privilege of seeing my wife, with only a long table between us, instead of through the usual double set of bars or wire gauze. One of the strictest warders was 'taking' the interview, and at the end my wife asked to be allowed a parting kiss. The warder bluntly refused, and the interview ended. Whereat I, knowing that other warders (in defiance, of course, of the rules) would have allowed it, forgot my principles and murmured a vicious 'You brute!' beneath my breath. But I had not long been back again in my cell and was trying to change my curse into a blessing, when I heard a key in the lock, and the tyrant of our visit came in, and, in a way that indicated how deeply moved he was, begged me to believe that he felt as unhappy over the incident as we must be feeling, and that there was nothing more hateful than having the duty of 'standing between man and wife.' My faith in humanity was renewed.

Such being the leading characteristics of the system, I will now attempt to illustrate further from my own personal experience what I regard as the most deplorable and immoral of all the rules. This is the attempt to enforce complete silence and separation upon prisoners. In the first place, this regulation, together with the absence of trust that is so conspicuous, brings to bear upon almost every prisoner an overpowering temptation to swerve more and more from the path of truthfulness and openness of conduct, and to fall into varying degrees of dishonesty, deception, and artfulness.

In point of fact hardly any prisoners keep the absolute rule of silence during a single day of their term. Some warders, sensitive to the inhuman nature of the

restriction, wink more or less openly at talking between prisoners, at least whenever there is no danger of a sudden invasion from the Chief Warder or Governor; but they do this at considerable risk, for they are fined, and may even be discharged, for allowing conversation. On the other hand, it is practically impossible for the strictest and most dutiful warder to detect all breaches of the rule. There are brief occasions on the exercising or elsewhere when the prisoner is actually too far away from him to be overheard; more often it is due to the simple fact that the warder's eyes cannot be turned in the direction of every prisoner at once. Talking without detection in a special kind of whisper, that will not carry more than a yard or two, becomes a fine art; as does also the swift handing of a note or other harmless article to one's neighbour, while the warder's attention is directed elsewhere. It is easy to imagine to what a pitch of skill the professional thief or burglar develops this artfulness. I used to watch them as we sat together in the workroom where, at regulated intervals, some thirty of us were sewing our bags in apparent silence.

Under the pressure of the cruel and unnatural restrictions nearly all of us conscientious objectors were also driven to similar forms of underhand communication. From the first, I personally took every opportunity of exchanging cheerful greetings and scraps of news with my companions in misfortune. Apart from the much-needed outlet for self-expression, it seemed a religious duty to pass on words of cheer and interest. At one time a single brief remark could be thrown out, at another a considerable conversation, protracted probably by interruptions, might even be carried on. In this way one's various companions gradually became distinct personalities, and one could love them and pray for them in a far more real way. And one's efforts, some successful and some unsuccessful, to communicate with different men added a spice of adventure to the monotony of the day. But gradually, as the months passed by, I felt increasingly the disloyalty to the spirit of absolute Truth entailed by the calculation and concealment without which the prohibited conversation would have been impossible. The sin against Truth was of a very subtle and excusable kind, but it was real; and one slight shade

of untruthfulness led on to another of a darker hue. Words thrown out quickly and boldly, when one was momentarily out of range of the warder's eyes and ears, might be blameless enough. But it is different when one habitually turns round to examine that officer's location and attentiveness, before venturing a whispered remark; or when one actually contracts the habit of closely watching his eyes, and regulates one's speech or silence in accordance with their direction at the moment, adopting involuntarily expressions of innocence when those suspicious eyes are turned upon oneself. And even when an unusually friendly warder openly winked at our whispered conversation, *we* were really involved in the deception, which he, by secretly allowing us to break the rules, was practising on the authorities responsible for the discipline.

Some may think it ridiculous to be conscientious about such minute and excusable breaches of the code of truth, but there seems to me no doubt that their cumulative effect was to create an atmosphere of falsehood, suspicion, and dishonesty which affected adversely every one in the prison; and that, to those who had previously acquired no rooted love of truth, prison was a school of artfulness and deceit as effective as human ingenuity could devise. In any case certain incidents, into which I need not enter here, caused me, when I had spent about eight months in prison, to decide that, cost what it might, I must once and for all break the meshes of calculating concealment in which I, along with the others, was entangled, and make an open protest to the Governor against the inhuman rule which lay at the root of the whole trouble. The result was that, in order to prevent my carrying out my intention of talking openly to my fellow prisoners, I was removed to a cell at a distance from the others, had a separate track to myself for the daily exercise, and spent the rest of my time, with the exception of four (or at most five) weekly periods of 'chapel,' in solitary confinement in my cell, where, of course, talking to other men was impossible. On an average nearly 23 hours of every 24 were spent inside my locked door for about four months preceding my release.

I was now almost completely removed from temptation to untruthfulness, but, on the other hand, I felt

the full pressure of the undiluted 'solitary' or 'separate system,' as distinguished from the 'system of silent association'—for so they were called when first introduced. I rejected the very few opportunities that brought me within speaking range of fellow-prisoners, and was entirely dependent for conversation on the warders and the three chaplains, two Church and one 'Quaker.' The occasional visits of the chaplains amounted in the aggregate to fifteen or twenty minutes in the week; and the warders, though, for various purposes, they mechanically unlocked my cell door nine or ten times in the 24 hours, were as a rule either unwilling or too busy to listen to one's remarks or to say anything beyond the different formulas of the day, 'All right?' 'Exercise,' 'Empty slops,' 'More bags or thread wanted?' etc. At first, indeed, I used to treasure up remarks on some rare point of interest which I might fire off, so to speak, as a means of relief, when the warder next faced me; but the opportunity even for this seldom occurred, and failures so depressed me that, as the weeks passed by and mental stagnation increased, I almost ceased to make the effort to address my keeper. I had a Greek Testament and other good books from the prison library, but my tasks of sewing, cell-cleaning, etc., left me little time to read; and, in any case, the isolation weakened the power of mental attention, so that I seemed to have no capacity for reading beyond about an hour daily.

Thus cut off from new impressions, and having no outlet for the expression of the obvious and the casual, my mind tended to become choked with trivialities and the somewhat sordid details of one's cell life. Besides, I was in a poor state of health, and my ailments were increased by the overpowering temptation to dwell upon them. A foolish rhyme or jingle would form itself in my brain, and go on repeating itself endlessly in the most wearisome fashion. And it may be imagined that there was a weakening of one's power of resistance to more positive temptations of evil, to complaint and bitterness, to ill-will and despair. More, however, than the restless dwelling on trivialities and the battling with temptations, I dreaded the occasional appearance of a spell of dazed vacancy of mind, of indifference to everything; for this seemed to be the prelude to the decay

of mind and will, which, as I had been told by a prison chaplain, is a not uncommon result of long imprisonments. And in my case I felt that a complete physical breakdown also could only be avoided by a maintenance of my will-power unbroken; for, in the confinement of my small and often very cold cell, the measure of health that I had was dependent upon a daily *régime* of physical exercises and other devices undertaken often very much against the grain and with the sacrifice of much of my leisure time.

That no permanent mental damage made its appearance during this last and hardest phase of my imprisonment, I attribute entirely to the spiritual equipment with which I was providentially, thanks to my past life, endowed. My principal means of salvation during this period were these: my faith in a personal God revealed in a human Christ; the practice of prayer, especially prayer for others; the habit of talking aloud to God and to my wife; the sense of the love of friends outside; the sense of the justice and holiness of the cause for which I was suffering; and the sight of the courage of my companions in that cause. I am mentioning these facts in order to emphasise the point that I had means of resistance to the deadliness of prison conditions, which very few, if any, of the ordinary offenders for whom prisons are intended could be expected to possess. I entered prison with all the advantages of a robust philosophy of life, buoyed up by the belief that I was fighting in a good cause, and without any sense of guilt other than that which is inseparable from the Christian outlook upon the world. Yet, with all these advantages, I seem only to have just managed to preserve my mental balance up to the time of my release. I ask myself how I could possibly have survived, if I had possessed little or no faith in a spiritual world, if I had been the victim of unregulated and violent passions, if I had done things for which my conscience smote me and over which my solitude forced me to brood unceasingly, if I had felt myself friendless, unloved, and, unloving, cast out by the society to whose sins against me I imputed my own misery.

It is not difficult to conceive the tortures of soul to

which the complete isolation of prison must drive an individual to whom this description might apply. And in a greater or less degree it probably applies to a large proportion of the occupants of our prisons. Some men, I suppose, are so hardened that the sensitiveness to mental torture is almost absent. But, if so, prison life does nothing to bring about the revolution which would be their only salvation, and only confirms them in their desperate condition. For other men, where penitence or the capacity for it is present, the possibility of amendment is almost removed. Man is essentially a social being; and to take away altogether the healing power of human intercourse, the opportunities for self-expression, and the possibility of doing a good turn to others, is a crime against nature, a deliberate assault upon the citadel of mental and moral life. The human brain is not proof against more than a very limited amount of mental suffering; and both common sense and the actual results of the discipline indicate that, where prison does not simply confirm a man in his hardened state of vice, it ends by breaking down his mind and will-power, so as at least to render him a useless member of society and, in the worst cases, to drive him to insanity.

To sum up, the wickedness of the *régime* of enforced silence lies herein: if observed, it inevitably tends to produce mental as well as moral decay; if surreptitiously disregarded, it promotes a special form of demoralisation, an undermining of the standard of truthfulness and sincerity. The present method is a mixture of the two systems which competed with one another for favour in the minds of the 19th-century reformers, viz. the 'solitary' or 'separate system,' and the 'silent associated system.' My own experience of some months of associated labour and opportunities for stealthy intercourse, followed by four months of solitary confinement, enabled me to isolate the effects of each method. In the experience of most prisoners, the two systems, with their characteristic features, are intermingled in varying proportions, but without, I think, much loss of the evil effects of each. The labours of John Howard and Elizabeth Fry revealed a festering mass of evil, of which the most prominent feature was the indiscriminate intercourse of every type of prisoner, herded together in what

might be called schools of vice. In their justifiable horror at this state of things, the men who carried on the work of these pioneers* swung to the opposite extreme and attempted to prevent every kind of intercourse, instead of carefully grouping the prisoners, discouraging vicious talk, and, through the companionship of good persons, permeating the various divisions of the prison with uplifting and educational influences.

The following criticisms of the two systems in vogue were written at a time when they had only recently succeeded in establishing themselves in our English prisons. The first quotation refers to the 'silent associated system.'

'The mind of the prisoner is kept perpetually on the fret by the prohibition of speech, and is drawn . . . to the invention of devices for defeating his overseers, or for carrying on a clandestine communication with his fellow-prisoners, deriving no benefit meanwhile from the offices of religion, but rather converting such offices into an opportunity for eluding the vigilance of the warders, and being still further depraved by frequent punishment for offences of a purely arbitrary character; for, surely, to place a number of social beings in association, and then not only interdict all intercourse between them, but punish such as yield to that most powerful of human impulses—the desire of communing with those with whom we are thrown into connexion—is an act of refined tyranny, that is at once unjust and impossible of being thoroughly carried out.'

The mid-Victorian objection to the 'solitary system' is formulated thus:

'The separate or cellular system breaks down the mental and bodily health of the prisoners; it forces the mind to be continually brooding over its own guilt, constantly urging the prisoner to contemplate the degradation of his position, and seeking to impress upon him that his crimes have caused him to be excluded from all society. With the better class of criminals . . . it produces not only such a continued sorrow at being cut off from . . . every one but prison officers but such an insatiate yearning to get back to all that is held dear, that the punishment becomes more than natures which are not

* Neither Howard nor Mrs Fry approved of the attempts to enforce continual silence or separation upon prisoners.

utterly callous are able to withstand ; so that, instead of reforming, it utterly overwhelms and destroys. With more vacant intellects and hardened hearts, it serves to make the prisoners even more unfeeling and unthinking ; for sympathy alone develops sympathy, and thought in others is required to bring forth thought in us. . . . This mode of penal discipline cages a man up as if he were some dangerous beast, allowing his den to be entered only by his keeper ; and it ends in his becoming as irrational and furious as a beast. . . . The system violates the great social law instituted by the Almighty, and, so working contrary to nature, it is idle to expect any good of it.*

These criticisms are as sound and true to-day as they doubtless were in regard to the prison discipline of the sixties. The tragedy lies in the fact that they awakened but slight response in the minds of the generation to whom they were addressed ; and that, for over fifty years since then, the same intolerable features have persisted, and have doubtless resulted in maiming and wrecking thousands of human lives, whose wounds and sores might have been healed by humane treatment. In the up-building of a new world out of the ruins of to-day, which is the hope and desire of every patriot, the reform of our prisons will be not the least important part. If the evidence of some of those, who are passing through prisons now, may serve to establish true principles by which these institutions may become schools of reformation instead of places of demoralisation and torture, their imprisonment, whatever its other results, will not have been in vain.

* This and the preceding passage are quoted from the section on Prison Discipline in Mayhew's 'Criminal Prisons of London,' a most interesting and elaborate work published in 1862, when the existing prisons at Pentonville, Wandsworth, and Holloway were already built.

STEPHEN HOBHOUSE.

Art. 3.—THE LAST OF THE LATIN HISTORIANS.

1. *Ammiani Marcellini Rerum Gestarum libros qui supersunt recensuit rhythmicęque distinxit Carolus U. Clark.* Vol. I, libri xiv–xxv. Berlin: Weidmann, 1910.
2. *Die verlorenen Bücher des Ammianus Marcellinus.* By Hugo Michael. Breslau: Maruschke, 1880.
3. *Ammien Marcellin, sa vie et son œuvre.* By Jean Gimazane. Toulouse: Chauvin, 1889.
4. *Die geschichtliche Litteratur über die Römische Kaiserzeit.* By H. Peter. Leipzig: Teubner, 1897.
5. *The Text Traditions of Ammianus Marcellinus.* By C. U. Clark. New Haven, 1904.
6. *Ammien Marcellin.* By L. Dautremer. Lille, 1899.
7. *Studien zu Ammianus Marcellinus.* By W. Klein. Leipzig: Weicher, 1914.

A STERN and melancholy interest, hardly to be matched in any other epoch, attaches to the records of the Roman Empire in the fourth century of our era. The old world was passing away in storm and agony, its frontiers assailed, its creeds challenged and perplexed, its social tissue suffering a slow and steady process of degeneration, which the political science of that time might note but was impotent to analyse or to cure. It was an age of bitter factions, when the demise of an emperor gave the signal for turmoil, intrigue or civil war; when, even within the Christian circle, sect contended with sect in savage and unrelenting animosity, and great political interests were often sacrificed to the vile machinations of the palace. And meanwhile the Empire was assaulted on all sides, by the Persians in Mesopotamia, by the Goths in Thrace, by the Germans on the Gaulish frontier—a contest waged with varying fortunes and exhibiting abundant proof that the legions of Rome had lost neither the discipline nor the coolness of their ancient renown, but nevertheless revealing to the understanding eye the ominous spectacle of a weakening defence against an ever-growing momentum of attack.

This, too, is the century which witnessed the codification of the orthodox creed of the Western Church and the expiring effort of paganism to maintain itself as the official religion of the Western world. In the brief

reign of Julian, which occupies a disproportionate space in Gibbon's majestic work and is therefore to Englishmen the most familiar episode of later Roman history, the contest between the Christian religion and a sublimated form of the older beliefs is shown against the sombre background of the German and the Persian wars. The pagan Emperor, fighting against overwhelming spiritual and material forces, dies after a reign of less than two years; and the wheel of fortune swings suddenly round. The worship of the Sun-god is discarded; the Nicene Creed expels the brief and enlightened catechism of the pagan Sallustius; and by the end of the century the official triumph of Christianity is secure.

For twenty-five years of this tormented age we may follow the guidance of a writer, who, though standing outside the Christian fold, was so temperate in spirit and so honourably distinguished for judgment and impartiality that critics have been divided as to the exact shade of his religious opinions. The History of Ammianus Marcellinus begins for us (for the earlier books have been lost) in 353 and ends with the defeat and death of Valens at Adrianople in 378, recounting in whole or in part the reigns of seven Emperors, Constantius, Julian, Jovian, Valens, Valentinian I, Gratian and the child Valentinian II. But the original work, which was designed as a continuation of the histories of Tacitus, went back to the death of Nerva (96 A.D.), so that the accident of literary survival has preserved to us, perhaps fortunately for his reputation, only so much of the history as concerns the period of the author's active participation in the public affairs of the Empire. We have no external evidence as to the character of the lost books of Ammianus. Probably Gibbon is right in assuming that the first thirteen books were but 'a superficial epitome of two hundred and fifty-seven years.' It has, however, been argued, from references to the earlier books contained in the surviving fragments and seeming to imply a full treatment of certain topics, that the history was written upon a uniform scale, and that it contained some eighty books, thirty-one of which were devoted to the period with respect to which Ammianus was able to employ ocular and oral testimony. This, however, is an hypothesis entirely unsupported by literary tradition; and, since Ammianus exhibits scant

regard to proportion in those parts of his work which we are enabled to test, we need not be at pains to defend the symmetry of his general design.

The last of the Latin historians was a soldier of Greek speech and lineage who was born about A.D. 332 in the half-Greek, half-Syrian city of Antioch. That Ammianus spoke Greek as his native tongue would be a natural inference from his birthplace, even if Greek modes of speech and thought were not plentifully illustrated in his writings. And it may give matter for surprise that, having been suckled in the speech of Herodotus and Thucydides, Ammianus should have staked his literary reputation upon a work written in a foreign language, over which he never succeeded in obtaining an easy and graceful mastery. Language is a delicate and intricate thing, so delicate and so intricate that only a man with a rare genius for style can hope to win complete purity of expression in a foreign tongue; and, though the gifts of Ammianus were numerous and solid, a sense of style in writing was not among them. He wrote Latin, then, not out of an artistic impulse to practise himself in a new and difficult mode, but because Latin was the official language of the Empire, because it was spoken in the armies and the public offices, because it was the instrument of a public career, and because, through the use of a long line of poets, historians, philosophers and legists, Latin might be regarded as the authentic voice of Roman patriotism itself.

Indeed it is curious to reflect upon the singular power and magnetism which the name and tradition of Rome were still able to exert over the mind of a provincial and critical Greek, some of whose most famous pages are devoted to a delineation of the vices of the Roman capital, to the defeat of Roman armies in Persia and in Thrace, and to the acceptance of an ignominious peace at the hands of victorious Orientals. Ammianus paints the decadence of Rome with every hue of elaborate contempt; he shows us Roman society eaten out to the core by the vermin of sloth, luxury and vice. He notes the shameful rule of the eunuch and the parasite, the breakdown of criminal justice, the perennial curse of calumny and terrorism, with its melancholy tale of

innocent victims, which has been the inseparable accompaniment of an uneasy and revolutionary age. All this he describes with rude and insistent emphasis, and yet it never occurs to him to question the claims of the sacred city to the eternal veneration of mankind, or to challenge its supreme place in the Divine ordering of the Universe. That the architectural splendours of the Imperial capital—its amphitheatres, temples, baths and palaces—contributed in some measure to counterbalance the impression left upon his mind by the degraded habits of its population is probable enough; for, though Antioch was sumptuous and famed for luxury, Rome was in respect of material magnificence far superior to any city in the Empire. But, in his many allusions to Rome, Ammianus was not chiefly inspired by the emotions of the architectural connoisseur or the retired veteran from the provinces, dazzled by the glittering marbles and huge structures of the capital. If we read his mind aright, he thought of Rome chiefly as the mother-city of a great and enduring Empire, rich in sublime associations, celebrated by a long line of famous authors as the shrine of ancient hardihood and virtue, and still in her old age the legitimate object of sentimental reverence. Nothing will enable us more fully to understand the feeling of the devout Catholic for the city of St Peter than the spell which the grandeur of Rome cast upon the mind of an Antiochene pagan in the last decades of the Empire of the West. In the time of Ammianus it was impossible to discern the future destinies of the Roman Episcopate, but it is clear from his narrative that the city of Romulus still worked its old enchantments, and conferred upon its officials and upon the members of its aristocracy a special renown throughout the Empire.

It has, indeed, been objected against Ammianus that, living under a sky black with storm-cloud, he appears to be insensible to the direction of the wind. A philosophic historian, considering the happenings of that time, would at least, one would think, have noted, as likely to change the very warp and woof of Mediterranean civilisation, two great tendencies—the impending victory of the Christian religion and the declining power of the Roman Empire. But Ammianus did not argue thus.

He belonged to that large class of men who feel little interest in theological speculations and possess no gift for the mystical *ascesis* of the spirit. The Christian religion did not attract him. As a soldier he admired the fortitude of the martyrs; and a well-known passage, contrasting the pomp and luxury of the Roman Bishop with the poverty and self-denial of the poor country priest, shows that he was not insensible to the milder virtues of the pastoral life. But of Christianity as a system of belief or conduct he has little knowledge and less curiosity. To the political mind the religious zealot principally presents himself as an administrative nuisance; and Ammianus condemns the synods of the Christian Fathers on the practical ground that they disorganised the postal transport of the Empire. It is not, therefore, to him that we must look for an appreciation of the strength and promise of the Christian life. A cold and somewhat scornful spectator of ecclesiastical events, he appears to be unversed in the literature and only remotely conversant with the ceremonies of the Christians. So far as he could judge the general outcome of that Oriental movement, it led to barbaric chaos, sect wrangling with sect, and every episcopal vacancy furnishing matter for intrigue or bloodshed. In one disputed election to the Bishopric of Rome a hundred and thirty-seven corpses were counted in a Christian Church.

The most impressive feature, on the contrary, of this honest and impartial writer's outlook upon his own age is a robust faith in the permanence and power of the Roman Empire. This Greek from Antioch is in spirit more Roman than the Romans, so Roman that it is difficult to believe that no Latin blood ran in his veins. His masters in literature are the classical authors of Rome—Cicero, Livy, Virgil, Sallust, Tacitus; and he draws his ideal of human conduct from that older and more simple Roman life which was canonised in the retrospective affection of a luxurious age. Indeed, as we read Ammianus, we are made sensible, at every turn, of the span and impetus of that great body politic which, despite furious batteries from without and more subtle maladies gnawing at the heart, still remained the most impressive monument in the world of force, fortune and prudence. How could a soldier historian fail to feel the

miracle of an Empire which sent its legions to fight on the Tees and the Euphrates, and included within its orbit all the peoples of the Mediterranean world? To a contemporary, the crushing defeat of Julian at Ctesiphon, the immense disaster of the Gothic victory at Adrianople, might well have seemed to be unfavourable episodes, carrying with them no sinister omen of ruin nor seed of mischief beyond repair. For centuries the Romans had fought and absorbed the barbarians; and Ammianus saw little reason to doubt that Rome would continue to fight and absorb barbarians to the end of time.*

One other circumstance may help to explain the survival, despite much cause for despondency, of a firm imperial faith in the spirit of Ammianus. The last and most impressive book of the history is devoted to an account of the Gothic invasion of Thrace, which culminated in the rout of a Roman army and the death of the Emperor Valens. The story of this great calamity is told with sombre force, and loses none of its tragical quality in the hands of Ammianus, who, after working steadily up to the great climax of the battle, ends with two minor but startlingly significant episodes—a Gothic attack upon Constantinople, which was repulsed by a sally of Saracen mercenaries, and the treacherous massacre by order of a Roman governor of a large body of Gothic youths who had been distributed through the cities of Asia Minor. In the light of our later knowledge these ominous passages might seem to be inspired by a profound valedictory emotion, but there is nothing consciously valedictory in the attitude of Ammianus. The history was not composed under the immediate impulse of the disaster of Adrianople, but was begun some ten years later, when the military vigour of Theodosius was asserting itself; so that, writing in a brief oasis of calm when the sky was blue and the sunshine again golden, Ammianus could recount the perils of the past, gravely indeed, but yet without a note of weakness or despair.

Almost all the little that we know of the life of

* Fifty years later the Greek historian, Sozomen, started a philosophy of the Decline and Fall; but Rutillius Namatianus, writing shortly after the sack of Rome by Alaric, was still of opinion that the Empire would last for ever.

Ammianus is derived from allusions in his own writings. Sprung of noble lineage, he passed early into the ranks of the 'Protectores Domestici,' a *corps d'élite* which may be compared to our Guards Brigade, and was soon attached to the person of Ursicinus, a distinguished and experienced soldier who inspired the confidence and admiration of his youthful aide-de-camp. A better opening for an ambitious and enterprising young man, fond of travel, adventure and companionship, could not have been contrived; and, before Ammianus had reached the age of thirty, he had voyaged on military and official errands from Mesopotamia to Gaul and from Gaul to Mesopotamia, and had tasted the excitements of a siege, a reconnaissance and a campaign. It is one of our misfortunes that, with a few rare exceptions, he refrains from recounting his personal experiences, and that his impressions of travel, which must have been various and diverting, are sacrificed to the austere tradition of classical history. Nevertheless here and there we descry traces of his activity. He was at Cologne with Ursicinus in 355, and witnessed the downfall of the rebel Silvanus and the beginnings of Julian's work in Gaul. Two years later he returned to the East, when Roman rule was once more exposed to grave peril from the energy and ambitions of Shapur the Great, the most formidable of the Sassanian kings of Persia. As he recounts this period of his career, Ammianus drops for a moment the impersonal tone which generally marks his history. He describes with some vividness of feeling his own part in the Persian campaign—how he was sent on a mission to the Emir of Corduene, how he took part in the famous defence of Amida (the modern Diarbekr), and joined in that expedition to the Tigris which resulted in Julian's death and the repulse of the Roman legions at Ctesiphon. After that catastrophe he returned to Antioch and for many years vanishes from history. When he emerges, it is as the spectator of the high-treason trials at Antioch in 371, as the tourist visiting the plain of Adrianople that he may inspect the site still strewn with the whitened bones of Goth and Roman, or finally as the man of letters, recently established in Rome and receiving the compliments of his friend, Libanius, upon a successful course of historical lectures. The sun-browned veteran

was, in fact, reading instalments of his *magnum opus* to the intellectuals of the capital and tasting the sweets of literary fame. We may guess that his last reading was not later than 392.

It has been conjectured, on the ground of his interest in legal affairs, that, after the death of Julian, Ammianus abandoned a military for a civil career, and that the later part of his life was divided between judicial and literary pursuits. Such a development is not impossible, for the 'Protectores Domestici' constituted a school of training for civil as well as for military duties. Nor is it easy to suppose that a man of so active a temperament would have retired altogether from public life at so early a point in his course. But there is no direct evidence, and we must be content with surmises. We only know that, resembling the Father of History in curiosity and love of movement, Ammianus travelled widely, visiting Egypt and Greece as well as Thrace, and carrying, as we may conjecture, in his head, the exciting design of the great book, the Tacitus brought up to date, which was to be recited before an exacting and distinguished audience in the marble capital of the Empire.

The circumstance that the history was intended for recitation was unfavourable to its quality as a work of art. It is a common experience that lectures, effective enough on first delivery, fail through some lack of subtlety and finish to preserve their power when issued to the world in cold print; and the historical lectures of the Syrian veteran were probably injured for posterity by too close an attention to the recondite tastes of an affected public. Ammianus had a rough but powerful mind, and, what is even more important in an historian, and priceless by reason of its rarity in that age, an essential sincerity and justness of judgment. Unfortunately he thought it necessary to conform himself to a literary fashion which we suspect to have been foreign to his real nature. His narrative is stuffed with turgid declamation and interrupted by long stretches of encyclopædic learning which a modern author would omit or at least consign to footnotes or appendices. He breaks off to describe a prodigy, an omen, a *cause célèbre*, in order that out of the studied variety of his matter he may provide a stimulus, appropriate to the varying

appetites of his audience. Probably, if he had taken literature less seriously, he would have written better, for he is capable, when off his guard, of a simple and soldierly narrative. But, though modest as to his own attainments, he cherished a secret flame of literary ambition. He read furiously. He soaked himself in Livy and Cicero and Virgil, in geographical and scientific handbooks, as well as in the proper and authentic sources for an historical narrative; and he succeeded in manufacturing a declamatory style of which we can say nothing more charitable than that accurate statements and moderate judgments have seldom been presented in a vesture so artificial and inappropriate.

If we had to single out the special excellence which marks Ammianus as a writer of history, we should find it in his distinct gift for life-like portraiture. He has provided us with a series of personal sketches than which of their kind there is nothing better in ancient literature; for the lives of Plutarch, incomparably more beautiful and attractive, do not come up for comparison, belonging as they do to the category of idealistic literature, whereas the work of Ammianus is founded upon a close and dispassionate study of mixed character. Historians are largely creatures of tradition; and the portraits of Ammianus may have owed something to a gossipy book, then greatly in vogue but now only surviving in a few scanty fragments, the satirical *Lives of the Emperors* by Marius Maximus.* In any case, it is reasonable to infer from the success which Ammianus achieves in a most difficult branch of the historian's art that the study of human character was one of the few departments of intellectual enquiry in which considerable progress had been made in the later years of the Roman Empire. Unfortunately the faculty of discerning portraiture was lost as soon as it had reached a point of distinguished excellence in the careful workmanship of Ammianus. The great calamities of the succeeding generation afforded no leisure for that habit of minute and engaging causticity which flourishes in sheltered and critical communities and is nourished by the drama, the satire and the novel. For eight centuries no greater actor in the stage

* *Historicorum Romanorum Fragmenta*, ed. H. Peter, pp. 331-9.

of European history is so well depicted for posterity as are the Constantius, the Julian and the Valentinian of Ammianus. Nor was the full spirit of penetrating psychology recaptured for Europe until the Renaissance of the 16th century.

History having to do with the business of the State, it is certainly no disqualification in a writer of history that he should have some real working knowledge of one of the great public callings. Ammianus approached history from the angle of a soldier, and his work is a repository of military information. He is, indeed, our principal authority upon the art of war in the fourth century, and has left us some careful descriptions, more appropriate to a dictionary than to an historical narrative, of the poliorcetic engines of his time. Nevertheless we cannot regard him as a good military historian, and that for a reason which may seem curious, in view of the large space which he allots to geographical surveys. He never seems to understand, or rather he never enables his reader to understand, the strategy of a campaign. He seems to put his geography in one department and his military history in another, and never to bring them into fruitful connexion. A siege he will often describe with intelligent particularity, but his battle-pieces are confused, his campaigns sketchy and imperfectly grounded; and it is curious to note that, though he records failure after failure, his work is not greatly distinguished for strategical commentary or criticism. Poliorcetics, however, he thoroughly understands; and the serious interest in practical things, which makes him a master of this branch of military science and betrays itself in a great range and variety of technical disquisitions in other spheres of knowledge, is only part of that masculine sanity of character which constitutes his principal force and attraction.

It is not to be claimed for Ammianus that he never talks nonsense. He talks a deal of nonsense. He believes in omens and prodigies, and delights in describing them to an audience which did not think the worse of a popular lecture for an admixture of the sensational and the ghostly. But the general balance of his judgment was undisturbed by such concessions to vulgar superstition. His mind was essentially strong and secular,

averse from all religious extravagance and as far removed from the exalted temper of the sects as the first Lord Shaftesbury from the Cameronians. In one passage he condemns his master, Julian, for the intemperance of his paganism, in another he applauds Valentinian for his policy of religious toleration—verdicts not to be explained on Epicurean grounds, but as the considered expression of that moderate and reasonable spirit which formed part of the Greek ideal of virtue. It is therefore possible from a study of Ammianus to derive a notion of the best secular moral standard which prevailed among cultivated pagans of the Roman Empire in the later part of the fourth century.

That standard was by no means low. The conscience of the soldier-historian was revolted by idleness and profligacy, cruelty and intemperance, trickery and injustice. In the main, our virtues and vices were his virtues and vices also. He had sources of moral sustenance which are not ours, but which may not have been inferior in potency to any that modern civilisation brings to bear on a character analogous to his. He was inspired by the great classical authors of Greece and Rome, and especially by Cicero, whose writings formed the Bible of humane wisdom as long as the humanities retained their value in the Western world. He had the strong Roman respect for the reign of law, coupled with a hearty detestation of that capricious Asiatic cruelty which, in his own time, had begun to debase the administration of Justice. Life in the army had given him a code of honour which is certainly not inferior to that which now regulates the conduct of some modern armies professedly Christian. Finally, he was moved by a deep sentiment of devotion to the Empire as a providential system for the governance of the world.

War is the supreme touchstone of ethical principle. Ammianus recounts, without adverse comment, the pitiless massacre of women and children in the barbarous fighting of the frontier wars. When a Roman general, after making a truce with a marauding band of Saxons, contrives for them an ambush so that they perish to a man, he observes that a just judge would condemn the act as perfidious and disgraceful, but that reflexion

would show that it was not improper to destroy a dangerous band of robbers' when occasion offered. To assign such sentiments to paganism is to ignore some very recent passages in the history of European morals. A Berlin pastor recently wrote in the 'Vossische Zeitung': 'Do you think it contrary to Christianity for our soldiers to shoot down these vermin, the Belgian and French assassins, men, women and children, and to lay their houses in dust and ashes?' and answered his question in the negative.* Ammianus was ignorant enough to suppose that Christianity exhorted men to eschew all courses save the straight way of justice and clemency; but then he did not pretend to be a Christian. His philosophy of war was that of the German War Book, tempered by an honourable dislike for treachery of all sorts; and, if he thought that extreme danger might justify anything, he is no worse than the great majority of men have always been.

A true estimate of our historian's moral quality can be more certainly reached through a consideration of his attitude upon the great topic of civil justice. War is at best a barbarous thing; and the wars of the fourth century, being conducted by barbarous armies on both sides, were not calculated to foster a code of clemency. If Ammianus, living through an age during which the Empire was fighting for its life, is not always too scrupulous, we may make allowances for any hardness of tone which we detect in him. But the breakdown in the administration of Imperial Justice moves him to righteous passion. His own city of Antioch was the scene of two frightful persecutions, one under the beautiful young tyrant Gallus, and the other under the insanely cruel and suspicious Valens. Innocent men were tortured to death by the score. Delation flourished; the forms of justice were flouted; no one felt secure. The later of these two persecutions touched Ammianus very nearly. He was himself witness of many of the terrible scenes which were enacted in the law-court, the prison or the amphitheatre. He heard the creaking of the instruments of torture, the cries of the victims, the hoarse and cruel ejaculations of the executioner. Some of his own

* 'Times,' Lit. Supp., Jan. 20, 1916.

friends were among the innocents who perished. One particular case branded itself upon his memory as, above all others, calling for vengeance. The young philosopher, Simonides, whose grave and stoical reticence had exasperated the savage mind of the Emperor, was burned alive. 'He quitted life as if it were a mad mistress, smiled at the sudden ruin of the passing moments and died without a quiver.' Simonides was executed in private. The mass of innocent conspirators were murdered in the amphitheatre at Antioch amid the loud wails of the spectators. And so far did the campaign of incrimination proceed that in the eastern province people burnt their libraries for fear that the possession of some treatise or other might furnish ground for a criminal charge.

The sombre story of these judicial murders closes with an eloquent apostrophe to the spirit of humane wisdom which shines through the classical literature of Greece and Rome :

'O glorious wisdom, gift of heaven to happy mortals, who hast often refined their corrupt natures, how many evils wouldst thou have corrected in these dark times, had it been vouchsafed to Valens to learn through thee that Empire is nothing else, in the opinion of the wise, but care for the well-being of others! If only he had learnt that it was the part of a good governor to restrain his power, to resist insatiate cupidity and implacable passions, and to know that, in the words of Cicero, the recollection of cruelty makes a miserable old age! Therefore it behoves every one who is about to pass sentence upon the life and spirit of man, who is a part of the world and makes up the complement of living things, to deliberate long and carefully and to resist headlong impulses, for the deed once done cannot be recalled.'

The stress levied upon the sanctity of human life as part of the animate universe is very remarkable.

We suspect, though we cannot bring our suspicions to the proof, that the example of his master, Julian, exercised a deep and enduring influence over the character of Ammianus. Julian was just the kind of man to inspire enthusiasm in a young soldier of sound moral instincts and intellectual aspirations. His frame was strong and athletic, his eyes remarkable for beauty and intelligence, his temperament of that sanguine and

impetuous type which specially appeals to young men. When in later life Ammianus comes to compose the full-length portrait of the 'Apostate,' the first trait which strikes him is the heroic air of the sitter. The Emperor was no ordinary man. He was to be classed with the heroes—'vir profecto heroicis connumerandus ingeniis'—having that indifference for the comforts and luxuries of life which, combined with high courage, brilliant energy and moral ardour, strikes the mind with an ineffaceable impression of greatness. The pursuit of philosophy, though it may give lustre to the soul, does not always improve the manners of the student. But it is very clear that Julian was attractive. His retentive memory, his eager excitable interest in the great things of literature and philosophy, his copious and fluent gift of conversation, must have made him a stimulating and perhaps even a fatiguing companion. The philosopher Julian was very unlike the philosopher Kant or the philosopher Frederick the Great. Of that patient, plodding, exploring faculty which goes to the making of metaphysical systems, he was completely innocent. He was, in fact, no more of a philosopher than Napoleon, and no more of a cynic than Carlyle. The principal characteristic of his temperament was a glowing impetuosity. He did everything with a rush and practically nothing on system. He would neglect food or sleep for an interesting book or a metaphysical disquisition, and in disputation would be as careless of his dignity as in battle he was reckless of his life. If we are to judge from his writings, most of them dashed off at white heat, he possessed that rare power of giving complete expression to mind and temperament which is the sure mark of literary genius. Now a man of this rushing quality, without reticence or reserve, makes mistakes and easily exposes himself to ridicule, but he is apt to be attractive, as the secretive, cunning, balancing intellect can never hope to be. What is singular, however, is to find this kind of temperament united to a very high measure of practical competence, for Julian was an excellent soldier, expert in every branch of the military art. Ammianus, who speaks with authority upon such points, commends his command of the principles of siege warfare, his skill in the selection of healthy

spots for camps, his tactical versatility in battle, his signal power over his troops, and the sage principles on which his outposts and defences were managed. And there can be no doubt that these soldierly aptitudes secured an additional measure of respect for qualities which are not commonly met with in the camp.

Among these qualities, Ammianus must have been principally affected by Julian's passionate enthusiasm for the ancient culture. An official patronage of letters is one of the most depressing stocks-in-trade of monarchs; but Julian's attitude towards literature was neither official nor patronising. It is indeed one of the charms of this singular character, that he preserved upon the throne all the disinterested reverence for learning of the genuine student. His court and camp were thronged by philosophers; and he spent the last moments of his life discussing the mysteries of the soul with two learned experts—father-confessors they may perhaps be called—who had been drawn in his train to the distant waters of the Tigris. Such enthusiasm, coming from so exalted a quarter, can hardly have failed to kindle a flame of emulation among minds susceptible of culture, the more so when we try to conjure up the quality of Julian's talk (and this may be naturally inferred from his writings), with its rich and easy command of literary allusion, its speed and vehemence, and above all its perpetual concern with the loftiest interests of mankind.

On the first contact with a remarkable man we often exaggerate both his positive and relative magnitude. We feel the enchantment of genius. We are excited by the glow of a strong character, and we do not stop to measure or compare. But, if this was so with Ammianus in his original estimate of Julian, it cannot be said that a cool and true perspective is lacking to the deliberate judgment of his later life. The truth is that an important side of Julian's character was alien, if not unsympathetic, to the lay intelligence of Ammianus. Though the Emperor had abandoned Christianity, religion was still the primary interest of his life. He conceived it to be his mission to oppose to Christianity a State religion compounded of the old creeds of the pagan world but animated by a new and more fervent spirit. In this campaign, which was conducted with desperate energy,

Julian received inspiration with equal impartiality from the poets and thinkers of ancient Greece, from the mystical doctors of Neo-platonic philosophy as well as from vulgar quacks and thaumaturgists; and his theology was a vessel into which every liquid, good, bad and indifferent, had been indiscriminately poured. The centre of his system was the worship of the sun-god, who was regarded as the supreme embodiment of the energy, spirit and intellect by which the Universe is ruled. Monotheism was in the air; and Julian, who was sensitive to the spiritual currents of his time, acknowledges the force of its appeal. But the gods of the ancient mythology were not to be dispossessed by an Oriental intruder; and place was found in the new system for the traditional polytheism of Greece, Rome and the Nearer East.

All this religious side of Julian's activity was indifferent, if not distasteful, to Ammianus. He was by nature a *politique*, with an ingrained distrust of ecstasy and enthusiasm; and it is like his Roman love of reserve to single out among the defects of Julian's character his volubility and not infrequent converse with persons of low degree, and to comment with some asperity upon the extremes of his sacrificial zeal. So, although he makes a hero of Julian, he is discriminating in praise and does not try to slur over defects. He comments, for instance, unfavourably upon his habit of asking litigants to what religion they belonged, and denounces in the strongest terms the cruel edict which forbade Christian masters of rhetoric and grammar to teach in the schools. In general it may be said that his portrait is fully substantiated by Julian's written remains, and that this singular body of literature affords the best proof of the discernment which Ammianus brought to bear upon the characters of his history. We read the letters, the orations and the satires, and then return to Ammianus to find that the strength and weakness of the writer's curious and attractive temperament have been duly noted. Perhaps a modern historian would see more to admire in the religious nature of this Crusader against the Cross and less in his military achievements. But in essential points, there will be no disagreement from this, one of the most remarkable studies of character in the whole range of history.

But, however highly we may be disposed to rate the gift of personal portraiture, it is not the principal treasure of the historical mind. A series of cameos, be they as delicate and true as you will, does not, of itself, constitute a history. We ask for more—for nothing less than the intelligent interpretation of a vanished age, so that we may understand not only the motives of the leading actors on the stage, but the general tendencies of the time, the essential springs of change, the elements of strength and weakness, of progress, recuperation or decay, which may be inferred from the recital of political transactions or from the analysis of the social and economic fabric, and above all so that we may form a just view of the political and social problems of the age. In the highest sense of the term, Ammianus is no philosophic historian. He has neither the moral depth nor the intellectual grasp which is necessary to the grand style in history; and, if we were compelled solely to rely upon his evidence for our knowledge of the life of the Romans during the later half of the fourth century, some essential elements would be wanting to the picture. But at least it may be said that he enables us to realise, through his own vivid feeling of their importance, two contrasted and portentous facts, the power of the barbarian world and the decay of Roman society. His graphic and vigorous sketches of the Isaurians, the Persians, the Saracens and the Huns, his admirable story of the Gothic invasion of Thrace and of the terrific fighting at Adrianople—where Rome experienced a defeat more crushing than any since Cannae—the care with which he enumerates and characterises the barbarian tribes who were pressing everywhere upon the Roman defences, and more particularly the attention which he devotes to the various manifestations of the military art to be found among the antagonists of the Empire—all this side of his work was not only relevant to immediate political needs, but has an enduring importance as throwing light upon one of the greatest changes in recorded history.

We are always a little distrustful of the critic who denounces the decadence of his contemporaries, for every generation can be shown to be corrupt on a careful selection of the facts, and every society takes a morbid pleasure in the recital of its own manifest degeneracy.

It is not surprising that a veteran from the provinces, trained at the ascetic court of Julian, should have found much to reprehend in Roman society. And, as Juvenal was still one of the most popular authors of the day, we may well imagine that a lecture on contemporary history would gain vogue through a spice of moral denunciation. But the real strength of the indictment of Ammianus does not consist so much in his portrayal of the profligate manners of the Roman people as in the crushing evidence which he adduces of a general infection of cruelty, incompetence and disorder, poisoning the whole body politic of the Empire. The strongest Roman fortress on the Tigris was sacrificed through a palace intrigue directed against Ursicinus, the ablest commander in the East. And such an incident does not stand alone. When the armies of the Goths were pouring over the Balkan Peninsula 'like the lava of Mount Etna,' the generals selected to oppose them were not only ignorant and rash, but actually sacrificed an important military advantage in order that they might traffic in slaves with the enemy. But perhaps the most signal evidence of the disease in the body politic is supplied by the conduct of the emperors themselves. Constantius was in some ways above the average level of conduct. He was chaste, temperate, laborious, a diligent cultivator of learning and scrupulous in his distribution of patronage. But his tyranny was terrific. The faintest suspicion—and the atmosphere of his Court was poisoned by the breath of traducers—was enough to set in motion the machinery of the most awful persecution. The same evil mania, resulting in the same wild orgy of Asiatic cruelty, afflicted the sluggish and illiterate Valens. Even the better emperors interfered with the course of justice, and were assailed by the voices of intriguers who wished to use the machinery of government for plunder or revenge. And the most sinister feature in this sombre story of panic and savage violence is that the voice of protest is silent. There are epigrams, there are bread-riots and wine-riots and military revolts, but there are no organs of liberty. The Senate of Rome is a powerless shadow. There are no parties formed on a common basis of political principles. The civilised world is governed by an Oriental tyranny.

'We might censure the vices of his style, the disorder and perplexity of his narrative; but we must now take leave of this impartial historian, and reproach is silenced by our regret for such an irreparable loss.' So does Gibbon wave his stately adieu to 'the accurate and faithful guide,' whose steps he has followed with punctuality, sarcasm and profit. The records of the Roman Empire are lamentably imperfect; and one of the most curious features in literary history is the complete disappearance of a series of autobiographies written by some of the most famous of the emperors. What would we not give for the memoirs of Augustus and Vespasian, for the autobiographies of Hadrian and Severus, or the Commentaries of Constantine? They have perished; and no fragment has been quoted sufficiently substantial to enable us to estimate our loss. For centuries, too, the work of Ammianus was lost to Europe; and it was not until Poggio's discovery of the Hersfeld manuscript that this invaluable writer was restored to European scholarship.

The 15th century was a Ciceronian age; and in the circle of Italian purists the solecisms of the Syrian veteran were felt to stand in need of apology. The *editio princeps* by Sabinus (Rome, 1494) is prefaced by a letter to the Bishop of Bergamo, in which the editor craves that his author may not be entirely condemned for his use of the Latin word for 'deacon.' We do not know whether the Bishop was able to condone so grave a departure from classical usage. But to the modern eye it is one of the chief merits of this honest writer that his Latinity is not too pure, that it bears traces of the mingling of Greek, Latin and Christian elements, and that it reflects with care and fidelity the conditions and transactions of the age in which he lived.

H. A. L. FISHER.

Art. 4.—CECIL SPRING-RICE: IN MEMORIAM.

'I vow to thee, my country—all earthly things above—
Entire and whole and perfect, the service of my love—
The love that asks no question ; the love that stands the test,
That lays upon the altar the dearest and the best ;
The love that never falters, the love that pays the price,
The love that makes undaunted the final sacrifice.

'And there's another country, I've heard of long ago—
Most dear to them that love her, most great to them that
know.

We may not count her armies ; we may not see her King ;
Her fortress is a faithful heart, her pride is suffering ;
And soul by soul and silently, her shining bounds increase,
And her ways are ways of gentleness and all her paths are
Peace.'

C. A. S. R.

WASHINGTON,
Jan. 12, 1918.

THESE lines were written by Sir Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, His Majesty's Ambassador to the United States, on the eve of his final departure from Washington. The vow recorded in them had been kept long before he put it into words, for he had served his country for a quarter of a century with 'the love that never falters'; and, though he knew it not, he was already a dying man. With his singular clarity of vision he had realised from the beginning of the war that its issue might well depend in the last resort on the attitude of the great American Republic ; and so acute a sense as his of the awful responsibility that rested in such circumstances upon a British Ambassador during the prolonged period of American hesitation and neutrality, would have told severely on a much more robust constitution. If diplomacy may be compared to active warfare, he had fought for two years in the most dangerous and important salient of the British lines—had fought, as diplomatists must ever fight, silently and patiently but indomitably under the poisoned shell-fire of German intrigues ; and when, with the entry of the great American democracy into the war, he had 'done his bit' and was free to quit the post he had held with unswerving tenacity through

the days of stress and storm, he was, as we now know, doomed—or should we say, privileged?—to survive but for a short time the hour of his crowning achievement. It was, at any rate, the end for which he had himself prayed not long before in some verses written on the death of a great friend who had passed away as suddenly as he was fated to do :

‘ Make no long tarrying,* O my God,
May the downward path be swiftly trod,
Swiftly the falling feet descend ;
Short the road and soon the end.
When the doom is spoken, let it fall ;
And when Thou takest, then take all.

‘ And as the sun sinks in the sea,
Nor dim nor pale nor overcast,
By no sad change, nor slow degree,
Radiant and royal to the last :—
So take the gift Thou gavest me.’

Spring-Rice was an admirable product of his race and class and education, yet he had great originality. With Irish blood through his father, who was the younger son of the first Lord Monteagle, he inherited some of the qualities of his mother's North of England family, the Marshalls, and their affection for the English lakes. At Eton and at Balliol he not only achieved distinction as a scholar, but acquired a reputation for a ready and whimsical and sometimes rather mordant wit which clung to him, not always to his professional advantage, throughout life. His first efforts at poetry came out in an Eton book, ‘ Out of School ’ ; and his Oxford Rhymes are not yet forgotten. But it was in his deep sense of reverence for all that was great and noble in the past, and in his love of all that is beautiful in nature and literature and art, that the influence of his early associations at school and college and at home was most strongly and permanently reflected. If his impatience of conventions sometimes startled the very conventional world

* Cf. Psalm lxx, 5. Spring-Rice was a great reader of the Psalms. By a curious coincidence Psalm lxx is appointed to be read at evensong on the 13th day of the month ; and it was in the night of Jan. 13-14 last that he died with ‘ no long tarrying.

of diplomacy, he brought into it the qualities of sympathy and imagination which it often lacks.

Whenever the time comes for the record of his life to be written, it will show, I believe, in a very striking way, how his whole career seems to have been a preparation for the final struggle at Washington in which he stood immovably for the finest and most honourable traditions of British diplomacy against the brutal and corrupt methods of German statecraft. The old gibe—that a diplomatist is sent to lie abroad for the good of his country—was as repugnant to his own conception of a diplomatist's duties and functions as to his innate personal rectitude. He believed that the business of a diplomatist is in the first place that of a peacemaker who, without ignoring international differences or being blind to possibilities of open conflict, should labour unceasingly to mitigate and avert them within the limits compatible with national interests and national dignity; that in the second place it is the duty of a diplomatist not only to maintain friendly and close relations with the rulers and governing circles of the country to which he is accredited, but to familiarise himself as far as possible with all the great currents of public opinion and all the great movements, social, religious and political, which in the long run determine the policy of autocracies that mould them to their purpose as well as of democracies that merely reflect them; and thirdly that in his own personal attitude and mode of life the diplomatist should seek a golden mean between the reserve and reticence which may be easily misconstrued into aloofness and distrust, and the facile appeals to a popularity wider than he can properly aspire to in a foreign country without suspicion of overstepping the limits of a position necessarily circumscribed by the privileges it carries with it. For the outer trappings and the ceremonial side of his profession he had perhaps an excessive contempt. He preferred to rely on the more human qualities of simplicity, directness and transparent honesty in association with great power of work and a fine intellect.

More fortunate than most young diplomatists, who often have to serve an interminable apprenticeship of mere routine work and somewhat frivolous drudgery

Spring-Rice, after entering the Foreign Office in 1882, was soon brought into intimate contact, first as assistant private secretary to Lord Granville and then as *précis*-writer to Lord Rosebery, with the whole range of world-wide affairs which come within the purview of a British Foreign Secretary. His first post abroad, as well as his last, was Washington, where he spent with brief intervals all the earlier part of his career, gaining that thorough and sympathetic insight into American life and American character, and making the many enduring friendships, which were to serve him in such excellent stead when he returned there as Ambassador at the most critical period in the whole history of Anglo-American relations.

The turning point in his career was his transfer as Second Secretary to the Embassy in Berlin in 1895. For, in the three years which he then spent in Germany, he witnessed some of the most significant manifestations of the aggressive spirit infused into the 'higher policy' of the German Empire after its youthful sovereign had thrown off the old Chancellor's tutelage. In the summer of 1895 Germany made her first bid for a place in the Far Eastern sun by turning against Japan and joining with Russia and France to despoil her of the fruits of her victories over China. In the early days of 1896 the Emperor's famous telegram to President Kruger sent through the whole British Empire the first thrill of alarm at the dangerous potentialities of Germanism. In 1897, after the Turkish armies, reorganised by a German military mission, had defeated the unfortunate Greeks in Thessaly, William II's effusive greetings to the 'ever-victorious' Sultan foreshadowed the price he was prepared to pay for the use of Turkey as his 'bridge-head to world-dominion.' In 1898 he watched, with an interest rendered keener by the intimate correspondence he kept up with many influential friends in Washington, the abortive efforts of the Wilhelmstrasse to persuade Great Britain, on the plea of European solidarity, into acting as the spearhead of at least a diplomatic offensive against the United States at the beginning of the Spanish-American war.

But Spring-Rice had not been content merely to study these outward manifestations of Germany's 'higher

policy.' While he was in Berlin he did what few diplomatists cared or were encouraged to do. He explored, so far as the restraints of his official position allowed, the whole field of German life, the character of the people, the ingenious constitutional machinery which Bismarck had so carefully devised for securing the supremacy of Prussia within a Federal Empire, and for combining the autocracy of the Hohenzollerns with the illusion of parliamentary institutions, the vigorous development of commercial and industrial activity, promoted and controlled by and for the State, the growth of a new 'will to power' nurtured in the schools and colleges as well as in the barrack-room, and equipped with all the resources of modern science for economic as well as military conquest. Spring-Rice was a diligent student of history, but he was also a student of men.

It was in Berlin, where I was then Correspondent of 'The Times,' that we became close friends; and I remember well how he used to envy me my opportunities of meeting the leaders of the Socialist and other political parties, whose acquaintance no diplomatist could venture to cultivate without giving dire offence in 'all-highest' circles. But he was quick to realise that German politicians, however large they might bulk in the press and in Reichstag debates, and German political parties, however formidable the numbers they might poll at general elections, were little more than *simulacra*; and that the whole power was concentrated in a masterful ruling caste, itself dominated by a masterful young sovereign, whose genius was a strange but vital blend of medieval mysticism and modern materialism fired by overweening ambition. And the whole nation, even those who protested most loudly, were ready to respond to his call. Spring-Rice saw all this and the menace there was in it for the future of the world. 'These Germans,' he once said to me, 'are a tremendous and terrible nation. They are going to laugh to scorn the old French saying: "Si jeunesse savait, si vieillesse pouvait"! They have got all the cunning of wicked old age, and all the forcefulness of lustful youth.'

Out of the striving pushfulness of modern Germany Spring-Rice passed to the slowly-moving East, first to Constantinople and Teheran and then to Cairo, where,

as he put it, he went 'back to school' under Lord Cromer, being temporarily seconded from his own service to act as British Commissioner of the Egyptian Debt; nor were they unprofitable school-days under such a master. From Cairo he was promoted, in 1903, to be Secretary of Embassy at St Petersburg during the stormy years of the Russo-Japanese war and the first revolutionary movements which followed the reverses of the Russian armies in Manchuria. In 1906 he returned to Persia, this time as British Minister, to witness the further stages of that ancient kingdom's decline. Then followed three years of relative rest and ease in Sweden, for the British Legation at Stockholm was mainly an 'observation post.' Sweden, though determined to keep away, so far as possible, from the cross-currents of world-politics, stood very near—in some respects perilously near—to them. Spring-Rice was a keen observer, and all that he saw and heard in Stockholm fortified the conviction, which had steadily gathered strength in him from his experiences in the Near and the Middle East and in Russia, that the war-cry of Pan-Germanism, 'Delenda est Britannia,' was merely an indiscreet echo of the 'higher policy' to which the rulers of Germany were definitely committing themselves.

In Turkey he had seen Austria and Russia, instigated by Germany, blocking the endeavours of the Western Powers to abate the Ottoman *régime* of misrule and massacre in Armenia and Macedonia, while William II was consolidating his hold upon the Red Sultan by encouraging his Pan-Islamic schemes and pointing always to England as the enemy. In Egypt he had seen Germans striving desperately to keep alive the embers of Anglo-French quarrels over the valley of the Nile. In Russia, even more clearly than in Persia, he had seen Germany steadily elbowing Russian expansion away from Europe towards more distant fields of Asiatic adventure, where the seeds of conflict between the Russian and British Empires were then still dangerously abundant; and, when the results of the Russo-Japanese War defeated Germany's calculations, he saw her exploiting Russia's internal troubles and pressing on the bewildered Russian autocracy the old Bismarckian arguments for dynastic solidarity in the presence of

revolutionary forces that drew their chief inspiration from England.

Spring-Rice had heartily welcomed the Anglo-French Agreement, for which, since his Berlin days, he had done useful spade-work wherever he went; and he recognised the paramount importance of the Anglo-Russian Agreement as a guarantee against the revival of the old Three Emperors' Alliance under German hegemony. But he was in Persia when it was concluded, and he knew the price we should have to pay for it in the loss of our slender remnant of influence with the Persians. Anything that savoured of *real-politik* was abhorrent to him. 'Its great apostle allowed himself only one luxury of emotion—to hate;' whereas Spring-Rice could not refuse himself the luxury of sympathising even with the feeble gropings towards liberty of the unfortunate Persian people, who used to take sanctuary in thousands within the grounds of the British Legation in Teheran. Nor had he much faith in the stability of the Russian autocracy or its permanent divorce from the more congenial influence of Berlin, though he never questioned the personal loyalty of the Tsar.

In his private letters, and even, I believe, in his official dispatches, Spring-Rice was so intent on counter-acting the easy optimism which prevailed in most quarters in England, as we know to our cost, right up to July 1914, that he often got the reputation of being a hopeless pessimist. He was never that; for, if his faith in human progress, and in a divine providence that shapes all things towards higher ends, had ever wavered, he would have been preserved from mere pessimism by his keen sense of humour—which, unlike most people, he exercised upon himself as often as upon others—as well as by his intense love of nature and by his strong family affections. He had lost his father and mother when he was still young, but he had brothers and sisters to whom he was devoted; and his marriage in 1904 to the only daughter of his former chief, Sir Frank Lascelles, brought him unclouded happiness.

Besides the loving care and soothing influence she constantly brought to bear on his high-strung and somewhat excitable temperament, Lady Spring-Rice gave him

a boy and a girl upon whom he lavished the tender and cheerful understanding of children's ways which made him a prime favourite and playmate and king of story-tellers to all the children with whom he happened to come into close contact. It was his lot to dwell mostly in cities and amongst men, but his heart was always in the country, and especially in the hills—most of all, perhaps, in the Cumberland hills, which he knew and loved above all others. He had sometimes an irresistible craving for their solitude; and at Oldchurch on Ullswater, which was his English home for many years, he would steal out quietly at night to watch the sunrise from the top of Helvellyn. The wilder mountains of Northern Persia appealed to him in the same way, and the primitive modes of travel which bring one so close to nature. I quote from a letter to myself.

'Have you forgotten your Persian wanderings? The early start while the stars are still bright, the sword of Orion remaining as long as any. Then on the top of the hill if possible before the sun gets hot; the burst of golden light on the rocky crest, and at last the view of the other side; hill after hill with Demavend behind. Then the awful descent; the poor pony struggling behind, looking appealingly at you as you try and pull him down some particularly bad drop, and his sad grunt as he steps down all four feet at once. Then the valley and a long delicious canter between the rocky hill sides till springs appear and the green patch in the distance means the camping ground. . . . I got so tired of seeing Demavend look down at me wherever I was that at last I persuaded a Persian servant to go up with me. I spent two nights on the mountain and got up without difficulty except getting very giddy from the thin air.'

No wonder, for Demavend is about 18,000 feet high, and the ascent of the great snow-clad cone is a steady grind, that tests endurance rather than mountaineering skill.

It was as much his sense of public duty as his legitimate ambition to reach the top of his profession that made Spring-Rice stick to the often disheartening road of diplomacy. He was impulsive and sometimes impatient, and in smaller matters inclined to rush to premature conclusions and even to act hastily. But on the greater issues with which he was confronted his

judgment, based on careful study and genuine knowledge, was seldom at fault. I would quote from one other of his letters to me, written from Stockholm in 1911:

'At the end of the 18th century it was the revolution which was dominant and seemed the greater danger to Europe. Now it is the counter-revolution—State organisation—incarnate in Prussia. I wonder whether we shall have to go through a similar crisis. Will Power after Power, "with sombre acquiescence," accept what they think is inevitable and, rather than fight, take the consequences of defeat without the perils of war? That is what the small Powers are doing. I wonder if England will prove stubborn or not. The main thing is that we must fight in a good cause.'

It was with such forebodings of an impending cataclysm that he proceeded in 1912 to Washington to take up the appointment of Ambassador to the United States—the appointment which above all others he had always hoped for as the crown of his career, because he felt confident that, with his knowledge of, and genuine liking for, the American people, he could render better service in the democratic atmosphere of the great western Republic than at any European court. He found many old friends and made many new ones, but his health was growing more and more precarious; and he had not quite recovered from a very serious illness when he came home on leave shortly before the great European crisis of 1914. On arriving in London he spent ten days with Sir Edward Grey and shared his Chief's increasing apprehensions of the storm that was gathering on the international horizon. During the last week of deadly suspense he never had any doubt that the day for which Germany had been preparing for years was at hand, and that there could be but one course open to us, that of duty and honour as well as of national self-preservation.

As soon as the die was cast he prepared to return to America, whither his wife and children followed him shortly afterwards. His ship was pursued by a German cruiser, but he perhaps ran less personal danger than he was exposed to later from German *condottieri* in America. Many people believed that the murderous affray in Mr Jack Morgan's house in Washington in the summer of 1915 was part of a plot against the life of

the British Ambassador, who was staying with him at the time. He was prepared for every form of German frightfulness; he was prepared for the bitter hostility of many alien and anti-British elements in America; he was prepared for the deep-rooted prejudices of a large volume of genuinely American opinion. What he was not prepared for was the mischievous activity of some of our own 'pacifists,' who did not hesitate to palliate the crimes of Germany and to distort our war aims in order to embitter American feeling against their own country, and to deter the American democracy from converting its instinctive sympathies with the Allied cause into active cooperation.

It is too early yet to attempt to appraise exactly Spring-Rice's share in bringing about the entry of the United States into the war. Some of his critics on this side have been inclined to rate it far less high than the Americans themselves, who must after all be the better judges. He had little faith in the coarser methods of propaganda, in which he knew we could never compete successfully with the Germans. Indeed he was convinced, from his knowledge of the American character, that such a tremendous issue as that which then confronted the American people would not be determined by any sensational or emotional appeal, and still less by any attempt to drive them. Only the stern logic of events would persuade them to turn their backs on their century-old traditions and prejudices, and plunge into the unknown vortex of a great European conflict. From his knowledge of Germany, on the other hand, he relied confidently upon the Germans to provide the events required for the conversion of the American democracy. That conversion the British Embassy, he believed, could do little to hasten, but might easily, through sheer excess of zeal, do a vast deal to delay or even to prevent.

Difficult and delicate questions arose, and were bound to arise, out of the most legitimate exercise of our naval power, between the British and American Governments, so long as America remained neutral and constituted herself the zealous champion of neutral interests. On two occasions, namely when Great Britain extended contraband to cotton, and when she 'blacklisted' a number of firms suspected of trading with the enemy,

the situation was seriously strained. Any slight error of judgment, any indiscreet move or word that could give a handle to the enemy or an occasion for unfriendly elements in America to blaspheme, might have had immediately disastrous consequences. Spring-Rice, mindful of what had happened to some of his predecessors in far less stormy times, never stumbled once, though many were the traps laid for him. In his official notes and conversations with the State Department, he upheld the British point of view in temperate and closely reasoned argument, but he never departed in public from the reserve which he knew to be his one safe shield against misrepresentation and calumny.

Our friends in America, who saw the German Embassy become the headquarters of a great anti-British organisation all over the United States, could not at times quite understand why he would not allow the British Embassy to identify itself closely with their well-meant and much more legitimate activities. He valued their enthusiastic support of the British cause. Many of them were his own oldest friends; but for that very reason, and because some were known to be political opponents of the existing American administration, he felt, and often frankly told them, that the less intimate their association with the British Embassy, the more effective their efforts would be. He believed in the high purpose of the President; he knew himself to possess the confidence and respect of the United States Government; and he felt that, whenever the time arrived for Mr Wilson to carry the American people with him into the war, the greatest service which the British Ambassador could then be found to have rendered, would be to have made it impossible for any American to charge the Head of the State with having yielded to British pressure, direct or indirect. This may well have been in President Wilson's mind when he bade Spring-Rice, who was paying him his farewell visit, remember that he would be always his friend—simple words, which, however, coming from so reserved a man as the President, had their own special significance.

To Spring-Rice the alliance of the two great English-speaking nations was the fulfilment of a life's dream, and its fulfilment in the noblest of causes. For him the

great war was no mere clash of worldly ambitions. It was a phase of the eternal struggle between light and darkness. It was only a short time before his death that in a speech to the Canadian Club at Ottawa he revealed his innermost soul :

‘The world has many ideals. Two of the most prominent are present in the minds of all. We have seen the relics of Egypt and of Assyria. We have seen the emblem of the ancient religions, the ancient monarchies—the king on his throne; the badge of sovereignty in his hand, the scourge. We have read of the ruins of a palace once decorated with pictures of burning cities, troops of captives, victims being tortured to death. That was the banquet-hall of the King of Assyria. That is one type of civilisation. There is another, the sign of which is the Cross. I need not tell you what that means, but I must say this: the Cross is a sign of patience under suffering, but not of patience under wrong. The Cross, gentlemen, is on the banner under which we fight—the Cross of St George, the Cross of St Andrew, the Cross of St Patrick; different in form, in colour, in history, yes, but the same in spirit, the spirit of sacrifice.

‘We are all subjects of the Prince of Peace, the Prince of Peace who fought the greatest fight ever fought upon this earth, who won the greatest victory, and won it by His Blood. That is the Cross; that is the sign under which we fight against this hideous enemy. That is the sign under which we fight, and by which we shall conquer.’

About a fortnight later, Spring-Rice, who was waiting at Ottawa for the steamer that was to carry him home to England, went out skiing with his children, and spent the evening as usual, and in very good spirits, with his wife and his kindly hosts at Government House. He had not long retired to bed when his brave heart suddenly failed, and he passed away without a struggle to the rest he had well earned. The following lines, though written by an English poet, Alfred Noyes, were first published in the ‘New York Times,’ and afterwards so widely reproduced all over America that they may stand for the epitaph placed by the American people themselves upon the grave of one who had held the banner of England high amongst them at the most solemn hour of their national fortunes and our own.

I.

- 'Steadfast as any soldier of the line
 He served his England, with the imminent death
 Poised at his heart ; nor did the world divine
 The constant peril of each burdened breath.
- 'England, and the honour of England, he still served,
 Walking the strict path, with the old high pride
 Of those invincible knights who never swerved
 One hair's-breadth from the way until they died.
- 'Quietness he loved, and books, and the grave beauty
 Of England's Helicon, whose eternal light
 Shines like a lantern on that road of duty,
 Discerned of few, in this chaotic night.
- 'And his own pen, foretelling his release,
 Told us that he foreknew the end was peace.

II.

- 'Soldier of England, he shall live, unsleeping,
 Among his friends, with the old proud flag above ;
 For, even to-day, her honour is in his keeping ;
 He has joined the hosts that guard her with their love
- 'They shine like stars, unnumbered, happy legions,
 In those high realms where all our darkness dies ;
 He moves, with honour, in those loftier regions,
 Above this "world of passion and of lies."
- 'For so he called it, keeping his own high passion
 A silent flame before the true and good ;
 Not fawning on the throng in this world's fashion,
 To come and see what all might see who would.
- 'Soldier of England, perfect, gentle knight,
 The soul of Sidney welcomes you to-night.'

VALENTINE CHIROL.

Art. 5.—GERMAN PROPAGANDIST SOCIETIES.

IN most countries propaganda is more or less of an accident, but in Germany it is a science. There the greatest importance is attached to propaganda, and it is developed with Teutonic thoroughness. Official propaganda in Germany is issued by the different Government departments, by the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Admiralty, each of which has a special section for the purpose. There is also a Press Department for influencing Neutral Countries (*Presseabteilung zur Beeinflussung der Neutralen*), presided over by the well-known Roman Catholic member of the Reichstag, Dr Matthias Erzberger. A vast amount of propaganda, however, is done by those private organisations, many of them established long before the war, which originated in the desire of the German industrialists to encourage commercial relations between Germany and foreign countries, and to influence public opinion abroad in favour of German interests. These have combined to form an Union of German Associations for Economic Activity in Foreign Countries (*Verband Deutsch-Ausländischer Wirtschaftsvereine*) for the settlement of questions jointly affecting them—a very useful scheme, but one from which little has resulted, owing to the divergence of interests between the constituent bodies. Besides the purely economic associations, there are others which concern themselves only indirectly with trade, and whose primary aim is to spread *Kultur* in foreign countries. Since the outbreak of war, these associations have worked hand in hand, devoting themselves but little to their original functions, and, together with those more recently founded, giving all their energies to furthering the general propaganda of the Fatherland. It is to an examination of these societies and their labours that this article is confined.

The most important and the most active of all the private propagandist organisations was the Deutscher Ueberseedienst Transocean, Berlin, which was founded in the spring of 1914 by a number of important industrialists, one of the most important shareholders being August Thyssen, the well-known German coal and iron-master. One of the principal objects of the founders

was to set up a news-service which should supplement or supplant Wolff's Telegram Bureau. Wolff, in the ordinary course of business, had concluded with the other great news-agencies, Reuter, Havas, Stefani, etc., an agreement by which each of these bodies had its own sphere of work, pooled the telegrams received, and circulated them to subscribers throughout the world. As an international news-agency the scheme worked fairly well, but the founders of the D. U. Transocean above all things objected to an international news-agency; they complained that the telegrams circulated by Wolff were too neutral in tone. They desired to establish a national, as opposed to an international, news-agency, which would serve exclusively the interests of Germany throughout the world, and have as its unwritten motto, 'Deutschland über Alles.'

The original intention of the founders was probably only to conduct a campaign for furthering the commercial interests of Germany; but the outbreak of war, which at once put an end to Germany's overseas export trade, and threatened very shortly to extinguish her overseas import trade also, impelled them to a different line of conduct. In 1915 the D. U. Transocean was reconstructed as a political propagandist organisation; and from that date it has been in close touch with other propagandist societies at home and abroad. Although its views did not always coincide with those of the German Government, and from time to time some measure of restraint had to be imposed upon it, it nevertheless to a great extent acted under official direction. Its pecuniary resources were apparently boundless; certainly its expenses were enormous; and there can be little doubt that it was heavily subsidised by Government. The Director of the organisation was Dr Th. Schuchart; and it is impossible not to admire the thoroughness and vigour with which he conducted the campaign entrusted to his management.

The D. U. Transocean issued a daily wireless service, which has been of great value to Germany; for, while Wolff's Telegram Bureau is to some extent compelled by its semi-official character to maintain a certain reserve, Transocean, being ostensibly a private concern, could conduct its service as unscrupulously as it liked, without

in any way implicating the Government. As a matter of fact, it did not hesitate to send out garbled war telegrams and tendencious matter of all kinds. It seems scarcely to be doubted that the official circles of the Empire encouraged and sometimes instructed it to issue doubtful and even definitely mendacious statements for which the Government did not care openly to accept responsibility. Certainly the promptness and regularity with which these messages were despatched suggest that priority was given to them by the authorities.

The management devised a very thorough Intelligence Section, with agents all over the world, especially in Central and South America. These agents reported on the political situation and economic conditions in the country in which they lived, and furnished lists of people to whom propagandist literature could with advantage be sent. Well aware that public opinion is to a great extent manufactured by the Press, the organisation endeavoured, by every means in its power, to influence proprietors and editors of newspapers and periodicals in neutral countries; and in this branch of its activities it was ably seconded by its agents abroad, who supplied detailed information concerning such publications, and the importance and financial position of proprietors, foreign correspondents, and journalists.

Besides its wireless propagandist messages, this association printed a news-service, 'Continental Correspondenz,' with editions in German, English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese. This was founded in 1915 by Herr Ludwig Asch, and said to be edited now by Herr Günther Thomas. Through its agents it supplied free 'copy,' in the form of Germanophile articles, to any newspaper that would print it. Before Rumania entered the war, that country was favoured by the D. U. Transocean with a special news-service, which consisted mainly of cuttings from the German, Allied, and Neutral Press, selected, of course, with the view of showing that the Central Powers must emerge victorious from the conflict. If argument failed, it would, if possible, subsidise a newspaper proprietor or editor; when this course proved ineffectual, it would endeavour to purchase a newspaper outright. All other means failing, it would itself found a newspaper.

For the general public the organisation published various propagandist works, the most important of which was the monthly periodical, 'Der Grosse Krieg in Bildern,' edited by Jos. Schumacher, consisting of about forty pages of photographs, with descriptions in German, Spanish, French, Portuguese, and English. The covers designed for the different countries bear the titles, 'Illustrations of the Great War,' 'Album de la Grande Guerre,' 'La Guerra Grande en Cuadros,' 'Ilustrações da Grande Guerra,' and 'La Grande Guerra Illustrata.' Another edition, with the legends printed in Turkish, Arabic, Persian, and Urdu, was published in co-partnership with the News-service for the Orient (*Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*). Nor did the Association confine itself to distributing its own publications, but it circulated through its agents many propagandist works brought out by other societies. In conjunction with the Society for Economic Training (*Gesellschaft für wirtschaftliche Ausbildung*), Frankfort, it issued a news-sheet, 'Wirtschaftliche Nachrichtendienst,' each number of which is devoted to a particular country, and gives a statistical survey of foreign trade, information as regards the position and prospects of the different branches of finance, industry, and agriculture, and the development of communication and traffic.

In September 1916 the Deutscher Ueberseedienst Transocean ceased to exist as such, and split up into two separate companies, known henceforth respectively as the Deutscher Ueberseedienst and the Transocean. From this date the Transocean dealt exclusively with the telegraphic news and the war-picture service; while the task of the Deutscher Ueberseedienst, which is presided over by Herr M. Rötger, a former managing-director of Krupp's, was

'to establish a foreign news-service, with the object of enlightening public opinion both abroad and at home, particular attention being paid to the requirements of Germany's economic life. The company being the centre of all general organisations supported by private means to cultivate relations with foreign countries, it will be its special object to take all measures likely, when economic relations with other countries are resumed, to promote German commerce and German prestige in the world.'

Apart from the division of labour between the two companies, the work goes on as already described.

If Tranzocean and the Deutscher Ueberseedienst bulk very largely in the public eye, and work on an extensive scale, they are not the only institutions that the war has converted from commerce to politics. The Hamburg Colonial Institute (*Hamburgisches Kolonial-Institut*) founded a news-service at the beginning of the war, and has issued at irregular intervals, but on an average once a week, 'Information for Foreign Countries' (*Mitteilungen für das Ausland*). This at first circulated widely, and was highly valued for propagandist purposes; but presently more attractive publications appeared, and it declined in consequence. The H.C. Institute in January last started a weekly paper, 'Wirtschaftsdienst,' with the sub-title, 'Reports on Commerce in Foreign Countries during the War' (*Kriegswirtschaftliche Berichte über das Ausland*).

The War Combine of German Industries (*Kriegsausschuss der Deutschen Industrie*) is an amalgamation, since the outbreak of war, of two rival organisations, the Central Association of German Manufacturers (*Zentral Verband Deutscher Industriellen*), the President of which is Herr M. Rötger, and the Union of Manufacturers (*Bund der Industriellen*), the President of which is Herr H. Friedrichs. The principal function of the new organisation is to represent the industrialists in their controversies with the Government. This, however, does not prevent it from disseminating propaganda, frequently of a political kind, though its chief aim is said to be the demonstration of Germany's economic ascendancy over her foes. The four-page leaflets which it issues in German, English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian, are said to be written by the well-known financial expert, Arnold Steinmann-Bucher, who is the editor of the weekly organ of the association, 'Mitteilungen des Kriegsausschusses der Deutschen Industrie.' These leaflets are frankly propagandist; and among the subjects, which are treated entirely from the German point of view, are 'The German-American Crisis,' 'The Economic Conference at Paris,' and 'The German victory in the naval battle of

the Skagerrak.' It is doubtful if this propaganda is private propaganda. Indeed, the space devoted in the leaflets to official statements and to ministerial speeches suggests that the War-Combine of German Industries is really an official organisation masquerading under a title likely to impress unsuspecting foreigners.

It is a common subject of complaint in Germany that the German who goes abroad speedily becomes absorbed by the country in which he settles. If he comes to England, he is soon more English than the English. He casts his nationality from him as if it were a cloak. Every effort is therefore made to keep him in touch with the Fatherland. Hence such an organisation as the Union for Germanism in Foreign Countries (*Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*). It publishes a quarterly review, 'Das Deutschtum im Ausland,' and a news-service, 'Mitteilungen des Vereins für das Deutschtum im Ausland,' the objects of which are, at home, to spread German thought by word of mouth, by articles, and by lectures; abroad, to set up schools, kindergartens, and libraries, to encourage union between Germans abroad, and, above all, to keep them in touch with the country of their origin.

While this society, and others like the Union for the Development of German Commerce in Foreign Countries (*Vereinigung zur Förderung deutscher Wirtschaftsinteressen im Ausland*), take the whole world for their province, there are numerous societies which restrict their operations to a certain country or a group of countries. One great sphere of activity is the Near East, in which Germany has, during the last thirty years, made such remarkable progress by means of 'peaceful penetration.' Some time since there was set up at Berlin the German-Bulgarian Society (*Deutsch-Bulgarische Gesellschaft*), which, however, in November last announced that it had become amalgamated with the more recently established Institute for Economic Intercourse with Bulgaria (*Institut für den Wirtschaftsverkehr mit Bulgarien*), which also has its headquarters in the capital. The Institute has been formed by three powerful German associations, the Union of Manufacturers, the Central Association of German Manufacturers, and the Union of

Farmers (*Bund der Landwirte*), their respective presidents, Herr H. Friedrichs, Herr M. Rötger, and Freiherr von Wangenheim, forming the Council. It was founded, under the patronage of the King of Bulgaria, for the purpose of stimulating and developing intercourse between the Central Powers and Bulgaria. It issues at Sofia its official organ, a newspaper bearing the title of the 'Deutsche Balkan Zeitung,' edited by the well-known German journalist, Hans Fischer ('Kurt Aram').

Similar organisations are the German-Balkan Society (*Deutsch-Balkan Verein*), which has issued, through the Berlin firm of Rudolf Mosse, a 'Commercial Guide to the Balkans' (*Balkan-Handelsführer*), and the German-Turkish Society (*Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung*). The articles of association of the German-Turkish Society, which are akin to those of similar institutions, provide for the sending of German teachers to Turkey, the establishment of libraries and other educational centres, the distribution of literature and other publicity material, and assistance for Turkish subjects who wish to complete their education in Germany. As this society is typical, an extract from its report for 1916 may be given :

'During the three years of its existence the Society has contributed largely to the support and enlargement of German schools in Turkey (Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Jerusalem) and has founded a school of its own in Adana—the junction-place of Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and Syria. Courses in the German language have been instituted in a number of Turkish towns; German teachers have been appointed at the cost of the Society in all kinds of Turkish schools. It is a tribute to the success of the methods of the Society that a member of its committee, Geh. Regierungsrat Prof. Dr Franz Schmidt, received an appointment as adviser to the Turkish Ministry of Education in order to cooperate in the reorganisation of Turkish schools. Professor Schmidt is also the organiser and intermediary for the admission of 100 Turkish youths to German educational institutions—a movement now under the auspices of the Society and greatly facilitated by the friendly cooperation of German municipalities. Besides this, the placing of Turkish pupils, especially trade apprentices, in German establishments and business houses has been promoted from the very outset, and is proceeding regularly.

'While a knowledge of Germany has been disseminated in Turkey by the circulation of tens of thousands of popular

pamphlets in the Turkish language, the Society is making every effort to promote a correspondingly better understanding of Turkish life and ideas in Germany. It has instituted lectures about Turkey; and, in connexion with these, the greater part of the Society's 4000 members in the bigger towns of the various provinces and states have formed themselves into local and provincial leagues. Courses in the Turkish language have been instituted in Berlin and many other towns. Medical work in Turkey has been promoted by the creation of a permanent medical committee under the direction of Ministerial-Direktor Geh. Obermedizinalrat Dr Kirchner, who arranged for the erection of clinical establishments and hospitals in Turkey, for the carrying out of which means will be found after the conclusion of peace. These will be primarily concerned with the combating and cure of endemical diseases, such as malaria, recurrent fever, and syphilis. The chief stations on the Bagdad and Anatolia railways are at present the centres for such medical work, more especially Konia, Aleppo, and Bagdad, besides Jerusalem, where German initiative has for some time past taken up the fight against malaria. Special attention will also be devoted to the improvement of midwifery in Turkey.

'It is a year ago since a Turkish-German Society (*Türkisch-Deutsche Vereinigung*) was formed, side by side with the German-Turkish Society, under the presidency of Enver Pasha, at Constantinople. Amongst its members are the German Ambassador, the Grand Vizier, Prince Said Halim Pasha, and the Ministers, Talaat Bey, Halil Bey, and Dschemal Pasha (in Damascus). . . .

'The German-Turkish Society has also established a special Information Bureau for German-Turkish Economic Questions (*Auskunftstelle für Deutsche-Türkische Wirtschaftsfragen*), which is in direct relations with authoritative sources in Turkey and Germany, to supply, free of charge, information on all trade and commercial matters relating to Germany and Turkey.'

An Institute of Science and Economics in the Near East (*Institut für die Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft des Vordern Orients*), with Herr Beit von Speyer as President, and Prof. Arndt and Consul-General Krebs as Vice-Presidents, has recently been founded at Frankfort. Apart from propagandist work for the general aims of the German-Turkish Society, opportunities will be given to members for obtaining information concerning the relations between Germany and Turkey, especially as regards

economics and science. It is intended to establish an Institute of Science and Economics of the Near East, which, in connexion with the universities, high schools, and libraries of south-west Germany, will collect information relating to the East and communicate information on questions of national and private trade.

The German Asia Minor Society (*Deutsche Vorderasiengesellschaft*), with which is associated the Asia Minor Institute (*Vorderasieninstitut*), was founded at Leipzig in 1905 for the purpose (to quote the prospectus) of 'the promotion of German research and cultural work in the Islamic East.' The President is Dr Hugo Grothe, Lecturer at Leipzig University, a well-known writer on the Near East. The Society has an Information Bureau, which collects material relating to German trade and economic conditions in Turkey, the Balkans, North Africa, and Persia. It publishes the '*Deutsches Vorderasiens- und Balkanarchiv*,' issued as a supplement to the quarterly review, '*Deutsche Kultur in der Welt*,' the official organ of the Society for spreading German Civilisation (*Deutsche Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft*), which also has its headquarters at Leipzig.

The German Levant Association (*Deutscher Levante Verband*), by the energy it has displayed since its foundation in March 1916, has taken a prominent position among the propagandist societies operating in the Near East. Its object, according to its own statement, is to promote and to safeguard German trade, industry and finance in the Near East, in constant touch with, though quite independently of, the official authorities, without regard to selfish private interests or monopolistic endeavours. Its labours extend over the entire Near and Middle East, the Balkan States, Greece, Turkey and Persia. In order to facilitate economic activity abroad for its members, it helps them to secure import and export permits as promptly, and capital and credits as easily, as possible, and advises them in respect of the purchase of land. It has established a special Export and Import Bureau, which accepts offers of every kind of agricultural and industrial product. Its Market Reports (*Orient Markt-Berichte*) enumerate import and export business openings. It has set up an Information Bureau, which has already had opportunities of

cooperating in the acquisition of mining concessions, and in arrangements for the erection of factories. Apart from this, it is engaged in organising sample depôts of German agricultural and industrial products in Constantinople, Sofia, and Belgrade. A further sample depôt at Berlin for Oriental products is in contemplation. This Association has an official organ, the 'Deutsche Levante-Zeitung,' which advertises for the Hamburg-America Line, the German Levant Line, the German-Balkan Society, and the German-Bulgarian Society.

German propaganda rears its head all over Asia. There is at Berlin the German-Asiatic Association (*Deutsch-Asiatische Gesellschaft*), of which Field-Marshal Freiherr von der Goltz was President until his death in 1916. He was succeeded by General Raschdau, who had previously served as Vice-President, has held official positions in the East and has been in the Asiatic Department of the German Foreign Office. Another organisation, the German-Persian Economic Association (*Deutsch-Persischer Wirtschaftsverband*), has for its object the promotion of trade relations between Germany and Persia. It is, by its articles of association, debarred from independent economic operations and political activity :

'When peace is concluded,' so runs a passage in the prospectus, 'Persia, with its great natural resources, will be of great importance to the German import and export trades; and, in order to prepare for this period, it has been determined to start immediately on the preliminary work.'

Though, for the time being, its activities are paralysed, mention must be made of the German-Chinese Society (*Deutsch-Chinesischer Verband*), Berlin, which was founded for the purpose of acquainting the Chinese with the achievements of German science and technical progress, and of promoting trade relations between Germany and China. The importance attached in Germany to propaganda in China is clearly indicated by the standing of the members of the Board of Directors, amongst whom are Freiherr von Mumm (President), Admiral von Truppel (Secretary); Fr. Urbig, manager of the Disconto-Gesellschaft (Treasurer); Dr von Böttinger, Member of the Prussian Herrenhaus; Herr H. Friedrichs, President of the German Union of Manufacturers; Herr G. Rötger,

President of the Central Association of German Manufacturers; and Dr Schrameier, of the Admiralty, who edits the monthly official organ of the Association, the 'China-Archiv.'

The Indian Association (*Indische Gesellschaft*) at Berlin, the Secretary of which is Verendranath Chattopadhyaya, is in close touch with the anti-English newspaper, the 'Hindustan Ghadar' of San Francisco, and the so-called Indian National Party. This Association differs from most of the other societies mentioned in that, so far as can be seen, it has no *raison d'être* other than an attempt to injure Britain by endeavouring to stir up sedition in India. It has produced a mass of literature, much of which claims to have been printed in England by presses which never existed. Among the pamphlets it circulates is 'British Rule in India condemned by the British themselves,' a patchwork of utterances by more or less distinguished Englishmen from Clive to Keir Hardie, which, like the reprint of W. J. Bryan's article under an almost similar title, has, under the auspices of the Association, been translated into many languages. It has recently issued a sequel to this work, 'Why India is in Revolt against British Rule.'

That Germany is well aware that its Berlin-to-Bagdad scheme has miscarried may be deduced from the energy which it has lately devoted to creating a favourable impression in the republics of Central and South America. These countries have always been regarded with the greatest interest by Germany, for there it saw great markets for its manufactures. As the war progresses, what was hitherto interest has become anxiety; for Germany has reluctantly come to the conclusion that, when peace is concluded, its European markets will have vastly contracted, and that Central and South America may perhaps be, not one, but almost the only dumping-ground for its goods.

Spain and Portugal are the mother-lands of the Latin countries in America; and one society worked at first through both the parent-countries, and, since Portugal joined the Allies, now works through Spain. This is the bi-monthly 'News-service for the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking Countries' (*Nachrichtendienst für*

die Länder spanischer und portugiesischer Zunge),* which has its headquarters at Frankfort, and is therefore often referred to briefly as the Frankfort Bureau. Founded immediately after the outbreak of war, for the special purposes of influencing public opinion in the Latin countries of Europe and South America, and of supplying information about these countries to the Foreign Office, it is frankly nothing more nor less than a propagandist organisation. Early in 1915 the Foreign Office made the Bureau a grant of M.10,000, and from May of that year gave it a monthly subsidy of M.3000, which in September was increased to M.4000, 'in recognition of the undoubted usefulness of the information service in the interests of truth in Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries.'

The Frankfort Bureau was hard at work within a few days of its inception, and its progress has been very rapid. In August 1914 it had on its books but a few hundred names to which propagandist literature could be sent. Then the Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank (known in America as the Banco Alemán Transatlántico), which is run by the Deutsche Bank, and has branches in all Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries, assisted it to compile large lists and to select its agents. At the end of 1914 no less than 3000 copies of its publications were distributed in Spain; while in August 1915 the number of copies printed was 7500 in Spanish, 4000 in Portuguese and 1700 in German. There is reason to believe that the number of paying subscribers is insignificant. That money was urgently needed by the Bureau is proved by the fact that the receipts from all sources for the year ending Aug. 31, 1915, amounted to less than 3000%. Since it was obviously impossible for it with so small an income adequately to carry on its various activities, there can be no question but that heavy contributions to its war chest have been made either by the State or by the great industrialists who hope presently to profit by its labours.

The Frankfort Bureau's Intelligence Section works on the same lines as that of Transocean, with which it

* This appears in translations as 'Servicio de informaciones para los países de lengua española y portuguesa' and 'Serviço de Informações para a America Latina.'

has a working agreement. It works mainly through its branch at Barcelona, of which Herr August H. Hofer is the Director. Through Barcelona it issues a daily press-service to the leading newspapers in Spain, transmitting news inspired by the Wilhelmstrasse; it invites the editors to print any article from these publications, and supplies for their use the principal German newspapers. At Barcelona it founded in 1916 two daily newspapers, 'Correspondencia Alemana,' printed in Spanish, and 'Deutsche Warte,' printed in German, both of which are avowedly issued by the Deutscher Nachrichtendienst für Spanien, an abbreviated form of the full title of the Bureau. It is also responsible for the fortnightly review, 'Germania,' which has a circulation of 3000 copies, and probably of the French weekly paper 'La Vérité,' both of which are edited by Luis Almerich and are published at Barcelona. The Bureau circulates Spanish and Portuguese editions of Transocean's magazine, 'Der Grosse Krieg in Bildern'; the Arabic papers and pamphlets prepared by the News-service for the Orient, to 'enlighten the Syrian and Arabic colonies in South America as to the state of affairs'; the Spanish and Portuguese editions of the 'Hamburger Nachrichten' (*El Heraldillo de Hamburgo* and *O Mensajeiro de Hamburgo*) and 'Welt im Bild' (issued by the 'Hamburger Fremdenblatt').

The kindred society, the German South-American Institute (*Deutsch-Südamerikanisches Institut*), known in South America as El Instituto Sud-Americano Alemán de Aquisgran, was founded on Dec. 29, 1912, at Bonn, but it has since transferred its headquarters to Aachen, and has Committees at Stuttgart and Barcelona. The President is Professor Dr Steinmann, of Bonn; and the Prussian Minister of Education sits on the Board of Directors. The Institute—so runs its programme—

'is a union of Germans and Latin-Americans, who maintain intellectual relations between Germany and the countries of Latin-America.' 'Its purpose is to foster these relations. . . . Questions of politics and creed are excluded.'

It endeavours to fulfil its aims by issuing publications, by assisting the exchange of publications issued by its members, as well as those issued by authorities, institutions, associations, and other public bodies, and by

supporting scientific institutions for information and research in Germany and in Latin-America.

The Institute issued in 1916 a circular letter headed 'An Appeal for participation in an effective increase of German influence in South and Central America,' which was printed in its 'Transactions' (November 1916). This letter runs as follows :

'Not the least important task which will confront Germany after the war is the provision of a more thorough and effective scheme of enlightening and influencing foreign opinion in the German interest. The war has made us realise as we never did before how much this has hitherto been neglected, being left, as it were, to particular groups and individuals, and not furthered by the nation as a whole, nor even by its leading elements. After much preliminary investigation and consultation, we have come to the conclusion that for the practical accomplishment of this task there must be, in the first place, a division of work into (i) the news-service for the foreign press, (ii) the safeguarding of German economic interests abroad, (iii) the cultivation of scientific and artistic relations with foreign countries on the lines of a general "cultural" policy. In the second place, it is necessary to make a geographical division, in order to do justice to the linguistic, political, and cultural peculiarities of each single sphere of activity abroad. The Institute, with the consent and support of the Imperial and the Prussian authorities concerned, has undertaken the third task within the extremely important and culturally homogeneous sphere constituted by the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries of Southern and Central America. The direction of the news-service and the safeguarding of economic interests will be set apart for other institutions to deal with.'

The Institute's collection of information with regard to South America is carried out on an elaborate scale; and an attempt is being made to build up a *bureau de renseignements*, from which Germans may obtain information concerning South America, and South Americans information concerning Germany. Such a collection is made possible by the cooperation of various scientific bodies. Commercial information concerning South America is collected by the central office of the Hamburg Colonial Institute, medical information concerning both Germany and South America by the General Hospital

at Hamburg-Eppendorf, other scientific information concerning America by the Seminary for the Romance Languages and Civilisation (*Seminar für Romanische Sprachen und Kultur*) in Hamburg. Technical information regarding German and South American questions is collected by the bureau at Aachen. Inquiries may be made in Spanish, Portuguese or German, and are answered free of charge. The Institute, with the assistance of the Prussian Ministry of Education, which made it a grant in 1915, has founded at Aachen a South-American Library, which will be housed for public use in a building provided by that city.

The Institute issues, besides 'El Mensajero de Ultramar' and 'O Transatlantico,' the monthly review, 'Mitteilungen des Deutsch-Südamerikanischen Institut.' It acts also as middleman for the distribution in Central and South America of the publications of kindred societies. For the Seminary for Romance Languages and Civilisation it circulates the monthly review, 'La Cultura Latino-Americana'; and for the German-Spanish Society of Hamburg, of which Dr Eddebüttel is chairman, a pro-German history of the war in monthly numbers, 'La Guerra Europea, mirada por un Sud-Americano. Crónica politico-militar'; the author of which is Lieut. J. G. Guerrero, Peruvian military attaché at Berlin. Like all other German propagandist societies, it issues the pictorial war-edition of the 'Hamburger Fremdenblatt,' and the weekly editions of the 'Hamburger Nachrichten.' It has, of course, agents in all the countries of Central and South America; and the resources and influence of the Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank and the Brazilianische Bank für Deutschland are everywhere at its disposal.

Scarcely less important than the German South-American Institute is the Hamburg Iberian-American Society (*Hamburgischer Ibero-Amerikanischer Verein*, known in America as the *Sociedad Ibero-Americana de Hamburgo*), the President of which is Prof. B. Schädel, the vice-chairman of the Council of the German South-American Institute. Among its supporters are the shipping companies, Woermann and Kosmos, and the great newspaper combine, of which the best-known organ is the 'Hamburger Nachrichten.' An article from 'El

Heraldo de Hamburgo by Dr Llorens, a South-American who is Lecturer on Spanish Life and Language at Hamburg, officially circulated, states that the object of the Society is 'to establish closer relations between Germany and the Latin-American countries, making the life and institutions of each country better known to the inhabitants of the other.' A circular letter written in Spanish, and issued broadcast, sets forth the advantages to be gained by membership of the Hamburg Iberian-American Society. Information, free of charge, is supplied in Spanish and Portuguese on science, art, literature, and economics concerning Germany and the Latin-American countries; advice for those visiting Germany for the purposes of business, study, or pleasure, and accommodation at special rates in hotels in Germany, Spain, and Latin-America; and despatch gratis of the publications of the Society, and of '*El Heraldo de Hamburgo*' and '*La Cultura Latino-Americana*.'

The Society apparently desires to appeal as a kind of Young Men's Christian Association, with the religion left out. What it actually is may be gathered from the appeal issued by the Committee of the Society in German only. This document lets the cat out of the bag. No longer is the Society represented as a philanthropic organisation, which showers benefits upon its members in return for a nominal subscription; nothing is said about its pacific designs; nor is there any reprobation of 'national exclusiveness.' It is all very clever, only not quite clever enough; you are offered in the one document God, in the other Mammon; and it is obvious that both masters cannot be equally well served.

The appeal in German starts by saying that the war has shown the result of Germany's neglect of the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking peoples, and complains that England and France, by their organisation, their ruthless Press control, their teaching, and other methods, have forestalled Germany in South America, and thus have been able to disseminate their anti-German propaganda with its catchwords of Huns, Boches, and *Kultur*. 'A gigantic struggle lies before Germany and German trade against French influence in the intellectual sphere and against English capital in the economic sphere.' The objects of the Society are then enumerated—to counteract

enemy propaganda, to strengthen German influence, to spread the knowledge of the German language and science, to make known Germany's services and her real method, and to establish and cultivate sound and useful connexions in economic, social, literary, and scientific spheres. These ends, it is further stated, are to be achieved by the distribution of the 'El Herald de Hamburgo' and 'La Cultura Latino-Americana,' the issue of works on special subjects in Spanish and Portuguese, the extension of the German book-trade, the subsidising of the native Press, the intercourse with institutes and officials, and the appointment of confidential agents; also by persuading South Americans to visit Germany for professional and technical instruction or for pleasure, promoting intercourse with them at Hamburg, and spreading the study of the Latin languages in Germany.

The German Economic Union for South and Central America (*Deutscher Wirtschaftsverband für Süd- und Mittelamerika*), Berlin, is run on much the same lines. The Union is associated with the German-Argentine Central Association for the Promotion of Economic Interests (*Deutsch-Argentinischer Zentralverband für Förderung wirtschaftlicher Interessen*), the President of which is Herr Waetge, a wool-merchant; and the German-Brazilian Commercial Association (*Deutsch-Brasilianischer Handelsverband*), the President of which is Herr G. Maschke. These gentlemen, with Dr B. Dernburg, are the Presidents of the German Economic Union for South and Central America; and on its committee sit representatives of the Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank and the Deutsche Bank für Südamerika.

Within the limits of this article it is impossible to give full particulars of all the German propagandist societies, but enough has been said to show what an enormous amount of trouble they have taken, and what vast sums they must have expended. The entire world has, through the agency of these institutions, been told that Germany is the greatest country in the world, the Germans the most wonderful people in the world, and German *Kultur* the last note in civilisation. Wherever you go, in neutral countries, you will find a paper uttering the most violent pro-German sentiments; and, if

you are behind the scenes, you can with little difficulty estimate what the expression of these sentiments costs the Fatherland.

The United States, China, and the republics of Central and South America, in particular, have been wooed persistently—with what result the whole world knows. China, the United States, Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Brazil have declared war on Germany; Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua have severed diplomatic relations. How great a blow this must be, can be imagined from the fact that, at the first annual meeting of the German Economic Union for South and Central America, held at Berlin, Sept. 1, 1915, Herr G. Maschke, President of the German-Brazilian Commercial Association, stated that 'South and Central America are our greatest assets overseas.'

Evidence that Germany for some time past has been realising the comparative futility of these propagandist efforts is to be found in the declaration by Herr Waetge, President of the German-Argentine Central Association for the Development of Economic Interests, at the annual meeting of that society, Dec. 15, 1915, that the report of the work done, which he had just read to the members, must not be published because 'our enemies, especially England, closely watch our activities and seek to counteract them.' The third annual report of the German-American Commercial Association, published on Oct. 1, 1916, is more frankly pessimistic.

'In reviewing the past, account must be taken of the extraordinary obstacles presented by the continuance of the war to commerce between Germany and the United States,' so runs a passage in that report. 'England's disregard of all written and unwritten rules of international law has introduced a state of anarchy into international trade relations, which no one before the war would have supposed even theoretically possible. German firms trading with America have remained for months without news of their business friends there. Robbery of the post has become a daily institution; the possibility of trade has been reduced to a minimum; and only a small part of the former exchange of goods between the two mighty nations can be maintained.'

This is pleasant reading for English readers, who, if

they wanted heartening, will be cheered by the knowledge that Germany itself admits that, in spite of her long-prepared schemes, her commerce has been hit much harder than they supposed 'even theoretically possible.' Light is also thrown on the German mind, and its strange limitations. Germany may break treaties, and commit atrocities of all kinds, but it was unthinkable that England should interfere with German trade. Commercial relations being at a standstill for the time being, the German-American Association states in the same report that it is

'making preparations for reconstruction after the conclusion of peace; that, in particular, great attention is being devoted to the New York organisation; and that every effort must be made to unite all groups interested in German commercial relations with the United States, so as to be in a position, when the time comes, without financial hindrance, to realise our projects by well-planned and energetic action.'

Within a few months of this utterance an American Admiral was in temporary command of the British fleet off the coast of Ireland, American troops were co-operating in the field with the Allies, and American factories were working day and night to assist in the overthrow of Germany. All the mean little tricks and quibbles, all the underhand devices, all the elaborate tissue of false representations have been blown away as by a draught of fresh air.

LEWIS MELVILLE.

Art. 6.—AMERICA'S FIRST YEAR OF WAR.

It is a common saying in America, and a true saying, that in no previous war undertaken by the United States has public opinion been so united as it has become since April 6, 1917. In the Revolutionary War the 'Loyalists' nearly equalled the 'Patriots' in numbers; and, while lack of organisation deprived them of the means of effectively opposing the movement for independence, they were strong enough to give to the Revolution many of the aspects of a civil war. In the War of 1812 the disaffection of New England was notorious; and in the Mexican War of 1848, disapproval of the objects of the war and distrust of the motives of the Administration found vigorous expression in many parts of the country. In the Civil War the North was by no means a unit; and in the War with Spain, while popular enthusiasm was at a white heat during the brief period of hostilities, there were many men of prominence and ability who denounced the war as imperialistic.

Opposition to American participation in the present war came, a year ago, mainly from four sources—the German part of the population, which still sympathised with Germany; a minority of the Irish element, whose antagonism to England determined its position on all international questions; the Pacifists, whose abhorrence of war was so great that it obscured their distinction between right and wrong; and the Socialists, whose organisation had fallen into the hands of those who were working in German interests.

During the past year the opposition from these sources has been rendered ineffective, and has greatly diminished in intensity. Among the German-Americans, sympathy with the present Government of Germany, with its aims and methods, has declined, until it is not too much to say that the average German-American is entirely loyal to the United States in its present conflict, without however being aroused to any great degree of enthusiasm. The German press, now required to print its editorial articles in English as well as in German, shows an increasing support of the Administration, and in some instances, at least, accepts the military defeat of the Central Powers

as necessary to the future safety of the world. Prominent German-Americans have given the cause of the United States and its allies their whole-hearted support; and from their lips have come some of the most vigorous denunciations of the German Government and of the spirit which dominates Germany, that have appeared.

During the past year there has been noticeable a breaking-up of organisations and institutions designed to foster the traditions, language, and *Kultur* of Germany, which tended to keep the German-Americans a separate element in the population. Apart from the various groups, passing under different and rapidly changing names, such as the American Truth Society, the Embargo Conference, Labour's Peace Council, and many others, which were but thinly disguised agencies of German war propaganda, and whose activities, once America had entered the war, were clearly seditious, older and more respectable societies, which had been agencies for German propaganda in times of peace, have disappeared. The largest and most influential of these, the German-American Alliance, which indeed had been guilty of endeavouring to influence elections in favour of Germany, has recently, and during the course of a searching Congressional enquiry into its methods and motives, voted its own dissolution. German propaganda in the schools, under the guise of teaching the German language, has met with a severe check. In many localities, the study of German has been dropped from the school curricula; and everywhere there has been a decrease of fifty per cent. or more in the number of those electing to study German, while there has been an almost corresponding increase in the number of pupils studying French and Spanish. Throughout the country all things German are increasingly unpopular; and, while there is not that blazing hatred of Germany, that would be the inevitable result of the extension of German war practices to American shores, there is a growing detestation of what Germany represents, and an increasing desire to crush for ever the German 'thing' that has driven the United States into the greatest undertaking in its history.

As the old forms of German propaganda disappear, new forms, with an opposite purpose, are springing up. Thus an organisation of Friends of German Democracy

is endeavouring to introduce democratic propaganda into Germany; and quite recently there has been reported the organisation of a society in Chicago composed of descendants of German refugees of 1848, whose object is to make the Germany of to-day understand why its practices and aims make it an outcast among nations, to 'teach the German people what America is and what the Republic stands for, and to teach German-Americans the wisdom of loyalty to their chosen land.'

Among the Irish in America, apart from a few professional agitators now known to have been in German pay, there has been no question as to their loyalty to the United States. They made no opposition to a war with Germany, but the thought of a practical alliance with Great Britain was gall and wormwood to some of them. While the Sinn Fein element is not particularly strong among Irish-Americans, a lively sense of hostility to England has been transmitted from generation to generation and has been kept uppermost by fresh arrivals from Ireland and by certain unfortunate exigencies of American politics. Of late, however, two considerations have seemed to be receiving recognition: first, that it is intolerable that American policy should be determined by factors entirely foreign to America; and second, that if the Irish problem is still a most intricate and puzzling one, this is due mainly to the failure of the Irish to reach any agreement among themselves. If Americans had but small patience with Ulster in 1914, they had still less with Sinn Fein in 1916.

The views of the average Americans are probably fairly represented by an editorial on the Irish question in 'The Public' of April 6—a periodical which, to say the least can hardly be regarded as reactionary:

'It is against the tyranny of a historical, traditional, conception of the Irish question that "The Public" wishes to protest. . . . If anything, we have spoiled our fellow citizens of Irish descent with too ready acquiescence in all their inherited prejudices. They enjoy a tremendous popularity; and we have been more than tolerant toward what has become almost a cult of hyphenated Americanism. . . . We have acquiesced in any amount of this sort of thing because, first, we loved the Irish, and, secondly, because we made allowances for days of oppression and for the instinct of men not quite

sure of their ground to assert themselves. But Irish origin has surely established itself on a firm enough footing to call for the modifying of an attitude that is unfriendly to free discussion. It is also to be said that politicians of one kind and another have built up in this country a wicked and unwholesome vested interest in the Irish question as a sure means of mobilising Irish support. Whenever a politician of a certain type has wished to get "the Irish vote," he has rhetorically twisted the lion's tail; and men and women to whom Ireland is no more than a half-forgotten old wives' tale have responded with their emotions and their votes. Anything like a real settlement of the Irish question would be a calamity to these men.'

Of the Pacifists, some, like Henry Ford, have come to realise that a durable and worth-while peace can be had only by fighting for it, and have turned all their energies to aiding the country in the prosecution of the war. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which, however, was never pacifist in any opprobrious sense, has expressed its attitude by embossing in red letters on its stationery the words 'Peace through victory.' William J. Bryan—whose pacifism, in so far as it obstructed any efforts that might have enabled the country to take an effective part in the war at an earlier date, had most mischievous results—has contented himself, in the main, with oratorical efforts to stimulate agricultural production and has almost dropped out of sight since the declaration of war. The truth is that supine pacifism has never taken deep root in the American character; and little patience is accorded to the few who still make audible protest against the war.

The Socialists, who have been a factor, but not a considerable one, in American politics, only during the last few years, have been avowedly opposed to the war. The party is made up, for the most part, of Americans of foreign birth or extraction. Several of the leading members of the Socialist party have left it, because of what they considered to be its disloyal attitude, among them being Charles E. Russell and John Spargo. Two other members of the Executive Committee have recently been candidates for office. Morris Hilquitt, Socialist candidate for the Mayoralty of New York, received 141,000 votes in the city election last fall, as against 298,000 votes

for Hylan, the Democratic candidate, who was elected, 149,000 for Mitchel, the fusion candidate who stood for re-election, and 53,000 for Bennett, the Republican candidate. In the senatorial election in Wisconsin, last April, Victor L. Berger, another member of the National Committee, and under Federal indictment for sedition, received 110,000 votes, against Lenroot, Republican, who was elected by 142,000 votes, and Davies, Democrat, who got 132,000 votes. In the Chicago municipal elections held at about the same time, the Socialists lost one of their three members on the City Council. The large Socialist vote in the New York and Wisconsin elections is to be explained by the fact that, in each case, the candidate undoubtedly drew heavily from German and anti-ally forces, numerically strong in both places. The Socialist party has afforded almost the only rallying ground for those opposed to the war; and, whatever its potential future strength, its actual power is relatively small.

Very erroneously, many have tried to see in the New York and Wisconsin elections a test of American devotion to the cause in which the country is engaged. In New York, the friends of Mayor Mitchel advertised him as the fighting mayor; a vote for him was declared to be equivalent to a shot at the Kaiser. The Democratic candidate for office contented himself with declarations to the effect that no American could outdo him in loyalty. When it came to voting, the issue of the war played a relatively small part; local issues, especially with regard to the schools, were far more important. It is probable that, beyond those who voted for Hilquitt, very few had any conscious intention of passing judgment on the war when they cast their ballots. Furthermore, it must be remembered that Tammany Hall, the Democratic political machine, which ordinarily controls New York, but which had been out of power for four years, was, in the normal course of events, 'due to come back' in 1917.

In Wisconsin there was no choice as to loyalty between the Democratic and Republican candidates. The State is normally Republican, and the Republican candidate was elected. There, too, the Socialist vote probably measured the struggle of the disaffected. In the Republican primary, however, which preceded the election

by only a few days, there were two candidates—Thompson, backed by Senator LaFollette, whose expulsion from the Senate on grounds of disloyalty has frequently been demanded, and who had received a vote of censure from his own legislature; and Lenroot, who ran on a platform supporting the war. The LaFollette candidate was defeated, but by a narrow margin. When it is remembered that the Republican party in Wisconsin contains a very large German element, and that LaFollette, in spite of his attitude toward the war, is still gratefully remembered in that State because of his identification with a host of liberal measures, it is not surprising that the contest within the party was so close, or that many voters refused to regard it as a contest over the issues of the war.

Nothing could be more misleading than the results of state and local elections as indices of the American attitude toward the war. The Democratic President will have as hearty and effective support from the Republican governor of Massachusetts, elected last November, as he will have from the Democratic governor of Missouri, elected a year earlier. Local elections are determined mainly by local issues, with which the war has nothing to do. Furthermore, in a country so large as the United States, the population of which is so heterogeneous, where issues vary so widely and local governments are so entirely detached from the national government, it is especially dangerous to generalise from the results of local elections.

During the past year the American people has gone through a process of education unexampled in its history. This process had its beginnings, indeed, in 1914; but these preliminary stages have been so admirably described by Mr G. L. Beer in his book on 'The English-speaking Peoples,' that they need not be recounted here. On April 1, 1917, the average American knew that his sympathies were strongly with the Allies. He was convinced that Germany was the aggressor in 1914; he was shocked by the German methods of carrying on the war; he was highly indignant (though his hot wrath over the 'Lusitania' had somewhat abated) at the German attitude towards the United States. Of course there were

thousands of Americans, in all parts of the country—not merely on the Atlantic sea-board—who had been chafing for two years because their country had not yet entered the ranks of the belligerents; but opposed to them were millions who were not only not convinced that the United States should take part in the war, but who were strongly of the opinion that she should not. If the elections of 1916 had been clearly on the issues of a more or less benevolent neutrality *versus* active participation in the war, they would have been carried overwhelmingly by those in favour of neutrality.

When, therefore, the Administration was forced to recognise that the continuance of neutrality had become intolerable, its first duty was to convince the American people that this was indeed so. Fighting 'to make the world safe for democracy' was very well, and the idea of it was rather stimulating; but, to the average American, democracy seemed reasonably safe in his own neighbourhood, and, indeed, upon all the continent of North America north of the Rio Grande. If Europe was not safe for democracy, let the Europeans make it so. That the United States was actually menaced, that, if the Central Powers were victorious and dominant in Europe, America must put itself upon a military footing of the greatest magnitude and would be compelled, in all probability and in the not too distant future, to contend with Germany in armed conflict—these eventualities were not altogether clear. The first step in the process of education, therefore, was to convince Americans that the war in which they were engaging was in reality a war of self-defence.

In his war-message of April 2, 1917, the President expressed the conviction of the Government that the German 'Government entertains no real friendship for us, and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience.' Later, Mr Lansing, Secretary of State, said in an address:

'Let us understand once for all that this is no war to establish an abstract principle of right. It is a war in which the future of the United States is at stake. If any among you has the idea that we are fighting others' battles and not our own, the sooner he gets away from that idea the better it will be for him, the better it will be for all of us. Imagine Germany

victor in Europe because the United States remained neutral. Who then, think you, would be the next victim of those who are seeking to be masters of the whole earth? Would not this country, with its enormous wealth, arouse the cupidity of an impoverished though triumphant Germany? Would not this democracy be the only obstacle between the autocratic rulers of Germany and their supreme ambition? Do you think that they would withhold their hand from so rich a prize?

'Let me then ask you, would it be easier or wiser for this country, single-handed, to resist a German Empire flushed with victory and with great armies and navies at its command, than to unite with the brave opponents of that Empire in ending now and for all time this menace to our future? Primarily, then, every man who crosses the ocean to fight on foreign soil against the armies of the German Emperor goes forth to fight for his country and for the preservation of those things for which our forefathers were willing to die.'

Such arguments as these served as text for a vast quantity of published matter, editorials, articles in periodicals, pamphlets, and for numberless speeches. Agencies of the Government and voluntary organisations cooperated in carrying on the educational campaign. The imperialistic designs of Germany were studied and exposed; substantial volumes were compiled of extracts from German sources, to show how far the imagination of the German people had been fired by dreams and deliberate plans of world-conquest. Long before the end of the first year, Americans in general were amply convinced that their country was fighting, not only for high ideals of freedom and right, but for its own protection against the most sinister menace.

Another step in the process of American education was due to German peace intrigues. In the early months of last year there were to be found many in America who would have welcomed a peace by negotiation. There were those—and not all of them were under German influence—who urged that the President should state clearly the terms upon which the United States would negotiate a peace. Those who realised the futility of a premature discussion of peace terms pointed out that the President had already, in his various messages to Congress and in his public addresses, indicated with

perfect clearness the objects of the United States in entering the war, and that any restatement of these objects was superfluous and would be misunderstood as an evidence of weakening resolution. The peace movement in the United States, if it was entitled to be dignified by that name, came to a head, or rather to an anticlimax, in the meeting of the so-called People's Council of America for Democracy and Terms of Peace in Chicago in the early fall of 1917. This group, the motives of which were more than suspected, was composed of Socialists and discredited Pacifists. It was refused permission to hold a meeting in several towns of the Middle West; and in one place at least its members were forced, by indignant citizens, to make a hurried departure. When at last it succeeded in holding a meeting in Chicago, it had become an object of ridicule as well as of suspicion; and its high-sounding resolutions, demanding a restatement of terms of peace, found no answering sentiment in public opinion.

In his reply to the Pope and in his Flag-Day address of June 14, 1917, the President exposed the nature of the German peace-intrigue, laid bare the ulterior motives of the German Government, and demonstrated the danger to America and to the world of even an apparent readiness to listen to the insidious proposals. As a result of the President's words and of the support and elaboration they received from numberless writers and editors, the mass of Americans came to understand clearly the uselessness of talking peace at this time.

Nevertheless the President considered it to be a part of his duty to conduct an offensive of his own, with the twofold purpose of giving encouragement to the Liberal elements within the German Empire, and of detaching, if possible, Austria from her overshadowing ally. Later, when the Russian *débâcle* was at its height, the President's policy had the further object of endeavouring to rally the moral forces of that unhappy country. This 'diplomatic offensive,' as it came to be called, was watched by the country with interest and sympathy, if with no very great confidence in its effectiveness. When on Jan. 8, 1918, the President, in addressing the Senate, enumerated fourteen specific objects as representing the principles for which the United States is contending, his programme

met with general approval—which does not, of course, mean that there were no dissenting voices. The complete restoration of Northern France, of Belgium, and of Serbia, as inevitable results of the war, have long been assumed. His reference to Alsace-Lorraine, for the first time specifically mentioned by him, aroused real enthusiasm, although a newspaper discussion at once arose as to the proper method of righting the wrong of 1871. When on Feb. 11, President Wilson replied to Count Czernin and Count von Hertling, enumerating the four principles which he deemed essential to any further comparison of views between the two groups of belligerents, there was a distinct sense of disappointment, a feeling that the President had in some way ‘backed down’ from the position he had taken a month before. A careful comparison of the two documents does not appear to justify this view; if their order had been reversed, the fourteen specific objects of Jan. 8 would have seemed to be logically evolved from the four principles of Feb. 11.

However, it is undoubtedly true that the great majority of Americans were growing weary of the ‘diplomatic offensive.’ The negotiations of Brest-Litovsk and the German aggressions which followed silenced even the Socialists and Pacifists who had been clamouring for a ‘peace by understanding.’ The country, as a whole, was eager to put an end to further discussion of this sort and to proceed to vigorous action. Its education with respect to German peace intrigue had been effected. Thus it was that the President’s address at Baltimore on April 6, the first anniversary of the declaration of war, called forth an instant and enthusiastic response.

‘What, then, are we to do? For myself, I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely proposed—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer.

‘I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the

world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything that we say, my fellow-countrymen, everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response, till the majesty and might of our concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat the force of those who flout and misprize what we honour and hold dear.

'Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it or dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.'

The education of Americans during the year has thus accomplished two major results. A fuller knowledge of German designs and ambitions has convinced them that they are fighting for their own future safety and well-being; and the exposure of the German peace intrigue has convinced them that this future safety and well-being can be secured only through a defeat of the military forces of the Central Powers. But these are not the only results. A year of contact with European problems has quickened American interest in the history and geography of Europe and the Near East. It is dawning on American consciousness that the question of who shall control Bagdad and the route thither has more than academic interest for the United States. The average American has not yet any very clear ideas about the Ukraine and the Jugo-Slavs, but he is beginning to seek information respecting them. A popular weekly magazine, the most widely read in America, has in recent numbers contained long and informing articles on such subjects as the German effort in Belgium to detach the Flemings from the Walloons, and the economic significance of control over Lorraine and the Longwy and Briey basins. In short, there are countless evidences that Americans are seriously endeavouring to become informed respecting the issues of the war, to learn something of their historical background, and to understand their economic and political significance.

The question is frequently put by English and French visitors: 'Are the Americans determined to see the war through to a victorious conclusion?' The best answer to this natural enquiry is to be found in the President's words at Baltimore, already quoted. The American prides himself on not being a 'quitter.' He is a stubborn fighter and cannot conceive of defeat. For the United States the war is just beginning; the first blow is yet to be struck. The country has not yet been tested, as have France and England; but the American is sure that, when the test comes, it will be endured without flinching. The most popular song of the training camps concludes with the refrain:

' And we won't come back
'Till it's over, over there.'

This is the sentiment of Americans in all sections of the country, east and west and centre, north and south. There can and must be no turning back, no slackening, no hesitation until the war is won.

A question much discussed in the opening weeks of 1917, when it became evident that the United States was about to enter the ranks of the belligerents, was the extent of American participation in the war. All such discussion came to an end when the President in his war message said:

'I advise that the Congress . . . take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defence, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

'What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension to those Governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organisation and mobilisation of all the material resources of the country, to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the Navy in all respects, but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing

with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States, already provided for by law in case of war, of at least 500,000 men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorisation of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well-conceived taxation.'

The task before the United States was indeed gigantic. The naval forces were to be augmented from about 83,000 to 350,000 men; and the largest programme of construction in the history of the country was to be entered upon at once and pushed with the utmost speed. An army of approximately 202,000 men, including the National Guard of the various states, was to be increased to 1,500,000 men, with provision for further and practically unlimited increase. The 9500 officers of April, 1917, were to be increased to approximately 124,000 within a year; and the new officers had to be selected and trained within a few months, in order that they in turn might train the new army. Clothing and equipment were to be provided in such quantities that, for certain articles, the amount immediately required far exceeded the annual output of the entire country. Rifles, guns, and munitions were to be manufactured on a scale infinitely beyond the producing capacity of the existing arsenals. Cantonments and camps were to be erected, involving the construction, in three or four months, of over 22,000 separate buildings. An aviation service for both the army and navy was to be developed out of nothing, and furnished with aeroplanes which were to be produced by a non-existent industry. The ship-building industry, which had been turning out on an average about 500,000 tons dead weight per year, was to be expanded so that within two years it would be able to turn out 10,000,000 tons. At the same time, after a year of poor crops, with the food surplus nearly exhausted, and in face of a shrinkage of available labour, the agricultural product of the country was to be increased to the utmost, in an endeavour to meet the imperative necessities of the

Allies. The transportation system of the country, consisting of over four hundred separate lines, would have to be so operated as to satisfy rapidly and without confusion greatly enlarged demands to be made upon it from every direction. A labour supply, already depleted by emigration and the cessation of immigration, composed of the most heterogeneous elements (including a large number of enemy aliens) and insufficient as respects skilled workmen, was to be distributed over the country, in order to make possible the necessary industrial expansion. Finally, money for carrying out this extensive programme, and for loaning to the Allied Governments, would have to be raised, to the amount, estimated as necessary, of twenty billions of dollars (4,000,000,000L.).

At the end of the first year, how much of this task has been accomplished? The personnel of the Navy has been increased to 350,000 officers and men; the 300 vessels of all classes, which were in commission at the beginning of 1917, have been increased to 1345, and about 550 vessels will be added during 1918. Soon after the declaration of war, the United States assumed the patrol of the western Atlantic; and destroyers and other vessels, reported now to number about 150, were practically incorporated in the British fleet, being employed principally in anti-submarine operations.

The Army has been increased to 1,500,000 men, of which number fully 1,000,000, probably more, have had nearly six months of intensive training. The equipment of all infantry is reported to be complete, as regards supplies, arms, and munitions; and ample production, to equip additional forces and to replace wastage, is said to be assured. A possible exception should be made in the case of machine-guns, of which 17,000 have been secured during the year; but an annual production of 225,000 is reported to be now provided for. The situation with respect to artillery appears to be much less satisfactory; and for the present at least America must be mainly dependent upon French and British arsenals for guns of all calibres, although an annual production of 15,000, in calibres ranging from 3½ inches to 9 inches, is now said to be assured. Motor trucks in sufficient numbers have been readily procured; and a standardised truck, in three sizes, has been designed and will soon be delivered in

quantity. Of the forces thus raised, about 500,000 have, according to common report in Washington (the statement of number is not authoritative), been transported to France.

In the Aviation Service a personnel of over 100,000 officers and men has been raised, representing an increase of something like 10,000 per cent. over the force existing in April, 1917. About 2500 officers have completed their preliminary training in flying; and of these a relatively small number have received advanced training, for the most part under French or British auspices. It was not until the May of this year that an American-trained aviator was reported to have brought down a German aeroplane. American production of aircraft has been limited thus far to the training planes; but a standardised motor, said to be suitable for all types except the light battle-planes, has been designed and successfully tested, and its manufacture on a large scale is reported to be assured. Meanwhile a large number of planes, over 6000, have been contracted for in France; and motors of British, French, and Italian design are being manufactured on a small scale in America. It is evident, however, that the American air service will be unable for some months to take any effective part in the operations.

As respects the increase of Shipping—one of the most pressing problems confronting the United States—it appears that 186 vessels, aggregating 1,290,000 tons dead-weight, have been added during the year. Of this number 112 are German and Austrian ships which had been laid up in American ports since the beginning of the war, and which their crews had endeavoured to disable early in 1917. These have been successfully repaired and put in commission, most of them being incorporated in the Navy. Seventy-two of the new vessels were under construction by private contract, and were requisitioned before their completion. Two vessels were of the number contracted for by the Shipping Board. This does not appear to be any very considerable accomplishment; but an additional number of about 1200 wooden and steel vessels have been contracted for, of which twenty have already been launched; and 338 of the requisitioned vessels are under construction, 52 of which have been placed in the water. The number

of shipyards has been increased from 70 to 151, and many of the old yards have been expanded. The number of workmen employed on ship construction has been increased from 43,500 to 170,500; and a much greater number will be available as soon as housing can be provided.

With respect to meeting the Food Requirements of the Allies a certain degree of success has been attained, although the requirements have not been fully met. The acreage of 1917 was ten per cent. greater than that of 1916, while the principal food-crops were twenty-six per cent. larger than those of the preceding year. Owing to the severity of last winter, however, the wheat crop, while larger than that of 1916, is a distinct disappointment and will fall far short of the record crop of 1915. Only two crops, oats and maize, were sufficient for both American and Allied needs; and it was necessary, therefore, to endeavour to make up the deficit in the other food-stuffs by reducing American consumption.

The problem of effectively operating the Railroad Systems of the country proved to be one of the most difficult in the programme. In spite of efforts at co-operation among the railroads, the transportation system failed utterly to meet the demands made upon it; and in December the Government was forced to assume control. This breakdown of the railroads was one of the most important factors in delaying the execution of the military programme.

After a year of war the organisation of Industry and Labour on a war basis has been but partially accomplished. It is, however, rapidly going forward; and the reorganised War Industries Board and the newly appointed War Labour Board are accelerating the process.

The raising of Funds for war expenditures and for loans to the Allies presented no particular difficulty to a country into which money had been pouring at a rapid rate for nearly three years. Over ten billions of dollars have been secured (bonds and certificates of indebtedness, \$8,500,000,000; war-saving stamps, \$140,000,000; taxation, \$1,535,000,000), of which amount \$4,500,000,000 (900,000,000L.) have been loaned to the Allies. It was estimated that the war expenditures of the first fiscal year (July 1 to June 30) would amount to \$18,500,000,000;

and it was planned to raise about 16·5 per cent. of this amount by taxation—a proportion of income from taxes to war expenditures which Great Britain did not reach until the third year of the war. It now appears that the war expenditures will fall nearly one-third below the amount estimated, a fact which may be taken to indicate roughly the extent to which the United States has failed to complete its programme.

Views as to the American performance during the first year vary greatly. Those who regard it absolutely say, and with some reason, that it is exceedingly creditable; those who regard it comparatively are not so optimistic. It cannot be asserted that it has met the necessities of the situation. To end the war this year, much greater reinforcements are needed in France than America seems likely to be able to send. As compared with the performance of Great Britain to Aug. 1, 1915, the accomplishment of the United States does not seem inspiring. During her first year of war Great Britain raised an army of 3,000,000 men, all volunteers; succeeded in putting 750,000 men in Flanders, where they held an important sector of over thirty miles; and sent expeditionary forces to Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles. The British losses during the first year were over 320,000; those of the United States a little over one per cent. of that number.

During the last three months vigorous dispute has been carried on in America as respects the accomplishments of the first year. Congress has laboriously, and in some cases acrimoniously, investigated the various war activities. Charges of inefficiency and stupidity have been freely made and briskly refuted. The interest of the country has shifted, for the time being, from the issues to the conduct of the war. It is impossible to isolate any single cause, or any two or three causes, for the failure of the United States to execute its programme more rapidly and efficiently. There are a great number of causes, more or less clearly related.

The situation of military affairs in the United States prior to April, 1917, was not favourable to the speedy organisation and equipment of a large army. The regular army was too small, and contained too many

recruits, to serve as a *cadre* for the training of a force nearly one hundred times its size. Congress had failed, in spite of repeated and insistent recommendations from the War Department, to make appropriations which would have enabled the army to lay the foundations for an adequate supply of equipment and munitions should an emergency arise.

The General Staff and the War Department appear not to have worked out any definite programme before the declaration of war, although the events of the two and a half years preceding would seem to have made obvious the desirability of such action. The General Staff, until its reorganisation a few weeks ago, had by no means the predominating position occupied by the French or German General Staff. It made studies and gathered information, and offered recommendations; but the heads of the great bureaus of the War Department were not clearly subordinated to it. An enlightening comment on its rôle is the fact that, shortly after the beginning of the war, the Chief of Staff was absent from the country for some months on a distant mission which had no relation to the raising and equipment of an American army. The result of this failure to prepare a programme was that, when the emergency arose, the programme had to be prepared and executed at the same time. This necessarily resulted in delays and wasted effort. Such matters as the composition and strength of a division were not finally settled until August 1917. A machine-gun which satisfied the requirements of the Ordnance Department was not tested and adopted until last February. A scientific classification of those who registered for conscription was not worked out and applied until long after the first draft had been called to the colours.

Another cause of delay and confusion was a failure to realise that a reorganisation, rather than a mere expansion, of the existing military and governmental agencies was necessary. Bureaus of the War Department competed with each other for supplies and labour. Military officers found themselves obliged to purchase supplies which could not be procured in sufficient quantities without an expansion of the industries producing them—a test which called for more knowledge of sources

of supplies, industrial conditions, and prices, than could possibly have been acquired from their previous limited experience. To aid in such operations, advisory committees of business men and engineers were appointed by the Council of National Defence; but there was lack of proper coordination among these various committees.

The Council of National Defence was created a few months before the declaration of war, for the purpose of preparing a war programme for industry, labour, agriculture, transportation, and scientific research. It consisted of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labour, and was assisted by an advisory commission. The Council was not organised until March 4, 1917; and there was not then time for it to render the service for which it had been created. By bringing to Washington men of wide experience, it was able to furnish to the Government advice of the greatest value; but it was impossible for it, faced as it was by the necessity of getting things done as speedily as possible, to construct at the same time a comprehensive programme for the most effective way of doing them.

The failure of the transportation system was one of the most important factors of delay. It was impossible for four hundred and forty railroads to operate as one system without unity of control. The problem was rendered still more difficult by congestion at the seaboard, which resulted in the detention of loaded cars for long periods, and by the lack of any comprehensive plan with respect to priorities. When the Government finally took over the control of the railroads, the general feeling was that, if this step had been taken at the outset, much confusion and delay might have been avoided.

It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the failure of the shipping programme delayed other operations, because it is not clear whether, under the most favourable circumstances, enough ships could have been completed by the present time to produce much effect on the situation. Undoubtedly the inability of the Shipping Board, as at first organised, to agree upon a policy retarded the construction of ships; but the effect of such delay would not fully manifest itself by the present time. If the Shipping Board had been promptly reorganised, or, better still, if its original members had been more

wisely selected, a larger number of vessels would probably be available now.

To a certain extent delay was also caused by the fact that Congress required six months to complete a programme of legislation. Necessary war powers were conferred upon the Executive one at a time. The Food and Fuel Control Act was not passed until Aug. 10, long after the need for it had become urgent. Members of Congress have criticised most bitterly the failure to make satisfactory progress with the production of aircraft; but the Act providing the appropriation for that purpose was not passed until three and a half months after the declaration of war. Control over exports was not given the President till June 15, and control over imports not till Oct. 6.

The American form of government is not conducive to effective cooperation between the Executive and the Legislature. Under a parliamentary system, the Executive is in reality a committee of the Legislature; and, as such, it is able to prepare and push a comprehensive programme of legislation. Under the American system, the Executive is not responsible to the Legislature but only to the people. The members of the President's Cabinet are responsible only to the President; they may advise Congress, on behalf of the President, respecting needful legislation, but they cannot introduce proposed laws or support them, except in private conversation or when called upon by a committee of Congress for an expression of opinion. The only pressure that the Executive can bring to bear upon Congress in favour of any programme is that of public opinion, which operates slowly and not always with clear intent. When the British Parliament, immediately after the opening of the war, passed the Defence of the Realm Act, it conferred upon the Government, at a single stroke, more powers than have yet been granted to the American Executive, though Congress has been in almost continuous session for a year.

Out of the apparent confusion of the summer and early fall of 1917, out of the experiences of the effort to formulate and execute a programme simultaneously, there has been evolved what may be described as a functional reorganisation of the Government. The

General Staff has been reorganised, and its relation to the bureaus of the War Department has been more clearly defined. The two great supply divisions of the War Department, the Quartermaster's Department and the Ordnance Department, have been reorganised along the lines of a modern industrial establishment, and their activities have at length been properly coordinated. The War Industries Board, which developed out of certain sub-committees of the Council of National Defence, and is not attached to any executive department, is the agency by which the requirements of all the war branches are coordinated and their provision assured. Its function is to enable American industry to meet war demands, and to present these demands in such a way that they may be satisfied most effectively and economically, with due regard to their relative importance. The War Trade Board is in control of exports and imports. The Railway Administration, under a Director-General of Railroads, controls the operation of all the railroads of the country. The Shipping Board constructs vessels, through the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and directs the operation of the merchant marine. The War Labour Board is charged with the settlement of labour disputes, with the survey of the supply of labour, and with its training, distribution, and housing. The Food Administration encourages the production of food and economy in its use, and controls its distribution. It is especially charged with procuring food products to meet the requirements of the Allies. The Fuel Administration controls the production and distribution of fuel. Other boards or officers, such as the Aircraft Board, the Alien Property Custodian, and the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, have more specialised functions. It is generally believed in Washington that a relatively permanent war organisation has at last been effected; that it will enable the country to devote a constantly increasing proportion of its resources and energies to the prosecution of the war; and that there will now be a marked acceleration of all war activities.

A governing principle of the Administration in its efforts to place the United States on a war basis has been the use of persuasion rather than of compulsion. The resort to conscription in raising an army was

not a contravention of this principle, because Americans in general were amply persuaded that conscription was the better of the two possible methods. The Administration, and most thoughtful Americans as well, have realised that the United States, like Europe, is passing through a social and economic revolution. The support of Labour, which has on the whole been gained, is due to the fact that Labour has been consulted equally with all other interests in the preparation of war measures. The problem of securing its support has been the more difficult in the United States because much of it is unskilled, because of its heterogeneous character, and because rather less than fifteen per cent. of it is organised.

The recent German offensive has forced Americans to realise the need for greater and more effective effort on their part. They begin to see that the country cannot carry on the war and at the same time continue the usual activities of normal times. They are becoming convinced, not only that it will be necessary to raise a much larger army than was at first contemplated, but that eventually a large part of the population will have to be enlisted in effective forms of war service. They have lost their belief that American genius could perform a series of miracles that would end the war cheaply and quickly. They no longer expect to exterminate the submarine in a month or two, or to cloud the skies of Germany with ten thousand, nay, a hundred thousand aeroplanes dropping death and destruction. They are not looking for a German revolution, and they know now that German soldiers will fight until they are killed. In short, they realise at last that, in this conflict of peoples, war consists mainly of two things—fighting and working—and that every one must do one or the other.

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Art. 7.—THE LATIN KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM: 1099–1291.

1. *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades*. Seventeen vols. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1841–1906.
2. *Les Colonies franques de Syrie aux XII^{me} et XIII^{me} Siècles*. Par E. Rey. Paris : Picard, 1883.
3. *Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge*. Von H. Prutz. Berlin : Siegfried, 1883.
4. *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani, 1097–1291, and Additamentum*. Von R. Röhricht. Oeniponti : Lib. Acad. Wagneriana, 1893–1904.
5. *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem : 1100–1291*. Von R. Röhricht. Innsbruck : Wagner, 1898.
6. *Renaud de Châtillon, prince d'Antioche*. Par G. Schlumberger. Paris : Plon, 1898.
7. *Revue de l'Orient Latin*. Eleven vols. Paris : Leroux, 1893–1908.

And other works.

No event of the war has been so dramatic, or has made such a powerful appeal to the imagination, as the liberation of Jerusalem on December 9, 1917, after a Moslem occupation of 673 years. While the name of Athens is full of meaning for the cultured alone, and many excellent citizens are not quite sure 'whether the Greeks or the Romans came first,' that of Jerusalem is known in every peasant's cottage of Christendom and represents the aspirations of an ancient race scattered all over the globe. But to us Anglo-Saxons the redemption of the Holy City has special significance, because a British general at the head of a force gathered from every part of the British Empire, and aided by our French and Italian allies, has repeated the achievement of Godfrey of Bouillon and the Crusaders, among them a brother of the King of England, and Edgar Atheling, the descendant of our Saxon line, in 1099, and has accomplished what even our lion-hearted monarch failed to do in 1192, and our soldierly Prince Edward in 1271. Thus the aspiration of the poet of 'Gerusalemme Liberata,'

"Sottrarre i Cristiani al giogo indegno . . .

Fondando in Palestina un novo regno" (l. 23),

has been realised by Britons from lands whose very existence was unknown at the time of the Crusades.

The present article is not intended to be a drum-and-trumpet history of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem and its almost constant wars, but an account of the organisation and social life of the Crusading kingdom. First, as to its extent. The kingdom of Jerusalem attained its zenith at the end of the reign of Baldwin II in 1131, when it stretched from the Egyptian frontier at El-'Arish, 'the river of Egypt' of the Book of Numbers, on the south-west, and from Aila, the modern 'Akaba (on the gulf of the same name), the Elloth of the First Book of Kings, and the site of Solomon's Red Sea naval station, on the south-east, to the stream now called Nahr Ibrahîm, which flows into the sea between Beirût and Giblet, the modern Jebeil—about 300 miles as the crow flies. To the east the kingdom rarely overstepped the Jordan except at the triangle of Banias, the ancient Cæsarea Philippi; indeed, in the north it was only 13 miles broad, but in the Dead Sea region it attained a breadth of 100 miles. This did not, however, comprise the whole of the Latin territory. To the north of the above-mentioned stream stretched the County of Tripolis, the foundations of which were laid by Count Raymond of Toulouse in 1102, to the rivulet, now called Wâdi-Mehika, between Maracée and Valénia (the modern Bâniyâs), which flowed at the foot of the castle of Margat—a further distance of about 100 miles. From that rivulet began the Principality of Antioch, whose first Prince was, in 1098, Bohemond of Taranto, and which at one time extended almost to Aleppo in the east and embraced a large slice of the kingdom of Armenia almost as far west as Tarsus, but latterly extended no farther north than a little beyond Alexandretta. On the north-east it was bounded until 1144 by the County of Edessa, the modern Urfa, founded by Baldwin I in 1098, which began at the forest of Marris and extended eastward beyond the Euphrates; but, owing to the permanent state of war, in which the forty-six years of its existence were passed, it never had any fixed boundaries. Thus, a Syrian writer could truly say that, in 1129, 'everything was subject to the Franks, from Mardîn and Schabachtana to El 'Arîsh,' far more than the 'Dan to Beersheba' of the Israelites.*

* William of Tyre, Bk xvi, 29; Jacques de Vitry (ed. Bongars), 1068-9; Röhricht, 'Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem,' 191.

The first diminution of the Crusading States was the loss of the County of Edessa in 1144. In 1170, at the other extremity, they were cut off from the Red Sea by the capture of Aila. Jerusalem and most of the kingdom, except Tyre and a few fortresses, fell before Saladin in 1187, and most of the Principality of Antioch and of the County of Tripolis in the next year. By the treaty of 1192, the Christians obtained the coast from Tyre to Jaffa; and Frederick II, by the so-called 'Bad Peace' of 1229, recovered the Holy City, except two mosques, the two other towns—Bethlehem and Nazareth—most closely associated with the life of our Lord, and all the chief pilgrimage roads. Fifteen years later, however, the Kharezmians, a Turkish tribe, finally captured Jerusalem, murdered the Latin Christians, and desecrated the Holy Sepulchre and the tombs of the Latin kings.

The battle of Gaza completed the disaster of 1244. From that time the recovery of Jerusalem was manifestly impossible. The Crusade of the saintly Louis IX was a failure; that of our Prince Edward was weakly supported, ended in a separate peace, concluded by the people of Acre against his will, and was only remarkable for one of the most beautiful stories of conjugal devotion in English history. Meanwhile Antioch had fallen in 1268 before Beibars, the Mameluke Sultan of Egypt; and Jaffa had entered upon the long captivity from which our armies redeemed it on November 17 of last year. The kingdom of Jerusalem was thenceforth a mere phantom of its former self, though kings of Cyprus were crowned kings of Jerusalem at Tyre, with all the pomp and splendour of the Middle Ages. Acre continued to be, as it had been since its recapture by Cœur-de-Lion, the capital of Frankish Palestine, where even on the eve of its fall, as a traveller * tells us, dwelt

'the richest merchants under Heaven, gathered from all nations, where resided the King of Jerusalem and many members of his family, the Princes of Galilee and Antioch, the lords of Tyre, Tiberias, and Sidon, the Counts of Tripolis and Jaffa, all walking about the squares with their golden coronets on their heads.'

There, too, were the head-quarters of the Military

* Ludolphi 'De Itinere Terrae Sanctae,' 40-1.

Orders, the Templars, the Knights of St John, the Brothers of the German House, and the Masters and Brothers of St Thomas of Canterbury. But the end of this carnival of kings and princes in exile was at hand. Since the second capture of Jerusalem, the kingdom had been slowly but surely dying, as its inhabitants knew full well. Signs and wonders foretold to the pious the coming catastrophe; shrewd business men hastened to sell their property in the doomed country. Tripolis followed the fate of Antioch in 1289; Acre, Tyre, Sidon, and Beirût were taken by Melik-el-Aschraf, the Sultan of Egypt, in 1291; and, with the fall of the last two strongholds of the Templars, Tortosa and Château Pèlerin, ended the rule of the Franks in Palestine. In Gibbon's sonorous phrase, 'A mournful and solitary silence prevailed along the coast which had so long resounded with the world's debate.'

Let us now see how Frankish Palestine was organised. At the head of the Latin kingdom stood the king. During the first three reigns the monarchy was elective; and it was not till 1131 that it became hereditary, as Baldwin II was the first sovereign who left progeny. When the Crusaders entered Jerusalem, the election of their first ruler was by means of an examination, from which few of us would emerge unscathed. The electors questioned the servants of the various candidates about their masters' morals and characters. Godfrey's attendants stated that their master's chief defect was, that he would linger on in church, after the service was over, asking questions about the images and pictures, and thereby making his household late for meals, 'which thus lost all their relish.'* But this interest in ecclesiastical archæology, which seemed such a drawback to the hungry men-at-arms, was counted as a recommendation by the pious electors, and Godfrey was elected. He declined, however, to take the title of king, preferring that of 'Protector of the Holy Sepulchre,' and refusing to wear a golden crown in the city where our Lord had worn a crown of thorns.† His modesty was also probably

* William of Tyre, Bk ix, 2.

† 'Recueil des Hist., Lois,' i, 22; Jacques de Vitry, 1116.

due to a tactful desire to disarm the opposition of the clergy, who had desired that Jerusalem should not have a lay ruler. He died, however, next year; and Baldwin I, Count of Edessa, his brother, who was elected his successor, then took the title of king, but salved his conscience by being crowned not in Jerusalem, but at Bethlehem. Baldwin II's daughter, Mélisende, and her husband, Fulk, were the first to be crowned in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, where was also the royal mausoleum. During the Moslem occupation of Jerusalem the king was crowned at Tyre; and, when the whole of the Holy Land was lost, the kings of Cyprus, who were titular kings of Jerusalem, assumed the former crown at Nicosia and the latter at Famagosta. From Queen Charlotte of Cyprus, in 1485, the title passed to Duke Charles of Savoy, and thus to the present Italian dynasty.

The Latin sovereigns of Jerusalem were mostly above the average in character and intelligence. Bravery and piety were essential to their position as chiefs of a crusading colony in the midst of a hostile country. Baldwin III was also a lover of literature and a graceful speaker, of whom a Moslem rival said that 'there was not such another king in the world.' His brother, Amaury I, prompted Archbishop William of Tyre to compose his valuable history. Fulk was generous and experienced in warfare, but signally lacked the usual royal faculty of remembering faces. Queen Mélisende, who was the real ruler in her husband's lifetime, was an excellent woman of business, of whom it was said that 'she had in her bosom the heart of a man';* indeed, so masterful was she, that on one occasion her son had to besiege her in the Tower of David. Unfortunately, Guy de Lusignan, who was king at the moment of Saladin's fatal attack, was notoriously inferior to the task of saving his wife's kingdom.

Society was constructed by the Crusaders on feudal lines. According to the 13th-century edition of the 'Assises de la Haute Cour,' by Jean d'Ibelin, Count of Jaffa, one of Godfrey's first acts was to appoint a commission to enquire from men of various nationalities

* William of Tyre, Bk xvii, 1.

then in Jerusalem the usages of their respective countries. From the report of this commission were drawn up the usages and assizes of the kingdom of Jerusalem, including a High Court, presided over by the King, for the nobility; a 'Court de la Boriesie,' presided over by an officer styled the 'Vicomte,' for the middle class; and a third court, under an official, called 'rays,' for the Syrians. As time went on, these usages were modified; and, at the arrival of each large company of new Crusaders, the King used to assemble the Patriarch and other notables at Acre, and enquire from the newcomers about their laws, while occasionally special missions of investigation were sent abroad. The written original of the 'Assises' was called the 'Letres dou Sepulchre,' because it was deposited in a large chest in the Holy Sepulchre; and, whenever a moot point arose, this chest was opened in the presence of nine persons, including the King, or his deputy, and the Patriarch, or the Prior of the Holy Sepulchre.* The 'Assises of Jerusalem,' of which the 'Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois' have also been preserved, are the most enduring monument of the Franks in Palestine, and not in Palestine alone; for they formed the basis of the 'Assises of Cyprus,' and of the feudal organisation of the Principality of Achaia.

William of Tyre expressly tells us † that the Counts of Tripolis were always lieges of the King of Jerusalem. But the Princes of Antioch (which had its own code) and the Counts of Edessa seem to have merely recognised him as *primum inter pares* by virtue of his possession of the Holy City; and the Princes of Antioch, beginning with Bohemond himself, were at times reluctantly forced to confess themselves vassals of the Greek Emperor. Thus, the existence of four practically independent states, instead of one centralised government, and the consequent lack of what the Italians would call a *fronte unico* against the Infidels, formed one cause of the collapse of Frankish rule, notably in the case of Edessa, sacrificed to the jealousy of the Prince of Antioch. Moreover, feudal regulations impeded the exercise of the royal power. Not only were the lieges not obliged to perform military service outside the realm; not only had

* 'Recueil des Hist., Lois,' i, 22-26.

† Bk xi, 10.

the king to consult a great council of magnates on all important questions—for we hear of Parliaments held in the Patriarch's palace at Jerusalem, in a church at Acre, and at Tyre, Nâblus, and Bethlehem—but Baldwin I was forced to revoke an ordinance for the cleaning of the streets of Jerusalem, because he had omitted to ask the consent of the citizens. Thus, Frankish Jerusalem was a limited monarchy, and its king really only the first of the barons—a system unsuited to a state of almost constant war.

The kingdom proper contained four great baronies—the County of Jaffa and Ascalon, which comprised the fertile plain of Sharon; the *seigneurie* of Krak and Mont Réal, which lay in the biblical land of Moab to the east and south-east of the Dead Sea, and dominated the caravan-route from Syria to Egypt; the Principality of Galilee, of which the capital was Tabarie (the Tiberias of St John); and the *seigneurie* of Sidon, or Sagette. Besides these great baronies, upon which in turn smaller tenures depended, it also included twelve lesser fiefs, likewise directly dependent on the Crown, of which the most curious was that of St Abrâham, the mediæval name of Hebron, and the most important that of Toron, founded by a member of the great crusading family of St Omer, which succeeded Tancred in the Principality of Galilee, but played an even more conspicuous part in Frankish Greece than in Frankish Palestine. The romantic title of Prince of Galilee survived at the Cypriote Court after the loss of the Holy Land; and a Lusignan bearing that scriptural name intervened in the tortuous politics of the Morea in the 14th century. Nazareth was naturally included in the Principality of Galilee; it was the see of an archbishop, and was governed by a 'Viscount.'

As in Greece, the Latin barons erected castles over the country; and the remains of some of these, particularly Krak de Mont Réal and Krak des Chevaliers, are among the finest specimens extant of mediæval military architecture, while others, notably that of the famous family of d'Ibelin at Beirût, were decorated with paintings and mosaics by Syrian and Greek artists. Each great feudatory presided over the high court of justice of his fief; and the 'Assises' enumerate twenty of them, besides the King and the Archbishop of Nazareth, who

possessed the right of coinage. Ecclesiastically, the Latin states of Syria were organised under two patriarchs—those of Jerusalem and Antioch; and the first archbishop of the kingdom was he of Tyre, whose function it was to crown the King in the Patriarch's absence.

The Salic law did not obtain in the Holy Land; and as, by some mysterious law of population, common also to Frankish Greece, many noble families consisted of daughters only, women played an important part in the crusading states. On two occasions, the election of the Patriarch of Jerusalem (Amaury in 1159 and Heraclius in 1180) was due to female influence; and, on the second of these, the personal predilection of the Queen-Mother Agnes prevailed (to the great detriment of Church and State alike) over the disinterested advice of William of Tyre, who urged the election of a candidate from beyond the sea, and recalled an old prophecy that, as the Emperor Heraclius had brought the true cross to Jerusalem, so in the time of another Heraclius would it be lost—a prophecy verified at the battle of Hattin.*

The competition for the hands of noble heiresses was another result of the extinction of families in the male line; it frequently caused serious political complications and encouraged penniless adventurers, like Guy de Lusignan, whose success aroused the jealousy of less fortunate rivals. Thus, the great disaster of Hattin, which led to the fall of Jerusalem in 1187, was indirectly due to the revenge of an Englishman, Girard de Rideford, for his failure as a suitor. He had come to the Holy Land as a knight-errant to make his fortune; and Count Raymond II of Tripolis had promised him the hand of his ward, the wealthy heiress of Boutron. A rich Pisan, however, arrived with a weighing-machine, placed the lady (probably an opulent beauty) in one scale and his money-bags in the other, and gave the Count her weight in gold. The baffled Briton became a Templar and rose to be Seneschal and Master of the Order, but never forgot how he had been cheated,† and persuaded the weak monarch to reject Raymond's strategy on the eve of Hattin.

* 'Recueil des Hist., Hist. Occid.,' II, 47, 58.

† *Ib.*, II, 36, 50; 'Archives de l'Orient Latin,' I, 663-4.

An even more romantic but equally fatal example was that of Renaud de Châtillon, who, coming to Palestine as a younger son to seek his fortune in the suite of Louis VII of France at the time of the Second Crusade, married the widowed Princess-Regent of Antioch, and governed the Principality for his stepson. Local gossips, and especially the Patriarch, criticised this *mésalliance*; whereupon the audacious Frenchman had the Patriarch stripped, smeared with honey, and exposed, a feast for the flies, during a long summer day. A born soldier of fortune, he put his sword at the disposal of the Greek Emperor for an attack on an Armenian baron, and, when a little difference arose as to the payment of the costs of the expedition, paid himself by ravaging the then Greek province of Cyprus. We next find him begging the Emperor's pardon in his shirt-sleeves, with a rope round his neck. Then he was captured by the Saracens in the course of a cattle-lifting expedition, and kept for fifteen years a prisoner at Aleppo. Finding, on his liberation, that his wife was dead and his stepson reigning at Antioch, he looked out for a second heiress, and found one in the widowed baroness of Mont Réal. There, in the land beyond Jordan, he was in his element. His next enterprise was, indeed, a bold one. He constructed a flotilla at Krak—'the stone of the Desert,' as it was picturesquely called—conveyed it on camel-back to the Gulf of 'Akaba, and sailed down into the Red Sea with the object of plundering Mecca and Medina, and conquering the Hedjaz and the Yemen. For this daring attempt, and for intercepting, in time of peace, the Moslem caravan, Saladin swore twice to kill him with his own hand. The second of these acts provoked the invasion which led to the capture of Jerusalem; and in Saladin's tent, as a captive after the battle of Hattin, the adventurous Frenchman, who declared that, to princes, treaties were 'scraps of paper,' was beheaded. His seal with the gateway of Krak upon it still survives as a memorial of his strange career.

The middle class was a far more important body than in either the England or the France of that day. Palestine during the Crusades was not visited exclusively for religious or military reasons. Besides being a goal

of pilgrimage, it was also what California or Australia was in the middle of the last century—a place where shrewd men of business could make money rapidly. Long before the First Crusade, there had been an Italian colony from Amalfi at Jerusalem, in the capture of which a Genoese detachment had assisted; colonies from Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Marseilles followed; we even find an 'English quarter' at Acre.* Owing to the small numbers of the nobility, and the constant need of recruiting its ranks after its losses in battle, it was easy for the wealthy members of the middle class to enter the aristocracy, while, from the nature of its occupations, it was thrown into much closer contact with the natives.

Mixed marriages were commoner among the *bourgeoisie*, although Baldwin I and II and Joscelin I of Edessa married Armenians, and Baldwin III and Amaury I Greeks. The issue of these mixed marriages was known as the *Poulains*.† These half-castes, who corresponded to the Γασμούλοι of Frankish Greece, are not depicted in flattering terms by contemporary writers. Jacques de Vitry, the Bishop of Acre, describes them as 'nourished in delights, soft and effeminate, more accustomed to baths than to battles, given to uncleanness and luxury, dressed in soft garments like women, slothful and idle, cowardly and timid, little esteemed by the Saracens.' With these they were too ready to make peace, and from them they were prone to accept assistance against their fellow-Christians in their internecine quarrels. They were, alike by nature and interest, opposed to the arrival of fresh bodies of Crusaders, because war interfered with their business and interrupted their commercial relations with the Moslems, whose family life they imitated, veiling their wives, shutting them up in Oriental seclusion, and allowing them to go out thrice a week to the baths, but only once a year to church. This undue preference of cleanliness to godliness had disastrous effects, for it led the ladies to intrigue all the more to get out.

The worthy Bishop, speaking doubtless from personal

* Röhricht, 'Regesta Regni Hieros.,' pp. 285, 321, 325.

† From *pullus*, a 'colt,' and probably of the same origin as the Moreote termination -δπουλος.

experience, adds that the *Poulains* swindled the ingenuous pilgrims by overcharges at inns, by exorbitant prices in shops, and by giving them poor exchange. Worse still, they despised these Christian 'boxers' and exiles, calling them fatuous idiots for their pains—for to the *Poulains* the Holy Land had no halo. They wore flowing robes, as even the first King of Jerusalem had done, while a coin of Tancred of Antioch represents him with a turban; and their whole outlook was Oriental rather than European. Indeed, Foucher, Baldwin I's chaplain, remarked quite early how soon the Westerner became an Easterner in Palestine, and how the Crusader who married an Armenian or a Syrian soon forgot the land of his birth, adopting the comfortable maxim—'ubi bene, ibi patria.' Hence the marked contrast between the Frankish residents, and still more the *Poulains*, and the newly-arrived Crusaders. Hence, too, the often far too harsh judgments passed by the latter, especially after the Second Crusade in 1148. Like the Philhellenes who went to Greece in the War of Independence, expecting to find the Peloponnese peopled by the superhuman heroes of Plutarch instead of by men like themselves, they did not realise that poor human nature, even under conditions far more favourable, could not have possibly shone resplendent in the tremendous setting of the Holy Land. Consequently, they were often disillusioned, whereas men like William of Tyre, born and living in the country, were far fairer in their judgments, because they measured the Holy Land by the standard of other and more prosaic lands and not by the unattainable perfection of the greatest figure in all history, with whom it must ever be associated.

Society in the Crusading States was, it must be remembered, even apart from the *Poulains*, an extraordinary mixture of races. Even an Austrian army does not contain so many nationalities as the Crusaders. The Franks, as they were generically called, included Normans (at first the dominant race), French (who ousted the Normans, and thenceforth maintained their influence, culture, and language, as they did nearly two centuries later at the Court of Athens), English, Welsh, Irish, Scots, Flemings, Italians, Germans (not very

numerous), and Scandinavians. De Vitry considered the Italians the most satisfactory. He describes them as

'prudent, temperate in eating and drinking, ornate and prolix in speaking, but circumspect in counsel, diligent in managing their own public affairs, and a very necessary element in the country, not only in battle, but at sea and in business, especially in the import trade. Since they are sober in food and drink, they live longer than other Western nations in the East'; and 'they would be very formidable to the Saracens, if they would cease fighting among themselves.'

Unfortunately, the rivalries between Venetians, Genoese, and Pisans were even more serious than the feuds between the Normans and the French; and the possession of the Church of St Saba at Acre (two pillars of which are now outside St Mark's, Venice) led to an Italian colonial war, in which we may find one cause of the final loss of the Holy Land. These Italian colonies, indeed, formed practically an *imperium in imperio*. Their respective quarters in the Syrian towns were the property of their Governments, which appointed their officials (called 'Consuls' in the Genoese and Pisan colonies, 'Bailies' in the Venetian), often from among the most celebrated families of the Venetian Republic. Venice had also what we should call a Consul-General, a 'Bailly' for all Syria; and both she and Genoa received a large portion of the harbour dues at Tyre and Acre. The Italian colonies had their own tribunals, like the consular courts in Turkey in our own day. Thus, Italian interests in the Holy Land were considerable and mainly commercial. To Venice and Genoa foreign affairs were—the affairs of their merchants. The French and the English settlers (says De Vitry) were

'less composed and more impetuous, less circumspect in action and more full of superfluity in food and drink, more lavish in expense and less cautious in talk, hasty in counsel, but more fervent in almsgiving and more vehement in battle, most useful for the defence of the Holy Land, and very formidable to the Saracens.'

Besides these various elements among the Crusaders, Palestine contained a large variety of indigenous races. Of these the native Christians of Arab speech,

collectively known as Syrians, were the most favoured. Baldwin I gave them marked privileges at Jerusalem, and they could give evidence on oath. But they were of little use in war, except as archers; and are accused by Jacques de Vitry of betraying the secrets of the Christians to the Saracens, whose customs they largely imitated. The Maronites of the Lebanon were, however, noted for their military prowess and for the help which they rendered to the Franks.

Next to the Syrians came the Armenians, reckoned the best fighters of the Orientals, who, from the proximity of the kingdom of Lesser Armenia to the County of Edessa, often assisted the Frank Counts, and copied their feudal arrangements. The Greeks were regarded as opponents of the Latins; and, when Saladin took Jerusalem, he allowed them to remain.

Historians of the Moslem Arabs admit that, except in war time, Christians and Moslems lived together in harmony. - There are examples of friendship, and even of adopted brotherhood, between Frank barons and Moslem emirs, who used to grant each other permits to hunt. Every reader of 'The Talisman' knows of the mutual courtesies between Richard I and Saladin, who sent medical aid to a sick opponent; but even more curious was the action of Guy de Lusignan, whose first act, on exchanging the kingdom of Jerusalem for that of Cyprus, was to ask his former captor how to keep the island. Many Franks spoke Arabic; and it was even found necessary for commercial purposes to coin money bearing in Arabic characters the name of Mohammed and the date of the Moslem era! The merchants of Tyre and Acre, where these heretical coins were minted, protested that 'business is business'; but the Papal Legate, who accompanied Louis IX on the Sixth Crusade, was so scandalised that he reported the matter to Pope Innocent IV, who excommunicated all who coined them. Like Frederick II in Sicily, the later Princes of Antioch and Counts of Tripolis had Saracen guards; and, under the name of *Turcoples*, given originally to Turks born of Greek mothers, Moslems entered the Christian armies as light cavalry. Of actual Turks there were few, for they had overrun Syria too short a time before the Crusades to take root in Palestine.

Like the Franks, and like the Turks in the Balkans, they were only a garrison.

Special interest attaches to the Jews, at this period only a small section of the population, and, as usual, exclusively urban. Benjamin of Tudela, who visited Palestine about 1173, found two hundred Jews in the ghetto at Jerusalem beneath the Tower of David, where they had a monopoly of the dyeing trade, and twelve, all dyers, at Bethlehem. The largest Jewish colonies were, as was natural, in the great commercial towns, Tyre and Acre; and the total in the whole of the Latin states was only 7000 to 8000. They could not hold land, and were classed below the Moslems, but practised successfully as doctors and bankers, and had their own judges. Many had come from the south of France.

Below all these freemen came the slaves, including Christians, partly prisoners of war and partly imported. The 'Assizes of Jerusalem' contain special regulations for the slave-trade (largely in Venetian and Genoese hands), but the legislators felt some scruples about allowing a Christian slave to be sold to a Moslem. There was one other very undesirable element in the population—persons who had left their country for their country's good; for it was not unusual to pardon criminals on condition that they made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and never returned. The Bishop of Acre complains of this practice of making the Holy Land a convict station; and he quotes the Horatian tag, that people who cross the sea change the climate, but not their character. Nor does he approve of the tourist who came from mere curiosity and not from devotion.

Among this heterogeneous mass the smallness of the Frankish forces makes us marvel that the Latin kingdom lasted for 103 years at Jerusalem and for nearly 200 at Acre. The 'Assizes' inform us that the paper strength of the Royal army was only 577 knights and 5025 foot-soldiers, to which we must add the contingents of the two great Military Orders and the *Turcoples*. At no time, in actual warfare, did the total armed forces of the four crusading states much exceed 25,000. At Hattin—the Hastings of the Holy Land—Guy de Lusignan had only some 21,000 men under his command; Baldwin I crossed the Euphrates with only 80 knights to take

Edessa; and some of the great battles of Tancred were fought by only 200 knights. William of Tyre,* writing a few years before the catastrophe of 1187, explains the greater success of the Franks in the earlier years of the kingdom by their piety and courage, as contrasted with the immorality and diminished martial spirit of his contemporaries. Other causes were the lack of military skill in the Moslems of that generation, and the disunion of their chiefs. When, however, Saladin united Syria and Egypt in his strong hand, the fate of the Frankish colony was sealed. Disunion among the allies neutralised the splendid courage of our Richard I in his attempt to restore what had been lost; Frederick II was a Crusader *malgré lui*; and in the 13th century many Franks, realising that the end was at hand, left for the Lusignan kingdom of Cyprus, or for Armenia, leaving as the most important factors in the Latin population the Italian colonies and the Religious Orders.

The Knights of St John, who originally took their name from St John the Merciful,† a Cypriote who became Patriarch of Alexandria, arose at the time of the conquest in connexion with the hospital founded at Jerusalem a generation earlier by a citizen of Amalfi. Their first aim was to tend and nourish the sick, then to guard pilgrims up from the coast, and next to fight against the Infidels. They never forgot their original object; and pilgrims were enthusiastic in their praise. Indeed, Saladin is said to have gained admission to their hospital at Acre as a patient to see whether all that he heard about their beneficence was true. Gradually, as the feudal barons found it harder to defend their castles, they handed them to the Knights, who specially chose difficult frontier positions. Margat, Krak des Chevaliers, Chastel-Rouge, Gibelin, and Belvoir were their chief fortresses; and Mount Tabor was one of their possessions.

The Templars, founded in 1118 to protect the pilgrims on their way from the coast, enjoyed a less enviable reputation. William of Tyre remarks,‡ that 'for a long time they maintained their original object, but subsequently forgot the duty of humility.' They were accused of greed and selfishness, and of being too anxious

* Bk xxi, 7. † Jacques de Vitry, p. 1082. ‡ William of Tyre, Bk xii, 7.

to stand well with Moslem princes, with whom they sometimes made a separate peace, to the detriment of Christendom. Their treachery to the sect of the Assassins scandalised the Court of Jerusalem and immensely damaged Christian interests. The chief of that terrible community, the 'Old Man,' as he was called, whose territory was separated from the County of Tripolis by boundary stones, marked on the Christian side with a cross, on that of the Assassins with a knife, had sent an envoy to King Amaury I, offering to embrace Christianity, on condition that the Templars consented to forgo the tribute paid to them by the Assassins. All had been arranged, and the diplomatist was on his way home, when the Templars assassinated the Assassin.*

The Templars' vow of poverty contrasted ill with their immense wealth, which enabled them, in 1191, to buy Cyprus from Richard I, and to lend a large sum to our Henry III. They acted as bankers; and through their hands passed the money collected in the West for future crusades. They were suspected, too, of heretical opinions, and were accused of initiating their novices with pagan rites. They possessed eighteen fortresses, of which Tortosa was the most important; but the Order did not long survive the loss of the Holy Land, being abolished by Clement V in 1312.

Palestine was a fruitful land during the Frankish period. Contemporary visitors wrote enthusiastically about the gardens of Jericho and the fertile plains of Jezreel; also about Tripolis, with its vineyards, its olive-yards, and its sugar plantations, whence the cane was taken to the factory at Tyre. The wines of Engaddi were as noted as in the Song of Solomon; and the vintages of Bethlehem and Jerusalem were highly esteemed. Jericho produced grapes so huge that 'a man could scarcely lift a bunch of them'—a statement which shows that the vines had not degenerated since the days of Moses. Even the silent waters of the Dead Sea were then traversed by fruit barges; and in the so-called 'Valley of Moses' to the south of it the olive-trees formed 'a dense forest.' There was more wood than now, and consequently more water, but corn had to be imported,

* William of Tyre, Bk xx, 29-30; Jacques de Vitry, p. 1063.

for the harvests of Moab, Hebron, Bethlehem ('the house of bread'), and Jericho did not suffice to feed the population. The Sea of Galilee was as full of fish as in the time of Our Lord, and boats plied upon its waters. But, owing to the general insecurity of the open country, few of the cultivators of the soil were Franks; and, where we find Latin peasants, they are usually not far from the shelter of fortified towns. Of manufactures the most important were those of silk at Tripolis, Tiberias, and Tyre, dyeing, and pottery; the glass of Tyre is specially praised by its archbishop, and the goldsmiths had a street all to themselves at Jerusalem.

Civilisation, so far as comfort was concerned, had reached a high level. Every castle had its baths; and minstrels and dancers appeared at the entertainments of the barons, while we read of theatrical performances at a coronation. A considerable amount of gambling went on in royal circles. Baldwin III was devoted to dice; the Prince of Antioch and the Count of Edessa were so busy with their dice-boxes during a campaign, that they demoralised many of their officers; the Count of Jaffa was so deeply engrossed in a game of dice which he was playing in the street of the Tanners at Jerusalem, that he allowed himself to be assassinated. Hunting with the falcon, and, in Arab fashion, with the cat-like animal known as the *carable*, were favourite amusements. It seems strange that nothing was done to encourage horse-breeding; and, as the Moslems were loth to sell horses to be used against themselves, the Franks usually imported their steeds from Apulia. Every spring it was the custom of the Frankish chivalry to take their horses to feed on the rich grass at the foot of Mt Carmel; and there, by the brook Kishon, where Elijah slew the prophets of Baal, tournaments were held, in which Saracen chiefs sometimes took part, and after which the combatants refreshed themselves with sherbet, made from the snows of Lebanon.

We must not expect a military colony, always fighting for its existence, to be very productive of literature. But perhaps the best specimen of mediæval history, the great work of William of Tyre, was produced by a Frank born in the Holy Land. The author possessed the two greatest qualities for writing the history of his own

times—personal acquaintance with the principal actors in the drama by reason of his high official position, and at the same time fearless love of truth. He tells us that he was well aware of the perils to which he thus exposed himself; and, if it be true that he was poisoned in Rome by order of a rival whom he had denounced, his forebodings were only too accurate. Having been a diplomatist, a prelate, a royal tutor, and chancellor of the kingdom, he possessed an unrivalled experience of men and affairs; and, as is usual with such persons, he was much more moderate in his judgments of human frailty than purely literary or monastic chroniclers.

A minor literary luminary was Renaud, baron of Sagate, who amazed the pundits of Saladin by his Oriental scholarship; and the cult of French novels was diffused among the nobles of the Holy Land, whose legal knowledge was considerable. Philip of Navarre,* the celebrated pleader, who has left a treatise showing how to make the worse cause appear the better in the feudal courts, tells us that he owed his knowledge of legal practice to the accident of being appointed reader of romances to the Seneschal of Jerusalem, who in return taught him law. The pleader, who also composed a historical work and a treatise on the four ages of man, and was an opponent of the higher education of women, is described by Florio Bustron, the Cypriote historian, as a 'huomo universale.'

In estimating the architectural results of the Frankish rule, we must remember the short time available—so far as all but the coast towns were concerned. But a traveller, who visited the country in 1185, tells us that the Franks had done much for the mural decoration of their churches, of which, beginning with Tancred's church on Mt Tabor in 1111, they erected many before the catastrophe of Hattin. William of Tyre specially mentions the munificence of Queen Mélisende in founding a church and convent at Bethany, of which her youngest sister was Superior and her splendidly bound copy of the Gospels is in the British Museum. In the church of the Holy Sepulchre, and in the cathedral and castle of Tortosa, still linger traces of the Crusaders.

* Mas Latrie, '*Histoire de l'Île de Chypre*,' i, 200, 256.

In conclusion, we may ask how Frankish society in Palestine compares with Frankish society in Cyprus and in the Latin principalities of the present Greek kingdom. Very different from either Frankish Palestine or Frankish Greece was the condition of the kingdom of Cyprus, created by a mere accident of the Crusades, which nominally continued the tradition of the kingdom of Jerusalem. While the reason of the latter's existence was war, Cyprus was essentially a commercial state, to which the loss of Acre was a blessing in disguise. So long as the kings of Cyprus, in their capacity of kings of Jerusalem, had territory on the opposite coast of Syria, they were necessarily involved in continental wars, and could not devote themselves to the development of their own island; as was the case of the kings of England, so long as they held the *damnosa hereditas* of the Plantagenets in France. Cyprus was, like England, defended by the sea; like England, she became one of the marts of the world, in an age when the crusading spirit had died away, and trade was the attraction that led men to the East. The popes, by prohibiting trade with the Saracens after the loss of the Holy Land, procured for Cyprus a monopoly; and Famagosta surpassed Constantinople, Venice, and Alexandria. Moreover, warned by the example of Jerusalem, the kings of Cyprus cut down the privileges of the nobles, who were denied the right of coinage and jurisdiction over the middle class. Consequently, the Cypriote monarchy was more independent, and continued to prosper until it allowed—and this should be to us a warning—foreign competitors, under the guise of commerce, to creep into its cities and ultimately to dictate its policy.

All the Latin states in the East, whether in Jerusalem, Cyprus, or Greece proper, presented examples of that difficult political experiment—the rule of a small alien minority over a large native majority of a different religion, an experiment worked most successfully in those states, like Lesbos under the Genoese Gattilusi, where the Latin rulers became assimilated with the ruled. But in Frankish Greece the feudal states were not commercial; and the Venetian and Genoese colonies were, except in Negroponte, quite distinct from them. The Frank conquerors of Greece did not go thither with

the noble aims which led some of the leaders of the First Crusade to the Holy Land; on the contrary, they turned aside from the recovery of the Holy City to partition a Christian Empire. Yet the moral standard of the Franks in Greece was much higher than that of their predecessors in Palestine, or their contemporaries in Cyprus. Possibly, the reason was that they lived healthier lives, and had fewer temptations. Big maritime commercial towns, like Tyre and Acre, and Famagosta, did not exist, and country life was more developed. Certainly, the 'Chronicles of the Morea' are more edifying reading than the 'Letters' of Jacques de Vitry on the condition of Acre at the time of his appointment as its bishop in 1216. But in one respect Frankish Palestine and Frankish Greece present the same strange phenomenon—that union of antiquity with the Middle Ages, of the biblical and the classical with the romantic, which inspired the second part of *Faust*. To find the feudal system installed at Hebron and Athens, at Shechem and Sparta, at Tiberias and Thebes, to read of Princes of Galilee and of Princes of Achaia, causes surprise only surpassed by that which we should have felt in August 1914, had we been told that before four Christmases had passed, Australians and New Zealanders would have shared in the taking of Jerusalem.

WILLIAM MILLER.

Art. 8.—THE IDEALS AND ASPIRATIONS OF ITALY.

1. *Laudi del Cielo, del Mare, della Terra, e degli eroi* (1905); *La Nave* (1908); *Le Canzoni della Gesta d'Oltramare* (1912). By Gabriele d'Annunzio. Milan : Treves.
2. *L'Altare*. By Sem Benelli. Milan : Treves, 1916.

ALTHOUGH the disaster at Caporetto in October last may have modified in some measure the hopes and expectations of Italy in the region of practical politics, the ideals and aspirations with which a large part of her people entered the war remain untouched. They lie too deep to be affected by the transient evolution of the present campaign, and will come to the surface again in future developments of Italian history.

Doubtless each of the nations now at war holds somewhere in the back of its mind an ideal conception of itself and of what it would wish to be. Some of them, perhaps, are hardly conscious of its presence; others possess a very clear-cut notion of their ideal and its aims. This ideal concept has no very close or direct connexion with the practical politics of the race; it is not the measure of what the nations actually hope to achieve. But it is the dream that lies behind their whole attitude and action, it is 'the master-light of all their being,' the very root and ground and habitat of their patriotism, the spirit which 'upholds and cherishes and has power to make' them endure and forget the groans and sufferings which inevitably mark the *via dolorosa* of their destiny. Without some such ideal conception of themselves, could the nations face and overcome the agonies by which they are now affronted? And so, too, of their ideal aims and aspirations; never, perhaps, to be realised, yet consciously or unconsciously moulding the type and forming the character which the race shall produce :

'All that I longed to be,
And was not, comforts me.'

'Comforts'—yes, and indeed creates.

In this country we have not personified 'England' as 'France' and 'Italy' are personified for the Frenchman and the Italian. It is the 'country,' the land and the people blended, which claim and win the love and the

On them that worship the ruthless Will,
 On them that dream, doth His judgement wait ;
 Dreams of the proud man, making great
 And greater ever
 Things which are not of God. . . . For all is vain,
 The pulse of the heart, the plot of the brain,
 That striveth beyond the laws that live.'

And yet the appearance of strength displayed by this type, its promise of very material successes, its flattery of the *orgoglio umano* and of the brain, the fallacious lucidity of its deductive method, relying on arbitrary premises, render it dangerously attractive. It is but too close to a large part of our human desires ; it appeals to our material appetites ; and it has thrown over the nations, Italy among them, a sort of glamour mingled of fear and admiration for the ' blond brute.'

With France, also, the ideal is a race-picture, an auto-portrait, a vision of 'La France,' so clear, so clean, so net ; a soul burning with 'a hard gem-like flame,' yielding the purest light of the intellect ; a personality elegant, finished, artistic to the finger-tips ; lean and spare like some master of the rapier, supple and flashing as his blade ; bursting, in the very crisis of the struggle, into that immortal phrase, *Debout les Morts*.

What, then, is Italy's ideal? The Italy to whom Italians have sworn allegiance is an Italy of historical continuity in the spiritual, if not yet entirely in the political world ; the Italy of Rome, the Renaissance and the Risorgimento ; the Italy to whom the West owes three such gifts as the Law, the Church and the Arts, and three such splendid languages as French, Spanish and Italian ; the *Madre antica* of European civilisation, and now the *sorella neonata*, the youngest born among the nations of the European family, drawing knowledge and wisdom from her centuries of past achievement, and hope and strength from her new birth. She is the vase that holds the aroma of those ancient words *fides*, *pietas*, *jus*, *officia*, *honor*, *decor*, and a dozen others, which mean so much for mankind and are so profoundly humane that they can take on the nuance of later ethical teaching and yet retain their antique connotation ; a personality more conscious of itself than England, more humane, may be, than France, a middle term between the two ;

the parent of our ancient culture as opposed to that new-fangled idol on the Spree. That is how Italians think of their Italy when they abstract the ideal of their country from the Italy of work-a-day politics. Ideals are, of course, idealised.

The religious fervour of the races, where any may be found, is drawn within the orbit of their various racial ideals and coloured by them, and finds expression in literature so true to the race and yet so diverse in quality as 'Christ in Flanders,' compared, for instance, with 'Lettres d'un Soldat.' In obedience to its worship of brute force and under pressure of its ideal, Germany has evolved that pleasing type of deity, Jehovah with the attributes of Moloch, whose church is the parade-ground, whose liturgy is the drill-book, whose ritual is the goose-step, whose fitting litany is 'The Hymn of Hate.' Contrast that hymn with the expression of Italian religious sentiment, where it exists at all—the gracious presence of the Madonna, the august beneficence of the *Padre Eterno*; for that is how an Italian feels it if he feels it in any sense. There is no break in the secular continuity; the historical forms are retained and are sufficient; the new spirit evoked by the war, the blending of Italian patriotism with Italian piety, so dear to the heart of the saintly peasant of Riese, Pope Pius X, finds a ready home within the ancient formulæ. A soldier of the line, a Bersagliere, sent me from the Italian front, from trenches 6000 feet above the sea, beaten by snowstorm and blizzard, three beautiful hymns circulating among the men up there who care for such things. They are appeals to the heart of the Madonna and the pity and loving-kindness of the Father for help in human suffering and for aid to Italy. I quote two.

A MARIA

PER LA VITTORIA DELLE NOSTRE ARMI.

'All' armi Italiche su estremi lidi,
Potente Vergine, dolce sorridi,
A quei che soffrono ne la battaglia
E al petto stringono la tua medaglia.

'Leviamo fervida, con umil cuore,
A Te la supplica, Madre d'amore,
Per tante lagrime di madri afflitte
Salvali, o Vergine, dalle sconfitte.

'Al serto fulgido de la tua gloria
Deh! presto aggiungasi questa vittoria,
Se grande e libera l'Italia vuoi,
Terra di martiri, terra d'eroi.' *

A DIO,

SIGNORE DELLE VITTORIE.

'Padre nostro che regni ne' cieli,
La preghiera ti cerca e t'invoca,
Perchè in mezzo alle stragi crudeli
Siamo tutti fratelli, O Signor.

O Signor della Vittoria, forza donaci e valor;
Al tuo nome sia la gloria, sia l'Italia a noi nel cuor.

'Tu ci hai data la patria bella
Coronata dall' Alpi e dal mare;
Per lei sola, che tutti affratella,
Vanno i figli d'Italia a pugar.

O Signor della Vittoria, forza donaci e valor;
Al tuo nome sia la gloria, sia l'Italia a noi nel cuor.

'Tu che esalti e disperdi le genti,
Padre nostro ci aiuta dal cielo;
Sono fango in tua mano i potenti,
E sai vincer tu solo, O Signor!

O Signor della Vittoria, forza donaci e valor;
Al tuo nome sia la gloria, sia l'Italia a noi nel cuor.

'Benedici tu dunque le schiere
Che ti pregano in faccia al nemico;

* Over our soldiers in a distant land,
Virgin most mighty, raise thy hallowing hand;
Smile graciously on those in battle pressed
Who wear thy medal on their suffering breast.

To thee we lift, with ever humble heart,
Our prayer, for thou the all-loving Mother art;
By all the tears by weeping mothers shed
Bring us, victorious, through this conflict dread.

To that bright crown of thine effulgent glory
Add, quickly add, a new triumphant story,
If thou wouldst have thy Italy great and free,
The land of heroes slain for liberty.

Dona a loro le nostre frontiere
 Che segnasti sull' Alpi e sul mar.
 O Signor della Vittoria, forza donaci e valor ;
 Sia al tuo nome la gloria, sia l'Italia a noi nel cuor.' *

The words are simple, meant for soldiers, but they ring absolutely true. And this same quality of religious fervour shows itself in a poem of a very different calibre, a work of pure literature, the fine Ode by Sem Benelli, entitled 'L'Altare,' written before the retreat in October, in which, by a striking image, the poet figures the Carso as a huge altar of rugged limestone whereon Italy was but lately offering her sacrifice, and to which the future generations of the New Italy, created by this sacrifice, will flock for commemorative rites. The note of the poem is that of the democratic rather than the ecclesiastical aspect of Christianity. In *that*, it differs from the soldiers' hymns; it looks forward rather than back. But even with Benelli the appeal to the past is strong; 'the sword of your heroes of old,' he says, 'flames like the sceptre of a king before the eyes of these patient soldiers of the line':

* Father which art in Heaven,
 Our prayers arise to Thee,
 For mid this deadly levin
 We're children at Thy knee.

Lord God of Hosts, now grant us strength to play a manly part,
 To Thy name be the glory, while Italia fills our heart.

Thy gift our winsome country,
 Crowned by the Alps and sea ;
 For her sake all and sundry
 Like brothers battle free.

Lord God of Hosts, now grant us strength to play a manly part,
 To Thy name be the glory, while Italia fills our heart.

Thou dost exalt and dost o'erthrow
 The nations, grant us aid ;
 In dust are all the proud laid low
 By Thy victorious blade.

Lord God of Hosts, now give us grace to play a manly part,
 To Thy name be the glory, while Italia fills our heart.

Then bless the ranks that raise to Thee
 Their prayer in face of foe ;
 Grant them their country's boundary free
 From sea to Alpine snow.

Lord God of Hosts, now give us grace to play a manly part,
 To Thy name be the glory, while Italia fills our heart.

'La spada dei tuoi vecchi eroi
 Apparisce alle menti di questi
 Pazienti soldati di linea
 Uno scettro da re.'

There is no real rupture between the vision of the future and the teaching of the past. 'The Cross and the sword!' he exclaims; 'never was the Cross a more manifest orifiamme, nor ever have Pity and Piety, with tenderer eyes, upheld another race':

'Con la Croce e la Spada! La Croce
 Non fu mai tanto chiaro segnacolo,
 Nè fu veduta mai,
 Con occhi più belli,
 La Pietà sostentare altro popolo!'

And of the 'umili soldati' of the line:

'paion meno nobili
 d'un mendicante, e son così vicino
 a Gesù nel patire e nel fidare,'

And so their foes themselves cannot fail to feel that within the heart of these humble soldiers dwells the very God unknown to them:

'dentro
 i cuori di questi umili soldati
 è il vero Dio che essi non connobbero.'

Just as the national ideal colours the religious fervour of the race, so, too, it guides and informs their temporal aspirations; it is the light towards which those aims are directed and by which they steer. It may savour of presumption that a stranger, even if he can claim the clairvoyance of affection, should venture to attempt their demonstration; yet, if one lives and converses with a people, it is not difficult to see where one pleases and where one hurts, and thus to divine the innermost core of their hopes and desires. The consciousness of her historical self, the continuity of the Latin idea through the centuries, from the ancient unity of Rome to the modern unity of *Italia nuova*, is the dominant factor in the ideal and the aspirations of the race. A people that has made so much history could not but dream of making more; and no Italian has ever lost faith in the rejuvenescent powers of the Latin blood. The majestic vision of Virgil—'Salve, magna parens

frugum, Saturnia tellus, Magna virum'—the rage of Dante, the wail of Filicaia, the despair of Leopardi, all mean *that*—the sense of Italy's historical past as the pledge and hope of her historical future. The Virgilian note of pomp and strength and illustrious lineage—

'Hæc genus acre virum, Marsos pubemque Sabellam
Assuetumque malo Ligurem Volcosque verutos
Extulit, hæc Decios, Marios, magnosque Camillos'—

is resumed in d'Annunzio's 'Laudi,' in the lists of heroic names that echo from the pages of the 'Gesta d'Oltremare.' In d'Annunzio, indeed, the appeal to the past is carried to extreme lengths; the 'Laudi' and the 'Nave' require a commentary hardly less erudite than that demanded by the 'Divina Comedia'; and there are not many Italians, however patriotic, who could explain, on the spur of the moment, the innumerable allusions to local and national history which it contains.

If there is continuity in the historical appeal, there is continuity, too, in the sentiment of passionate affection aroused by the *patria bella*. 'Tu ci donasti la patria bella,' say the soldiers in the trenches to-day; and Rutilius, leaving Rome in A.D. 417, for his native Gaul, addresses the Eternal City in language whose fervour is identical in quality with the pæan to Italy sung by Benelli on the Carso in 1916:

'Crebra relinquendis infigimus oscula portis;
inviti superant limina sacra pedes.
Oramus veniam lacrimis et laude litamus,
in quantum fletus currere verba sinit;
Exaudi, regina tui pulcherrima mundi,
inter sidereos Roma recepta polos,
Exaudi, nutrix hominum genetrixque deorum
(non procul a cœlo per tua templa sumus).
Te canimus semperque, sinent dum fata, canemus;
hospes nemo potest immemor esse tui. . . .
Mitigat armatas victrix clementia vires,
convenit in mores numen utrumque tuos.
Hinc tibi certandi bona parcendique voluptas;
quos timuit, superat; quos superavit, amat.'

Benelli might almost be paraphrasing these last lines—and yet he is not—when he writes:

'ogni milite può gridare il tuo
nome, poi che tu rechi gentilezza.'

Nor are the poets wrong in their insistence on the historical continuity of the Italian spirit. Italy is indeed the *semprerinascente*. She has witnessed the great epochs of Rome, the Renaissance and the Risorgimento. This is the Third Italy. Her history has, in a certain sense, been the age-long effort to carry the spiritual continuity out into a material unity, not yet achieved in full. 'We have made Italy; we must now make Italians,' inspired by the past, looking forward to the future.

Through the Dark Ages and the Renaissance down to our own day, this historical sense was chiefly a local inspiration. The unity and continuity were broken in the political, though not in the spiritual sphere, by the political subdivisions of the peninsula. The inspiration of Venetian, Genoese, Florentine, Pisan achievements was stimulant and binding only, or chiefly, for Venetians, Genoese, Florentines or Pisans. But, now that Italy is a political unit once more, these local achievements become part of the spiritual patrimony of the whole race. They take on a wider significance; a new mould is created into which the precious metal of these glowing deeds can now be poured to make the spiritual coinage of the newer race. The desire for such a political and spiritual union was never absent from the minds of Italian statesmen, throughout the Renaissance; the dream of a united Italy floated before the eyes of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, of Cesare Borgia, and of Machiavelli. But it was reserved for the Italians who followed Victor Emanuel, Cavour, Mazzini and Garibaldi, to realise that dream, and to create a new Italy 'non meno bella ed assai più forte.'

For the first time since the days of Rome, an Italian army, drawn from the whole peninsula, as distinguished from a Florentine, Venetian or Piedmontese army, is taking part in a European conflict. In the war of 1866, the Veneto was not yet Italian; and the wars in Abyssinia and Tripoli, important as they were for Italy, were not European wars. The political union of Italy has made the country conscious of its past as a whole. And behind the dream, the aspirations which animate the 'giovincello Regno,' loom two great names, Rome and Venice, with all the hopes and suggestions those names imply. Not that in the region of practical politics,

of possible achievement, the Italians, as a nation, allow the dream to carry them too far. They are eminently a practical people; and the vision of Italy's future rôle on the world-stage, if its indulgence threatens to lead beyond the bounds of reason, is quickly corrected and checked by the homely Venetian phrase, *massa roba*, 'o'er much,' and the warning of their own proverb 'chi troppo abbraccia nulla stringe.'

But the dream is there, nevertheless. If one hears the words 'usque ad fines' used to indicate the scope of the war, it is not difficult to guess what 'fines' are at the back of the speaker's mind; and the latest map of the war-zone marks the watershed of the Alps as the *Vetta d'Italia*, the crest of Italy. Nor has the name of Venice a less potent, it has indeed a more practical, inspiration and content, the lure of the sea. No one who was present at the early performances of 'La Nave' will ever forget the thrill that ran through the house, and thence through the country, at such lines of inspired challenge as

'Arma la prora e salpa verso il mondo' . . .

'Fa di tutti gli oceani il mar nostro' . . .

'Non è mai tardi per andar più oltre.'

There was the hope of the future, boundless as the ocean, based on the achievement of the past. *Massa roba*, perhaps, but who has ever achieved much that did not dream of more? And then the draw to East and South, felt and expressed by d'Annunzio and Benelli:

'Il mattino per noi sorge dall' ostro' . . .

'O Trinacria natante, ponte aperto
Sull' Africa, destino ultimo e primo' . . .

'Il vento soffia verso l'Oriente' . . . *

with their implication of claim to the Venetian inheritance in the Adriatic, the Mediterranean and the Levant.

The dream of the Adriatic as an Italian *mare clausum* is born of the ancient Venetian doctrine of the *Golfo*, as the Republic called it; the vital necessity that Venice should be dominant in those waters as the great sea-

* From the 'Laudi,' the 'Altare,' and the 'Nave,' respectively.

avenue which leads towards the East, whence she drew her commercial wealth and strength. The attitude of mind and the policy it implies are strikingly like our own towards the Narrow Seas. The English point of view found passionate expression in the '*Libellus de politia conservativa maris*' or Tractate on the Conservative policy of the sea, a poem published in the early years of the 16th century, with its urgent refrain 'That we be masters of the Narrow Sea.' Venice felt the same necessity; and the effort to realise her aim led her to engage the Normans who had threatened to close the mouth of the 'Gulf,' and to seize Durazzo, as Italy now, and on the same grounds, has occupied Valona.

The endeavour to make good her position in the Adriatic exposed Venice to endless exhausting wars, which, in part at least, contributed to her decline. But both Venice and Italy have rightly recognised the supreme importance of superiority in the Narrow Sea. For a time, which coincides with the gradual eclipse of the Republic, the value of the Adriatic was diminished by the discovery of the Cape route to India, which drew the main trade between East and West out of the Adriatic into the Atlantic. But the opening of the Suez Canal is tending to restore the importance of the Adriatic as the water-way leading furthest into the heart of Europe; and with the revival of the Adriatic the position of Venice at the head of it resumes its significance and cannot fail to affect profoundly the future of Italy, raising the hopes and the dreams that centre round that lovely city. The whole question is one of great delicacy, and will give pause to practical Italian statesmen. There is much to be urged against a too material interpretation and realisation of the desire for a *mare clausum* in the Adriatic, against a land-frontier difficult to organise and hold; the danger of an inverted *irredenta* in Slav lands is obvious; but Italy cannot ignore the vital importance to herself of her position in the Adriatic, and there is evidence that her leaders are handling the question with caution and skill.

The war, however, has evoked another order of thought, aspirations of a vaguer and less material, though, possibly, profounder and more enduring influence. The ideal of Italy remains the same, and the appeal to

the past, which is so vital a factor in that ideal, loses none of its force, but the trend of aspiration is different. D'Annunzio, with the material glories of his dream, with his excessive emphasis and his exaggerated appeal to history, is the poet of the one order; Sem Benelli, with his intense sympathy for the actual human beings of the hour, his spiritual rather than material outlook, is the poet of the other. If d'Annunzio seems to us to overstrain the historical and material rôle, Benelli, perhaps, lays too much stress on the spiritual and mystic; but we must bear in mind that the Latin races have their own heightened way of saying things, and that, in any case, ideals are apt to carry us beyond the bounds of common fact. Benelli's rugged altar on the Carso, then, is to be the shrine of a new democracy, whereat shall meet

‘i nuovi figli d'Italia . . .
in accordo perfetto
con tutto l'amore
della più nobile famiglia
del mondo.’

It is a people's war, to win a people's prize, the fraternity of the race in the unity of its home; a war with the *popolo* as the hero, inspired, no less than the medieval heroes of d'Annunzio, by a passionate devotion to their ideal Italy, but issuing from the people and the people's dwellings,

‘Salgono alle trincee e sempre nominano
le loro madri due: la mamma e te.’

That is profoundly true of the Italian soldier now in the trenches; the cry of his heart is for his two mothers, *mamma mia* and *Italia*, and, if his religion be still alive, for yet a third mother, *Maria Vergine*, in heaven. Benelli's vision and aspiration is a ‘Democratic Vista,’ recalling the hopes and forecasts of Walt Whitman for ‘these States’; but Italy has a richer historical past to draw upon, and even in her democratic mood, ‘la spada dei tuoi vecchi eroi’ is invoked to inspire the warriors of the new idea. Italy is always conscious of her past.

And how does the poet envisage the festival commemorative of the sacrifice which has given birth to the New Italy? It will be a gathering of all the arts, of all

the sciences, of all the crafts, of all the industries, of all who are engaged in activities that ennoble man :

‘ i sommi di tutte le arti,
i nuovi di tutte le scienze,
i coltivatori di tutte
le prime virtù,’

welded in one vast brotherhood by the sacrifices of this war, which is to complete the unity of Italy in body and soul, and to edify it by the mystic knowledge, now acquired, that gain can only come by suffering :

‘ Nulla dà il bene,
anche se par un sogno,
se non è con dolore edificato.’

The processional hymn will be ‘ the chaunt of Italian brotherhood.’ Now at last has the word been found which shall bring consolation to all hearts ; the song of Italy, for the first time full and complete in perfect diapason, rises on high from the throats of a people united at length in their material home and in their spiritual aspirations :

‘ Trovata è la parola
che finalmente tutti ci consola ;
è trovato l'accordo e sale il canto
italico la prima volta in alto
pieno e intiero.’

This is, of course, the language of the visionary, of the poet. ‘ It is only Piron the poet ’ who is speaking, not the guns on the Piave, the Alpini on the Tonale, not the men in the Galleria at Milan, or at the ‘ Aragno ’ in the Corso, not the men of Montecitorio ; and yet it is the poets who express their race and are speaking for all.

HORATIO F. BROWN.

Art. 9.—THE FOOD PROBLEM 1914–1916.

1. *Departmental Committee appointed by the President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries to consider the Production of Food in England and Wales. Interim and Final Reports* [Cd 8048, 8095]. H.M. Stat. Office, 1915.
2. *Departmental Committee appointed by the Board of Trade to investigate the principal causes which have led to the increase of Prices of Commodities since the beginning of the War. Interim, Second and Third Reports* [Cd 8358, 8483]. H.M. Stat. Office, 1916, 1917.
3. *Royal Commission on the Sugar Supply. First (interim) Report, showing the operations of the Commission from date of appointment to the beginning of December, 1916* [Cd 8728]. H.M. Stat. Office, 1917.

ONE of the last acts of Mr Asquith's Government was the institution of the office of Food Controller, though no candidate could be found bold enough to fill it. One of the first acts of Mr Lloyd George's Government was the institution of the Ministry of Food on Dec. 22, 1916, with Lord Devonport at its head. After some fifteen months' experience of increasing State control over our food supplies and their distribution, it is a matter of considerable interest to review the causes which little by little forced a reluctant Government 'to suspend the easy flow of voluntary action' and to resort more and more to State interference in regard to food as in almost all other departments of our national life. From the official reports quoted at the head of this article, supplemented by other evidence, it is now possible to get a fairly clear idea of our Government's activities from the outbreak of the war until Mr Asquith's resignation on Dec. 5, 1916—a period throughout which, though there was some reshuffling of the cards in May 1915, Mr Asquith continued to be Prime Minister and Mr Runciman President of the Board of Trade, the Department then most directly concerned with our food supplies. The scope of this article is limited to this period; the intimate history of later happenings is yet to be disclosed.

At the outbreak of the War the United Kingdom was a Free Trade country under a strongly Free Trade

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Government. Its population of forty-seven millions was dependent for two-thirds of its food on foreign supplies. In particular, our islands produced only one-fifth of the wheat, only three-fifths of the meat and bacon, and none of the sugar that they consumed; on the other hand they produced more than nine-tenths of the milk, and all the potatoes required. The only staple food of which they produced far more than they consumed was fish. Obviously, therefore, as everybody knows only too well, our very existence in time of war depends on our command of the sea.

At first no statesmen and very few generals seem to have anticipated that the war could last beyond a few months; and neither in this nor in any of the belligerent countries—once the panic of the first few days with its mad run upon the food-shops was over—does there appear to have been any special anxiety about food supplies. It was only as the probable prolongation of the war began to be perceived that drastic measures to secure the feeding of their peoples were taken by the Central Powers, while our own Government was content to devise means to meet special crises as they happened to occur. The Government, said Mr Runciman two years later, had regarded ‘practical objects as the only objects worthy of attainment.’ None the less, however much in theory Mr Asquith’s Government may have been ‘wedded to the old voluntary principle,’ the actual history of what they did in practice to secure ample food supplies may come as a surprise even to close observers.

As soon as war was declared, the Government appointed a Cabinet Committee on Food Supplies, which took immediate steps to secure supplies of sugar, meat and corn, and—most important of all—unrestricted transport by land and sea. On Aug. 4, 1914, it assumed control over the railways. Next day it announced a system of State insurance for British shipping to compensate our shippers for losses at sea through enemy action. It foresaw a shortage of sugar, due to the fact that in normal times 65 per cent. of the supply came from Germany and Austria; and it made immediate arrangements for the state purchase of sugar from other sources. To guard against a possible meat shortage, it obtained a list of all refrigerated vessels afloat, and gave orders to the Navy to

shepherd them all to our shores; and on Aug. 6 it secured from the Queensland Government the option of the whole of the Colony's frozen meat supply. To allay the senseless food panic of the first few days it took over the control of all flour mills, and appointed on Aug. 7 a Consultative Committee on food supplies, which, in conference with representatives of large distributive Companies and the Grocers' Federation, issued lists of maximum prices—without indeed any legal sanction—at which articles of food might fairly be sold in the retail shops.

On Aug. 10 it passed the Defence of the Realm Act, under which it was authorised to requisition not only food, fodder and stores for the Navy and Army, but also all food-stuffs unreasonably withheld; and on the same day it appointed a special Committee of the Board of Agriculture to consider the production of home supplies. It also ordered the Board to make a survey of our food resources both at the moment and afterwards periodically, and, to increase confidence, announced that there was in the country five months' supply of wheat and nearly a twelve months' supply of potatoes. Further, it prohibited all export of food-stuffs and, two or three months later, all export of fodder. Finally, on Aug. 20 the Cabinet Committee on Food Supplies handed over the purchase of sugar to a special Commission, which it had already empowered 'to purchase, sell and control the delivery of sugar, and generally to take such steps as may seem desirable for maintaining the supply.'

This last step was the boldest of the measures then taken to safeguard supplies; and, though it was at first subjected to much adverse criticism, it has proved so successful, that the Sugar Commission even now continues its work with but little change from the form in which it started. The Commission was composed of five persons, assisted by a small staff. At the end of August there was in the United Kingdom only one month's stock in store, but by the following November, by purchases through ordinary trade channels in the United States, Cuba, Mauritius, Java, the Philippines and elsewhere, the Commission had completely relieved the shortage; and from that time onward maintained stocks in this country at the normal level till early in 1916, when

difficulties of tonnage and exchange led to a slight reduction, which down to the end of that year never became serious. The rise in price, however, was considerable, being over 200 per cent., from the *ante-bellum* price of 2*d.* to 5½*d.* per lb. in December 1916, of which 1¼*d.* is accounted for by additional taxation. By November 1916 the Commission had expended 81,000,000*l.* in the purchase of sugar. Though the article has practically been made into a State monopoly, the Commissioners have added to its cost price only ⅛*d.* per lb. in order to cover insurance and working expenses, and to provide a reserve fund large enough to maintain uniformity in price and to meet any possible reduction in prices at the close of the war.

To return to the activities of the Government during the first autumn of the war. In October 1914 the import of sugar through ordinary trade channels was prohibited, in order to prevent enemy sugar from reaching England through neutrals; and a Committee on Grain Supplies was formed, composed of representatives of various Government Departments, on the ground that it was 'too risky to leave the bread supply of the country and its armed forces entirely to private enterprise.' Its scope was limited to the piling up of a grain reserve; and, during the next four months, it purchased 3¼ million quarters of wheat, besides large quantities of flour from the United States and India. Large purchases of frozen meat were made by the Government from the River Plate and elsewhere, but only for army purposes, the balance remaining over for civilian consumption being insignificant.

In October and November a disquieting feature began to show itself. Shipping freights rose sharply. The Admiralty at once met the difficulty, so far as merchant vessels requisitioned in its service were concerned, by making an agreement with the owners for fixed rates (the so-called 'Blue Book' rates) on all cargoes. But in the open market, from November 1914 to March 1915, the rise in freights was steep and continuous; e.g. the rate on corn cargoes rose from the *ante-bellum* figure of 12*s.* per ton to 142*s.* The causes were obvious. The Admiralty had already requisitioned a large number of our merchant vessels and was always requisitioning more;

some seventy to eighty British vessels were interned in German harbours, and a hundred more locked up in neutral ports in the Baltic; nearly a hundred big steamers were transferred from the British to neutral flags before the practice was forbidden about the end of the year; and 3½ millions of enemy tonnage, shut up in British, American, and other harbours, were unable to trade. Moreover, an appreciable number of our vessels had been sunk by the enemy cruisers. The Battle of the Falkland Islands and other successes cleared the seas of these surface raiders, but drove the enemy to adopt a far more dangerous engine in the submarine.

By the end of the year, food prices had risen by 17 per cent. In January 1915 prices continued to rise; and the Labour Party began to agitate for more State interference, demanding State purchase and ownership of all stocks of wheat and its sale at fixed prices. But, beyond the Board of Trade's taking over the control of the Australian meat import under ordinary commercial conditions, and the appointment of a Cabinet Committee to consider the rise of prices, little was done. The results of the Committee's deliberations were presumably given in Mr Asquith's comforting speech in the House of Commons in the middle of February. He pointed out that, though food prices had risen by 20-24 per cent., the prices of five of the necessities of life—wheat, flour, meat, sugar, and coal—had not yet reached the level of the time after the Franco-Prussian War; he attributed the higher price of wheat to the failure of the Australian crop, the embargo on Indian export, the delay of the Argentine export owing to bad weather, the closing of the Dardanelles against Russian wheat, the loss of the crops in Belgium and northern France, and the competitive purchases of France, Italy and Holland; and he explained that the advance in meat prices was caused by the enormous consumption of the new armies. Maximum prices he roundly condemned as discredited, not only theoretically, but by their ill success in Germany. But, except for a brief reference to the steps taken to secure the surplus of Indian wheat, Mr Asquith made no reference to the measures which the Government had already taken to meet the various difficulties of the situation. How little strength there was at this time

behind the Labour Agitation is plain from the fact that the Labour Resolution, after severe criticism from Mr Runciman, Mr Bonar Law and Mr Chamberlain, was allowed to be talked out.

At this time, however, a cloud was rising on the horizon of the food situation which at the present time—three years later—has darkened the whole scene. On Jan. 26, 1915, the German Government announced its control over all food-stuffs, including imports from overseas. Our Government countered the stroke by proclaiming all food cargoes for German and even for neutral ports, if their ultimate destination for Germany was evident, to be contraband of war. On Feb. 4 Germany replied by announcing that, as from Feb. 18, British or neutral merchant vessels in British waters would be sunk by submarines without notice and without provision for the safety of crew or passengers. In 1914 only three British merchantmen had been sunk by submarines. Between Jan. 1 and March 31, 1915, the number was thirty. Our Government left the task of coping with the new danger to the Navy, and in the sphere of food supplies limited its activities to forming an Indian Wheat Committee to cooperate with the Indian Government in securing the Indian surplus—it was, to the amount of $2\frac{1}{2}$ million quarters, safely shipped to the United Kingdom—and to revising, in consultation with shipowners, the so-called Blue Book rates for freight on all requisitioned shipping, which had in October 1914 been fixed considerably below market level. The new rates came into force on March 1, and it was agreed that no further change should be made during the war. At the end of 1916 they still held good.

For some months, although a small group of agriculturists in both Houses of Parliament continued to urge the increase of home production, both the nation and the Government were more occupied with the pressing problems of recruiting, munitions and finance than with the gradually rising prices of food-stuffs. At last, in June 1915, the question of increased home production was definitely raised, but only as a side issue, as part of an economy campaign started by the Government in view of the enormous War Budget and of the subscription to the Second War Loan. As yet there was no general

fear of shortage; and the only economies preached were the cutting down of luxuries and the avoidance of waste, in order that more money might be forthcoming for the loan. The Coalition Ministry came into office on May 25; and almost the first act of the new President of the Board of Agriculture, Lord Selborne, was the appointment on June 17 of a small committee of experts under the chairmanship of Lord Milner, with instructions

‘to consider and report what steps should be taken by legislation or otherwise for the sole purpose of maintaining and, if possible, of increasing the present production of food in England and Wales, on the assumption that the war may be prolonged beyond the autumn of 1916.’

Similar committees were appointed for Scotland and Ireland. In July Lord Milner's Committee presented an Interim Report, recommending, among other things, that farmers should be encouraged to grow more wheat by a State guarantee of a minimum price of 45s. per quarter for 1916 and the four following years, and that local War Agricultural Committees should be set up by County Councils to act as intermediaries between the Board of Agriculture and the farmers. The Scottish Committee would have nothing to do with a guaranteed minimum price. At the end of August Lord Selborne announced that the Government also rejected the first recommendation, but would at once proceed to the appointment of the proposed local committees. His statement clearly reveals the attitude of the Government towards the food problem at this time. Was it wise, he asked, to burden the nation with a heavy guarantee at a time of serious financial strain, or to encourage farmers to embark on large schemes of additional cultivation, when, as it was, the military authorities were not leaving them enough labour properly to cultivate the fields already tilled? At the moment 500,000 more acres were under wheat than in the previous year—an increase of 30 per cent. The harvests of Canada and Australia were super-abundant, and the Navy (we were told) had the submarine menace well in hand.

Six or seven weeks later things changed for the worse. There was a serious fall in imports, due, we must suppose, to shortage of tonnage—a shortage due

in its turn not so much to increased submarine depredations, as to the requisitioning of more ships to supply the Allied Armies sent to Salonika after the declaration of war against Bulgaria. In October an important Committee of the Cabinet met to review the whole question of shipping. While with certain reservations it decided against the artificial regulation of rates, not wishing to drive away neutral vessels, which were rendering valuable but expensive services both to ourselves and to our Allies, it recommended a very considerable advance towards the State control of British shipping. The results of its labours were soon seen. On Nov. 10, 1915, an Order in Council was published, appointing three Committees under the Board of Trade to deal with three different aspects of the shipping problem. These were (1) the Licensing Committee, (2) the Requisitioning or Carriage of Food-stuffs Committee, and (3) the Port and Transit Committee.

The function of the Licensing Committee was to prevent any British steamship of over 500 tons from carrying cargo between foreign ports without its licence—a provision extended on Feb. 15, 1916, to all voyages whatsoever. Its chief object, therefore, was to keep as many ships as possible for our own trade; only to established liners did it grant general licences—revocable at any moment—in order to maintain a skeleton outline of our normal trade activities. All other vessels it dealt with voyage by voyage. It was also its duty to stop sailings to congested ports, and to prevent, so far as possible, sailings in ballast.

The Requisition Committee was charged with the duty of providing tonnage, either by requisition or by direction of sailing, for the import of wheat and flour in quantities prescribed monthly by the Cabinet Committee on Food Supplies. After a conference with the leading ship-owners it requisitioned for this purpose 50 per cent. of the cargo space on all liners and 75 per cent. on a certain number of tramp steamers. Though it requisitioned the ships, it did not fix the rates of freight, but practically controlled them through its power of directing an adequate number of vessels to sail to the necessary ports, with the result that, e.g., North American rates fell in six months from 18s. to 12s. per ton. By

June 1916 it had for the moment fulfilled its allotted task, having secured not only the normal supplies of wheat and flour, but a very substantial reserve as well. After March 1916 it was much helped in its operations by the Import Restrictions Department of the Board of Trade, whose function it was to make the best use of cargo space by excluding unnecessary articles.

The Port and Transit Committee was given, as its first duty, the task of promoting the free flow of traffic and of preventing that congestion in the ports which had hitherto resulted in a loss of quite 10 per cent. of our available tonnage. Its first act was to persuade the War Office to exempt transport workers from military service. Next it set up Port Labour Committees in twenty-two of our ports for the purpose of organising local labour. In February 1916 it organised a Labour Battalion on a military footing, which was to be moveable from port to port, when civilian labour failed; and it increased railway facilities by inducing the Board of Management to pool all the trucks belonging to the various companies and private owners. But, notwithstanding all its efforts, it was reported, twelve months later, that cargoes still took twice as long to unload as in time of peace.

On Jan. 26, 1916, in order to secure better coordination in the work of these Committees, yet another was appointed—the Shipping Control Committee, with Lord Curzon as chairman. It was to be supreme over all the rest and subordinate only to the Cabinet. Its primary duty was to allocate tonnage to our Allies—a somewhat delicate task; and it was at the same time to deal with all applications for tonnage from the Naval, Military and Munitions authorities and to harmonise them with the demands of the Requisitioning Committee and the activities of the Licensing and Port and Transit Committees.

Two other Committees also exercised important functions connected with shipping: (1) the 'Bunker' Committee, which was able to exert very considerable pressure on neutrals by forbidding the supply of bunker coal at any of our coaling stations to any foreign vessel known to be trading in the German interest; (2) a Joint Committee of representatives of Great Britain, France,

and Italy, meeting daily in London, which was formed to buy wheat, flour and maize in combination instead of competition, thereby effecting great economies. The outcome of all these measures was that henceforward shipping was practically a State-controlled industry.

By the end of 1915 food prices had risen 40 per cent. above the level of July 1914; and nearly 1000 Allied and neutral vessels had been put out of use by enemy submarines and mines—an ominous increase having taken place since Lord Selborne's boast, at the end of August, that the Navy had the submarine menace well in hand.

In 1916 food questions were for the first eight or nine months again overshadowed, first, by the more pressing problem of compulsory military service, which was solved by the two Military Service Acts, passed on Jan. 25 and May 25; and then by the Irish Rebellion, which broke out on April 25 and for some time occupied the main attention of Parliament. Continual labour troubles, however, revealed a strong undercurrent of discontent, which led to repeated demands for higher wages to meet the ever-growing cost of food.

During this period the Government seems to have relied on its new Shipping Committees as adequate to solve any food difficulties that might from time to time arise by the time-honoured and, when practicable, the most satisfactory of all methods—the method of increasing supplies, prices being left to take care of themselves. Meanwhile the German submarines still took toll of our merchantmen, but only to such an extent as to irritate rather than to alarm us for the safety of our overseas supplies.

In February 1916 Mr Runciman explained to the House of Commons why the Government had decided against the policy of commandeering the whole mercantile fleet, and had contented itself merely with a large measure of control. He pointed out that the same amount of trade had now to be done with only 67 per cent. of the vessels available in time of peace, and that of these some 21–24 per cent. were neutrals, whose rates were determined not in our own, but in the world market. Considering that these vessels brought us a large portion of our food-stuffs and raw materials, the Government was anxious not to drive them away by any arbitrary

fixing of maximum rates—a consideration which meant that in common fairness as many of our merchantmen as possible ought to be allowed to share in the high profits made by neutrals.* Though no voyage could be undertaken without permission, Mr Runciman maintained the wisdom of allowing British merchants to keep up their old trade connexions instead of abandoning large spheres of trade entirely to foreign enterprise. All the difficulties were ultimately due to shipping shortage and labour shortage; the needs of the Navy had pushed aside the building of merchant vessels; the needs of the Army had robbed the dockyards of artificers and the quays of transport workers. The Government had done its utmost to alleviate, but it could not cure, these evils, which were simply the results of the war.

In the spring the imminence of the second War Budget provoked a renewal of the campaign for National Economy. Official orators up and down the country inculcated the virtue of saving money and inveighed against useless expenditure on luxuries; they had much, too, to say about thoughtless waste of food, but betrayed no anxiety about any real shortage; only alarmists talked of the possibility of its occurrence. Similarly, a circular, issued by the Board of Trade on March 15, appealing to civilians to eat less meat, based its appeal, not on the supply being below the normal, but on the fact that the Allied armies were eating more meat than had ever been eaten before. It was undoubtedly the fact that, so far, the supply of necessities had been maintained not only not below but even above peace level. Our embarrassments were financial rather than material; and the rise in prices had hitherto been caused rather by increasing demands than by diminishing supplies—always excepting ships. So late as April 12, Lord Selborne, President of the Board of Agriculture, said that the principal difficulties of the war were first foreign exchange and secondly the shortage of transport.

In the debate on the vote for the Board of Agriculture on May 22, the chief theme of Mr Acland, the

* The fact, however, remained that all work done for the British or Allied Governments was done at Blue Book rates, far below the market level, and in some cases even at lower rates.

Parliamentary Secretary, was the shortage of labour. After reviewing with some complacency the activities of three Departmental Committees in promoting the cultivation of wheat by educational propaganda, in providing adequate fertilising substitutes in the absence of German potash and the scarcity of Chilean nitrates, and in replacing foreign with home-grown timber for pit props and war purposes; and after praising the work of the War Agricultural Committees which had been appointed on the recommendation of Lord Milner's Committee, he solemnly warned the House of Commons that 300,000 farmers and labourers out of less than a million had left the land to join the army—with the result that British Agriculture was in danger of an absolute breakdown. Boy labour could do but little to replace the men; the only possible substitute was women, who had in many cases done splendidly. Mr Acland ended with a warning to the Military Tribunals that a skilled agricultural labourer was of more use to the country in the fields than in the trenches.

In the course of the debate Mr Prothero, who a year before had already demanded a State organisation of all food and fodder supplies, not only at home but throughout the Empire, once again urged the Government seriously to grapple with the problem and to put the nation on rations immediately, instead of waiting till it was compelled to do so. But the Government still declined to be roused. A few days later it refused to legislate for the appropriation of vacant land for the purpose of cultivation, probably because it knew—what outsiders did not know—that the corn purchased in America had already been safely landed through the efforts of the Shipping Committees; and also that there was a large surplus in Australia, part of which had already been purchased, but not yet transported to this country.

Meanwhile prices had risen from 45 per cent. above peace level in January to 55 per cent. in May. Labour circles began to grumble about the rapacity and greed of dealers. The Press announced Government inquiries into imported and home-grown food supplies, and, on the ground of the failure of the food economy campaign, anticipated large measures of State control. But the

only immediate outcome was the appointment on June 17, under the Board of Trade, of a Committee

‘to investigate the principal causes which have led to the increase of prices of commodities of general consumption since the beginning of the war, and to recommend such steps, if any, with a view of ameliorating the situation, as appear practicable and expedient, having regard to the necessity of maintaining adequate supplies.’

The appointment of the Committee was generally well received; and the inclusion of a Labour element led to the expectation of a ruthless exposure of ‘profiteering,’ which was popularly supposed—especially in view of the unexpected productiveness of the Excess Profits Tax—to be the chief cause of high prices. The Committee at once set to work, but did not present its first Report until the end of September.

Meanwhile prices crept up. In June they rose four points, in July two, in August they went down one; in September they made a jump of five, reaching 65 per cent. above the peace level. Ministers were approached by deputations from various Labour bodies, the most important being that of the Trade Unions Congress, which was received by Mr Asquith on July 19. It put forward three definite demands: (1) the commandeering by the State of all food and fuel supplies, and their distribution by the municipalities; (2) the State ownership and control of all merchant shipping; and (3) the commandeering of the home-grown crops at a fair price to the farmers. Mr Asquith gave the Deputation his usual answer, which, however sound in itself, was little calculated to satisfy their wishes. He pointed out that, even if the ship-owners were making high profits, they had to pay away 50 to 60 per cent. of the money to the State under the Excess Profits Act; and that they were competing with neutrals, who were making still higher profits, but none the less fulfilling the useful function of bringing us one-third of our imports. He saw no need for the Government to assume the ownership of our mercantile fleet, as, under existing regulations, it already exercised complete control over the whole of it, and had actually requisitioned one-half for its own purposes. As to food and fuel—he thought it far more important for

the Government to secure sufficient supplies than to regulate their prices. German experiments in maximum prices had made him very doubtful of their success, and he was not at all disposed to repeat them here.

By September the situation had grown distinctly worse. Submarine activity, which had shown increased intensity as the summer wore on, took a sudden leap forwards and steadily became more deadly, even before the proclamation of 'ruthless warfare' in February 1917—being extended from the more enclosed and shallower seas to the open and deep waters of the Atlantic, and even as far as the American coast. Neutral ships were attacked with as much virulence as British. A world-wide shortage was anticipated in the new harvest. In the United Kingdom the area under wheat had shrunk by a quarter of a million acres compared with 1915, mainly owing to dearth of labour; and the yield per acre was much poorer. What was still more serious, the North American crop threatened to be short. Further afield the Indian crop was comparatively poor; and in the Argentina a prolonged drought had rendered the prospects doubtful. The one bright spot was the enormous crop in Australia, the exportable surplus of which our Government had purchased in the spring and early summer. Here the difficulty was transport; the voyage from Australia takes three times as long as the voyage from North America (hitherto the main source of our supply) and would require three times as many ships, when fewer ships were forthcoming.

The prospective shortage was naturally reflected in the prices of wheat and bread. Between July and October the former rose from 50s. to 60s. per quarter, the latter from 8d. to 10d. for the 4lb. loaf. So, when the Trades Union Congress, dissatisfied with Mr Asquith's reply to the Deputation in July, met at the beginning of September, it unanimously passed a strongly worded resolution accusing the Government of having 'failed to give proper attention to the people's grievances due to the enormous and unjustifiable increase in the cost of living,' and demanding a revision of the prices of necessities, either by fixing maximum prices or by taking full control of supplies, in order to prevent the people being 'systematically robbed.' Serious trouble, too, was threatened by

the railway men, who through their National Union demanded a further bonus of 10s. a week to meet the increased cost of living, and soon succeeded in getting this demand in great measure conceded. At the same time certain newspapers began a campaign against 'greedy and unscrupulous food pirates,' who filled their own pockets at the expense of their fellow-citizens.

Even to cool critics, like Dr Arthur Shadwell, a dangerous situation seemed to be rapidly developing. The moment called for an authoritative statement. Accordingly, in a letter to the borough of Poplar dated Sept. 20, and in a speech at Dewsbury on Sept. 28, the President of the Board of Trade defended the Government from the charge of inaction by recounting the measures which it had taken from the very beginning of the war to maintain the supply of, and to secure control over, sugar, meat and wheat. It was true that, notwithstanding Government intervention, these articles had undergone the highest rise in price; but he pointed to the fact that the German Government, with all its powers, had not been able to prevent food prices rising by 117 per cent., while in this country they had advanced only by 65 per cent. The Government, he explained, though it held its first duty to be rather to maintain supplies than to regulate prices, was considering whether it should try to secure, as had been suggested, the same control over home-grown supplies as it possessed over imports; but, as to fixing maximum prices for bacon and a hundred other articles, for his part he was not going to follow the German example, unless he was sure that good would come from it.

On Sept. 29 the Food Prices Committee at last published an Interim Report, dealing first with prices in general and then with those of meat, milk and bacon in particular. Prices, the Report stated, had risen by 65 per cent.; but the average increase in the cost of living for the working classes, when all items of expenditure—apart from increased taxation—were considered was estimated to be about 45 per cent., on the assumption that the standard of living had not been modified in view of war conditions. Though there had been many increases in wages, the rates of increase were much below those recorded in the prices of food and

other necessities. On the other side, however, it had to be remembered that the official figures did not include increases in earnings which had resulted from greater regularity of employment, overtime and night-work, substitution of piece-work for time-work, speeding-up of piece-work, transference of individuals from less to more highly paid employments, and other factors which had tended to raise the actual earnings quite apart from the increases in rates of wages. At any rate the general result had been that there was less distress in the country than in ordinary times of peace and much less unemployment, though some classes, like the cotton operatives and people with small fixed incomes, had been hard hit by the war. The general prosperity of the people was beyond doubt, and had shown itself in a considerable increase in the demand for food, which was one of the main causes of the advance in prices. As to the prices of meat, milk and bacon in particular, the Committee found that the advance was mainly due to the increased costs of production and distribution rather than to any unrighteous 'profiteering' on the part of 'rings,' speculators, or traders; and that the high profits, where made went primarily to the producers, secondly to the wholesalers, and not at all to the retailers.

In conclusion the Committee made various recommendations to the Government—none of them very drastic—such as to hasten the construction of mercantile shipping, still further to restrict the import of superfluities, to develop the large-scale purchase by the Government of frozen meat and to impose such conditions on wholesalers and retailers as would secure its sale at reasonable prices, to invite patriotic citizens to observe meatless days, to open municipal shops, to urge upon employers and public bodies to raise the wages of their lower-paid workers, etc. Seven members of the Committee, including the Labour representatives, were so discontented with the mildness of these recommendations that they appended a memorandum of their own, calling vaguely upon the Government to take far-reaching action, which should include the State purchase of all foreign meat and the State control of the prices of all the primary food-stuffs produced at home.

On Oct. 10 a further step towards the State control

of our wheat supply was taken. On that day Mr Runciman announced to the House of Commons, which had just reassembled, the appointment of a Royal Commission 'to purchase, sell and deal in wheat,' alleging, as the reason, that our wheat supplies could 'no longer be left to private enterprise,' as private traders were becoming 'too timid to hold stocks,' though the still more urgent reason was, as appeared a few weeks later, the shortage of the world's harvest. Mr Runciman further explained that the Commission, among its earliest tasks, would have to arrange for the transport of a large amount of Australian wheat already purchased.

A week later the Labour Party in the House of Commons renewed their old demand for stronger State action, asking in particular for a Food Controller, a fixed price for bread, and the maintenance of the milk supply at a reasonable price. In refusing all these demands, the President of the Board of Trade stated that he had no change of policy to announce on the part of the Government. Its aim was still, as it had been hitherto, plenty of supplies and prevention of exploitation; but, to secure these objects, the Government had of course to adapt itself to changing circumstances. The general causes of the rise of prices were threefold—the restriction of production, the narrowing of markets, and the difficulties of transport; to which he would add a fourth, the inflation of currency. Moreover, in the United Kingdom, the consuming capacity of the people had actually increased. After reviewing the Government's activities since the outbreak of the war in securing our sugar, meat and wheat supplies, Mr Runciman passed on to our transport difficulties, and in dealing with them partially lifted the impenetrable veil in which successive Governments have shrouded the situation of our mercantile marine. He admitted that the shortage of vessels was at the root of the whole problem, but stated that it was caused much more by the requisitions of our own Admiralty than by the depredations of German submarines and mines, although enemy action and wrecks together had since the beginning of the war resulted in the loss of 2,250,000 net tons, or 3,000,000 gross tons, of British shipping.

Next he showed how far the Government had already

gone in its control over our mercantile fleet. Out of nearly 10,000 vessels, he explained, only 1118 vessels were free to trade as their owners liked; it subsequently appeared that even this small minority could not sail without the Ship Licensing Committee's permission. Of the 1118 free ships, 297 were permanently abroad, employed in keeping up a skeleton of our former trade between foreign ports; 588 were cargo liners and tramps chartered to liner companies, thus leaving only 233 free tramps—free to sail and to earn as their owners liked. As to the remaining 9000 vessels, they were either (1) used for the purposes of the Navy and Army, or (2) temporarily released to their owners to go on intermediate voyages carrying commodities urgently needed in this country, or (3) chartered by the Foodstuffs Requisitioning Committee at Blue Book rates, or (4) chartered by the Allies or Colonies, also at Blue Book rates. These rates were much below those of the open market, and added only $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per lb. to the price of meat, and only $\frac{1}{4}$ d. per lb. to the price of Canadian cheese. Turning finally to the Labour Party's demand for maximum prices and a rationing system, Mr Runciman maintained that, though prices could not be left altogether to take care of themselves, our own experience in rationing sugar and petrol had not been altogether happy, and that the German system of bread-tickets and meat-coupons was harmful to the people who had the least to spend.

The month of November was marked by two most important advances towards State control of food and industry. A disastrous strike in South Wales, which would have imperilled the coal supply of our Navy, was only averted by the Board of Trade taking over the entire control of the mines from the coal-owners, owing to the irreconcilable antagonism between masters and men. The grave shortage in the world's wheat harvest, which in October had been feared, had now become a certainty, and forced Mr Runciman to put into force a whole series of measures, which in his speech of Oct. 10 he had at least deprecated, if not condemned. Herein he was supported by the recommendations of the Food Prices Committee, which had signed its second Interim Report on bread, flour and wheat prices and freight charges on Nov. 15. The most important of the

Committee's recommendations were that the Government should (1) at once fix maximum prices for both home-grown and foreign wheat, (2) contract with the British farmers to grow wheat and oats for the harvest of 1917 at fixed prices, (3) negotiate with the Indian Government to secure as large an exportable surplus as possible of next year's harvest, and (4) assume still greater control over the British mercantile marine. Five members of the Committee, including Mr Prothero and Prof. Ashley, in special view of the world shortage in wheat, appended two additional recommendations for immediate application—(1) the closer milling of grain, whereby an addition of 10 per cent. of flour could be obtained; (2) an addition of 10 per cent. of maize flour to the ordinary bread flour. These members were of opinion that the bread produced by these expedients could be increased in quantity and reduced in price, and yet would remain palatable and digestible.

Accordingly on Nov. 15, before introducing his new proposals, Mr Runciman briefly reviewed the food situation of the past two years, when, as a previous speaker in the debate had bluntly put it, there had been no food problem. Now, the new fact that the Government had to face was the failure of the North American wheat crop, to counter-balance which the only available surplus to be found was in far-distant Australia. To transport this surplus, three times the amount of tonnage would be necessary, and that at a moment when ships were scarce and their numbers, owing to shortage of labour and material, could not be increased. Economy in the use of wheat and other food-stuffs was therefore absolutely necessary. The Government had appealed to the people to economise voluntarily, and had appealed in vain; indeed consumption had steadily increased. There remained, then, no alternative but to try to effect by compulsion what persuasion had failed to achieve. Mr Runciman, therefore, announced a series of permissive Orders in Council, which, under the powers given by the Defence of the Realm Act, he proposed to make operative as occasion required. First and foremost he put the appointment of a Food Controller—only a month earlier he had scoffed at the notion—in whose hands would be concentrated all the existing powers of the

Board of Trade, and whose function it would be to co-ordinate the work of all the subordinate Committees. Then there would be Orders, he said, to institute war bread, to fix maximum prices for wheat, flour, sugar, and certain forms of meat—all of them food-stuffs already under State control—to limit the price of milk in accordance with the cost of its production, to prevent the waste and destruction of food-stuffs, to regulate market operations in order to check unreasonable prices, to enforce returns of stocks, to requisition stocks, etc.—all the paraphernalia, in fact, of the German system.

Finally, Mr Runciman wound up his explanation of the new Government policy with an apology for the drastic measures now proposed, which very aptly marks the close of the first stage in the development of the food situation in these islands and the transition to the second stage, which was destined to be developed under a new Prime Minister and a new President of the Board of Trade.

‘We have been driven,’ he said, ‘bit by bit against our will (and here I speak for myself, because I do not like these arrangements, if they can be avoided) to suspend the easy flow of voluntary action. We cannot depend on it now. We are bound to give increased powers to State Departments and State officials. . . . We have to abandon in some respects the old voluntary principle, to which I have long been wedded; and we may have to take steps in the way of State control, which may cause a good deal of discomfort and create discontent in some quarters. But you can have no State regulation which does not bear hardly on somebody. We have the right to ask that all our people at home should be prepared to put up with some hardship, which will be assessed and prescribed and distributed as evenly as possible, in order that those who are giving far more for the country should be allowed to reach a glorious victory.’

On Nov. 17 the new Orders in Council were published in the London Gazette. From that date onward till Mr Asquith's resignation on Dec. 5, the activities of his Government in dealing with the Food Problem were restricted to the issue by the Board of Trade of sundry orders making these permissive Orders in Council operative; no man, however, could be found bold enough to

undertake the onerous and thankless office of Food Controller. Thus, on Nov. 20, Orders were published fixing maximum prices for milk, both wholesale and retail, raising the milling of wheat from 70 to 80 per cent. (which would enable us to obtain 10 per cent. more flour) and providing for a census of the potato stock. On Nov. 26 the use of wheat for brewing was prohibited. On Nov. 29 the President of the Board of Agriculture (Lord Crawford) announced in the House of Lords the forthcoming issue of new Orders to empower the Government—with a view of increasing home production—to acquire unoccupied and common lands for allotments and market gardens. On Dec. 5 an Order was issued to impose certain restrictions on meals served in hotels and restaurants. On the same day Mr Asquith resigned.

All these Orders in Council combined had, however, not yet satisfied the Labour Party. On Dec. 7 a Conference of Trade Unions, Cooperative Societies and other Labour organisations passed resolutions demanding the State purchase of all imported essential food-stuffs, the State commandeering or control of home-products, State control of all shipping, and State control over the retail sale of all controlled articles at prices which would secure to consumers the full benefit of Government action.

By Dec. 10 Mr Lloyd George had succeeded in forming his Government, and in the long list of new Ministers appeared the name of Lord Devonport as Minister of Food. The new Ministry of Food was formed by Act of Parliament on Dec. 22. At last the Food Controller on the German model, so long demanded by the Labour Party, had become an accomplished fact; and thereby it was at last recognised—as Mr Prothero, the new President of the Board of Agriculture, expressed it—that the United Kingdom had become 'a beleaguered city.'

G. E. UNDERHILL.

Art. 10.—THE FOUR TREATIES OF BUCAREST.

In the year 1812, exactly a century before the formation of the Balkan League and the destruction of the Turkish Empire in Europe, the first Treaty of Bucarest was signed, not in the Wallachian capital, but in a villa at Sinaia, by Russian and Turkish plenipotentiaries. Under the Empress Catherine II, Russia had begun to interest herself in the welfare of the oppressed Christian races in Turkey; and in the Treaty of Kainarji (1774) she had already exacted from the Sultan a general promise of protection for the Christian faith in the Ottoman Empire. The war with Turkey, which originated in the division of Europe between Napoleon and Alexander in the Treaty of Tilsit, naturally came to an end when the French Emperor turned against his ally. The conflict had been indecisive, but, by the Treaty which concluded it, Russia obtained special assurances for the good government of Serbia, Moldavia and Wallachia. These regions passed gradually out of Turkish hands, and a portion of the Greek race became free in 1829; but the condition of the population remaining under the rule of the Porte grew worse rather than better, and solemn announcements of reform, such as the Hatt-i-Shereef of Gulhané (1839), the Hatt-i-Humayoun (1856), and the "constitution" of 1876, proved to be nothing more than delusions. The efforts of the Powers in 1856 and 1878 on behalf of the suffering races were of a half-hearted character; and the Treaty of Berlin sanctioned the great diplomatic crime of the century—the retrocession to Turkey of large portions of the Armenian and Bulgarian races newly liberated by the Treaty of San Stefano.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the consequences of that fatal act. Not one of the statesmen who signed the Treaty can have believed in his heart that the tripartite division of the Bulgarian race would be a permanent arrangement. It could only serve for the nonce as a check to Russian designs. Under the Cyprus Convention reforms were to be carried out in the Armenian provinces, but practically nothing was done. For some years the Christian populations, exhausted by the war and hoping against hope for the realisation of the promised reforms, remained quiescent. The first shock

to the artificial structure raised at Berlin came in September 1885 when Eastern Rumelia proclaimed its union with Bulgaria. All the world expected that the Sultan would crush the revolt, and Turkish troops assembled on the frontier. But the Bulgarians were aided by British diplomacy, which had executed a complete *volte face* under the able direction of Sir William White; and that remarkable man, though opposed by all his colleagues, induced the Sultan to stay his hand. The danger to Bulgarian union came from the West, not the East. While Prince Alexander was hurrying all his forces to the Turkish frontier, King Milan of Serbia suddenly declared war and invaded Bulgaria. Prince Alexander's position was apparently desperate, but the Bulgarians, led by young subalterns—the chief of the staff was in his twenty-fifth year—routed the invaders and were pursuing them in the direction of Nish when the Austrian minister at Belgrade, Count Khevenhüller, appeared on the scene and imposed a cessation of hostilities. A few months later Serbian and Bulgarian plenipotentiaries and Majid Pasha, a Turkish official, met at Bucarest, where a treaty of peace was signed.

The second Treaty of Bucarest (March 3, 1886) is the shortest on record. It consists of a single clause stating that peace has been restored between Serbia and Bulgaria. The war cost Bulgaria upwards of 6000 killed and wounded and some 25 million francs, but the aggressor escaped scot-free. Austria, which had unquestionably winked at, if she had not instigated, the Serbian attack, defended the interests of her *protégé*. In justice to Serbia it must be stated that King Milan's adventure was far from meeting with general approval; it was recognised that the King, aware of his increasing unpopularity, sought to prop up his tottering throne by means of an easy victory. Several years later King Milan, in conversation with the writer, gave an interesting and impressive account of his experience during these stormy days and of the motives of his action. He was in Vienna when the news of the Bulgarian revolution reached him; he started at once for Belgrade, where all was excitement and confusion, and put himself at the head of the national movement for the defence of the principle of 'equilibrium' and the sanctity of treaties.

He said nothing, as might be expected, of Austrian encouragement or of the dangers which encompassed the dynasty. In the certain anticipation of victory he took with him to the front some gigantic candles to be lighted for the *Te Deum* which he proposed to celebrate in the cathedral at Sofia; these fell into the hands of Prince Alexander, and are now religiously preserved in King Ferdinand's palace.

The real significance of the war of 1885 seems to have escaped the notice of most observers. It was the first instance since the Middle Ages of an attack made by one of the Christian nations of the Balkan Peninsula upon another. It was the beginning of a series of fratricidal conflicts, partly due to unscrupulous foreign intrigue, partly to the crude chauvinism of young and inexperienced States, whose national programmes were as yet unfulfilled. It was the precursor of the Serbo-Bulgarian wars of 1913 and 1915. The Bulgarians have long memories and never forget an injury; to those who are familiar with this trait in their character there is nothing surprising in the fact that they fired the first shot in the former year, and in the latter dealt their neighbours a 'stab in the back' similar to that which they had received from them thirty years previously. Before 1885 the relations between the two races had been most friendly; Bulgarian *haiduks* in the mountains had helped the Serbians in their struggle for independence; a Bulgarian legion was organised at Belgrade when that city was bombarded by the Turks in 1862; and large numbers of Bulgars fought under the Serbian flag in the campaigns of 1876 and 1877.

Why did not King Milan, instead of attacking the sister-state, seek 'compensation' from Turkey, the traditional enemy, for the Bulgarian union? Greece was preparing to take that course, but Austria preferred a Serbo-Bulgarian war. *Divide et impera* had already become the watchword of her Balkan policy. Austria had already in 1881 made a secret Treaty with Serbia, assuring her expansion in the direction of Macedonia in order to divert her attention from kindred Bosnia. The Treaty was renewed in 1889; but, even then, few persons in Serbia thought of making any claim to Macedonia on ethnological grounds. The writer spent some months in

Serbia in that year, when the 500th anniversary of the battle of Kossovo was celebrated with great solemnity and intense patriotic excitement. Ardent desires were expressed for the restoration of Czar Dushan's empire, but, except in this connexion, Macedonia was never mentioned.

The absence in the second Treaty of Bucarest of any indemnity for her neighbour's aggression caused much soreness in Bulgaria, which, together with the unsatisfactory and incomplete settlement of the question of the union with Eastern Rumelia and the intrigues of Russia and her partisans, brought about the fall of Prince Alexander and plunged the country in confusion. On the Serbian side there was the soreness of defeat, which led King Milan's delegates, it is said, to oppose the insertion in the Treaty of the usual reference to friendly relations in the future. Nevertheless, in 1904, after the extinction of the Obrenovich dynasty, we find Serbia and Bulgaria engaged in the negotiation of a defensive alliance and a fiscal union. The proclamation of Bulgarian independence in 1908 passed almost unnoticed in Serbia, owing to the irritation caused by the simultaneous annexation of Bosnia by Austria. The formation of the Balkan league followed in 1912; and the Christian nations which had fought side by side against the Ottoman invader at Kossovo were once more arrayed together against the secular foe. The Turkish empire in Europe was overthrown, but the splendour of this great achievement was soon dimmed by sordid disputes among the victors. The Central Powers, in confident anticipation of the defeat of the Balkan allies, had refrained from interference; but Austria, in pursuance of her usual policy, now began to foment their mutual jealousies, while Rumania, which had stood aloof from the great crusade, demanded 'compensation' for her neutrality.

It soon appeared evident that Bulgaria, whose central position exposes her to encroachment on every side, would be expected to satisfy all claims; and in these circumstances her wisest course would have been to buy off Rumania, who demanded a considerable slice of her territory, although the question between the two nations had already been settled by the Protocol of Petersburg. As between Serbia and Bulgaria, all possibility of a

conflict had apparently been eliminated by a treaty (March 13, 1912) which minutely defined the territorial claims of both nations, reserving the final disposal of a certain contested area for the decision of the Tsar. But Serbia repudiated the treaty; and the opposition orators in the Skupshtina at Belgrade were still denouncing Russian arbitration and advocating an appeal to the sword when the war party at Sofia broke away, and General Savoff, without the knowledge of his Government, gave orders to attack the Serbian and Greek armies. This rash step—of which the more immediate causes were the fear of the officers that the peasant soldiers would insist on going home for the harvest, and the exasperation of the Macedonian chiefs at the forcible denationalisation of their kindred by the Serbian and Greek authorities—put Bulgaria out of court and gave her enemies their chance. Two days later the troops were recalled and General Savoff was dismissed, but it was too late. The armed forces of Rumania, Turkey, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro closed around the culprit State as the champions of order and the sanctity of treaties; Bulgaria was crushed; and in the first week of August 1913 the delegates of the victorious allies, together with a number of military officers fresh from the battlefield, met at Bucarest for the division of the spoil. In the space of eight days a complete re-arrangement of territories in the Balkan Peninsula was announced to an astonished world. Had General Savoff stayed his hand the result would hardly have been different, for the military coteries surrounding King Constantine and the Serbian Crown-Prince were determined on war. Three days before General Savoff's adventure King Constantine had left Athens for the front taking with him the declaration of war already drawn up.

The third Treaty of Bucarest (August 10, 1913) is of the old-fashioned type. It is based on the venerable principle *Victoribus spolia*, and, like most of its predecessors, e.g. the Treaties of Vienna and Berlin, takes no account of nationalities. It assigns practically the whole of Macedonia to Serbia and Greece, the greater part falling to Serbia, and hands over to Rumania a considerable portion of Bulgarian territory to which she

has no ethnological or geographical claim. Of the conquests made by the Balkan allies in 1912, Macedonia, which the verdict of the scientific world declares to be mainly Bulgarian, is handed over to alien rule, while a portion of Thrace, which the Greeks themselves declare to be mainly Greek and Turkish, is left to Bulgaria. Nothing could be more inconsistent or more likely to engender future trouble.

To criticise in detail the unjust territorial arrangements of the third Treaty of Bucarest would be to flog a dead horse. Like the Treaties of Vienna and Berlin, it is already obsolete. According to the Carnegie Commission, it registered the 'illegitimate pretensions of victorious nationalities'; according to Mr Asquith, it has been the especial source of continued discord in the Balkans. It has found a champion, however, in Principal Burrows, who in the last number of this Review classes it with 'recent European decisions,' and asks why any superior moral validity should be attributed to the Treaty of London and the Protocol of Petersburg? The answer is that those arrangements possess the sanction of Europe, while the Treaty of Bucarest has no better claim to general respect than the *fiat* of the Kaiser, which, as yet at least, is not equivalent to a European decision. He regards as 'suspect' the suggestion of a future Balkan settlement imposed 'from above' (i.e. by Britain, France, Italy and the United States on the conclusion of the war) and prefers in its stead the 'compromise' between Serbia and Greece embodied in the Bucarest Treaty, which 'still forms the only solid basis for our hopes of a Balkan Confederation.' In other words, these two States only—for Rumania disappears from the scene—are to regulate at will the future situation in the Balkans. Dr Burrows forgets that Serbia made a 'compromise' with another neighbour which she quickly discarded when the opportunity occurred of obtaining larger gains by other means. An excuse for setting aside her treaty with Bulgaria (1812) was discovered in the doctrine *rebus sic stantibus*—that a treaty is binding only so long as circumstances remain unchanged. This elusive principle, by which Germany might have triumphantly defended her attack on

Belgium, will henceforth be frequently invoked in the Balkans unless we find a higher sanction for the ultimate settlement than the Greco-Serbian 'compromise' and the Treaty of Bucarest. A very competent writer has said that—

'The settlement of Bucarest was imposed against the teachings of equity, of ethnography and of experience in professed pursuance of a Balkan balance of power. . . . The Balkan wars and the Treaty of Bucarest have left an aftermath of wars of extermination and the seeds of future wars of annexation.' *

The Powers, Dr Burrows truly asserts, contributed nothing to the formation of the Balkan League; and the friends of Greece and Serbia consequently maintain that they should be superseded by those States as the arbiters of the future Balkan situation. Greece, he thinks, has shewn its fitness for this high vocation by its noble spirit of self-sacrifice—it has cheerfully acquiesced in the loss of Monastir, 'the watchword of its Irredentism, the test case for the argument that town should weigh more than country in determining ethnology.' This thoroughly Hellenic town, Hellenic it seems *par excellence*, was visited by Sir Valentine Chirol, a high and impartial authority, in 1881. 'With the exception of the Archbishop and the Hellenic Consul,' he writes, 'there is scarcely a family in Monastir that can lay claim to pure Greek blood.' Another eminent authority, Sir Arthur Evans, whose Serbophil sentiments are well known, declares that the population of the town is predominantly Bulgarian and that Bulgarian is the language of the market. Mr H. N. Brailsford, who spent a long time in the Monastir district and who speaks Greek and Bulgarian, writes: 'The so-called Greeks of Monastir are Vlachs to a man.' The writer, who has frequently visited Monastir, can add his testimony to these pronouncements. The population of Monastir is Turkish, Bulgarian and Vlach; the genuine Greeks are few; until the Serbian occupation, when the era of colonisation and forced conversions began, there were practically no Serbs in the town.

* 'Nationalism and War in the Near East,' p 356.

The fate of Monastir is indeed a 'test case,' not only of Greek magnanimity, but of the vaunted equity of the Treaty of Bucarest. Another instance of both is to be found in the fate of Kavalla. Not twice in three years, as Dr Burrows supposes, but thrice was M. Venizelos ready to concede that port to Bulgaria as a necessary outlet and inlet for the commerce of the interior and a set-off to the retention of Salonika by Greece. Dr Burrows regards ethnology as a bar to the admission of Bulgaria to Kavalla, a town which before the war was pre-eminently Turkish and is now perhaps rather more 'Hellenic' than Monastir. In the 'Quarterly Review' of last October the present writer, while insisting on nationality as the fundamental principle of the Balkan settlement, adduced certain considerations which must also be taken into account in the interests of the various populations and the law of Europe. Among these was the right of all the nations to sufficient access to the sea; this was insisted upon in the case of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Bulgaria, and it has been recognised by the leaders of the Entente Powers in the case of Poland. The more or less cosmopolitan character of the principal seaports in the Balkan Peninsula, which is noticed by Sir Thomas Holdich in his recent work, will not be denied by those who, like the writer, have resided in most of them.

The third Treaty of Bucarest, which embodies the Serbo-Greek 'compromise' for the division of the spoil, can only be cleared of the imputation of injustice by the production of proof that Macedonia is mainly a Serbian land and that whatever is not Serbian is Greek. With regard to Macedonia a voluminous literature has appeared since 1913. Since the outbreak of the great war practically all this literary activity has been on one side, as was only to be expected; and it would be strange indeed if it had not influenced the public mind to a large degree. But partisan literature and partisan statistics cannot prevail against facts. For the scientific world the Bulgarian character of Macedonia is a *chose jugée*; it has been established by the testimony of a long series of eminent and impartial travellers and scientific investigators such as Leake, Pouqueville, Ami Boué, Cyprien Robert, Lejean, Tozer, Mackenzie and Irby,

Jireček, Lamouche, Weigand, Victor Bérard, Evans, Chirol and a host of others, all writing before the war and some even before the outbreak of any national controversy.

After pointing out—what most persons know—that there are ‘Bulgares’ and ‘Valaques grécisants’ in Macedonia, Dr Burrows proceeds to ‘join issue’ with what he incorrectly describes as my ‘main argument.’ The existence of these non-Greek ‘grécisants’ is of course due to the ecclesiastical and educational monopoly which the Greeks enjoyed for centuries in Macedonia. Had they employed better instruments for their propaganda, their privileged position would have enabled them to hellenise the whole ignorant Christian population. With the disappearance of this monopoly the numbers of their partisans among the non-Greek populations has enormously declined. A word only need be said with regard to the ‘official Greek figures for East Macedonia,’ compiled in 1915, while that region was under Greek rule, which afford an amusing instance of how deftly the Bulgarian element is eliminated on paper as well as by other means. The Greeks, who are represented as the great majority, are divided into ‘Greek-speaking Greeks’ (169,290) and ‘Non-Greek-speaking’ Greeks’ (16,627); of the former a considerable number are unquestionably Patriarchist Bulgarians, who, in the region to which these statistics apply, are generally bilingual, Greek being the language of commerce. The ‘Non-Greek-speaking Greeks,’ a singular category, are practically all Patriarchist Bulgarians, inasmuch as there are scarcely any Vlachs or Christian Albanians in this part of the country; these Bulgarians till recently were styled ‘Bulgarophone Greeks,’ but the adjective ‘Bulgar,’ even in a compound, is now anathema. For the same reason the Exarchist Bulgarians are put down as ‘Slavs’ (33,255). Lastly of the so-called ‘Turks’ (145,857) at least half are ‘Pomaks’—the Moslem Bulgarians of the Rhodope slopes.*

* In this case there is some excuse for the misnomer, as Mahometans of all nationalities, e.g. the Moslem Greeks of Crete, are commonly described as ‘Turks.’ The Serbians have similarly banned the tell-tale adjective ‘Bulgarska’ by which the eastern confluent of the Morava has been known from time immemorial.

The Bulgar element has been annihilated in the elections as well as in the census, not a single 'Slav' being 'returned from Macedonia as a whole to the Greek parliament'; Dr Burrows seems unaware of how elections are 'made' in these countries, even under Greek auspices. Rejecting the teaching of history, which shows that the Turks always emigrate from countries where they have ceased to be masters, he believes that they will remain in Macedonia, having experienced 'good Greek government.' And yet they have emigrated in great numbers from Thessaly, where they have experienced 'good Greek government,' and where the discontent of the Moslem peasantry is notorious.

It only remains to enter an emphatic protest against Dr Burrows' assumption that the numerical superiority of the Greeks over the Bulgarians, which he regards as 'the dominant fact about the two races,' entitles them to plant their refugees from Turkey and elsewhere on Bulgarian lands. It is strange to find such a doctrine advocated by a champion of 'equilibrium.' The population of Germany is greater than that of Britain; is she therefore entitled to appropriate our colonies and to plant settlements in Kent and Sussex? An amicable exchange of lands was recommended in the October number of this Review, especially in cases where there is an overlapping of natural boundaries; but this, of course, can only take place when peace has been restored and the frontiers of the various nations fixed by impartial arbitration. It is earnestly to be hoped that, in the result, ample room will be found in Greek lands for the distressed Hellenic populations, and that at the same time King Constantine's Bulgarian victims will be restored to the homes of their forefathers.

The transition from the third Treaty of Bucarest to the fourth is short and tragic. The third Treaty, which was set up on the shreds of three repudiated compacts and proclaimed the triumph of force over right, tended to perpetuate race hatreds in the Balkans, threw Bulgaria into the arms of Germany, and directly led to the outbreak of the European War. Austria, which had done her best to kindle the war of partition, soon endeavoured to profit by the situation created by the Treaty and

invited Italy to join in an attack on Serbia. Italy refused; and the project was abandoned because Germany was not ready at the time. But Germany was ready within a year, and the murder of the Austrian heir-apparent furnished a convenient pretext for the inauguration of the grand struggle for world-domination. Serbia and Montenegro were crushed after a heroic resistance; Greece underwent a long period of humiliation, from which she was happily rescued by her geographical situation and the firmness of the maritime Powers. Of the States which imposed the predatory arrangements of 1913 she has paid the lightest penalty.

The turn of Rumania came next. Had King Charles lived for some years longer, she might have maintained her neutrality; but this, in view of the Russian collapse, would not have saved her in the end from humiliating dependence on Germany. King Charles, indeed, desired active co-operation with the Central Powers; he believed that Bulgaria would range herself on the side of the Entente, and he aimed at extracting from her another slice of territory and at getting back Bessarabia from Russia. This policy implied the sacrifice of Transylvania, but King Charles, as a German, preferred *Realpolitik* to nationalist ideals. He was never a chauvinist; he disapproved of the invasion of Bulgaria, and signed the order for mobilisation with tears in his eyes. After his death * Rumania 'took the better part'; her gallant stand for national unity can only excite our admiration, and her misfortunes compel our sympathy, although they must be regarded as the historical consequence of past errors. She has been betrayed by the same Power which encouraged her to invade the territory of a neighbour with whom she was at peace. Bulgaria, too, has paid a heavy price for the faults of the past, for the precarious attainment of national unity cannot compensate her for her prolonged sufferings, still less for her humiliating subjection to the Central Powers. Had the Balkan States held together after the triumph of 1912 how different would be their position to-day!

* King Charles' death, like the mysterious assassination of King George at Salonika, had an important bearing on the politics of the time. The former event left Rumania free to pursue a national policy; the latter placed Greece for the time under the control of the Kaiser.

The fourth Treaty of Bucarest (May 7, 1918) was signed by the ubiquitous Von Kühlmann, for Germany; Count Czernin, for Austria-Hungary; M. Momtchiloff, Vice-President of the Bulgarian Sobranye; Talaat Bey, the Grand Vizier; and M. Argentoianu, a Rumanian senator. Like its predecessor of 1913, it embodies a series of harsh and humiliating conditions imposed by a predatory Coalition on a prostrate State. The main difference lies in the circumstance that the treaty of 1913 is far shorter, and is almost entirely taken up with delimitations of territory, no pecuniary indemnity being demanded of Bulgaria and no right of interference in her internal affairs being claimed. The fourth Treaty, on the other hand, is a very long document, drawn up with German minuteness, and containing a series of regulations with regard to the Dobrudja, ceded to the four Powers in *condominium*, to the territory appropriated by Rumania under the former treaty but now restored to Bulgaria, and to the regions in the Carpathians now ceded to Austria-Hungary. It also regulates such internal questions as the treatment of aliens (i.e. Jews, Moslems, Uniates, etc.), hitherto denied political rights, but now accorded complete equality with Rumanian citizens and allowed to have their own schools and religious instruction and the right of forming religious communities. However humiliating such interference in her internal affairs may be, it must be admitted that Rumania had brought it upon herself by her failure to comply with the provisions of the Berlin Treaty, which guaranteed equality of rights to all creeds and races in the country, and especially by her tyrannical maintenance of an exceptional *régime* in the Dobrudja and in the regions she took from Bulgaria. When the Constituent Chamber met at Jassy in the summer of last year, laws were passed for the introduction of universal, direct and secret suffrage in lieu of the old system of voting by colleges, and for the expropriation of the great landlords and the division of their estates among the peasants; but the Jewish question was left untouched, on the ground that it was not included in the reference to the Chamber, and the Jews had to be content with a promise that their claim to equality of civil and political rights would be satisfied by future legislation.

Before the treaty was drawn up, General Mackensen had already ordered the demobilisation of the Rumanian army. Hopeless as the situation of Rumania had become, it was no doubt preferable to deal with a totally defenceless foe. 'Disarm your adversary before plundering him' is a commonplace of professional brigandage. Before the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations the obliging Trotsky had disbanded the Russian army, believing, or affecting to believe, that the whole fabric of German military power would collapse like the walls of Jericho at the sound of the revolutionary trumpet. This, however, did not occur; Germany forthwith reverted to military measures for the purpose of enforcing her demands, and the treaty was speedily signed. Rumania is permitted to retain a very small force under arms, but practically all war material is placed at the disposal of Germany and her allies until the conclusion of a general peace. The demobilised troops must remain in Moldavia so long as the German occupation of the rest of the country continues; the date for the termination of this is not fixed. German military tribunals will continue their sittings, and the Rumanian courts must not interfere with their jurisdiction. The country in reality will remain in German hands.

Space will not permit an analysis of the other provisions of the Treaty.* Rumania will be allowed 'an assured commercial route' to Constanza. She is bound to offer full railway facilities for the passage of German troops to Odessa through Moldavia and Bessarabia. The occupation of the great seaport of Southern Russia, which has been carried out in defiance of the treaty with the Ukraine, has been followed by the capture of the great fortress of Sevastopol, the docks of Nikolaieff, and the important emporium of Rostoff on the Don. For the moment it is not certain whether Novorussisk has succumbed; but that event cannot be long delayed, and the whole series of Black Sea ports—for Turkey is already at Batum—will then be in the hands of Germany and her allies.

* The full text has lately been published by the journal 'La Roumanie,' now issued in Paris, for June 6, 13 and 20. It is translated into French from the official or semi-official German papers, the 'Norddeutsche Zeitung' and the 'Reichsanzeiger.'

The Black Sea thus becomes a German lake. But the importance of this fact, though great, is overshadowed by the circumstance that Germany is now in a fair way to the possession of a direct route to Central Asia and the frontiers of Afghanistan and India. From Rostoff there is direct railway communication to Baku, whence the route lies across the Caspian to Krasnovodsk and thence by the railway leading to Merv, Bokhara and Samarcand. The Turks have reached Tiflis; and, though the Georgians and other races of the Caucasus may still give trouble, it seems not unlikely that the Rostoff-Baku line will soon be in the hands of the Germans and their allies. There is also the alternative route Constanza—Batum—Baku. It is true that neither of these routes possesses the same importance as the over-land route Berlin—Kieff—Tamboff—Samara—Cheliabinsk, or the route *via* Moscow to the last-named place, where the great Siberian trunk-line begins, while a branch starting from near Samara leads southward to Tashkend. These, however, do not fall within the scope of this article.

The route *via* Rumania and the Black Sea or Southern Russia has been discussed for years past by the organs of Pan-Germanism, which aim at setting up a German Mittel-Asien corresponding to and connected with Mittel-Europa and Mittel-Afrika. The ultimate goal of Germany's advance was to be China, which was to form a German sphere of influence counterbalancing or dominating Siberia on the North and India on the South. This project gave way to the B.B.B. (Berlin—Byzantium—Bagdad) scheme, as German influence in Turkey became consolidated, but now reasserts itself in view of the British occupation of Bagdad and the German occupation of Rumania. The *condominium* in the northern Dobrudja has been devised with a view to the retention of Constanza and the control of the Danube waterway, both important for the future *Drang nach Asien* as well as for commercial reasons. The international Danube Commission is nominally maintained, but in reality abolished, being now confined to representatives of the States situated on the river or on the coasts of the Black Sea, all of them now under the hegemony of Germany.

‘A tout malheur il y a quelque chose de bien.’ If Rumania must lose the Dobrudja she regains Bessarabia,

which has been offered to her by a native diet. The forced sacrifice of this kindred province in 1878 was deeply resented by King Charles and his subjects; and the non-Rumanian Dobrudja, which they were compelled to accept in exchange, was never regarded as an adequate substitute. It may be noted that the inlet of Akerman, in southern Bessarabia, offers a far better harbour than Constanza; but whether Germany will allow Rumania to possess the Bessarabian port remains to be seen.

The commercial and economic stipulations of the treaty, which have not been fully disclosed, would if generally known tend to confirm Mr Balfour's remark that Germany never loses sight of her commercial aims in her schemes of domination. The arrangements of the 'Petrol Peace' imposed on Rumania resemble those of the 'Bread Peace' imposed on the Ukraine. Both States are bled to the last drop. According to trustworthy information from Rumania, the Central Powers obtain the control of the Rumanian oil-fields for ninety-nine years. For this purpose a syndicate will be formed which will possess a monopoly of the production. A certain number of shares in this will be granted to the Rumanian Government. Until the signature of the general peace, the oil-fields will remain in Austro-German occupation. Rumania will be allowed a certain quantity of oil to cover her needs in case the yield of the small wells of Bacau, which alone are left to her, should prove insufficient. The pipe-line from Câmpina to Constanza remains in Austro-German hands. The 'Petrol Peace' has indeed earned its distinctive title. With regard to cereals, Rumania is compelled to sell her harvest to the Central Powers at a price to be fixed by a mixed commission, being allowed to retain only what is necessary for her immediate needs. A number of German officials will remain in the country in order to see that Rumanian needs are not interpreted in 'too broad a way.' The economic stipulations, as a German lady writes, 'seem very nourishing.'

As a last security, the control of the railways, posts, telegraphs and telephones remain in Austro-German hands till the end of the war. Even the Government and the foreign diplomatists are not allowed to send

cipher telegrams. Space forbids the enumeration of other humiliating conditions. *Væ victis* indeed—though Rumania was betrayed rather than conquered. When the fourth treaty was signed, Bucarest presented a mournful appearance. The streets were patrolled by German soldiers; a German general was installed in the palace; the King and Queen were far away in the Moldavian Carpathians; famine and disease prevailed. What a contrast to the gay scenes which marked the signature of the third treaty! Flags were waving over the crowded streets; parades of the victorious troops, receptions, banquets, investitures, concerts were the order of the day. Every one was happy and triumphant except the Bulgarian delegates. Pictures displaying the valorous exploits of the Rumanian troops, and post-cards which represented 'grateful Civilisation' crowning M. Maioresco with a wreath and M. Také Jonesco administering the *coup de pied* to M. Daneff, abounded in the windows of the shops. And yet, amid all this jubilation, King Charles, who never lost his calmness of judgment, was inspired with prophetic misgivings. Receiving a well-known Rumanian journalist a few hours after the signature of the treaty, 'It is not a treaty,' he said sadly, 'it is only a truce, and it cannot last.' 'Thanks to you it is definitive,' he telegraphed to the Emperor William, but he did not believe this in his heart.

The first Treaty of Bucarest marked the awakening of the Christian nations of the Balkans, the second the beginning of their fratricidal quarrels, the third the zenith of their madness, the fourth its inevitable consequences. In the interests of civilisation, militarism must disappear not only from Germany but from the Balkans.

Art. 11.—SPAIN AND GIBRALTAR.

1. *Las Llaves del Estrecho. Estudio sobre la reconquista de Gibraltar.* Por José Navarrete, precedido de una carta prólogo del Exc. Sr. Teniente-General Don José Lopez Domínguez. Madrid: Hernandez, 1882.
2. *Gibraltar y la Bahía de Algeciras.* Por D. Camilo Vallés, Coronel de Artillería. Madrid, 1889.
3. *La Humanidad y los Césares.* Por D. Mario Roso de Luna. Madrid, 1916.
4. *La Cuestión del día: Gibraltar y Africa.* Discurso del General Primo de Rivera. Cadiz, 1917.

ON the 25th of March 1917, General Don Miguel Primo de Rivera, military governor of Cadiz, delivered an address on 'The Recovery of Gibraltar,' at the Royal Academy of Sciences and Arts in that city. A few days afterwards, he was summoned to Madrid by the Minister of War, and discharged from his office. The Spanish Government, perhaps, conceived his theme to be inopportune and his utterances indiscreet. In 1915, Señor Dato, then Prime Minister, had opened, with the greatest reserve, *pourparlers* with England and France about Gibraltar and Tangiers; and, though no definite conclusion was reached, hopes were entertained in Spain of their renewal at some later date. Probably also, since the recovery advocated by General Primo de Rivera was to be through friendly negotiation with England, the Spanish Cabinet feared to arouse Germany's suspicions.

General Primo de Rivera's academic address did not, in reality, give any cause for offence. He touched upon a very ticklish question, and one which the Spaniards consider a sore wound to their pride, but he did it in terms of much courtesy to England, voicing, at the same time, the universal feeling of his countrymen. As to the opportunity for bringing the affair of Gibraltar before the public, and calling the attention of the Spanish Government to it, he believed that no better could be found. The peace of Europe is going to be settled, according to him, in a conference or congress of nations. If Spain, as a neutral, is denied a voice in that parliament, she will surely find one of the belligerents whom she has represented during the conflict, to take up her

interests. What more befitting occasion than that for offering to England, with Europe's approval, the exchange of Ceuta for Gibraltar?

General Primo de Rivera knows that to abandon Ceuta would mean the end of Spanish aspirations in Africa; but the idea of African expansion, under present conditions, is to his mind a deceptive dream, and the acceptance by Spain of the African zone of influence allotted to her in the Conference of Algeciras was a mistake. The recovery of Gibraltar is of far greater importance, above all from the moral point of view.

'The wish to recover it (he exclaims) is unanimous on the part of the nation; and unanimous also the conviction that it is, more than anything, a question of honour. It is more vexing than dangerous for Spain, that the English should possess Gibraltar; it pains more than it harms us to see a foreign flag wave in our own territory.'

This is the first time within the last fifty years that the question of Gibraltar has been treated by a Spaniard in so gentle and diplomatic a way. The late General Don José Lopez Dominguez owed much of his popularity and political influence to his fiery speeches on the same subject in the Spanish Senate. His ideas were explained and somewhat enlarged in a book by Don José Navarrete, an officer of artillery, who published it in 1883 under the title '*Las Llaves del Estrecho*.' In 1889, Lieut-Colonel Don Camilo Vallés published in '*La Revista Científico-Militar*' of Barcelona, a series of essays on Gibraltar and Algeciras, which aroused much public attention. But both General Lopez Dominguez and Colonel Vallés expected to recover Gibraltar by force of arms, with the aid of batteries on the neighbouring Spanish positions. Señor Navarrete suggested an alliance with 'some other European nation' in order to defeat England—a plan warmly recommended by the Pan-Germanist propaganda which preceded the war. Who can doubt that Germans were behind the veil, when in 1911, 1912 and 1913, some newspapers in Madrid named Germany as the ideal ally for helping Spain to recover Gibraltar?

Happily, General Primo de Rivera's project is not so unfriendly; and the General's popularity both in the Army

and outside, and his influence in the last cabinet of Señor Dato (in which his uncle, the venerable Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, Marqués de Estella, held the portfolio of War), only a few months after Don Miguel's discharge from the Military Government at Cadiz, are clear evidences that his address was well received by public opinion. We are far from the times when Canovas del Castillo indignantly rejected the idea of exchanging for Gibraltar any other part of the national territory, and war was believed the only solution of the problem. The consensus of opinion now is that Spain ought to proceed by way of friendly negotiation. Even Señor Maura—in spite of a veiled threat—seems to support this idea by his declaration that some negotiation about Gibraltar and Tangier must take place before Spain's attitude in the European conflict can be defined. Señor Alvarez (leader of the Reformistas), Señor Lerroux (of the Radicals), and the Republicans and Socialists in general, ascribe to the narrowmindedness of the Spanish Government, since the 18th century, the lack of an agreement with England on this point. In April 1917, the subject was academically discussed at the Ateneo; and the conclusion prevailed that, since Richard Cumberland's mission to Madrid in 1780 until to-day, the failure of all negotiations with England about Gibraltar is to be laid to the charge of Spain. 'That the English flag still waves over Gibraltar'—said Señor Roso de Luna last year in his spirited book against German imperialism entitled 'La Humanidad y los Césares'—

'is due to the incapacity of Spanish politicians, who could have found long since some method of saving Spanish sovereignty, and giving to England what she needs . . . what we might call her right of way.'

Naturally, such utterances are balanced by the ill-feeling against England so abundant in the newspapers influenced by Germany. General Primo de Rivera has been accused by them of playing a part, and acting under suggestions made to him during his recent visit to the British front in France—a charge which he disproved by showing that his address was presented to the Academy long before he went to France, though the meeting at which he read it took place subsequently. In the same

address he deprecates 'the policy of hates and grudges, followed on account of spite and disappointment.' He believes the demonstrations against Great Britain a great mistake, and warns his countrymen against the disastrous consequences of sowing hostility instead of affection.

Human nature is prone to resent such prudent counsels. There can be no doubt that the question of Gibraltar is one of the several causes of Spain's lukewarm feeling towards the Allies, and of the sympathy for Germany which is evident among a large part of her population. But it is far from being the only, or the most important cause.* I firmly believe that to remain neutral until the end of the war would be the decision of an overwhelming majority of the Spanish people, even if no question of Gibraltar existed. The Conde de Romanones, leader of the Liberal party, is well known for his sympathetic attitude towards the Allies. He represents a policy of friendliness with France and England, and on account of this, and the opposition it provoked among his best political friends and in the country at large, he had to resign office last year. Yet, on Nov. 24, 1917, at a banquet given in Madrid by his party, after explaining that he never thought of a participation by Spain in the present conflict, he declared that 'to drag Spain into the war would be a crime'; and that whoever ascribed to him such intention, 'lied, lied and lied.' The Conde de Romanones' words elicited a thunderous applause.

The political parties in Spain are divided into two large groups, irrespective of their support or dislike of the Monarchy, and according to their clerical or anti-clerical, their reactionary or their liberal tendencies. They are called *derechas* and *izquierdas*, those of the 'Right' comprising various sections, from the rabid *jaimistas*, or partisans of the pretender Don Jaime and of absolute monarchy, to the moderate Conservatives led by Señor Dato. With very few exceptions—Señor Dato's group is 'neutral'—they sympathise with Germany. The 'Left' comprises not only Romanones' party, and García Prieto's—among the latter there are some uncompromising Germanophiles, and Señor García Prieto declares

* See the article on 'Spain and Germany,' in this Review, July 1917.

himself 'strictly neutral'—but also the Republicans, Republican Radicals, and Socialists. They generally sympathise with the Allies. Señor D. Melquiades Alvarez and his followers, the *Reformistas*, demand the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany, on account of the seventy Spanish ships which the Germans have torpedoed ; and one, only one, important leader of the Left, Don Alejandro Lerroux, has demanded, since August 1914, a declaration of war on Germany. The Army—which has lately played so important a rôle in Spanish politics and is responsible for the two last Cabinet crises—has expressed the gloomy conviction of Spain's unpreparedness for a war, and her incapacity to put on the field an efficient force even for her own defence. The Army believes that it is necessary to reform the Administration and remove for ever the old cankers of political intrigue and corruption. This work, of course, requires a long time.

Meanwhile, many Spaniards recognise the danger for England of handing over 'the key of the Straits,' and so formidable a position as Gibraltar, to a nation which deserves for her glorious past all the admiration and praise of history, but is at present in the melancholy state of military weakness confessed by her most eminent sons. According to General Primo de Rivera, when Señor Moret was in London some years ago as Spanish ambassador, the Foreign Office told him that his country was not sufficiently strong to hold Gibraltar, but if some day the situation changed, England would not object to speak on the matter. 'In Spain,' the General concludes, 'the possession of Gibraltar by the English is regarded as a permanent national affront. In England it is considered a necessary injustice.' In any case, we may ask what would have happened to Spain itself, if during this war Gibraltar had belonged to the Spaniards.

On Dec. 12, 1917, the Spanish Government issued an official note, stating that the Council of Ministers had resolved to submit to the King for his signature, within a short time, a decree dissolving the present Cortes, and calling for a general election :

'The Government (the note added) declares once more its unshaken decision to assure the electors that their votes shall

be respected, and for this end measures will be taken to insure fairness in the elections and to relieve the liberty of franchise from all official pressure.'

It promised also that the first bill to be presented to the new Cortes should be one for a general amnesty for political causes.

Here, then, was an opportunity, if ever there was one, for some political party or other to include in its platform the demand for a settlement of the Gibraltar question, in favour of Spain, had there been any strong feeling in the country in regard to that question. That no party availed itself of the opportunity may be regarded as significant. It is a striking fact that the question of Gibraltar does not appear in the programme of any political party in Spain, and has been seldom alluded to in public appeals made by political groups during electoral contests. It is true that, in discussing the present war, some Carlists and reactionaries use Gibraltar as an argument against England, and in favour of Germany. The Germans, they say, are fighting heroically—this is a favourite expression of 'El Correo Español'—for the triumph of principles which will restore to Spain her past greatness, together with 'the key to the Straits,' her ancient colonies in America, and the dominion over Portugal. But, though such absurdities may do harm in country districts among illiterate crowds, no sane and instructed mind pays the slightest attention to them; and the question of Gibraltar, or of its recovery, is not a burning issue. The leaders, whether they are Conservatives or Liberals, Monarchists or Republicans, allow their followers to think independently on that question; and the opinions I have quoted are those of individuals and are shared alike by *izquierdas* and *derechas*.

Prominent men are reluctant to express, even when questioned, a definite opinion, and shrink still more from tracing, in present circumstances, the details of any plan of negotiation with England on the subject. They consider it 'too delicate' and 'dangerous' at present, and content themselves with saying that negotiation is necessary, speaking either in the vague way of Señor Maura, or in that of Señor Alvarez. While the men of the *derecha* recognise that the compensations to be offered

for Gibraltar 'ought to be studied carefully beforehand,' those of the *izquierda* fractions generally approve, at least in private conversation, the project emanating from General Primo de Rivera.

At the same time, it would be dangerous to regard this attitude of reserve on the part of the politicians as a sign of indifference. The Germans, in their propaganda, have derived so much profit from the question of Gibraltar, that the silence of political parties cannot be construed as a proof that Spain has forgotten the matter. The absence of declarations, and the fact that, since General Lopez Dominguez's protests in the Senate prior to 1883, the question has not been taken up again in the Cortes, are rather to be ascribed to the chaotic state of Spanish politics, and to the fact that other issues, of more immediate importance, absorb the Spanish mind.

In the first place, Catalonia, that ever-discontented and disturbed province, is claiming home-rule more energetically than ever since the restoration of the Monarchy. The Cabinet of Señor Garcia Prieto, in which Señor Rodes, a Catalonian Republican, and Señor Ventosa, a staunch Catalonian home-ruler, held the portfolios of Public Instruction and Finance, was but a temporary compromise, designed to appease the Catalonians, and especially their leader Señor Cambó, who talks without ceasing of the rightful claims of Catalonia. Next, there is the doubtful attitude of the Army, and the fear of indiscipline in its ranks. Lastly, the war has led, as elsewhere, to an immense rise of prices, and thrown the country into grievous straits. The cost of living is beyond the resources of the great majority; and the poverty-stricken population is on the verge of famine. The Government, owing to lack of coal, is unable to ensure an efficient railway communication between the provinces; the output of the Spanish coal-mines, scanty and poor in quality as it is, cannot be conveyed and distributed throughout the country; and the German submarines wage a pitiless war on the seaborne commerce of Spain.

Thus, when, in accordance with the decision of the Government quoted above, the General Election took place, early this year, there was room for anxiety, especially in the Conservative party. Nevertheless, the

critical occasion passed without disturbance. The elections were, on the whole, favourable to the Monarchy, but not to the Cabinet of Señor Garcia Prieto. The Germanophiles triumphed in many districts. Señor Lerroux was defeated in Madrid and Barcelona, while Señor Alvarez and other prominent friends of the Allies were beaten in their own provinces. In spite of these rebuffs, the Cortes are—what Spain in general is—neutral; for Señor Dato, a neutral with romantic feelings for France and England, is followed by over one hundred deputies, and, with the aid of other groups of similar tendencies, is in a position to control the House.

The Cabinet crisis of last March threw everything for a time into confusion. It had, however, nothing to do with the international question, but arose from a personal quarrel between two political enemies in the Ministry. No political party having a majority in the Cortes, the King formed a mixed Cabinet, presided over by Señor Maura, in which all important sections are represented. It contains such influential men as Señor Dato, the Conde de Romanones, Señor Garcia Prieto, Señor Cambó and others. So long as it holds together, internal tranquillity appears to be ensured; and meanwhile the international attitude of Spain is unchanged. There are no signs that her determined adhesion to neutrality in the world-conflict will be abandoned for a more active policy. In these circumstances, the question of Gibraltar sleeps.

JOSÉ DE ARMAS.

Art. 12.—BRITISH FINANCE DURING AND AFTER THE WAR.

IN order to obtain a correct view of our War Finance it is necessary to review briefly the economic history of the past four years. In the first place it should be borne in mind that during the forty-four years of intensive economic development which preceded the outbreak of war, Great Britain, in common with the other leading industrial States of the world, had been accumulating immense reserves of economic strength. Our merchant fleet amounted to over 20 million tons gross, only about one-half of that tonnage being employed in the carrying trade of the United Kingdom. The national wealth of the United Kingdom was about 16,500£. millions, and the annual national income 2140£. millions.* The national wealth of the Overseas Dominions and Possessions was about 9500£. millions and the national income approximately 1350£. millions,† making the total wealth of the Empire 26,000£. millions and the total income 3490£. millions. The United Kingdom's share of the international trade of the world was 15·9 per cent., and the share of the Overseas Dominions and Possessions was 12·7 per cent., so that the British Empire transacted 28·6 per cent., or nearly three-tenths of the trade of the whole world. The steam-power equipment of our industries amounted to over 10,755,000 horse-power, and our output of coal was 280 million tons per annum. Our investments abroad were valued at 4000£. millions, and brought us an annual income of 200£. millions.

The Empire, therefore, entered upon the war with almost immeasurable reserves of economic power; but, owing to our neglect of the problem of financial preparation for war and the contempt of our people and politicians for statistics, these vast resources were utterly unorganised. The task before our Government and the nation was, first, to survey and organise the national resources; secondly, to enrol and equip an army on the Continental standard; thirdly, to transform the entire

* 'Economic Relations of the British and German Empires,' Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, July 1914.

† 'Imperial Defence and Finance,' 'Nineteenth Century,' August 1913.

fabric of our economic life, with all its international complexities and ramifications, from peace production to war production; fourthly, to increase the output of commodities on the new basis necessitated by the war; and, fifthly, to convert the resources accumulated through three centuries of commercial intercourse with the world into war munitions or war services.

Before the war, out of a total national income of 21500 millions, only 770 millions, or 3·5 per cent., were allocated for the purposes of the Army and Navy. By the end of the third year of war it had become necessary to allocate for the purposes of the war 27000 millions. As a matter of fact, part of this amount was borrowed abroad; but the United Kingdom in 1917 provided about 18000 millions, or, say, 50 per cent. of the increased national income, for the purpose of carrying on the war.

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of over five millions of men for naval and military service, the production of the country appears to have been not only maintained but increased. Dr Addison stated on June 28, 1917, that before the war the output of steel in this country had been more or less stationary at a little over 7 million tons per annum. The output then (June 1917) was about 10 million tons, and he would be disappointed if they had not reached a 12-million ton output by the end of 1918. With regard to coal, the production appears to have been well maintained. The total output in 1916 was 256,375,000 tons, as compared with 253,206,000 tons in 1915. The returns as to electricity show an increase of 528 million units or 68·6 per cent. All these facts point to the same conclusion, namely, that since August 1914 there has been an increase in the production of the United Kingdom; and I am convinced that during the war our power of production has increased by 30 per cent.

The problem of financing the war was naturally the most formidable of the economic tasks which had to be undertaken by the Government. Our war expenditure began at an average of 1,000,000000 per day. As the Army grew and the scope of our activities steadily widened, and the prices of commodities and foodstuffs advanced, the war expenditure rapidly increased. From August 1914, to March 31, 1915, it averaged 2,050,864000 per day;

for the year to March 31, 1916, 4,271,666*l.*; for the year to March 31, 1917, 6,022,222*l.*; for the year to March 31, 1918, 7,387,000*l.*

The first war budget was introduced by Mr Lloyd George on Nov. 17, 1914. Its main features were the doubling of the income tax and super-tax, an additional $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* on the half-pint of beer and 3*d.* per lb. on tea. The second war budget, presented on May 4, 1915, contained no new taxation proposals. The expenditure for the year 1914-15 amounted to 560,474,000*l.*, and the revenue to 226,694,000*l.* (189,305,000*l.* from taxes and 37,389,000*l.* from non-tax revenue), leaving a deficiency of 333,780,000*l.* The third war budget was presented by Mr McKenna on Sept. 21, 1915. Under this budget 40 per cent. was added to the existing rates of income tax, and certain alterations were made in the exemption and abatement limits. The super-tax was raised, the Excess Profits Duty was instituted, and the duties on many imported articles were largely increased. The fourth War Budget, introduced on April 4, 1916, provided for a graduated increase of the Income Tax, making the maximum rate 5*s.* in the \pounds . The duties on sugar, cocoa, coffee and chicory were appreciably advanced, while new taxes were levied on matches and table waters. The expenditure for the year to March 31, 1916, amounted to 1,559,158,000*l.*, and the revenue to 336,765,000*l.* (from taxes 290,088,000*l.*, non-tax revenue 46,679,000*l.*), leaving a deficiency of 1,222,391,000*l.*

On May 2, 1917, Mr Bonar Law introduced the fifth War Budget, under which the excess profits duty was increased from 60 per cent. to 80 per cent. as from Jan. 1, 1917, and the entertainments tax was substantially increased. The expenditure for the year to March 31, 1917, was 2,198,113,000*l.* and the revenue 573,428,000*l.* (from taxes 514,105,000*l.*, non-tax revenue 59,323,000*l.*), leaving a deficiency of 1,624,685,000*l.* The sixth War Budget was introduced by Mr Bonar Law on April 22, 1918. The total expenditure for the year to March 31, 1918, was 2,696,221,000*l.*, including 505,000,000*l.* for advances to the Dominions and our Allies, leaving a net expenditure of 2,191,221,000*l.* It is gratifying and significant that our Dominions and India were able to finance so large a proportion of their own expenditure. The

revenue amounted to 707,235,000*l.*, or 26·2 per cent. of the gross and 33·6 per cent. of the net expenditure.

The following table, which contains particulars of the actual receipts and expenditure for the years 1913-14 and 1917-18, will show the changes in National Finance produced by four years of war :

RECEIPTS.

Actual. 1913-14. £		Actual. 1917-18. £
35,450,000	Customs	71,261,000
39,590,000	Excise	38,772,000
27,359,000	Estate, etc., Duties	31,674,000
9,966,000	Stamps	8,300,000
2,700,000	Land Tax and House Duty	2,625,000
47,249,000	Income Tax, including Super-Tax	239,509,000
	Excess Profits, including Munitions Levy	220,214,000
715,000	Land Value Duties	685,000
163,029,000	Total Receipts from Taxes	613,040,000
35,214,000	Non-Tax Revenue, including Post Office, etc.	94,195,000
198,243,000	Total Revenue	707,235,000
	Deficiency	1,988,986,000
		<u>2,696,221,000</u>

EXPENDITURE.

Actual. 1913-14.		Actual. 1917-18.
24,500,000	National Debt Services inside the Fixed Debt Charge	19,828,000
	Outside do.	170,023,000
9,734,000	Payments to Local Taxation Account	189,851,000
3,089,000	Other Cons. Fund Services, etc.	9,731,000
37,323,000	Total Cons. Fund Services	201,252,000
28,346,000	Army " " (a)	15,000
48,833,000	Navy " " (a)	17,000
	Ministry of Munitions (a)	1,000
53,901,000	Civil Services	61,242,000
4,483,000	Customs, Excise and Inland Revenue	5,156,000
24,607,000	P.O. Services	25,738,000
160,170,000	Total Supply Services	92,169,000
	Votes of Credit Balance	2,402,800,000
198,243,000		<u>2,696,221,000</u>

(a) Nominal provisions, the substantive provision being made under Votes of Credit.

The whole basis of taxation has been profoundly disturbed by the war. In 1913-14 direct taxation amounted to 93 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions and represented 57 per cent. of the total tax revenue. For the year 1917-18 direct taxation, including excess profits duty, amounted to 503 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions, or 82·5 per cent. of the total taxation. It will be seen, therefore, that the burden of war taxation has fallen almost entirely upon the direct taxpayers. The proportion of the total expenditure raised by (1) borrowing and (2) revenue—that is taxation and Post Office, etc., during the years 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918—was :

For the year to March 31, 1915 (which included the first eight months of the war), the revenue was 576·7 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions, of which amount 405 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions were borrowed and 171·7 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions, or 29·7 per cent., raised by revenue.

For the year to March 31, 1916, the total sum received was 1,501·3 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions, of which 1,164·5 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions were borrowed, and 336·7 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions, or 22·4 per cent., were raised by revenue. For the year to March 31, 1917, the amount received was 2199 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions, of which 1,625·5 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions were borrowed and 573·4 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions, or 26·8 per cent., raised by revenue. For the year to March 31, 1918, the total expenditure was 2,696,221,000 $\frac{1}{2}$, of which 2,989,000,000 $\frac{1}{2}$ were borrowed and 707,000,000 $\frac{1}{2}$, or 26·2 per cent., were raised by revenue.

Mr Bonar Law, on April 22 last, estimated the expenditure for the year to March 31, 1919, at 2,972,197,000 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 8,142,000 $\frac{1}{2}$ a day. In his Budget speech he said :

‘The rule originally introduced by my predecessor implies that at the end of the budget year we shall have revenue sufficient to meet all normal expenditure and the Debt Charges without new taxation or new borrowing. . . . As long as it is humanly possible for the country to live up to that standard it is our duty to see that it is carried out.’

He then made the following calculation :

	£	£
Pre-war expenditure	173,000,000	
Pensions, Education and other ad- ditions to pre-war expenditure	97,000,000	270,000,000
Interest and Sinking Fund on War Debt		380,000,000
		<hr/> 650,000,000

In order to comply with the principle thus laid down, Mr Bonar Law said it was necessary to impose new taxation which would produce in a full year an additional revenue of 114,500,000*l.*; and he accordingly proposed the following new taxation: (1) the standard rate of the income tax to be increased from 5*s.* to 6*s.* in the *£* with consequential modifications in the graduated scale; (2) the limit of Super-Tax exemption to be lowered from 3000*l.* to 2500*l.*, and the rates of Super-Tax under the graduated scale to be increased up to a maximum of 4*s.* 6*d.* in the *£*; (3) Farmers' Income Tax under Schedule B to be doubled (the 1917-18 measure of liability was the rental; it has now been increased to double the rental value); (4) Stamp Duty on cheques to be increased from 1*d.* to 2*d.*; (5) postage rates to be increased by about 50 per cent. all round; (6) the duties on spirits, beer, tobacco, sugar, and matches raised by amounts varying from 30 to 60 per cent. Finally, Mr Bonar Law proposed an excise duty of one-sixth part *ad valorem* on Luxuries. These additions were approved, with the exception of the Luxury Duties, which were eventually referred to a Special Committee, to be dealt with in a separate measure. For the current year Mr Bonar Law estimated that the new taxation would produce 67,800,000*l.*, and that the yield in a full year would be 114,500,000*l.* He estimated the total revenue for 1918-19 at 842,050,000*l.*, leaving 2,130,147,000*l.* to be borrowed.

Many people have expressed their disappointment that a larger proportion of our expenditure has not been obtained from taxation, and they maintain that the financial policy adopted in the Napoleonic wars should be applied to the present war; but this contention has not been sustained. Too large a share of the burden of taxation has been thrown upon the direct taxpayer. Under the new budget, incomes of 5000*l.* will pay 7*s.* 2*d.* in the *£*; those of 10,000*l.*, 8*s.* 4*d.*; those of 15,000*l.*, 10*s.* 0*d.* So long as the Excess Profits Duty forms one of the principal sources of revenue, and Income Tax, Super-Tax and the Estate Duties are retained at their present levels, it would be very dangerous to place any further burden upon the shoulders of the direct taxpayers. There are already indications that the limits of direct taxation have been nearly reached, and that further

additions will cease to yield a proportionate increase of revenue.

From the statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when introducing the Budget, it may be assumed that the gross amount of the National Debt on March 31, 1919, will be approximately 7980*l.* millions. From this we may make the following deductions:

	Million £
Advances to Allies up to March 31, 1919 .	1632
Less proportion deducted—one half .	816
	<hr/>
Advances to Dominions (to March 31, 1919)	816
Liability undertaken by India (do.) .	244
	<hr/>
	64
	<hr/>
	1124
Balances with financial agents abroad .	375
Land, Securities, Buildings, Ships, etc. .	97
Stores of all kinds, chiefly Munitions Department (cost 325 <i>l.</i> millions) taken at .	100
	<hr/>
	572
Further assets of the same nature to be acquired during current financial year .	100
	<hr/>
	672
Estimated amount of Excess Profits Duty accrued but not collected at March 31, 1919	500
	<hr/>
Total credit items	2296
	<hr/>

This would reduce the net amount of the National Debt on March 31, 1919, to 5684*l.* millions. To this must be added the cost of demobilisation and other expenses in connexion with the conclusion of the war, so that, if the war should end this year, we might expect to wind up with a net debt of about 7000*l.* millions, exclusive of the capitalised value of the pensions, for which the latest valuation is 750*l.* millions. How much of this vast sum can be truly described as lost? Only a comparatively small proportion. I am in complete agreement with the views expressed many years ago by Sir Robert Giffen in his book on the 'Growth of Capital' (1889):

'Of course to each individual holding a portion of the National Debt, the holding is property. . . . On the whole

the reason assigned is a good one, but I should not censure very much any one who included the debt as a part of the capital of the community . . . the money expression of all the other capital of the community is less than it would otherwise be by the amount of the debt . . . if there were no debt, lands, houses, etc., would exchange for rather more than they do now. The debt in this view represents a certain distribution of part of the capital of the country, and we do not get a complete view of the capital unless we include it.'

The National Debt at the end of the war will probably be about 40 per cent. of the total of the national wealth before the war; and the vast amount which must be raised annually by way of taxation to pay the interest, even though the debt is practically all held at home, somewhat weakens the complacent views which Giffen took when the National Debt was only about 4 per cent. of the national wealth.

The real cost of the war may be summarised under the following headings: (1) The death and disablement of, say, one million men. Human suffering and sorrow cannot be expressed in terms of money, but, if an actuarial valuation had to be made, this million of lives might be estimated to represent 800l. millions. (2) The capital value of the pensions, say, 750,000,000l.; (3) diminished stocks of food supplies, raw materials and manufactured goods; (4) a large diminution in our shipping tonnage and the impaired efficiency of the remainder. (5) We have parted with a considerable proportion of our investments abroad. In the years immediately preceding the war we used to invest about 200l. millions abroad and expend about 200l. millions in the form of new investments in the United Kingdom, besides providing about 180,000,000l. per annum for depreciation, renewals, etc. This latter provision has been largely suspended during the war. (6) The community is poorer to the extent to which it has been deprived of many services, such as cheap and frequent train services, shipping services, etc., but this is largely a temporary loss and cannot be expressed in terms of money. Altogether I think it would be a reasonable estimate to assume that, including the capitalised value of the war pensions and the moneys borrowed abroad, our real loss during the war in terms of money is in the

neighbourhood of 2000*l.* millions, without taking into account loss of profits, etc.; but against this must be set the increased power of production.

If we should finish the war with a net National Debt of 7000*l.* millions, what is our National Budget likely to be? We should have first to provide, say, 5½ per cent. for interest and sinking fund, which would mean an annual charge of 385*l.* millions. Before the war the Civil Government cost 97*l.* millions per annum. We are committed to a large and expensive scheme of educational reform; we know that old-age pensions will cost 18,000,000*l.* instead of 12,000,000*l.*; and the recent increases in salaries in the Government Departments will involve a large annual sum. It would be prudent to reckon that in the first years of peace the cost of Civil Government will not be less than 150*l.* millions, while pensions will form an annual charge of at least 50*l.* millions.

In the year before the war the Army cost 28,300,000*l.* It is my belief that, notwithstanding the proposed League of Nations, the British Empire will find it very difficult for many years to come to reduce its standing Army below 500,000 men, and its annual expenditure on the Army below 80*l.* millions. In the year before the war the expenditure on the Navy amounted to 48,800,000*l.* Naval shipbuilding costs 70 per cent. more than it did before the war. The development of the submarine may alter the whole conception of sea-power, and we shall get off lightly if we can keep our expenditure on the Navy below 70*l.* millions per annum. The third arm, Aircraft, is yet only in its infancy, and an annual expenditure of 20*l.* millions on this service would not be an excessive estimate.

Summarising the conclusions arrived at, we may estimate our *post-bellum* expenditure as follows:

	Millions. £
Civil Government Charge	150
Army	80
Navy	70
Aircraft	20
Interest and sinking fund charge on National Debt	385
Pensions, etc	50
	<hr/> 755

The pecuniary cost of defending the Empire has naturally fallen mainly upon the United Kingdom. Our burden of war debt will be about 150*l.* per head, while that of the Overseas Dominions will probably be very much less.

We may apparently, then, look forward to an annual expenditure of about 750*l.* millions. How is this vast sum to be provided? The Labour Party propose 'a special capital levy to pay off a very substantial part of the National Debt, chargeable, like the death duties, on all property.' This appears to me to be wholly impracticable in the form in which it is suggested by the Labour Party. What the Government requires is income, not capital. The capital of the Government is the national production.

There are many alternative methods of meeting the charge for the National Government after the war, but it is of vital importance that we should adopt a course which will impose the minimum of hardship and will not check our industrial development. We have already gone much further than America or Germany in the matter of direct taxation; and it would be unfortunate if the treatment accorded to capital should be so much more unfavourable in this country as to divert both home and foreign capital from London.

We might continue the Excess Profits Duty, but this is open to the grave objections: (1) that it constitutes a restraint upon the development of trade and tends to standardise production at the low level of 1913; (2) that it will probably cease to yield any substantial amount of revenue in a few years after the war. Of course, this duty cannot be suddenly dropped, but I think it should be fixed for a period of, say, five years ahead on a descending scale, say 50 per cent. in the first year of peace, declining to 10 per cent. in the fifth year after peace. Another course would be to increase the Income Tax and Super-tax; but the Income Tax is already at an oppressive level, and any further substantial advances would impose a check upon individual enterprise at a time when it should be most actively encouraged, and would probably result in a diminished yield. The Death Duties will doubtless be further increased, and they might possibly be advanced considerably without causing

undue damage to the economic system. There must be a further increase in indirect taxation. The case for the adoption of such a policy is very strong. The working-classes are getting a much greater share of the gross income of the country than they have had in the past, and they are not contributing their fair proportion of the cost of government. The wages bill has gone up by at least 600l. millions since 1914, but indirect taxation has only advanced by about 35l. millions. In 1913-14 indirect taxation was 43 per cent. of the total revenue; in 1917-18 it amounted to only 17·5 per cent. The Chancellor of the Exchequer appears to have realised the necessity of placing the burden more fully upon the indirect taxpayer, because the new taxation imposed under the Budget for the current year is estimated to produce in a full year 61l. millions from direct taxation and 48·6l. millions from indirect taxation apart from the Luxury Tax.

Until the Budget of 1918-19 very favourable treatment was accorded to farmers in the matter of Income Tax. For the year 1913-14 farmers were assessed to Schedule B on the basis that their profits equalled one-third of the rent. Farms under 450 acres paid no income tax at all. A few farmers were assessed under Schedule D, but even those assessed under Schedule B had the right, if their profits fell below the statutory one-third, to get a special reduction to the actual profits of the year. The method of assessment for the financial year 1917-18 was similar, save for the fact that the Schedule B assessment, instead of being one-third of the rent (plus tithe), was the full rental value. Under the Budget for 1918-19 the charge under Schedule B has been increased to double the rental value; but, even with this addition, it would be difficult to maintain that farmers were contributing their fair proportion to the Income Tax. They are also exempt from the Excess Profits Duty. The gross production of farmers before the war was valued at about 200l. millions. For the current year I estimate it to amount to 400l. millions. In 1913-14 farmers' profits were probably not less than 50l. millions, and they were only assessed at 17l. millions. As a result of this exemption from Excess Profits Duty, the partial exemption from Income Tax, and the special treatment which has been

accorded to them in other directions, it may be safely affirmed that the capital of farmers has been more than doubled during the war.

Even if effect were given to the proposals outlined above, it would not produce sufficient revenue for the purposes of the Government; and the best course appears to me to be the institution of a small annual tax on capital, graduated so as to yield an average return of 1 per cent. per annum on the capital wealth of the country, and to be strictly limited to a term of ten years. An exemption limit of, say, 2000*l.*, might be adopted. If such a tax were imposed, it should yield a revenue of not less than 120*l.* millions per annum in the United Kingdom. The method of assessment should be comparatively simple and inexpensive. Each taxpayer, when making his return to Income Tax, should be required to include a valuation of his capital. In case of dispute the valuation should bear a certain specified ratio to the gross income assessed to Income Tax, the ratios varying in relation to the nature and state of development of the property. The Income Tax returns would provide an annual check; but, if there should be found to have been evasion, the arrears could be recovered when the estate ultimately came to valuation for probate purposes. If effect were given to the above proposals, the post-war revenue might be as follows (the actual revenue for 1913-14 and 1917-18 are included for comparison):

	Actual Revenue for 1913-14. Millions. £	Actual Revenue for 1917-18. Millions. £	Estimated Post-War Revenue. Millions. £
Customs and Excise .	75	110	200
Estate Duties .	27	31	50
Stamps, Land Tax, etc.	14	12	15
Income Tax, say .	47	240	250
Non-tax Revenue .	35	94	70
War Tax on Capital .	—	—	120
Excess Profits Duty .	—	220	50*
	198	707	755

It should, therefore, be possible, by increasing indirect

* Average for, say, ten years.

taxation to 200l. millions, by advancing the Death Duties and by instituting a small annual tax on capital, to meet our post-war charges, to abolish the Excess Profits Duty in five years' time, and reduce the Income Tax to the standard rate of 5s. in the £. In 1929 the Government will have the option of paying off the 5 per cent. War Loan; and many of the other Government obligations will become liable to redemption. It is probable that we shall then be in a position to reduce the rate of interest and consolidate the war debt; and, if the monetary conditions are suitable, we might issue a Consolidation Loan at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Of course, due consideration must be given to the condition of the money markets, the cost of living, and the rate of income tax. A reduction of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. interest on 7000l. millions would mean an annual saving of 105l. millions per annum to the Exchequer. I think, therefore, that for the next decade we should adopt what may be termed transitional methods in national finance, and at the end of that time reconsider our national economic policy.

Expenditure must always be considered in relation to income; and we must remember that in 1914, when the Imperial expenditure was 200l. millions per annum, the national income was about 2400l. millions per annum. That is to say, the cost of Government represented about 8 per cent. of the entire national income. What is the national income at the present time? The following table gives an estimate of the income and expenditure of the United Kingdom for the years 1907 and 1917:

	1907. (In million £.)		1917. (In million £.)
Food, etc.	483·1	. . .	875
Dress	248·0	. . .	320
House	246·0	. . .	260
Miscellaneous . . .	186·3	. . .	150
Cost of distribution .	200·0	. . .	300
Professional and Domestic Services .	100·0	. . .	60
	<hr/> 1463·4		<hr/> 1865
National Service, including Army and Navy, Local Govt.	184·0	War and other Expenses of Govt. incurred at home .	1800
	<hr/> 1647·4		

Forward . . .	1647·4	Forward . . .	1965
Depreciation, repairs, re-		Forward .	1800
newals, etc. . .	180·0	Less cost of feed-	
New Investment at		ing, clothing,	
home . . .	150·0	and maintain-	
Capital invested abroad	176·0	ing 6,000,000	
		soldiers and	
		sailors, 2,000,000	
		munition work-	
		ers, and their	
		dependents, al-	
		lowed for above	300 1500
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	2153·4		3465

From the estimates furnished in the above table, it may be said that, while in 1907 we produced commodities and services sufficient to feed, clothe, and maintain us, and leave a surplus of about 500l. millions for repairs and renewals and new investments at home and abroad, in 1917 we produced commodities and services sufficient to feed, clothe, and maintain us, and provide a surplus of approximately 1500l. millions, which we devoted to the carrying on of the war; but there was practically nothing available in 1917 for renewals and new investments. This great surplus was produced partly by increased production, partly by restricting consumption, partly by using up accumulated stocks, and partly by the rise in prices. It will be noted that I estimate that the national income advanced from 2153l. in 1907 to 3465l. millions in 1917. This estimate is borne out by the amount of gross income brought under the review of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, which advanced from 980,117,000l. in 1907-08 to 1,600,000,000l. in 1916-1917. The number of income-tax payers in 1913-14 was 1,200,000, and in 1916-17, 3,200,000.

All this conduces to show that the solution of our domestic post-war financial problem can only be found by increased production. If we can maintain the production of the United Kingdom at not less than 3600l. millions per annum, the estimated Imperial expenditure 750l. millions per annum will not amount to more than 21 per cent. of the national income; and this is a burden of taxation which the nation should be able to bear with

comparative ease. I believe we can maintain the production of the United Kingdom at the level I have indicated if we profit fully by the lessons which the war has taught us, improve our very defective commercial organisation, and place the relations between capital and labour on a happier footing than they were on before the war.

Ordeal by battle has shown the weakness of our old economic policy as well as its advantages. For centuries it was our practice to throw out from the centre, as it were, our different sources of strength. In pursuance of this policy we encouraged our people to emigrate to the remote parts of the world. We invested about one-fourth of the national wealth outside the limits of the United Kingdom. Our investments abroad have proved of inestimable value during the war. They have been our real war treasure, and without them it is difficult to believe that we should have been able to finance our Allies and provide for our own expenditure. We also derived great advantage from our Free Trade policy through the development of British shipping. When the war broke out, we owned one-half of the mercantile tonnage of the world; and it was the magnitude of our mercantile marine, and the fact that through its use we were able to call upon not only the Empire but the whole world for supplies of food and raw materials, that saved the Empire and our Allies from disaster. On the other hand, under our Free Trade policy agriculture declined, and the factory and the furnace flourished by the ruin of English agriculture. The general tendency of our economic policy was to subordinate everything to the development of international trade and finance. We threw down all the barriers which restricted the freedom of commerce. Thus we became dependent upon foreign countries for more than half our supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials, and upon Germany in particular for various commodities vital to the conduct of some of our greatest industries.

Now the final purpose of economic labour is production to meet consumption; and I venture to think that in the past we paid too much attention to production and too little attention to consumption. There was waste in the production and consumption of food. The report of the

Food (War) Committee of the Royal Society (Cd 8421) showed that the amount of food produced and imported into the United Kingdom during the period 1909-13 was 15 per cent. in excess of the amount required to feed the entire population; and yet there is irrefutable evidence that a large proportion of the population was undernourished. Our industrial organisation was defective; there was waste in the production, consumption, and distribution of coal and motive power. 'The present coal consumption (say our experts) would, if used economically, produce at least three times the present amount of power.* The Coal Controller estimates that, by bringing the consumption of coal as near as possible to the source it will be possible to save, roundly, 700 million ton-miles per annum. Again, we did not make the most economical use of our shipping. Under war conditions the carrying power in weight per 100 tons net of shipping entrances increased from 118 tons in 1914 to 143 tons in 1916.† Further, a large number of people were engaged in services which were not essential to national welfare. There were too many people employed in distribution and too few employed in production; the drink traffic was not sufficiently controlled; there were too many domestic servants. In short, any one who will take the trouble to examine closely the reports made under the Census of Production Act cannot fail to be impressed by the smallness of the national output in relation to our capacity to produce.

An interesting statement with regard to pre-war industrial conditions and output was made in a report of the Mechanical Section Committee of the Iron and Steel Institute issued in the latter part of 1917 as to the causes of the smaller output of steel in British steelworks as compared with foreign practice. On the question of labour conditions the report states: 'There is a general agreement that our labour conditions, as compared with the Continent, are detrimental to output. It is not, however, suggested that this is due to inferiority of the

* Reconstruction Committee, Coal Conservation Sub-Committee (Cd 8880).

† Annual Report of the Liverpool Steam Shipowners Association for the year 1916.

men individually.' The following is a comparison of melters' earnings in several countries before the war:—

EARNINGS PER SHIFT (*ANTE-BELLUM* FIGURES).

		ENGLISH.	AMERICAN.	GERMAN.
		<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>
1st hand	. .	36 11	17 4	9 6
2nd hand	. .	24 9	11 3	7 0
3rd hand	. .	18 5	9 9	5 6
Total	. .	80 1	38 4	22 0

The weight of steel made per shift is approximately in the ratio of : English, 1·0 ; American, 1·5 ; German, 2·0. Thus the German workman got little more than a quarter of the Englishman's wage, and turned out twice as much work. The accuracy of these startling figures was challenged, but the general conclusions of the Committee appear to have been fully established.

Assuming that we can reconstruct the national finances on the lines I have indicated and at the same time increase our production over the pre-war level by about 50 per cent., what is the economic problem which we shall have to face after the declaration of peace? We shall have to provide work for four or five million men who are at present in the Army and Navy or employed as munition workers, and one million women who are employed in munition works. At the same time we shall have to readjust our foreign trade policy to the new position which we shall hold in international finance.

A sub-committee of the executive of the Labour Party have put forward an interesting programme of reconstruction. The report states, *inter alia*, that, in order 'to prepare for the possibility of any unemployment either during demobilisation or in the first years of peace, the Government should make preparations for putting instantly in hand' a large number of social and other domestic reforms involving a huge outlay. It is disappointing to find that an important body, which will have so large a share in the determination of the future economic policy of this country, should have taken such purely domestic views of our post-war problems. We cannot afford an extravagant programme of internal

development until we have restored our position in foreign trade.

The report states: 'To-day no man dares to say anything is impracticable.' I will dare to say that it is impossible to evolve a satisfactory and adequate scheme of economic reconstruction unless it is based upon (1) a great increase in the production of commodities and services in the United Kingdom, and (2) a vast expansion of our foreign trade. We all recognise that domestic reforms are urgently necessary, that our agricultural industry must be fostered, and that home industries, particularly the dye and chemical industries, must be greatly developed; but, whatever schemes we may adopt, we shall ultimately find that they are of little account unless they comply with the two conditions which I have laid down above. The expansion of our foreign trade is, therefore, a matter of profound importance.

The Government are at present spending in this country about 5l. millions per day. During demobilisation they will probably spend not much more than 2,000,000l. per day. Who is going to take the place of the Government as the purchaser of commodities or services to the value of 3,000,000l. per day? It will be a much more difficult task to move from war production to peace production than it was to move from peace production to war production. In the latter case we had at our disposal the wealth and resources accumulated through a century of industrial expansion. The manufacturer, in transforming his works, knew that he had behind him a Government contract, at, to say the least of it, remunerative prices, with no risk of bad debts or a falling off in the demand. How is the British manufacturer to shape his peace programme and to move from war production to peace production with a heavy burden of taxation, a problematical demand for his products, and an unknown volume of competition from foreign manufacturers? Before the war we imported mainly foodstuffs and raw materials and exported manufactured goods and coal, and it does not seem probable that the war will make any fundamental alterations in our dependence upon foreign trade. As to foodstuffs, in spite of the progress made in agriculture, we shall hardly be able to produce all the food we require in these Islands.

As to raw materials, we shall be still more dependent upon foreign supplies than we were in 1914.

Through the command we had of the markets of the world, and the economic momentum given to our trade by the interest on our investments abroad and the earnings of our shipping, insurance companies, etc., we could, before the war, determine in a large measure the nature of our imports. It is of vital importance that we should arrive at a clear understanding of our international position as it will appear after the war, and ascertain whether we shall still possess this command of the markets of the world. Shall we still be a creditor nation? Shall we have capital available for large investments abroad?

We began the war as the greatest creditor in the world because we carried, financed and insured more than one-half of the world's sea-borne commerce, and the world was indebted to us for 200l. millions a year by way of interest on investments. Our pre-war foreign investments have shrunk from 4000l. millions to 3000l. millions, but, on the other hand, we have made new investments abroad during the war to the extent of 1500l.—2000l. millions. Before the war the foreign holding of our national debt was negligible. At the end of the current financial year it will probably amount to 1500l. millions. If these conclusions are approximately correct, we stand to receive only 200l. millions as interest on investments; that is, assuming half our loans to our Allies are good. On the other hand, we shall have to pay 75l. millions per annum by way of interest on British Government securities held abroad. On balance, therefore, we should stand to receive 125l. millions by way of interest on investments.

With regard to food imports, for the five years preceding the war our purchases, including drink and tobacco, averaged 270l. millions per annum. Even if we prove able to provide food supplies at home for five days in each week, which I very greatly doubt, the cost of food for the two days will, owing to the increase in prices, probably amount to as much as the pre-war imports for three days per week. Our mercantile marine has shrunk from over 20 million tons gross to between 16 and 17 million tons gross; but, owing to the high freights that must obtain for some years after the war, it seems not

unreasonable to assume that our earnings from shipping will be in the neighbourhood of 200*l.* millions per annum. Until the international financial system has been re-established it would not be reasonable to expect that our earnings from our share in the financing of international trade will approach the pre-war standard; but, on the other hand, earnings from insurance, underwriting, etc., will probably be increased.

We should, therefore, be able to count upon a credit balance of over 400*l.* millions per annum.

	Millions of £.
Interest on Investments held abroad	200
<i>Less</i> Interest on British Government Stocks held abroad	75
	— 125
Earnings from Shipping, etc.	200
Earnings from Banking, Insurance, etc.	70
	—
	395

On the basis of these calculations we should, therefore, be nominally as well off as we were before 1915; but, on the new basis of prices, a credit of 395*l.* millions after the war will not be worth anything like a credit of 400*l.* millions before the war, and to this extent we shall be in a less favourable position in relation to international trade.

All the conditions essential to a vast development of international trade should be in existence after the war. The principal trading countries of the world have depleted their stocks of manufactured goods and raw materials; and all neutral countries which produce foodstuffs and raw materials have, under the stimulus of economic pressure, enlarged their capacity for production of these commodities. In our own case we have increased the power equipment of our industries. We have introduced labour-saving appliances and revolutionised our industrial methods. We shall have a larger industrial population, including women, than we had before the war; and, when demobilisation has been in operation for a year or so, our production—that is to say, our wealth-producing power—should be at least 50 per cent. greater than it was before the war.

One of the most difficult questions in connexion with the expansion of our foreign trade will be the problem of the foreign exchanges, some of which are now heavily against us. We do not know with any accuracy the extent of foreign holdings of our Treasury Bills, Exchequer Bonds and Currency Notes, etc., but we do know that the aggregate amount must be very considerable. In the course of his Budget speech Mr Bonar Law told us that, during the past financial year, the United States had made us advances to the extent of nearly 500 millions. With regard to Egypt, the 'Times' of Nov. 28, 1917, stated: 'There is ample evidence that practically the entire surplus income of the country (i.e. Egypt) since the outbreak of war, computed at about 40l. millions, had been invested in War Stock, principally British.' The building-up of our gold reserve is, therefore, a matter of the first importance.

Altogether, I estimate that from the beginning of the war down to the end of 1917 we borrowed abroad, or through the sale of investments obtained credits abroad for, sums amounting altogether to 350l. millions in 1915; 600l. millions in 1916; 900l. millions in 1917—a total of 1850l. millions. Of this total about 900l. millions represent British holdings of foreign securities, principally American, which we have sold back to America, Japan, etc., leaving us with a net indebtedness of, say, 1000l. millions. Against this we may place the remainder of our pre-war foreign investments, say, 3000l. millions:

	£	
Balance of <i>ante-bellum</i> investments abroad	3000	millions.
Add Investments made abroad during the war (that is, loans to the Dominions and one half of the loans to Allies), say . . .	1000	„
	<hr/>	
	4000	„
Less monies owing to the United States, etc., down to March 31, 1919	1500	„
	<hr/>	
Balance	2500	„

The conditions under which our foreign trade will be carried on during the years immediately following peace cannot possibly be the same as before the war. We

shall probably have to pass through a transition stage which may extend over a decade. During the five years preceding the war we used to invest about 200l. millions per annum by way of loans to Colonies and foreign countries. On the present basis of prices this average would represent a value of 400l. millions per annum ; but, if we intend to make good our war losses as quickly as possible and provide employment for the men who are coming back and the munition workers who will be discharged, we must make provision for the investment of much larger sums abroad in the transition period. I think they should be not less than 600l. or 700l. millions per annum. This is quite feasible. In its ultimate form, this kind of investment represents the excess of production over consumption of commodities and services. It should be quite practicable for this country, while relaxing the war strain on the industrial population, to produce 800l. or 900l. millions more services and commodities than it consumes, provided the cooperation of Capital and Labour is obtained.

The weakest point in our position is that of shipping. We have lost about four million tons, and the remainder of the tonnage is in need of repair and overhauling ; but the new shipbuilding programmes in this country and America should improve the position. It is a national misfortune that the nation should have been manoeuvred into an attitude of hostility to the shipowners. Thanks to private enterprise, we possessed at the outbreak of war a vital and incomparable weapon without which the nation could not have carried on the war. The course of freights since the Government requisitioned shipping has proved conclusively that the shipowners, in allowing the law of supply and demand to take its course in fixing rates, were acting on sound and, in the circumstances, inevitable lines ; and that the charge of profiteering was due to the economic ignorance and the jealousy of sections of the British public. The recovery of this country from the economic wastage of war will be gravely menaced if the State attempts to continue a day longer than is absolutely necessary the control of shipping ; and I would suggest that our shipowners should take the Labour leaders into their confidence and discuss this vital question with them, for on a clear

understanding of the issue the future of the British Empire must largely depend.

The whole ground should be comprehensively surveyed. We must see what tonnage we are likely to have, what supplies of raw materials will be available, what our principal foreign customers require, what we can manufacture, and what they can sell us in exchange; and then form overseas development corporations for Canada, Australia, India, South Africa, New Zealand, West Africa, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Palestine, East Africa, and the Crown Colonies. We must also provide for the development of trade with Belgium, France, Italy, Serbia, Russia, etc. It will not be an easy matter to hold the balance between the claims of our different Allies for the expansion of our trade, but it is obvious that the development of Empire trade must be our first consideration.

During the war we have evolved the machinery requisite for the transference of a great portion of the resources of the country to the State, i.e. through War Loans. In the transition period we must provide machinery for the re-transfer of these resources from the State back to the individuals—that is, from War Loans into oversea joint stock enterprises. The banks must either provide loan facilities on a vast scale or establish a great national loan institution, which will accept War Loans, National Bonds, etc., as collateral, and issue in exchange therefor credit notes, which could be applied for the purpose of subscribing capital for these overseas enterprises in such a manner as will prevent inflation of credit. Unless some such machinery is provided, there is a danger that the market will be flooded with sales of war stock, etc., by holders who wish to take up again their industrial and commercial occupations, and require cash for the purchase of manufactured goods or raw materials.

Concurrently with this vast expansion of our foreign trade we must be prepared with an equally big scheme of Empire settlement. Before the war emigration was proceeding from the United Kingdom at the rate of 300,000 per annum. It may be confidently assumed that this rate will be accelerated after the war. There can be no question as to the need for this if the Empire is to maintain its position in the world. We could not have

built up and held the British Empire if we had not encouraged our people to emigrate; and it cannot be doubted that the United Kingdom has attained a much more powerful position in the world and a greater efficiency in war from the emigration of her sons and daughters than she would have attained if she had restricted their emigration.

A general process of consolidation and reorganisation is going on throughout the country, both with regard to capital and labour. The great joint-stock banks are amalgamating. The shipping companies and great industrial undertakings, such as coal, iron and steel, are amalgamating. Employers are consolidating their forces into a smaller number of federations, while the Labour Party has been reorganised, and the women are developing their organisations. Our Consular system has been reorganised and an Overseas Intelligence Department elaborated. But all these measures will bear little fruit unless there is hearty cooperation between Capital and Labour, which will result in a great increase of production. In short, our economic position is perfectly sound. We have entirely revolutionised the character of our national production, and we are now producing commodities and services nearly equivalent in value to the commodities and services requisite to maintain our population at home and to carry on the war. I therefore see no reason to doubt that Great Britain can continue to carry this stupendous burden if the people do not weaken in their resolve, and provided that we do not withdraw too many men from production and that we maintain our mercantile marine.

EDGAR CRAMMOND.

Art. 13.—SINN FEIN AND GERMANY.

IN the 'Quarterly Review' for last January we traced the origin of the Sinn Fein movement and described its home and foreign policy down to 1916. We showed that, from 1903, Arthur Griffith and the group associated with him had insisted that Irish independence was to be achieved by making British Government in Ireland impossible, just as Hungarian independence had been won by making Austrian Government in Hungary impossible. We showed that, three years before the War, Roger Casement had formulated a foreign policy for Sinn Fein based upon the imminence of a struggle between Germany and England; that this policy had been endorsed by Bernhardt and was widely discussed in Germany in 1912; and that Casement and the Irish revolutionaries, through the German and Irish-American subsidised propaganda, had long before the War been urging the Irish to prepare to ally themselves with Germany in the anticipation that Germany would be victorious in the great struggle; that, at the Peace Congress, the European Powers, actuated by jealousy of England and controlled by Germany, would guarantee the independence of Ireland as a neutralised State; and that England would thus be deprived of the key of the world's sea power and have the Freedom of the Seas wrenched from her.

The Germanising policy thus advocated was, when the War broke out, and now is, the declared policy of Sinn Fein at home and abroad. This policy, pregnant in its inception with peril to Great Britain and the British Empire, drew, during its years of parturition, nourishment from the virus of English party; it was nursed to maturity by the half-informed doctrinaires and insouciant politicians called in to handle and prescribe for Ireland; and during the War it has developed into a danger to the liberties of the world.

In basing the policy of Sinn Fein upon a victory of Germany in the anticipated war with England, the Sinn Fein Executive, with Casement and Prof. Kuno Meyer, did not leave out of sight the danger that their calculations might be upset by an alliance between the United States and the United Kingdom, and that a contest for

supremacy between England and Germany might resolve itself finally into a racial combat between the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic Powers. It thus became the settled determination of the Irish revolutionary leaders, in combination with the German elements in the United States, to provoke jealousies between England and America, and to embroil, so far as possible, the relations between Washington and London.

Prof. Kuno Meyer was actively associated with Casement in publishing articles and brochures with this object. In 1911 Casement wrote :

‘The American Alliance *may* come off. The entente with France, already of great value, can be developed into something more assuredly anti-German; and, if the present-day relation of friendship with the United States can be but tightened into a mutual committal of both Powers to a common foreign policy, then the raid on Germany may never be needed. . . .’

‘A bitter resentment with fear at the bottom, a hurried clanging of bolt and rivet in the belt of new warships, and a muffled but diligent hammering at the rivets of an ever-building American Alliance—the real Dreadnought this, whose keel was laid sixteen years ago, and whose secret construction has cost the silent swallowing of many a cherished British boast. . . . That mightier Dreadnought yet to be—the Anglo-Saxon Alliance—Germany must fight, if she is to get free.’

In 1914 Casement went to America, and was there when the war broke out. What he and his Sinn Fein associates were doing can be judged from this despatch sent in January 1916 from Berlin, and afterwards published by the American Secretary of State :

‘Telegram from the German Foreign Office to Count von Bernstorff :

‘January 26, for Military Attaché. You can obtain particulars as to persons suitable for carrying on sabotage in the United States and Canada from the following persons :

‘(1) Joseph M’Garrity, Philadelphia, Pa.; (2) John P. Kealing, Michigan Avenue, Chicago; (3) Jeremiah O’Leary, 16 Park Row, New York. One and two are absolutely reliable but not always discreet. These persons are indicated by Sir Roger Casement. In the United States sabotage can be carried out on every kind of factory for supplying munitions of war. Railway embankments and bridges must not

be touched. Embassy must in no circumstances be compromised. Similar precautions must be taken in regard to Irish pro-German propaganda.

‘Signed Representative of General Staff.’

Reuter's news agency on June 9, 1918, reported that

‘Jeremiah O’Leary, John Ryan, a Buffalo attorney, Lieutenant-Commander Wessels, of the German Navy, and Baroness Maria von Kretschmann, a kinswoman of the German Empress, and three others have been indicted before the Federal Grand Jury on the charge of conspiring to commit treason, the penalty for which is death.

‘The indictments against Jeremiah O’Leary charge him with the collecting and transmission of information regarding the conduct of the war, the destruction of piers, docks, and troop transports with bombs, the destruction of quicksilver mines, with hampering the manufacture of munitions, assisting Germany in landing an armed expedition in Ireland, the fomentation of a revolt in Ireland, raising funds in America to finance these operations, and the destruction of munition factories and mines in Great Britain. The indictments also allege his participation in a conspiracy to commit treason and in a conspiracy to commit espionage.

‘The seven individuals who have been indicted with O’Leary are charged with complicity in both conspiracies.’

The statement made by the Government on May 24 gives an outline of the connexion between the Sinn Fein leaders and the Germans, as disclosed by the documents in its possession. The revolutionary movement (it states) consisted of two closely related series of activities: (a) The attempts of the German Government to create rebellion in Ireland; (b) The preparations made in Ireland to carry their attempts into action.

The story falls into two parts—the period prior to, and the period since, the Irish Rebellion of Easter 1916. The events of the first period are told with some detail; but those of the second period, which covers recent events, can only be given in a summary form, as a full statement of the facts and documents in possession of the Government would disclose the names of persons who stood by the Government and also the channels of communication through which the German Government was acting, and which it would not be in the public

interest to reveal at present. The necessarily abbreviated narrative of the Government can, however, be supplemented by references to matters already made public.

Casement's statement of his dealings with Germany is worth giving in his own words. He wrote a letter to the 'Evening Mail' (New York), on Aug. 10, 1916, which was republished as a leaflet under the title 'Why Casement went to Germany,' and is now widely circulated as part of the German propaganda. It can be procured in any petty newspaper shop in Ireland. He wrote:

'I have read so many explanations by others why I went to Germany that a word from myself may not be inappropriate. . . . In June 1913 I resigned from the British Consular Service. . . . In November of that year came the establishment of the Irish Volunteers at Dublin. The Irish Volunteers sought to do for all Ireland what the Ulster Volunteers sought for Ulster Protestantism alone—to defend the rights and liberties common to a whole people, Protestant and Catholic. I joined Professor MacNeill and became a member of the governing body of the Volunteers, and with him addressed the first meetings held after the inaugural Dublin meeting in Galway and Cork in December 1913. . . .'

'After making arrangements with a small band of Irish friends whom I had gathered together in London on May 8, 1914, to get a first consignment of arms purchased on the Continent and landed in Ireland, I went to America to complete the work of obtaining the financial support of Irish Nationalists there, to get arms, just as the Ulster movement had obtained its armed support from the anti-Irish elements of England. . . .'

'I sought to meet the dishonest attempt to betray my countrymen into the ranks of an army of aggression, massed for a dishonest attack upon a people with whom Irishmen had no just cause of quarrel, by two letters addressed through the Irish press to Irishmen, in which I begged Irishmen to stay at home and leave England to fight her own wars of aggression. The first of these letters reached its destination and was published in the 'Irish Independent,' Oct. 5, 1914. The later letter failed to reach the Irish press owing to the British Censorship. . . .'

'I hoped that the German Government might be induced to make clear its peaceful intention towards Ireland, and that the effect of such a pronouncement in Ireland itself might be powerful enough to keep Irishmen from volunteering for a

war that had no claim upon their patriotism or their honour. With this aim chiefly in view I came to Germany in November 1914, and I succeeded in my purpose. The German Government declared openly its good will towards Ireland and in convincing terms.'

The letter as it appeared in the 'Independent' was published at much greater length in 'Sinn Fein' (Griffith's paper), and was caught up by the other seditious prints and reiterated. It had a quick effect in stopping recruiting.

When Casement arrived in Germany he got into immediate touch with the German Government and kept up regular communication with the Sinn Fein leaders in America, such as Judge Cohalan, Jeremiah O'Leary, and John Devoy, through the German Foreign Office and the German Embassy in America. Several despatches have been published by the American Government which throw light upon the German machinations. The Clanna-Gael, which was in touch with the Fenian Republican Brotherhood, the Irish Volunteers, and the Sinn Fein Executive, was in alliance with the German organisations in America; and active arrangements for a rebellion in Ireland were undertaken. One of the German agents, Lody, was arrested in Killarney, brought to London, tried, and shot in the Tower.

Judge Cohalan was an Irish-American who had been a member of the law committee of Tammany Hall and had been appointed a Supreme Court Justice by Governor Dix in 1911. At the meeting of the Irish Race Convention in March 1916, when a speech by Supreme Court Judge John W. Goff aroused cries of 'Down with England,' Judge Cohalan was announced as one of the Board of Directors of the Friends of Irish Freedom. His name appeared as one of the conveners of the meeting with that of Jeremiah O'Leary and T. St John Gaffney, an Irishman from Limerick, who had been recalled as American Consul from Munich by the United States Government.* We shall find the Friends of Irish freedom and St John Gaffney actually plotting in Germany and neutral countries against England in the present year and representing Sinn Fein at the Stockholm Conference.

On Nov. 6, 1914, immediately after Casement's arrival,

* See the New York 'World,' Sept. 23, 1917.

Herr Zimmermann transmitted from the Foreign Office in Berlin through Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, a message from Casement asking that a messenger, if possible a native-born American to prevent risk of arrest, should be sent to Ireland with word that everything was favourable. He was to carry no letter. A priest also was to be sent to work in the prison camps among the Irish soldiers and to corrupt them from their allegiance. This attempt on the allegiance of the valiant Irish soldiers failed, with very few exceptions, ignominiously. The priest sent was a Rev. John T. Nicholson,* an American citizen of Irish birth; in January 1915 he was found to be transmitting messages from Germany to America for communication to Devoy by the German Embassy. Confidential agents were sent to Ireland from America to push the German propaganda. An immense amount of seditious literature financed by Germany was poured into Ireland from the United States. The message of goodwill from Germany to Ireland, which Casement had requested, was printed officially in leaflet form in Berlin, headed 'Germany and Ireland,' and was widely circulated.

As stated in the January number of this Review, a large consignment of this leaflet and of 'Ireland, Germany and the Freedom of the Seas,' and of a proclamation dated Berlin, Nov. 20, 1914, purporting to be issued from the German Foreign Office, was found in the house of Laurence de Lacy at Enniscorthy on Feb. 24, 1915, when two men, John Hegarty and James Bolger, were arrested on the charge of having gelignite and other explosives and ammunition in their possession for seditious purposes. These men were subsequently tried by jury in Dublin and acquitted. Bolger was also acquitted on the charge of publishing the following notice which was posted up extensively in County Wexford :

'PEOPLE OF WEXFORD.

'Take no notice of the police order to destroy your own property, and leave your homes if a German army lands in Ireland. When the Germans come they will come as friends,

* As to Father Nicholson's operations and the formation of the Irish Brigade, see evidence given at the Court-Martial on Joseph Dowling, 'Times,' July 9, 1918.

and put an end to English rule in Ireland. Therefore, stay in your homes, and assist as far as possible the German troops. Any stores, hay, corn, or forage taken by the Germans will be paid for by them.'

De Lacy escaped to America, where he is now undergoing a sentence of two years' imprisonment for intriguing with German agents in San Francisco.

Light was thrown long after on this transaction from an unexpected quarter. The Zurich 'Volksrecht' (Nov. 3, 1917), the leading Socialist organ of Eastern Switzerland, published a number of important German official documents relating to the Casement conspiracy. The first is a letter written from Berlin under date of Dec. 28, 1914, and addressed to Casement by Herr Zimmermann, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

It states that the Imperial Government has accepted Casement's proposal for the formation of an Irish Brigade to fight only in the cause of Irish nationality under the conditions contained in the contract already concluded between Casement and the German Government. These conditions provided that, in certain circumstances, the Irish Brigade should be sent to Ireland well furnished with stores and munitions to help equip the Irish for a united attempt to restore freedom to Ireland by force of arms. Among the special conditions mentioned were the following, namely, that in the event of a German naval victory rendering it possible to reach Ireland, the German Government undertook to assist the Irish Brigade with a German auxiliary corps, under the command of German officers in German transports, which would be landed on the Irish coast. The landing in Ireland would, however, only be considered expedient in the event of a German victory offering good prospects for a successful passage to Ireland, failing which the Irish Brigade would be employed in Germany or elsewhere—solely, however, in the manner already agreed upon with Casement. In such a contingency the Irish Brigade might be sent to Egypt to render assistance in restoring Egyptian independence.*

The contract between Germany and Sinn Fein concluded by Casement had been immediately communicated to Ireland, and was published in 'Irish Freedom' in

* See 'Daily Chronicle,' Nov. 5, 1917, and 'Times,' July 9, 1918.

December 1914. This speedy communication was probably effected by wireless telegraph, as it appears from a message from Bernstorff to Berlin that there were numerous private wireless receiving stations in Ireland.*

'It was suggested' (stated 'Irish Freedom') 'that Germany aimed at a conquest of Ireland; and it was declared that the only way to save Ireland from such a conquest was to send young men to France to fight for England. This absurd story obtained credence from a number of uninformed Irish, and may have helped to get a few recruits for the English Army. We have now an official statement by the German Government that Germany would never invade Ireland with a view to its conquest or the overthrow of any national institutions. Should fortune ever bring the German troops to Ireland's shores, those troops would land, not as an army of invaders to pillage and destroy, but as the forces of a nation inspired by goodwill towards Ireland and her people, for whom Germany desires national prosperity and freedom. In fact Germany has no quarrel with Ireland, and Ireland has no quarrel with Germany. The only enemy of Irish Freedom is now, as ever, England.'

Meanwhile Prof. Kuno Meyer, who, while holding the chair of Celtic Literature in Liverpool University, had unquestionably been acting as a German secret agent, had returned to America from Germany, where he had been with Casement endeavouring to tamper with the Irish prisoners of war. He was lecturing the Clan-na-Gael in New York, and encouraging the Irish revolutionaries to expect German aid and an invasion of Ireland.

The Government statement indicates the character of the despatches which passed between Berlin and the German Embassy at Washington making arrangements for the Sinn Fein Rebellion of Easter 1916. John Devoy, the notorious Fenian, editor of the 'Gaelic American,' was one of the trusted agents employed by Germany. The Von Igel papers disclosed by the American Committee of Public Safety on Sept. 23, 1917, make mention of the Secret Code, 'Cypher Devoy,' to be employed in communicating between Germany and the Irish rebels. In February 1916 Devoy informed Bernstorff that the leaders were insisting that immediate action was becoming necessary; and Count

* See the Government statement of May 25, 1918.

Bernstorff, according to his usual practice, surreptitiously attached to a message to Berlin from the Washington Embassy a note from Devoy on the Irish position, stating it had been decided to begin action on Easter Saturday, and urging that arms and ammunition must be in Limerick by that date.

In December 1914 Devoy had remitted a thousand dollars to Casement in Germany through the German Foreign Office.* Messages passing between the Ministry of War and the Foreign Office in Berlin and Count Bernstorff on March 4, 14, and 26, made arrangements for a code of signals to be used while the arms were in transit between Germany and Ireland, discussed the possibility of submarines entering Dublin Bay, and getting as far up the Liffey as the Pigeon House without encountering nets, settled that arms and explosives should be landed in Tralee Bay, and that a special code word should be employed every night as an introduction to the German Wireless Press Service to notify the Irish of the progress of the action being taken to assist them from Germany.

Immediately before the Rebellion the following message, with others, was cabled :

‘New York, April 8, 1916.—The following communication from a confidential man, John Devoy, duly transmitted :

‘Letter dated March 22, delayed by censor, seems conclusive that the first messenger arrived safely, with proposals to send supplies, and that the cable was suppressed. Second also safe. Third, with change of plan, due about April 15.’

‘John Devoy further requests that the following telegram be despatched to Sir Roger Casement :

“‘No letter now possible. All funds sent home ; sister and M. family well. Should Sir Roger be absent or ill, then J. D. requests that the telegram be delivered to John Monteith.—(Signed) KU St.”’

‘To His Excellency the Imperial Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, Washington.’

Among other documents seized by the American Government's Secret Service agents in the office of Wolff von Igel, the ‘diplomatic agent’ of Germany,

* New York ‘World,’ Sept. 23, 1917.

was one marked 'Very Secret,' and signed with a cipher intended to conceal the origin. It was sent April 18, 1916, and read as follows :—

'Judge Cohalan requests the transmission of the following remarks : The revolution in Ireland can only be successful with the support of Germany, otherwise England will be able to suppress it, even though it be only after a hard struggle. Therefore help is necessary. *This should consist, principally, of aerial attacks on England and a diversion of the fleet simultaneously with the Irish Revolution.* Then if possible a landing of arms and ammunition in Ireland and possibly some officers from Zeppelins. This would enable the Irish ports to be closed against England and the cutting off the food supply for England. The services of the revolution, therefore, may decide the war.

'To his Excellency, Count von Bernstorff, Imperial Ambassador, Washington, D.C.' *

The story of Casement's landing and arrest on April 21 is familiar to all. News of this event was conveyed to Prof. Eoin MacNeill immediately by a special messenger April 22, and he forthwith published a notice rescinding the previous orders given to Irish Volunteers for Easter Sunday, and ordering that on that day no parades, marches or other movements should take place. There is a clear connexion between this notice and the loss of the German auxiliary with the guns and ammunition for the rebels. The other leaders of the Rebellion, however, determined to strike, and the insurrection took place. On the same day—as arranged by Germany in response to the request quoted above from Judge Cohalan—operations were undertaken by the German Fleet against England.

It became clear (the Government statement says) that very soon after the Rebellion the Sinn Fein leaders were again asking Germany for help. On June 17, 1916, there was a message from Berlin to Washington saying that Germany was ready to give further help if the Irish would only say what sort of help they wanted. Bernstorff's telegram further stated that 100000 had been provided for the defence of Casement. A member of

* See the 'Times,' Sept. 23, 1917 ; New York 'World,' Sept. 23, 1917.

the American Bar—a Mr Doyle—was in fact sent over to watch the case. In July Bernstorff communicated further news from Ireland to Berlin stating that the work of reorganising the rebels was making good progress, and that their lack of money had been remedied by him. It was notorious that Sinn Fein sympathisers had gone to America and were making collections there; and that, owing to the attitude taken up by Mr Asquith after his visit to Dublin, and the political inertness of the Government, Sinn Fein rapidly gathered great strength. In June 1916 there was published a letter from Bishop O'Dwyer, of Limerick, thanking the Guardians of the Tipperary Union for a resolution that they had passed approving

‘of my attitude towards that brute Maxwell, who in my opinion is only one degree less objectionable than the Government that screens behind him. But Ireland is not dead yet. While her young men are not afraid to die for her in open fight, and when defeated stand proudly with their backs to the wall as targets for English bullets, we need not despair of the old land.’

The priests followed this episcopal lead in sedition in numbers; and the American revolutionaries became active in their correspondence with Germany and in preparing for another rising when the opportunity might come. On Aug. 23, 1916, a remarkable despatch was telegraphed from Washington by Count Bernstorff to the German Foreign Office in Berlin :

‘The Bishop of Cork having died, there is a sharp contest over the succession. The present Assistant-Bishop, Daniel Cohalan, is the choice of the local clergy; but England is using unusual influence to have — appointed. — is strongly anti-German, although Germany at our request released him shortly after the outbreak of the War. Assistant-Bishop Cohalan is cousin of Judge Cohalan and strongly Nationalist and pro-German. He was the intermediary between the insurgent Cork Volunteers and the British Military Authorities, and publicly exposed the gross breach of faith of the English with the surrendered men. Hence the effort to defeat him through the English Envoy at the Vatican. The appointment of an Irish Bishop is made at Rome. . . . It would have a

great moral effect in Rome if Cohalan were chosen. If Germany can exert any influence to bring about this result it would defeat the English intrigue aimed against her interests.*

Germany, according to the 'Globe,' acted on Bernstorff's advice at Rome. Dr Daniel Cohalan is the present Roman Catholic Bishop of Cork. Illegal drilling was going on persistently during this period in Ireland; and Sinn Fein was not only increasing in numbers and audacity but perfecting its organisation, although most of the original leaders had either been executed or were undergoing imprisonment. On Sept. 8, 1916, as the Government statement tells, a memorandum was sent by Bernstorff to Berlin from an 'Irish Revolution Director Resident in America,' containing proposals for a fresh rising. The advantage of having submarine and Zeppelin bases on the west of Ireland was pointed out; and suggestions for a German Military Expedition were made. In December the Irish were pressing for an answer; and on Dec. 31 the German War Office informed Bernstorff of proposals to land munitions in Ireland between Feb. 21 and 25, 1917, but that German troops could not be sent. On Jan. 18, 1917, the Irish declined the proposal, as a rising would be useless without the assistance of German troops. In the meantime the German propaganda was spreading apace and corrupting the country. Its virulence can be judged from—merely one example out of hundreds—the following 'poem' on the battle of Jutland (fought just five weeks *after* the Rebellion), which is one of the most popular recitations at numerous Sinn Fein concerts and gatherings:

THE RATS CAME OUT.

' Britannia Rules the Waves, Britons never shall be slaves!
We've been told the tale so often, that we've scarcely room
for doubt;
Irish Rebels in their graves, done to death by cowardly
knaves,
Would sleep peacefully, I'm certain, if they knew the rats
came out.

* The 'Globe,' Sept. 29, 1916; 'Cork Constitution,' Dec. 1, 1916,
Vol. 230.—No. 456.

'Twas on the 31st of May—for ever blessed be that day!
 The British Fleet off Denmark's coast were cruising round
 about,
 They felt safety in numbers, and no fear disturbed their
 slumbers
 Not dreaming for an instant that the rats were coming out.

'Those tars renowned for bravery, those sworn foes of
 slavery,
 Were out upon a pic-nic German merchant ships to rout;
 They thought they had an easy thing, their bands were
 playing God Save the King,
 But very soon they changed their tune, they found the rats
 were out.

'The blood of murdered Irishmen appeals to Heaven once
 again;
 The Fleet that shelled old Dublin Town have got a clean
 knock-out.
 True Irish hearts will ever pray that God will speed the
 coming day
 When Britain's Fleet is swept away when next the rats
 come out.'

The United States declared war on April 4, 1917. On June 14, 1917, a Sinn Fein convention was held at Ennis and selected De Valera, who was undergoing penal servitude for life, as candidate for East Clare; he was subsequently elected by a very large majority. On June 15 the Government announced that they had decided to release without reservation all the Irish prisoners. They were released, and immediately began to deliver throughout Ireland harangues of the most seditious and treasonable character, telling the thousands who thronged to the meetings that

'Germany is no enemy of Ireland.' 'France is bled white.'
 'England is beaten to the ropes.' 'Make it impossible and
 unprofitable for England to govern Ireland.' 'Raise a national
 army of volunteers, drilled, disciplined and equipped in such
 a manner as to be able to strike a blow for Irish freedom
 when the opportunity arises; and, so far as can be seen, such
 opportunity will be very soon.' 'Germany is Ireland's friend
 because Germany is fighting for the Freedom of the Seas. It
 is therefore to her interest that Ireland should be free. As

long as England holds Ireland there can be no Freedom of the Seas, because Ireland is the key of the Atlantic.' 'England has been our enemy in the past, and why should we not assist her enemies now?' 'Get ready; keep getting ready; when the call comes stand to arms.' 'You never can tell what will come; wait for your orders.'

These are phrases taken from speeches by leaders, organisers, agitators and priests, delivered in hundreds week by week up and down the country. The constant cry was that at the Peace Conference Ireland would appear with Germany's advocacy to protest her sovereign independence and win recognition as a new Republic. The atmosphere thus created was charged with pro-Germanism and hostility to England. There was no propaganda to counteract it on the British side, and it was allowed to develop unchecked.

After America's entrance into the War, Washington was no longer a satisfactory base for the Sinn Fein treason-mongers. But on June 18, 1917, 'The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic,' which (as it stated) existed before the Revolution of 1916 and continues to exist, had the impertinence to convey to President Wilson and the Congress of the United States the appreciation by the Irish people of the principles enunciated in President Wilson's communication to the new Government of Russia, interpreting that statement in effect as a Declaration of Independence for all oppressed nations.

'Our nationalism is not founded upon grievances (they said). We are opposed not to English misgovernment but to English government in Ireland. . . . While prepared, when the opportunity arises, to assert our independence by the one force which commands universal respect and to accept aid from any quarter to that end, we hope Americans will see their way to aid in doing for Ireland what they did for Cuba.'

This message was delivered by the Sinn Fein 'Ambassador,' Dr Patrick McCartan, F.R.C.S., at that time a fugitive from Ireland, and since then elected a member of Parliament.

When America entered the War, Prof. Kuno Meyer returned to Germany, and, with St John Gaffney and George Chatterton-Hill—a *soi-disant* Irishman born in

Madras, educated at Geneva, and resident for many years in Germany—founded the German-Irish Society, which has its headquarters in the same premises in Berlin as those used by the Official German Press Bureau. The presidents of the organisation were Herr Mathias Erzberger, Baron von Reichthofen (a prominent Junker and Pan-German), and Count Westarp, the Junker leader in the Reichstag. On the directorate were Kuno Meyer, Prof. Edouard Meyer of Berlin University, his brother, Karl Goldschmidt of Essen (connected with Krupps), Prof. Schiemann, and many other eminent men in public and professional positions in Germany. The organ of the Association is 'Irische Blätter,' a high-class monthly review, well printed, and edited by Chatterton-Hill. It is devoted to pressing the Sinn Fein programme in Germany and neutral European States. The society started with messages of goodwill from General Ludendorff and Herr Zimmermann, then Foreign Secretary. It has since received similar messages from the Kaiser.

The following is from the inaugural address of the German-Irish Society:

'The war has proved that Germany has very few friends. But the Irish have acted as friends at home as well as in the United States, and Germany must not underestimate the value of Irish friendship. From the beginning of the war the American-Irish adopted the German cause with enthusiasm, and, in alliance with the German-Americans, conducted a courageous fight for true neutrality. There is no doubt that, but for the support of the Irish organisations, the politically unorganised German-Americans would have been condemned to impotence.

'The formation of this society is to supply visible proof to the Irish in Ireland as well as in America of German gratitude and German sympathy. The heroic rebellion of 1916 still lives in the memory of all of us. The uprising in Dublin, during which 2000 armed Irish defied a British force many times their superior, evoked lively interest in Germany for the Emerald Isle and all its inhabitants.

'The German-Irish Society will devote its energies to re-opening Ireland to the world, and *especially to Germany*. It will see that the voice of the Irish nation, which has been oppressed and sucked dry by England, again finds expression, and generally and in every way further the progressive

development of the Emerald Isle in the interest of the German as well as the Irish people.' *

The first number contained a full account of the Irish Easter week Rebellion—with illustrations of the leaders. The following is a quotation from one of the articles :

' When the west Irish harbours serve as bases for U-boats, and a large part of the country is in the hands of one of the organised revolutionary armies, then will England's rule over the sea quickly come to an end. Not only can many English ships carrying munitions and the necessities of life be sunk, but others can be captured and towed into Irish ports in order to supply the Irish army with munitions and the Irish people with food. Thus would England be handed over to her enemies and the war quickly brought to an end. The setting free of Ireland from England would be the end of England's world-dominion and of English rule over the seas. Both of these depend entirely upon whether England remains in possession of Ireland. . . .

' But this result cannot be brought about without a struggle. Ireland must secure her independence by the bravery of her men and the support of her women. "He who will be free must himself draw the sword." Ireland cannot accept her freedom as a present from the hand of another nation. The Irish, not the Germans, must drive the English army from Ireland and leave behind, as an example to coming generations, memorials of their fame and glorious traditions of the heroic struggle.

' Germany will help gladly, just as the help of French, Germans and Poles was thankfully accepted by the founders of the American Republic, as France and Spain in past days lent their support to Ireland, and as Ireland, again, obtained support from France and Russia. Every Power which wars with England is by that act the ally of Ireland; every sword-thrust made against England, no matter by whom, is a sword-thrust for the freedom of humanity.

' Ireland cannot fight without weapons and war material; and these absolutely indispensable things must be procured wherever they are to be had. But without money that is impossible—impossible without a great deal of money. From whence is this money to come? The Irish in America could raise it in the course of a month, if they had the confidence given by the prospect of the result and faith in the integrity

* See ' Daily Mail,' Oct. 27, 1917.

and activity of the men, sufficient to interest themselves in the matter. Every man and woman who desires the freedom of Ireland must strive to arouse this mutual confidence. That is at the present time the essential, the indispensable thing. When that is attained, the way is made clear.*

The continuity of the Sinn Fein revolutionary movement and its connexion with German intrigue is further exemplified by the proceedings at the great Sinn Fein Convention held in the Mansion House, Dublin, Oct. 25, 1917, when De Valera was elected President and Arthur Griffith Vice-President of the Association, and all the surviving rebels were elected to high office in its councils. The Sinn Fein Constitution then adopted declared :

‘Whereas the people of Ireland never relinquished their claim to Separate Nationhood, and whereas the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic, Easter 1916, in the name of the Irish people and continuing the fight made by previous generations, reasserted the inalienable right of the Irish Nation to Sovereign Independence and reaffirmed the determination of the Irish people to achieve it; and whereas the Proclamation of an Irish Republic, Easter 1916, and the supreme courage and glorious sacrifice of the men who gave their lives to maintain it have united the people of Ireland under the flag of the Irish Republic ;

‘Be it resolved that we, the delegated representatives of the Irish People in Convention assembled, hereby declare the following to be the Constitution of Sinn Fein.’

Then follow the different articles of the Constitution. The Constitution is based upon the grounds of the rebellion of Easter week 1916, in which Germany was proclaimed the ‘faithful ally’ of Sinn Fein. Speech after speech of the members of the Executive since October 1917 could be quoted, urging preparation for a new rebellion and hinting that the assistance of Germany would be again forthcoming. Never were traitors treated with such leniency as have these men been by England. Their hatred of England is, however, immeasurable. Irish Home Rulers and the Irish labourers owe much to the British Labour Party, and yet at the Convention a resolution was carried unanimously :

* From ‘Irische Blätter,’ May 1917, p. 102.

'That, as the first principle of Sinn Fein is to end the connexion with England, Sinn Feiners belonging to Trades Unions affiliated or amalgamated with English Trades Unions should be recommended when possible to try and sever the English connexion.'

Two days afterwards De Valera, addressing the Convention of Irish Volunteers, told them :

'They could see no hope of another rebellion being successful except through a German invasion of England, and the landing of troops and munitions in Ireland. They should be prepared to leave nothing undone towards that end.'

Corresponding to the German-Irish Society in Germany there had been founded in 1916 in America the Society of 'The Friends of Irish Freedom,' to carry on through the Germans and Irish in America the Sinn Fein struggle and propaganda against England. Since 1916 it has had its branches in all the important cities of the States. J. O'Leary was its president, and Kuno Meyer and St John Gaffney are among its prominent members. The Sinn Fein Executive in Ireland framed in 1917-1918 a long 'Statement of Ireland's Case at a Peace Conference,' partly argumentative, partly historical (in the Sinn Fein sense of history), and carrying to a conclusion the policy of Casement. Copies of this document were furnished through the agents of Sinn Fein in Germany to various Continental Powers. The following extracts show some of the existing links between Sinn Fein and Germany and illustrate its operations :

'Amsterdam, Dec. 3.—A telegram from Berlin reports that the German-Irish Society, which now numbers 300 members, held its first public gathering yesterday at the Hotel Adlon. Those present included representatives of the Imperial authorities, members of the Reichstag, and the Irish Nationalist, Dr Chatterton-Hill, whom the message in question describes as the "soul of society."

'Speaking on the community of German-Irish interests, Professor Edouard Meyer, of Berlin University, said that "during the war Ireland had shown herself Germany's true ally, not only with arms in her hands, but through her passive resistance, which had caused the British enormous difficulties." In conclusion he expressed the hope that the day of freedom

night soon come also for Ireland, after over 700 years of bondage.—Reuter.

“Times,” Dec. 5, 1917.

ST PATRICK'S DAY CELEBRATION IN BERLIN.

The celebration of the Irish National Festival instituted by the German-Irish Society on the occasion of St Patrick's Day was held last evening in the Hotel Adlon, Berlin, and was attended by a numerous company. Graf Westarp, Conservative Deputy of the Reichstag, welcomed the guests in the name of the Committee, and stated that a people which was incapable of a righteous hatred towards their mortal enemies was also incapable of any profound devotion to its own cause. England, Ireland's mortal enemy, had now become the mortal enemy of Germany. Before the war, the German people had never thought that it would be their mission to destroy England's maritime tyranny, but Germany had been compelled to undertake this task, and was in a position to accomplish it, thanks to the numerical superiority which she had now achieved, and to the U-boats.

A lengthy speech was delivered by Councillor of Legation von Stumm, as representative of the Foreign Office. In the course of his speech he said:

“It was recently stated in English reports on the state of the Irish question that in Ireland all was quiet and in the best of order, and that an Irish Convention had assembled which was to settle the destiny of the Irish people to the general satisfaction. After some time, talk about the Convention came to an end, and now we suddenly saw that Lord French, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces, had landed in Ireland to re-establish tranquillity.

“What the English mean by ‘tranquillity’ we can best ascertain from the people of Ceylon, or from the Boers in the Transvaal. The news is no surprise to us, for we knew that the Irish people, who for centuries had conducted an unflinching struggle against British oppression, and to whose list of martyrs Sir Roger Casement has been added as the latest but not the last, could never have bowed its neck to the might of the ‘guardian of the smaller nations.’ Mr Asquith recently stated that the territorial conquests which England has made during this war would come before the Peace Conference. If he really meant it, it is his duty to see to it that the Peace Conference should also concern itself with the destinies of Ireland; even if Lord French, as may be feared in view of his resources, succeeds in conquering and occupying the green

island. But he will never subjugate Ireland. And in this struggle for self-determination the Irish can at all times count upon the sympathy of the whole German people."

'Dr George Chatterton-Hill, as the only Irishman present, thanked the company for their warm-hearted interest in the Irish question. . . . He stated that Ireland was on the eve of great events. The reason of all this was summarised in the two words "Sinn Fein," that great political, economic, and cultural movement which recognised England as the evil genius of Ireland, and which thwarted and combated her in every direction. The movement therefore raised the cry "Separation from England!" and demanded Ireland for the Irish. From the moral point of view Ireland was the best contradiction of England's hypocritical boast that she was fighting for the freedom of the smaller nations.

'An address upon Germany and the Irish question by Kommerzienrat Dr Karl Goldschmidt concluded the proceedings.' ('Berliner Tageblatt,' March 18, 1918.)

A report of this meeting was sent out by German Wireless on March 18, concluding with the words, 'The freedom of the seas would only be assured when a free Ireland is made the Watcher of the Atlantic Ocean.'

The Stockholm Bureau of the 'Amis de la Liberté irlandaise' handed to the Ministers of the Powers there a statement of the present position in Ireland, and the claim of Ireland to equal freedom with Serbia and Belgium. The document was signed for the Bureau by Mr St John Gaffney, formerly Consul-General of the United States, and Dr Chatterton-Hill, Professor, Geneva University. ('Nationality,' March 23, 1918.)

IRELAND AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

'Speaking at a largely-attended meeting in Foxford (Co. Mayo) on Sunday, Citizen Arthur Griffith, referring to the meeting of the German-Irish Society at Berlin on St Patrick's Day, said it followed the presentation of a claim at Stockholm to the same treatment for Ireland as would be accorded to Poland. Copies of the claim were accepted by all the neutral and Central Powers. The gathering at Berlin was officially visited by the German Government; and the representatives of the German Government declared that they would support Ireland's claims at the Peace Conference. It was because she feared they were going to that court that

England wanted to set up bogus Home Rule. Dealing with the renewed demand for conscription, Mr Griffith said: "We tell England that she will never enforce conscription on Ireland." ('The Irishman,' April 6, 1918.)

The Government statement tells how in April 1918, shortly after Von Stumm, the representative of the German Foreign Office, told his hearers that the Irish could count at all times upon the sympathy of Germany, it was ascertained that a plan had been formed by Germany to land arms and munitions again in Ireland; and they only awaited definite information as to the time and place and date. On April 12 a German emissary—Dowling, *alias* O'Brien—one of the few Irish soldiers who had been corrupted from his allegiance by Casement when a prisoner of war, landed in a collapsible boat from a German submarine on Crabbe Island, off the coast of Clare. The Germans had been plotting with Sinn Fein for a new rising, to accompany their great offensive in France, and to be assisted by the landing of arms and munitions from submarines on the Irish coast. In May of the present year arms for Ireland were shipped at Cuxhaven in submarines; and the plots and plans for another rebellion were actively maturing in Ireland and Germany in the hopes of a decisive German victory in the great offensive.*

In the face of these perils to Ireland, England, the Empire and the world's liberties, the Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, on April 18, 1918, proclaimed that the Conscription of Ireland is

'an oppressive and inhuman law which the Irish people have a right to resist by all the means that are consonant with the law of God'—and directed their clergy 'to celebrate a public Mass of Intercession in every Church in Ireland to avert the scourge of conscription with which Ireland is now threatened.'

While the Bishops in Maynooth were thus urging their servile and superstitious flocks to resist the law of the land, and to combine in protesting against 'the naked militarism' of the Prime Minister of England, Messrs Dillon, Devlin, Healy, William O'Brien, and the representatives of the Irish Trade Unions, gathered in

* See evidence at the Court-Martial on Dowling, 'Times,' July 9, 1918.

Dublin, under the presidency of the Lord Mayor, and, in concert with the Bishops at Maynooth, resolved to resist the 'Declaration of War on the Irish Nation by the House of Commons in passing the Conscription Bill.'

The following is a specimen of the appeals which have been spread broadcast in Ireland—in this case an appeal to women—and are supported by the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the Nationalist leaders. This appeal was circulated widely at church and chapel doors.

A CALL TO IRISHWOMEN.

'IRISHWOMEN! Your Country is threatened with a calamity more deadly and appalling than anything that has confronted it since the days of Cromwell. England in her malignant hate of our small nationality has declared a war of extermination upon the last remnant of the Irish race which has survived her brutal rule of famine and persecution. England declares war upon YOU by her decision to seize by force the bodies of *Your Men*—those nearest and dearest to you—and compel them against conscience and national honour to wear the shameful livery of their country's implacable enemy—to become helots in body and soul!

'Irishwomen! Take your stand with Ireland. You must realise your power and use it, whatever be the cost. There must be no *blacklegs* amongst you base enough to help the British Government in their dirty work. There must be no question of women filling men's places, or taking any part, *active* or *passive*, in this crime against the Irish Nation.

'Women must resolve to sacrifice everything in their efforts to oppose, thwart and render impossible the murderous attempt on the life and honour of Ireland. CONSCRIPTION FOR IRELAND MEANS ETERNAL SLAVERY FOR OUR COUNTRY. Irishwomen! You must choose Death itself, rather than suffer this National Disgrace! The Time to make Your Choice is Now!'

But at this same time the ceaseless watch of the British Navy was saving Ireland, her priests, politicians and people, from the 'naked militarism' of Germany, and from a German invasion plotted by Sinn Fein.

'VIGILANT.'

Art. 14.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

THE flagging of the German offensive, which became noticeable on March 31, continued during the first few days of April; the enemy confining themselves to local attacks, which were for the most part unsuccessful, while the Allied forces made progress in several localities. The village of Ayette, which had been lost on March 29, was recaptured by our troops on April 3; and enterprises in the Hebuterne sector resulted in the improvement of our positions, with the capture of some 300 prisoners. The combined French and British forces also gained ground between Moreuil and the Somme. The great German offensive south of Arras in fact came to an end with the month of March, the operations of the succeeding days on this portion of the front marking a period of transition to a new scheme, which was about to unfold itself further north, and being partly designed, no doubt, to keep alive the anxiety which the Allies naturally felt for the safety of Amiens.

On April 4 the Germans resumed the offensive with large forces between Montdidier and the Somme. Our troops were obliged to evacuate Hamel; Mailly and Morisel fell to the enemy's assaults; and the Grivesnes sector was heavily attacked, but the French maintained their positions in this quarter. On the following morning the Germans, while continuing their pressure south of the Somme, threw ten divisions against our positions between Albert and Bucquoi, but without gaining any important success in either region. On April 6 the right wing of von Boehm's army began a new offensive on the south bank of the Oise, which, in the course of three days' intermittent fighting, obliged the French to withdraw behind the Ailette. The Germans contented themselves with the possession of the right bank of the river from Chauny to Landricourt; and the general situation between Arras and the Aisne remained practically unchanged till May 27, though occasional engagements of some severity were fought in several localities, principally on the front between the Somme and the Avre.

It is now known that, as was conjectured in the article which appeared in the April number of the 'Quarterly Review,' the object of the enemy, in the first

phase of the offensive, was to gain possession of the railways which cross the Somme estuary at Amiens and Abbeville, with the view of attacking subsequently the smaller group of Allied armies north of the river, which would have been isolated by the loss of these lateral communications. This object they had partially attained by intercepting the double-track railway from Montdidier to Arras, and by bringing under long-range artillery fire the other lines which cross the river immediately above and below Amiens. Their plan was, however, very far from completion. Their abandonment of the enterprise may fairly be attributed to the staunch resistance of the Allied armies on both flanks, towards Arras and Montdidier, which frustrated their design for the envelopment of Amiens. To persist in the endeavour would probably have entailed greater sacrifices than the Germans were in a position to incur.

It may, in fact, be surmised that they had miscalculated, at the outset, the strength and time necessary for the completion of the first phase of the operations; and that they had to choose between relinquishing the attack on Amiens and dislocating their arrangements for the second phase (the offensive against the northern group of armies) by withdrawing a great portion of the force assembled for its execution in order to reinforce the armies on the Amiens front. In choosing the former alternative they no doubt acted wisely. The Allies had gained time to concentrate large forces on the front south of Arras, and to strengthen their positions. The attack might fail; or, if successful, it might involve an expenditure of force which would so weaken the German armies as to necessitate a revision of the whole plan of campaign. It seemed, therefore, preferable to strike in a fresh locality, trusting to the effect of surprise, to the partial interruption of the Allied communications, which would delay the lateral movement of reserves, and to the probable reluctance of the Allies to withdraw troops from the Amiens front, where the situation was critical, to meet a blow which might prove to be only a diversion. In this connexion it may be observed that, if any significance is to be attached to the reports of press correspondents, there was a natural tendency at the Allied headquarters to doubt the seriousness of each

fresh move on the enemy's part until the presence of large forces had been definitely ascertained. In the instance under consideration, the situation on the Amiens front was too menacing to admit of any dispersal of the reserves so long as the enemy's intention was in doubt.

The Germans, accordingly, proceeded at once with the second part of their programme, leaving the first part unfinished. Their first objective was that portion of the line held by the Portuguese troops, who were, at the moment, in course of being relieved. The first sign of the impending attack was given by a heavy bombardment of the front from the La Bassée Canal to Armentières, which began on the morning of April 8, and continued at intervals till midnight. As on previous occasions, the action of the German artillery embraced both the front lines and the back areas, and gas shells were liberally used. In the early morning of April 9 the bombardment was resumed; and later, under cover of a dense mist, the infantry attack began to develop irregularly, the Germans, apparently, seeking for a weak point before engaging the bulk of their forces. By 9 a.m. the battle became general on a front of about eleven miles from the neighbourhood of Bois Grenier to the La Bassée Canal, the enemy employing ten or twelve divisions. The first breach was effected in the Fauquissart sector of the Portuguese line; and, by the end of the day, the Germans had advanced as far as the Lawe at Lestrem, and, on the right, had reached the Lys between Bac St Maur and Estaires. On the extreme flanks the British troops maintained their hold on the positions about Givenchy and Fleurbaix; but, on the following morning, they were obliged to withdraw behind the Lys below Estaires, the Germans pressing forward in the direction of Steenwerck.

On April 10 the battle spread northwards to the Ypres—Comines Canal. The enemy entered Hollebeke, reached the crest of the Messines ridge, captured Ploegsteert, and made some progress in the wood of that name. Armentières, being overwhelmed with gas-shells and threatened with envelopment, had to be evacuated. On the succeeding days the Germans made continuous progress in the centre; but the gallant 9th and 51st divisions retained their positions on either flank, the

former holding off the enemy's attacks on the Wytschaete heights till the 16th, and the latter maintaining an unbroken front about Givenchy throughout the battle. Merville was evacuated on April 12, Locon on the following day; and, after a stubborn resistance, the front north of the Lys was withdrawn to the line Neuf Berequin—railway south of Bailleul—Neuve Eglise—Wulverghem. Severe fighting continued for several days north of the Lys, which resulted, by April 16, in the capture by the enemy of Wytschaete, Wulverghem, Neuve Eglise, Bailleul, Meteren, and Vieux Berequin. In conformity with the situation south of the Comines Canal, our forces had been withdrawn, without interference, from the Paschendaele ridge, Poelcapelle, and Langemark, to positions behind the Steenbeek. In the meantime the Germans had made some progress south of the Lys; but the bulk of their forces, which were continually strengthened by the arrival of fresh divisions, operated in the region north of the river.

On April 17 the enemy made a determined attempt to eject the Allied forces from the Ypres salient by a concerted system of enveloping attacks. Their plan comprised four principal operations: (1) an advance in great strength from the Wytschaete—Wulverghem front in a westerly direction towards Kemmel; (2) a north-westerly advance between Neuve Eglise and Bailleul; (3) a northerly attack round Meteren; (4) an advance towards Bixschoote, on a front of about three miles between the Houthulst Forest and the inundations near Kippe. The first three attacks, after gaining some initial successes, were driven back by the French and British troops. For the fourth operation the Germans had assembled seven divisions, three of which were held in reserve and took no part in the engagement, their design being to capture Bixschoote, and to advance towards Elverdinghe and Brielen. They attacked at daybreak, without any preliminary bombardment, and, in the early stages of the engagement made some progress in the area south and east of Merckem. The Belgians, however, soon recovered from their surprise, and, by a counter-attack from about Luyghem, drove the enemy from part of the lost positions, the remainder of which were recovered by a second counter-attack later in the

day. The result of the battle was a complete victory for the Belgians, who captured 700 prisoners and a great quantity of material, and slew large numbers of the enemy, who, losing their way, had become entangled among the marshes.

After the failure of these enterprises the enemy made no further move of importance in the direction of Ypres for more than a week, with the exception of a series of strong attacks, on April 18, between Givenchy and the Clarence River east of St Venant, which left the situation in that quarter practically unchanged. At this stage the Germans seem to have recognised that they had lost the advantage originally gained by surprise, that the arrival of Allied reserves had eliminated their numerical superiority in the new area of operations as a whole, and that their only prospect of success lay in a redistribution of their troops, reinforced by fresh divisions, with a view to concentrated action on a restricted front. The objective chosen was the line of heights stretching westwards from Kemmel, which they designed to capture by concerted attacks on the Bailleul—Wulverghem front from the south, and from the east on the front Wytschaete—Comines Canal.

The week's interval was devoted to making arrangements for these operations; and, on April 25, the new offensive opened with a series of heavy attacks, in which nine divisions were engaged, between Wytschaete and Bailleul, the fighting being especially severe about Vierstraete, Kemmel, and Dranoutre. On the following day the battle extended northwards to the Comines Canal, when the Germans captured St Eloi, Wytschaete, the village and hill of Kemmel, and Dranoutre. Severe fighting continued on April 27 and 28, in the course of which positions changed hands repeatedly. Locre fell to the fourth assault, but was recaptured in the evening; Voormezele was lost and recovered; and, in a local action beyond the main battle-front, the Australian troops regained the outskirts of Meteren. On April 29 the Germans made a final effort, embracing the whole front from Zillebeke to Meteren and the Belgian positions north-west of Ypres. The entire area was deluged with German shells in the early morning; and the infantry attack, which began soon after 5 a.m., was

pressed with great weight and determination, the bulk of the hostile forces, which comprised thirteen divisions, being flung against the front between the Comines Canal and Locre, with the object of capturing the Scherpenberg heights, and taking Ypres in rear from the direction of Voormezele. After some vicissitudes the battle left the situation practically unchanged, the Allied line including the west bank of the Steenbeek, the outskirts of Verlorenhoek and Hooze, Zillebeke, Voormezele, La Clytte, Locre, and the outskirts of Meteren. The second phase of the German offensive may be said to have come to an end with this engagement, though local attacks were delivered in some force between Voormezele and the Scherpenberg on May 8 and 9, in which the enemy claimed a trifling advantage. The Germans were said to have employed, in all, 45 divisions in the operations on the Flanders front, and 130 different divisions during the two phases of the offensive.

As often happens in war, the operations had taken a course very different from that originally intended. It is known from captured documents that the Germans had proposed, in the first instance, to seize the important centres of Hazebrouck, Aire and Bethune. This accomplished, a fresh advance was to have been made between Lens and Arras in the direction of Houdain and St Pol, in conjunction with a southward movement from the region of Lillers. These operations, if successful, might have resulted in the withdrawal of the Allies from the positions south of Arras, and in the consequent widening of the German offensive front opposite Amiens, the attack on which place might then have been resumed with improved chances of success. The firm attitude of the 51st Division about Givenchy, however, gave little promise of immediate success in the direction of Aire and Bethune; while the retreat of the Portuguese caused a break in the Allied line on the right flank of the attack, which laid bare the British defensive zone to an oblique attack in a northerly direction between Fleurbaix and the river Lawe. The Germans quickly adapted their plan to the situation thus created. Instead of striking southward and westward in the Bethune—Arras sector, as originally intended, they decided to strike to the north and west between Ypres and Hazebrouck, a move

which, if successful, would have made the Ypres salient untenable, and, by turning the inundated area between Dixmude and Nieuport, would have obliged the Belgians to abandon their strong positions on the Yser. In pursuance of this design the attack north of Armentières, which had been intended merely as a subsidiary operation, was pressed with great vigour on April 10 by the small forces available at the moment; and, by the following morning, the bulk of the troops in the main battle-area had been brought into position for the principal attack on the Lys.

As had previously happened on the Amiens front, the second phase of the German offensive was brought to a close as soon as the influx of their reserves enabled the Allies to offer an effective resistance. The enemy again sought a field where they hoped to deal a crushing blow at their opponents, weakened by the bulk of their forces having been attracted to the northern area of operations. The abandonment by the Germans of their original project—the destruction of our armies north of the Somme—may fairly be regarded as an open confession of failure. The first two phases of their offensive were clearly connected, and formed integral parts of a predetermined plan. The promptitude with which the enemy passed from one to the other makes it obvious that the dispositions for the second phase had been made concurrently with the thrust towards Amiens. But the offensive against the French army on the Aisne was an entirely new departure. It formed no part of the original plan, which did not look beyond the destruction of the British armies, though it had doubtless been projected as a necessary sequel to the latter if the French should still be in a position to continue the struggle after the defeat of their allies. That this is so may be concluded from the fact that nearly a month elapsed between the termination of the offensive on the front in Flanders and the beginning of the attack on the Aisne; a delay which, having regard to the facilities at the disposal of the Germans for the rapid transport of troops in the intervening area, indicates that an extensive redistribution of the German forces had to be effected before they could embark upon their new enterprise. The situation



at the end of April may be summed up thus. The first part of the German plan—which contemplated the separation of the French and British forces—had been only partially accomplished; the second part—the destruction of the British armies—had failed; and the only course open was to attempt the destruction of the French armies, but for this no preparations had been made.

It was not until May 27 that the redistribution of the German armies was completed. In the early morning of that day, after a short preliminary bombardment, heavy attacks began to develop between Brimont and Vauxaillon, a front of about 25 miles. The army of von Boehm, crossing the Ailette, captured the heights of the Chemin des Dames from Vauxaillon to Craonne, forced the first line of defence from Corbény to the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, which was held by four British divisions, and succeeded in passing the Aisne in the neighbourhood of Pont Arcy. Further east, Fritz von Below pushed the French across the Aisne—Marne Canal between Saigneul and Brimont, and entered Cormicy. On the following day the enemy captured the heights north of Soissons, reached the Vesle south-east of that town, occupied Braisne and Fismes, pushed the British troops back from Berry-au-Bac, and attacked the heights of St Thierry.

On May 29 the Germans, having reinforced their wings towards Soissons and Reims, captured Crécy au Mont, Juvigny, Soissons, Villemontoire, and Fère en Tardenois, carried the north-western forts of Reims, and entered Bétheny. Next day they drove the French from positions about Arcy and Grand Rozoy, and approached the Marne south of Fère en Tardenois, taking the heights near Champois and Romigny. They also made progress west of Reims, and between the Oise and the Aisne. A fresh attack in the last-named region, on May 31, carried their right wing forward to the line Sempigny—Blérancourt—Epagny—Nouvion—Fontenoy. South of the Aisne they entered Vierzy and Blanzay, gained the heights east of Neuilly St Front, and reached the Marne between Château Thierry and Dormans.

On June 1 the fighting became more intense on the front between the Oise and the Aisne. The Germans occupied Carlepont, a road centre of some importance,

which dominates the routes traversing the forests of Carlepont and La Montagne. The heights east of Moulin sous Touvent also fell into their possession. South of the Aisne, also, the battle raged with great severity on this and the succeeding days, the French reserves having come into action in considerable force on this portion of the front. The enemy succeeded in occupying the northern part of Château Thierry, and in gaining complete possession of the north bank of the Marne as far as Verneuil. The fiercest fighting took place along the eastern edge of the forest of Villers Cotterets, the Germans endeavouring to advance by the routes which enter the forest at Longpont, Corcy, Faverolles, and Troesnes, places which changed hands repeatedly. South of the Ourcq the battle-front was defined by the line Mosloy—Chezy—Bouresches. By June 4 the enemy's advance may be said to have been brought to a standstill; for, though the battle continued to rage throughout the three following days, the French counter-offensive gained ground on several sectors of the front, while the Germans made no appreciable progress at any point. The high-water mark of the enemy's advance during this stage of their offensive was defined by the line Sempigny—Carlepont—Autrèches—Amblény—Dommiers—Longpont—Corcy—Mosloy—Chezy—Torcy—Bouresches—Château Thierry—River Marne—Verneuil—Ville en Tardenois—Gueux—Béthény; and the greatest distance covered, from the Ailette near Pinon to the Marne at Château Thierry, was about 35 miles. According to the Berlin estimate the Allied losses amounted to 58,000 prisoners, 650 guns, 2000 machine-guns, and an immense quantity of material.

The effect of this advance was to leave a deep indentation in the enemy's line, which formed a pronounced angle in the neighbourhood of Noyon. Here the French positions embraced the forest region north-east of Compiègne and the hilly district on the right bank of the Oise between the valleys of the Divette and the Matz, constituting a formidable bastion in the line of defence. Having failed to break through the eastern flank of this bastion, which was prolonged southwards along the margin of the forest of Villers Cotterets (the scene of their recent efforts), the Germans turned against the northern flank, between Montdidier and Noyon,

which they attacked in considerable force on June 9. The new move, however, found the Allies better prepared than on previous occasions; and, as they had the advantage of occupying the interior lines, and the reserves which had been assembled for the defence of the eastern flank being readily accessible, the conditions were not very favourable for the success of the enemy's enterprise.

As invariably happens, the forward positions were overwhelmed by the onset of superior numbers; but a state of equilibrium was soon restored by the arrival of the Allied reserves, which came upon the scene in masses, and not, as formerly, in driblets. At the end of the first day, the German right wing was held on the line Rubescourt—Le Frétoy—Mortemer; the centre occupied Ressons sur Matz and Mareuil; and the right made some progress in the Bois de Thiescourt. On June 10 the Germans continued to make progress, principally in the centre, where they carried the heights about Marquéglise and Vignemont, and reached the outskirts of Antheuil. On the right they took Méry, Belloy, and St Maur; and, on the left, they reached the outskirts of Ribécourt. On the following day the French counter-offensive began to develope, forestalling the resumption of the enemy's attack, which was broken up and thrown back on the greater part of the front. West of the Matz the French recaptured Le Frétoy, Méry, and Belloy, and reached the heights between Courcelles and Mortemer, and the outskirts of St Maur. In the centre the Germans were driven from Antheuil; and, in the course of heavy fighting, our Allies regained the positions south of Marquéglise and Vaudelincourt. The enemy won their only success in the region immediately west of the Oise, where they gained a footing in Machemont and Béthancourt, and occupied Ribécourt. On June 12 there was no material change in the position west of the Oise, though the fighting continued to be severe. The enemy's progress on this portion of the front, however, made it necessary for the French to withdraw from their advanced positions east of the river, in conformity with the retirement on the west bank; and they accordingly evacuated the woods of Carlepont and La Montagne, and took up a new line of defence which included Bailly and Tracy le Val, and passed in rear of Nampcel.

On this day (June 12) the Germans, finding themselves foiled in their offensive west of the Oise, renewed their attacks between the Aisne and the Ourcq, where they fought with great determination, but with little success. The French troops were driven from their positions west of Cutry and Dommiers, but they held their ground nearer the Aisne, while, south of the Ourcq, they pushed the enemy back in the region of Bussiares. On June 13 the Germans, pressing the attack with even greater vigour, gained possession of Laversine, Cœuvres, and St Pierre Aigle; but they were unable to debouch on to the heights beyond, or to advance in the forest of Villers Cotterets. On the west bank of the Oise they sustained a local reverse, the French recapturing the village of Mélicocq. Their offensive came to an end with an attack on Reims in the evening of June 18, which was repulsed after violent fighting in the outskirts of the city.

At this stage the enemy, pursuing their policy of extending their offensive front and attacking in fresh quarters, with the object of leading the Allies to disperse and exhaust their reserves, opened a new offensive on the Italian front. The operations began on June 13 with an attack in some force on the positions about the Tonale Pass. After this preliminary demonstration, which does not appear to have produced much effect, the Austrians proceeded, on June 15, to develop a general attack between the Asiago plateau and the sea, for which, however, the Italians were fully prepared, having ascertained the intended date, and even the hour at which it was to commence. The hostile bombardment, which was timed to begin at 3 a.m., was anticipated by the Italian artillery, which, opening a heavy fire at midnight, both embarrassed the action of the hostile guns, and interfered with the assembly of the attacking infantry.

It is unnecessary to describe the strategical situation, which had undergone no material change since it was discussed in the 'Quarterly Review' for January last. As disclosed in captured documents, the design of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief was to overwhelm the Allied armies by a general attack on the entire front of



about 70 miles, to carry the battle into open country, and, having turned the line of the Brenta by the advance of his right wing from the Asiago plateau, to direct the march of his columns towards the Adige. So ambitious a plan was not likely to be realised; and it is probable that his object in communicating it to the troops was to spur them to supreme exertions, his real intention being to seek for weak points in the Allies' line, where any initial success could be followed up by large reserves kept in hand for the purpose. Whereas in last year's offensive the enemy had aimed chiefly at turning the line of the Piave by an advance on the front between that river and Asiago, they do not appear to have committed themselves to any such definite project on the present occasion. As was observed in our article of January, the nature of the country and communications in the Asiago—Piave region did not admit of any appreciable increase of the forces already concentrated on that portion of the front; and, although a success on that wing might promise even more decisive results than the defeat of the Third Italian Army, it would, for that reason, have to be confirmed and developed by an advance across the Piave. The Austrian Commander-in-Chief, accordingly, massed the bulk of his forces on his left wing, where, once the obstacle of the river had been surmounted, or rendered untenable by the advance of the right wing, the country and communications would be better adapted for the operations of large forces.

On the first day the enemy gained some initial successes at various points. The left wing of the British contingent, which held the flank of the Allied positions in the neighbourhood of Asiago, was obliged to relinquish its first line of defence; and the Austrians also gained a footing in the Asolone sector and the Coll dell' Orso salient, between the Brenta and the Piave. The greater part of the lost ground was, however, recovered later in the day; a fact officially admitted by the Austrians, who confessed that their initial gains were only partially maintained. On the Piave front the enemy met with better success. Forcing the passage of the river at several points, they carried the eastern edge of the Montello; and, in the neighbourhood of San Dona, they

made progress on a broad front astride of the Treviso railway. The Italians met the hostile offensive with prompt and well-sustained counter-attacks; and, in consequence, the success gained by the Austrians at their first onset compared unfavourably with that won by the Germans in France in the first stages of their various offensives.

On June 16 the attacks west of the Piave were suspended, and were not subsequently resumed; but the battle continued on the river front, where for several days the situation was not without danger. The enemy made some progress in the Zenson and San Dona sectors, and extended their footing on the Montello heights, the complete occupation of which would have imperilled the whole position of the 3rd Army by menacing its lines of retreat on Vicenza and Padua. But the Italians fought with great tenacity; and, their counter-attacks gaining strength with the arrival of fresh reserves, the enemy's advance was ultimately brought to a standstill. The crisis of the battle was reached on June 20, when the Austrians began to give way on the entire front; and three days later General Diaz was able to announce that they were re-crossing the Piave in disorder. Vienna, at the same time, prepared to announce the failure of the offensive by referring in the official report to the state of the river, which, swollen by the rain which had fallen heavily for several days, had made it almost impossible to keep the troops on the right bank supplied with food and ammunition. Before the end of the month, the Italians were again in possession of the right bank of the Piave; and the whole ground between the Sile and the Piave was reoccupied in the first week of July. On the Asiago plateau our allies had recovered the Monte Val Bella, which had been lost at the outset of the battle.

Some progress has been made in Palestine and Mesopotamia since the situation was reviewed in January last. After the capture of Jerusalem Sir Edmund Allenby advanced his front north of the city, and, by the middle of March, occupied a position halfway to Shechem, thus securing the flank of a movement towards the Hedjaz railway, which proceeded simultaneously.

Jericho was occupied on Feb. 21, and a month later the Jordan was crossed on the road to Amman, a station on the railway twenty-five miles east of the river. On two occasions in March and April an advance was made beyond the Jordan, and mounted troops did some damage to the railway; but, the Turks being in strength, the force had ultimately to withdraw to the west bank of the river. In Mesopotamia our forces defeated the Turks in several engagements, and, before the hot weather brought the operations to a close, had advanced up the Tigris to a point 140 miles beyond Hit; and, on the road to Mosul, had occupied Kifri and Kirkut, and driven the enemy across the Lesser Zab, 150 miles north of Baghdad.

The situation in the Turkish theatre of war has been profoundly influenced by the surrender of Russia. Germany, feeling her position in Persia secure, could afford to disregard our progress in Mesopotamia, and to concentrate the Turkish forces in Palestine, which she regards as the key of the military situation in the East. If the Germans should hereafter be in a position to support the Turks, Egypt, not Mesopotamia, would probably be their objective. The re-occupation of Mesopotamia would not directly affect the situation in Egypt, whereas the conquest of the latter, by severing the communications of the British Empire at their most vital point, would decide the fate of Mesopotamia, and cause us grave embarrassment further east, the nature of which is sufficiently obvious. Moreover, an attack on Egypt would appeal to the Turks, and enlist their best efforts; and, the lines of communication being shorter and the railway system complete, the concentration and maintenance of a large force would be more easily effected.

The enemy's activities in the Middle East have, accordingly, been chiefly of a political nature. The Turks, overcoming the opposition of the improvised Armenian forces, have recovered Armenia, and occupied the southern part of Caucasia; and their Kurdish irregulars, having overrun north-western Persia, are said to be advancing towards the Caspian. These quasi-military operations are, however, subsidiary to the machinations of the swarms of German emissaries, referred to by Lord Chelmsford at the Delhi Conference, who, penetrating by way of the

Ukraine, have begun a fresh campaign of intrigue; the design being, according to hints dropped by the German press, to promote an anti-British agreement between Persia and Afghanistan, the Amir being won over to the side of Germany by promises of territorial extension and of a port on the Mekran coast.

The requirements of the Western front, and the increase of the forces opposed to him, have not made General Allenby's position easier. Being hemmed in on the west by the sea, which, owing to the want of a harbour, is useless for purposes of transport, his line of communication is less secure than that of the Turks, who have ample space for manœuvre. To continue his advance he would need more reinforcements than are likely to be forthcoming until the situation on the Western front changes definitely in favour of the Allies. His masterly operations during the past campaigning season have, however, secured Egypt against any possibility of attack unless there should be a marked change in the present balance of forces, the prospect of which is remote. The Turks have evidently passed the zenith of their military power; and their resources are definitely on the decline. A successful offensive would be far beyond their means without liberal help from Germany—help which could only be available in the event of Germany being victorious in the West.

On the Western front the Allies have continued to suffer the consequences resulting from the distribution of their forces at the beginning of the German offensive on March 21. The establishment of a war council entrusted with the executive functions of supreme command, while it satisfied political requirements by conveying the semblance of unity of direction, and thus disarmed the critics who had been incited to inconvenient activity by Mr Lloyd George's notorious Paris speech, carried with it certain fresh embarrassments, the influence of which quickly came to light when the capabilities of the new creation were put to the test. It was inevitable that the supreme executive authority should assemble, and keep in its own hands, a considerable force for use as a general reserve. Without such a force its power of directing the course of a

battle would be imaginary, and its claim to supremacy a mere pretence; for it is a truism that, once battle is joined, the ability of the chief command to control the fight is limited to the employment of the reserves at its disposal. When these have been expended, its power of control vanishes; unless, indeed, it should descend to interference with the action of subordinate commanders, a course which, in the past, has usually led to unfortunate results. The general reserve could only be drawn from the armies of the commanders-in-chief in the field, whose forces would, in consequence, be depleted. If this was not one of the causes which resulted in the inadequacy of the forces at the disposal of the British Commander-in-Chief to resist the German offensive, it is hard to see where an explanation is to be sought.

But the mischief did not end here. Assuming that the original dispositions of the general reserve were the best that could be made under the difficult conditions which existed, its effective use would depend on promptitude of decision, and on rapidity of transport to the points where it could exercise the maximum effect on the operations. A council of war, especially one composed largely of civilians, could only act after deliberation, and on expert advice. The delay involved might well be fatal to the timely intervention of the reserve; especially as the means of lateral communication were far inferior to those at the disposal of the Germans, who, on the front from the sea to the Moselle, held the interior lines, and, consequently, the shorter routes. In the present state of public knowledge one can only judge from results; and it is on this basis that these observations are founded. Whether owing to faulty dispositions at the outset, or to delays in decision and transport, forces drawn from the general reserve generally arrived too late on the scene of action, and came into action in dribblets. In the first two phases of the German offensive a week passed before the Allies were strong enough to oppose effectively the enemy's advance; and we have, besides, the spectacle of French, British, and American troops fortuitously intermingled in the fighting line, which has been hailed by the newspapers as glorious evidence of comradeship, but which, in reality, implies inevitable want of cohesion, and, consequently, impaired

efficiency. Those who had been most clamorous in the demand for unity in the supreme command were keenest in their appreciation of a state of things which involves complete dislocation in the command of the troops immediately at grips with the enemy.

That, under such unfavourable conditions, things have not gone worse, is much to the credit of the troops and their leaders; and it testifies to the good understanding and mutual confidence which prevails among all ranks of the composite Allied forces. But the testimony has been bought at a high price, which the troops have had to pay. To claim credit for the supreme command is another matter. The admixture of units, which in previous wars has distinguished bad generalship, has, at the present juncture, become an admixture of different nationalities, each characterised by differences of organisation, method, and armament, and, in some cases, speaking different languages—a serious impediment to command when, as often happens in the turmoil of battle, officers and non-commissioned officers have to lead groups of men belonging to strange units. The inefficiency of the War-Council as the supreme executive authority became so obvious that the objections which had been urged against the appointment of a generalissimo had sunk into insignificance when its functions of command were transferred to General Foch.

The assurance, repeatedly given, that the Allies in France were not numerically inferior to the enemy, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that, in the two phases of the hostile offensive in which the British troops were principally concerned, as well as on the Aisne, the Allied forces were, at the outset, heavily outnumbered by the Germans. The disparity, on some occasions, is stated to have exceeded three to one. That this was so may be attributed partly to surprise, for the Germans showed considerable skill in concealing their intentions; but, assuming the situation to have been correctly gauged, sufficient reserves should have been left at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief to guard against the effects which actually resulted from surprise. In view of the alleged equality of forces it should have been possible to make these reserves strong enough to guarantee the safety of any part of the front where attack was probable

until the general reserve could come into action; and the dispositions of the latter should have ensured the intervention, at the decisive moment, of a force sufficient to stem the enemy's advance if not to obtain victory. It would seem that the local reserves were not strong enough to gain time for the concentration of the general reserve; or, in other words, that the latter was too far away to arrive in time. Assuming that the dispositions of the general reserve were the best that could be devised, having regard to the means existing for its transport to those sections of the front where it might conceivably be required, the obvious remedy for this state of things would have been to restrict its numbers, in order that the forces at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief might be augmented; for the safety of the defensive front should have been the first consideration.

But the fact is that the Allies were not so favourably situated. The assurance referred to has been materially qualified by the admission that it was based, not on a comparison of the strength of the fighting forces on either side, but on an estimate of the total numbers, combatant and non-combatant; and this novel method of arriving at the fighting strength of the opposing armies was justified by the amazing assertion that the distinction between the combatant and non-combatant services is merely technical; the latter being necessary for the maintenance of the former, and being, therefore, an integral part of the fighting force. This argument might carry some weight if the proportion between the combatant and non-combatant services were approximately the same in the Allied and German armies in France. This, however, is not the case, because the sea-bases of the British and American armies, and the entire administrative machinery of the French, are in France, and are, therefore, included in the estimate; whereas the bases, recruiting and training organisations, and the greater part of the hospital and other administrative services of the German army, being beyond the frontier, are excluded from the calculation. If, for these reasons, we put the excess of Allied over German non-combatants, employed on purely auxiliary services in France, in the neighbourhood of a quarter of a million, we should,

probably, be well within the mark. *The supposed equality of forces is, therefore, illusory*; and a comparison between the respective fighting strengths based on the number of Allied and German divisions—in which the proportion of combatants to non-combatants is approximately identical—would show a preponderance in favour of the enemy somewhere in the neighbourhood of five to four; a superiority greater than the Allies have enjoyed during their offensive operations on the Western front.

When these facts are considered, there is less reason to be surprised at the large measure of success which has attended each stage of the German offensive. A more efficient system of command, better lateral communications, and a general preponderance of force, together with the advantage conferred by the initiative, have enabled the enemy, on each occasion, to throw superior forces against some weak spot in the Allied line, which, if not previously ascertained, was discovered by attacking, at the outset, on a wide front.

There are also other circumstances that contributed to their success. Their tactical methods differ fundamentally from those hitherto employed by the Allies. They have not adopted the system of the restricted offensive, which appoints a definite objective for each stage of the attack, beyond which the advance is not to proceed. For this formal system, which has the disadvantage of preventing the troops from following up a local success, and of giving the adversary time to repair a weak spot by bringing up reinforcements, they substituted complete freedom of action, relying on being able to confirm a local advantage, and to extend its scope, by the prompt use of reserves. Needless to say, this method was not uniformly successful; and, when it fails, large losses are likely to result from the inability of the artillery to give adequate support to the infantry, with which it inevitably loses touch. But that it proved, on the whole, effective is apparent from the results achieved. It needs a high standard of training on the part of the troops and their leaders in independent fighting, to compensate for the absence of superior control which it involves. It owed its success to the constant maintenance of pressure, which, by allowing the defending troops no respite in which to re-form and entrench, accelerated the

advance. The artillery, except the lighter guns, was out-paced; but this disadvantage was not seriously felt until the Allied reserves were encountered in insufficient strength to bar further progress. It then became necessary to await the arrival of the heavy artillery; and the delay thus caused enabled the Allies to prepare a new line of defence, the attack of which promised to be so costly that the Germans preferred to seek a fresh objective.

When the Germans broke through the prepared defensive zone into the open country beyond, the training of their troops in independent fighting, and the practice which the higher commanders had gained on the Eastern front during the past three years, gave them an advantage over our forces, whose training was not so well adapted for the new conditions. It would be wrong to attribute this lack of training to remissness on the part of the British commanders. As Sir Douglas Haig observed in his despatch on the campaign of 1917, drafts for the army have always been provided too late to admit of their being thoroughly trained before they were required to take their place in the fighting line. Inability to foresee requirements, and the false optimism which has persistently under-estimated the enemy's resources, are responsible both for the defective training of our troops, and for the depleted state of our divisions at the most critical stage of the war.

While it would be rash to affirm that the crisis is past, signs may be perceived which suggest that the situation is undergoing a change favourable to the Allies. At the time of going to press, more than three weeks have elapsed since the onslaught on the French armies was brought to a standstill; and, during the past fortnight, the Germans not only have remained inactive, but have accepted several local rebuffs at the hands of the Allies, who have displayed a spirit of enterprise which was wanting during the similar pause which followed the abortive offensive in Flanders. As on that occasion, the enemy's prolonged inactivity amounts to a tacit confession of failure; while the energetic action of the Allies, which has deprived the Germans of vantage-points in various localities, indicates a change in the balance of forces, which, thanks to the efforts of America, is tending towards equilibrium. The irreparable failure of the

Italian adventure is the heaviest blow sustained by the Germans since the Austrian *débauche* in Volhynia forced them to abandon their attack on Verdun; and their temerity in entrusting an enterprise of such importance to an ally who, when left to his own resources, had given repeated proofs of incompetence—if not due to inability to provide the stiffening of German troops which, judging from past experience, might at least have averted disaster—was the greatest blunder they have made since, in the early days of the war, they assigned to Austria the task of invading Poland. An Austrian victory was as necessary to the success of their plans for the destruction of the Allied armies in France as it had been in 1914; and the Supreme War-Council were guilty of no exaggeration in describing the victory of the Italians on the Piave as ‘an invaluable contribution to the eventual success of the Allied cause.’ It will need all the efforts of the newly appointed German commanders to revive the spirit of the defeated Austrian army, and to urge it to any further exertion.

With the campaigning season half spent, the Germans are still faced by the dilemma which confronted them at its commencement. They have to choose whether they will persist in their endeavour to force a military decision while they retain a local superiority in France which now depends rather on efficiency than on numbers, or conserve their strength for the defensive campaign which, in the event of failure, they must anticipate next year, hoping to gain their ends by indirect methods. Their choice will probably be governed less by military than political considerations, the exigencies of which are best appreciated by the Germans themselves.

W. P. BLOOD.

CORRIGENDA.

(1) In the Q. R. for April last (No. 455), p. 301, last line and note, and p. 319, lines 8 and 9, for ‘Ralph Nevill, “Floreat Etona,”’ read ‘An Etonian, “Eton Memories.”’

(2) P. 465, line 2, for ‘mountain, built’ read ‘mountain-built.’

(3) P. 474, line 9 from foot, for ‘Ode to Autumn’ read ‘Ode to Maia.’

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the Sublime Porte, addressed to the Doge and Senate. The second period runs from the year 1603 to 1651; it begins in the illegal, fortuitous and unofficial operations of the pirates, continues through Mansell's official expedition in 1620, and ends with Blake's successful establishment of Great Britain as a sea-power in 1650.

Burghley, in pursuit of his far-sighted commercial policy, encouraged and fostered every effort of the instinctive national tendency to expand. He bent his mind to the extension of the trading markets of England; and it is hardly too much to say that the history of modern British commerce begins with him. Burghley and the statesmen who worked with him clearly grasped the possibilities of England's island position. The policy of 'diffusus in orbe Britannus' was to be carried out by the opening of new 'vents' or markets for English goods. For Burghley, with singular lucidity and prescience, had already enunciated the fundamental doctrine of modern economists: 'It is manifest,' he says in a memorandum on the importation of wines, 'that nothing robbeth this realme of England but when more merchandise is brought into the realme than is carried forth,' because 'the balance must be payd with money.'

For the furtherance of this policy of foreign trade it was necessary to foster the mercantile marine, the ultimate source of sea-power; for in peace it feeds trade, and in war it alone can feed the navy. The essentials of a mercantile marine are men, ships, sea-craft, and, when these have been secured, the erection of trading companies for the use of them and the exploitation of foreign markets. On the matter of men and sea-craft Burghley argued that there were three ways of breeding the one and learning the other—fishing, the carrying trade, and piracy. Piracy, though a good school, was abhorrent to the merchant, who was, in the last resort, the chief factor in Burghley's scheme; the carrying trade was still non-existent, though it would come with the development of his policy; fishing, therefore, was the great school 'in which men are made meter to abide stormes and become common mariners than by sailing in ships to Roone or Burdeaux.'

Burghley fully grasped the fact that the wealth of a nation lies in its trade. The spectacle of Spain, whose

policy aimed at amassing actual treasure, did not impress him. He no doubt was pleased if Drake could seize the *Flotta*; but he knew that all the riches of Peru would not make England so securely rich as a flourishing over-sea trade; and so he bent his efforts to the creation of negotiable goods and the opening of markets for venting the same. Nor did the close restrictive policy which aimed at fostering native shipping by Navigation Acts, such as those adopted by Venice and Spain, meet with his approval. He was all for developing the healthy growth of the mercantile marine, nourished on the natural food of exchange and barter. So the question of foreign markets claimed his attention; and he set himself to encourage private venture, and to erect upon that foundation the fabric of the great trading companies, the Merchant Adventurers, the Muscovy Merchants, the Levant Company and, later, the India Company.

It is with the Levant Company that we are here concerned. Undoubtedly, the richest field for commerce in the 16th century was the Mediterranean; it was the trade route for oriental merchandise, and also the producer of sugar, currants, sweet wines and oil. Both the Orient and the Levant were good markets for woollens, kersies, leather and tin, thus furnishing the outward and the homeward cargoes. This rich trade had hitherto virtually been a Venetian monopoly. Sir William Monson has recorded the reasons why England did not embark earlier upon traffic in the Levant. He says there was not enough English shipping; that the danger from Barbary pirates was prohibitive; and, lastly, that the trade was already in the hands of Venice. But the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, which eventually transferred the oriental trade-route from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, and the disastrous effects of the League of Cambrai (1510), gradually undermined Venetian commercial supremacy. Venetian trade to England slowly dwindled; in 1532 the last 'Flanders Galley' put into Southampton; and in 1587 the last Venetian argosy was cast away on the shingles at the Needles. The Levant trade thus became open to competitors at the very time when England was starting on her commercial career.

In common with all the commercial developments of

the British Empire, the Levant trade began, in a purely fortuitous fashion, with the enterprise of private individuals, whose efforts were eventually supported by the Government and finally consolidated into a trading company. The industrious Hakluyt has preserved records of these early voyages, which show us English merchants trading to Sicily, Crete, Chios, Cyprus, Beirout and Tripoli in Syria, between the years 1511 and 1553. There was an English consul at Chios; there were English factories in Crete. The Levant voyage took, on an average, from ten to eleven months out and back. A typical ship was the 'Mathew Gonson' of London, of three hundred tons burthen, with a crew of one hundred hands, including six gunners and four trumpeters. In 1531 we find a London merchant, John Gresham, trading goods to the value of 12,000 ducats; as the silver ducat was worth five shillings and the purchasing power of money at least ten times what it is to-day, this meant a venture of about 30,000*l*. Sometimes the agents of English merchants would take passage in a foreign ship, Portuguese or Italian; and in 1553 John Locke relates how the Venetian ship in which he was travelling was hove-to in rough weather to save the Captain's cat which had gone overboard, for, says he, 'the Italians esteem their cats as in England we esteem a good spaniel.'

In that same year Anthony Jenkinson made the first English attempt to trade with the Turk. Jenkinson was in Aleppo when Suleiman the Magnificent made his entry; and from that enlightened Sovereign he obtained a safe-conduct and leave to trade everywhere in the dominions of the Great Turk, on the same conditions and with the same privileges as those conceded to the French and the Venetians; the importance of this formula will become apparent presently. In 1566 Chios, which had hitherto been in the hands of the Genoese, became Turkish; and the comment of English traders on this event demonstrates the friendly relations which then existed between them and the Turk.

It would seem, however, on the testimony of Hakluyt, that, after the year 1550, the whole Mediterranean trade of England had been slowly declining until, in the year 1575, the enterprise of two English merchants revived and launched it on a fresh and far more vigorous career.

In that year Sir Edward Osborne, ancestor of the Dukes of Leeds, and Mr Richard Staper resolved to attempt the 'renewing and increasing of an ancient and commodious trade into diverse places in the Levant Seas.' To that end they despatched two agents, John Wight and Joseph Clements, by way of Poland to Constantinople, where Joseph remained eighteen months, to procure a safe-conduct from the Grand Seigneur for Mr William Harborne, then factor for Sir Edward Osborne, 'to have free access into his Highness' dominions.' The presence of these English agents escaped the eagle eye of the Venetian ambassador, who would certainly have done all he could to upset their projects, in defence of Venetian trade in those parts. We do not know how or with whom the English agents negotiated, but they were successful, and Clements returned to London with a safe-conduct for Harborne. In July 1578 that gentleman, accompanied by Clements, left London overland, as Walsingham feared that the Venetians might find out what was going forward. He travelled by way of Hamburg to Poland, where he and his party donned Turkish dress and attached themselves to the caravan of the Turkish ambassador, in whose suite they reached Constantinople on Oct. 28. We have no report of Harborne's negotiations, but, by March 1579, he had obtained a letter from Sultan Murad III addressed to that 'cloud of most pleasant raine, and sweetest fountaine of noblesse and vertue,' Elizabeth, 'ladie and heire of the perpetual happinesse and glory of the noble Realme of Englande,' in which the Sultan states that he has granted to Harborne and two others the right to trade freely in his dominions on the same footing as the French and Venetians. In return he asks for a like privilege for his subjects; the probability of such traffic is revealed by the phrase 'whether they come by sea with their ships, or by land with their waggons and horses.'

The question of the Levant trade was already occupying the attention of Burghley; and the Sultan's letter was no doubt submitted by Osborne and Staper to the Lord High Treasurer, who, in pursuit of his commercial policy, was ready to help all such enterprises. In October 1579, the Queen's answer to the Sultan's letter was drafted. In it the 'invictissima et potentissima

defensatrix' of the Christian faith against all 'idolaters,' requests that the privilege granted to Harborne, Osborne and Staper 'may not be so narrowly restrained to two or three men only, but may be enlarged to all our subjects in general.' The Queen further begs for the liberation of some of her subjects, slaves in Turkish galleys. This letter was entrusted to Master Richard Stanley and conveyed by him to Constantinople in the 'Prudence' of London.

Hitherto there had been only two foreign flags recognised or admitted in Turkish ports—the Venetian and the French. The French was the covering flag for all foreigners trading in Turkey; and foreign merchants received their passports through the French Embassy. The Venetians sailed under their own flag, and were directly under the protection of the Venetian ambassador at the Porte. France was extremely jealous of her prestige as protector of all Europeans, except Venetians, in the East—a position secured by treaty between Francis I and Suleiman. The appearance of an English agent seeking to establish commercial relations with Turkey seemed to the French ambassador, M. de Germigny, to threaten his master's honour; while the avowed object of the Englishman was an overt challenge to Venetian interests. We shall find that, from the outset, the French and Venetian ambassadors combined to thwart the representatives of England.

Harborne set to work at once to secure a proper opening for English trade by the recognised method of 'capitulations' conferring definite privileges, such as already existed in the case of Venice and of France. But a firman granting capitulations could only be secured through strong interest at Court. The English agent soon found that the pashas of the Divan and the high functionaries of the Court, through whom alone he could hope to reach the Sultan, were divided by greed, ambition, jealousy; if he secured the help of one party he roused the antagonism of the other. Harborne elected to work towards his end through the Grand Vizir, Sokolli Pasha, and the all-powerful tutor to the Sultan, Seadeddin, the historian and soldier. This combination made an enemy of the terrible Uludschali—'Occhiali,' as the Italians called him—the High Admiral or Capudan Pasha.

The Venetian, French and English diplomatists freely employed the usual methods of bribes, in addition to the various political and commercial arguments which they were able to marshal in their support. On Harborne's arrival de Germigny suspected that the question of the flag would be raised by the newcomer. He remonstrated with the English agent, pointing out that hitherto the French flag had proved sufficient cover for English traders. Harborne declared that his mission, and the letters he brought, were concerned with the liberation of English slaves. De Germigny offered to present the letters and support the appeal. Harborne replied that he would take time to consider that offer. He went straight to the Grand Vizir and succeeded in extracting a promise that capitulations should be granted to England. When de Germigny heard this, he set in motion the Capudan Pasha, the Grand Vizir's rival, who was annoyed because Harborne had not sought his aid in the usual manner, and also because all captured slaves were his property, and Harborne was seeking the release of some. The French Ambassador urged that no valid assistance could be expected from a woman, especially when she was so far away, and without any fleet to speak of.

But Harborne was successful. Though de Germigny reported home in April that 'the Englishman will accomplish nothing,' by June he was forced to admit that there had been great progress. As a matter of fact, by the beginning of June, concessions, which virtually amounted to formal capitulations, had been arranged and signed by the Sultan. They were embodied in thirty-five clauses, drawn up by Sokolli, Grand Vizir, but signed by his successor Ahmed Pasha. In substance they conceded free trade to the English under their own flag. The capitulations were accompanied by a letter from the Sultan to the Queen. But, as so frequently happened at the Porte, the matter, though apparently settled, was suddenly upset by de Germigny, who succeeded in procuring the revocation of the sign manual, and also obtained a letter addressed to his master, Henri III, promising that only on French intercession would the Sultan enter into an alliance with England. Harborne, however, by this time was on his way home with his

capitulations and the letter. That he had the capitulations with him is proved by the fact that a copy exists among the Foreign Office Papers at the Record Office. After consultation with the Levant Merchants and with Burghley, he returned once more to Constantinople with letters from the Queen, in which she speaks of the capitulations as a *fait accompli*. Harborne found, however, that such was not the case. The firman had been recalled, and the whole question was still open. He set out for England once more, *re infecta* so far as a treaty of commerce and capitulations for the Levant Company were concerned.

Meanwhile the promoters of the Levant trade, Osborne, Staper and other London merchants, had obtained from Elizabeth letters patent dated Sept. 11, 1581, erecting the Levant Company. The Company was a chartered 'regulated' Company, as distinguished from a chartered 'Joint Stock' Company; that is to say, it was an unlimited-liability concern, which admitted apprentices, and each member of which traded in his own bottoms. The membership was limited to twelve; the new members were elected by the original founders; the Crown had the right to name two members; the duration of the patent was seven years, but the Crown reserved the power to revoke; the privilege granted was a monopoly of trade with Turkey; the penalty for infringement, confiscation of ships and goods, half to the Crown, half to the Company; the Company guarantee not less than 500*l.* of dues per annum to the Customs. Osborne was the first Governor. The arms of the Company were the arms of England with a red cross over the same.

There was, however, another branch of English Mediterranean trade which had sprung up in much the same fortuitous way as the Levant venture—the trade in currants and sweet wines from the dominions of the Venetian Republic. In 1575, Elizabeth, at the request of the Earl of Leicester, had granted to one Acerbo Velutelli, a Florentine merchant, with whom she had already had monetary dealings, a patent of monopoly for the import of currants. On the strength of this monopoly Velutelli levied, under the title of licence-money, a charge of 5*s.* 6*d.* on every hundredweight of currants imported. So long as the currant trade was chiefly in the hands of Venetians

and the impost fell on them, no complaint was raised, though of course the tax was borne by the consumer. But, when the embargo on English ships in Spain forced English merchants to seek new outlets for their tonnage, and directed their attention to the currant trade, they complained that Velutelli's licence-money put them at a disadvantage with the Venetian merchants, because they had to pay Venetian export dues, in addition to the English import charges. Their petition for relief succeeded. Velutelli was ordered to levy this licence-money on foreigners only. Thereupon the Venetian merchants induced their Government to raise the tariff both on exports and imports. Negotiations between the two Governments proved abortive; and in 1582 or '83 Velutelli's patent was revoked, and a monopoly for the import of currants, sweet wines and oil was granted to Edward Cordell, Edward Homborn, Paul Bayning and others for six years. The patent was to hold only so long as Venice maintained her hostile tariff. This was the origin of the Venetian Company, which was later amalgamated with the Levant Company.

The Levant Company's original charter expired in 1588. The merchants appear to have been rather disappointed with the progress of their venture; and, in spite of Harborne's encouragement, they did not apply for a renewal. The charter of the Venetian Company ran out in 1589; and there seems to have been some clash of interests which induced both Companies to desire amalgamation. The Venetian Company was hampered by oppressive imposts at Venice; the Levant Company by heavy charges for the maintenance of the ambassador at the Porte. Moreover, there was a dispute as to the spheres of the two Companies. Sweet wines formed a large part of their commerce; and both claimed to trade with Crete, the chief home of sweet wines—the Venetian Company because that island belonged to the Signory of Venice, the Levant Company because it lay in the Archipelago.

Both Companies, therefore, resolved to petition for fusion. The Turkey merchants supported their plea on the ground that the ambassador maintained by them had rendered most valuable service to the Crown of England not only commercially but also politically by

thwarting the efforts of the King of Spain to conclude a truce and then a peace with the Sultan, which would have set free large forces for service in the West. The plea was fully justified, as the history of English ambassadors at the Porte will presently disclose. This attempt to erect a monopoly of all Mediterranean commerce in favour of a few traders roused the opposition of some 'outside' London merchants, who claimed admittance. The Companies resisted, and urged that it was quite possible to kill a trade by 'overcharging' it with too many participants. Burghley took the opinion of Sir John Hawkins and William Brough, both navy men, who naturally favoured the enlargement of the Company, in order, as they argued, to increase the number of ships available for attack and defence.

The new Charter was accordingly issued in January 1592. Its duration was to be twelve years; and it was renewed, for fifteen years, in 1601. Elizabeth's death (1603) voided this Charter; and the Levant trade fell into a state of chaos, aggravated by the creation of the East India Company in 1600. Finally, a new, and this time a perpetual Charter was issued in December 1605. The chief characteristic of this Charter was that it broke up the narrow monopoly of a comparatively few merchants; and 119 names were enumerated as forming the nucleus of the new Company. Moreover, that number could be increased by the admission of any English subject who was a merchant and over twenty-six years of age, on payment of 25*l.* as entrance fee, which a few months later was raised to 50*l.* The new Company still continued to meet the charges for the ambassador and the present to the Porte. The Company guaranteed 4000*l.* a year to the Crown. With the grant of the perpetual Charter of 1605 the Levant Company was launched on its long history, which closed only in 1828; and we must now turn back to follow the history of the English ambassadors at the Porte down to the year 1603, which concludes the first period in the history of English sea-power in the Mediterranean.

Even before the creation of the Levant Company by the charter of 1581, the Crown had granted credentials to Harborne as ambassador, and had addressed to the

Sultan, to the Grand Vizir, and to the Capudan, letters commendatory. With these and with the present, Harborne embarked in the 'Susan,' a ship of three hundred tons, seventy hands and thirty-four guns, in November 1582. He was delayed by stress of weather and did not leave England till January of the following year. After considerable trouble at Majorca, where he suspected the Spanish of a design to seize the ship, and after touching at Palermo, where Harborne seduced the Venetian consul, Merzè, to leave the service of the Republic and enter his at an annual salary of 126*l.* 7*s.* and four suits of clothes, he reached Constantinople in March 1583. The Venetian ambassador, Morosini, reports his arrival. We must bear in mind that the attitude of the Republic was hostile to English commercial enterprise, and further that Morosini was indignant at the defection of the Venetian consul at Palermo. The 'Susan' arrived at the Seven Towers, but was delayed there some days owing to the French ambassador's hostile representations to the Capudan who commanded the port. The Grand Vizir, however, overrode this opposition, and

'on Good Friday the ship was towed in, about the hour when all good Christians were celebrating the Divine Office. Suddenly, when the "Susan" was off Seraglio Point, a great noise of artillery was heard, with a continual music of trumpets and drums, and other signs of rejoicing, to the great grief and pain of the faithful. When the Ambassador landed, not a Christian went to escort him to his house, nor raised his hat when he passed. Even the Turks call him a Lutheran. That same evening the Ambassador gave a banquet on board, with fireworks, salvoes of artillery, music and a great uproar. But they nearly paid the penalty of their sins, for a rocket fell back into the ship close to the powder magazine and set it ablaze.'

Harborne was lodged in a house called Rapamat, on the slope of the hills of Pera, where the other Embassies were and are. He made his offering to the Grand Vizir and other pashas in order of precedence, and on May 3 was received in audience by the Sultan. To him he delivered the Queen's present—a clock set with gems and pearls, ten pairs of jack-boots, two lap-dogs, twelve lengths of Royal cloth, two lengths of bleached linen

and thirteen pieces of silver-gilt—produced his credentials and kissed hands; he then attended the banquet in Divan, and thus formally took his place among the diplomatic agents accredited to the Porte.

His position, like that of the Venetian ambassador, was a double one; he was paid by the Levant Company to act as their commercial agent and consul-general, and he was accredited, but not salaried, by the Crown as English ambassador. His financial position was often trying. The Queen was extremely parsimonious, while the Company was at times in difficulties and remiss in payment. We know that the French ambassador received a salary of 10,000 ducats, and two per cent. on all French goods brought into Turkey; the Venetian 8000 ducats of gold, and the *cottimo*, or one per cent. on all Venetian goods entering Turkey; the Imperial ambassador had 16,000 dollars a year. 'I am allowed 3000 ducats,' wails Barton, Harborne's successor, 'and yet as much required at my hands as at theirs.' 'I had not in all my household sixpence of money to pass the water,' Barton says again, 'so miserably am I treated by the Company as not to have had a penny allowance from them this twelvemonth.'

The ambassador's diplomatic duty was, if possible, to win the sympathy of the Turk for the English, and for the Protestant group of European nations; also to prevent the conclusion of a truce, or a peace, with Spain which would relieve that country from the standing menace of a Turkish attack on its Italian possessions, and would thereby allow Philip to concentrate his whole forces on the western conflict. In discharging this mission, the ambassador was aided by the fact that he could always point to Elizabeth and, later, to Henri IV (until he reverted) as the champions of Protestantism and the natural enemies of Spain and the Pope; further, he could urge that by favouring England, the Turk would help to keep Spain busy, and would thus secure a free hand in the prosecution of the Persian war, which was a standing menace to his oriental frontier. Consequently the question of creed assumed a diplomatic importance which explains the frequent allusion to Elizabeth as the bulwark against 'idolaters,' and the resentment of the French ambassador when his

master Henri III was described as one. Furthermore, Philip was hampered in his negotiations for a truce with the Turk by his piety and his pride. He could not bring himself to make the first advances ; and, instead of sending a fully-accredited ambassador to the Porte, he chose to work through mere agents, whose efforts Harborne and Barton and Lello easily rendered abortive. Nor, as his Catholic Majesty, could he well seek truce or peace with the head of Islam ; the mere rumour that he had concluded a truce in 1581 brought a message from Pope Gregory XIII, to the effect that, as the King of Spain had come to terms with the infidels, the Pope could no longer sanction the tax on the clergy and on ecclesiastical property, and that in expiation for such an offence, Philip must turn all his attention to crushing heretic England.

On the commercial side, the ambassador appointed consuls, and was expected to foster English trade in the Levant, securing concessions, protecting merchants, administering justice between co-nationals and redeeming slaves. As a matter of fact, the English Levant trade was not very flourishing during the earlier life of the Company ; and, though some business was carried on in the Archipelago and in Syria, comparatively few ships visited Constantinople itself. The Venetian ambassador, in opposing the establishment of an English embassy in Constantinople, pointed out to the Grand Vizir that in one whole year only one English ship, and that a small one, had reached the Golden Horn ; 'more-over,' he added, 'she carried more guns than goods, which fully proves her real intent to go pirating on her home journey.' The English, he said, would not get return cargoes, for they were well supplied with wool and leather, Turkey's chief exports ; the presence of the ambassador was, therefore, useless, and merely jeopardised the Franco-Turkish alliance. Morosini was, of course, acting on instructions from home and urging a hostile suit ; but he was not altogether wrong in his estimate of English trade at that date. The truth is that the English were beginning at the wrong end ; their sea-power in the Mediterranean could not develop from the eastern half. The midland sea is, comparatively, a narrow sea ; and the trade-route through it was exposed

to hostile attacks all the way to the Levant. It was essential that the development should begin in the West and spread eastward by a series of stations where the fleets could shelter and refit; the same necessity had governed Venetian development, when, after the Fourth Crusade, she was forced to approach the East by the stations of Corfu, Coron (in Messenia), Candia and the Islands. As a matter of fact the historical development of English sea-power in the Mediterranean has moved from West to East by Tangiers, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Egypt, and is still obeying that trend.

The presence of the English ambassador and his diplomatic and commercial activities at once ranged against him the representatives of France and Venice. Every device was adopted by Morosini and de Germigny to damage the social and diplomatic position of Harborne. The fact that he was the Company's agent, as well as the Queen's representative, gave the Frenchman the pretext to declare that he was no ambassador, merely a merchant; and, thus prompted, the terrible Uludschali publicly insulted Harborne by saying, 'Just look at this fellow who wants to stand on an equality with France and Venice.' As heretics, the English were represented by the Catholic ambassadors as pariahs, outside the pale of European nations; and again Uludschali remarked, 'They're a bad lot, these Lutherans.'

The upshot of the whole matter, however, was a success for Harborne. The capitulations, implying the covering flag for English traders, were confirmed; and the Grand Vizir told de Germigny that it was useless for him to endeavour to upset the English ambassador; while the Sultan himself declared that he 'would never expel the foes of his foes,' the Pope and Spain.

In August 1584 de Germigny was recalled because of his failure over the covering flag and the English capitulations; and Jacques Savary de Lanscome was appointed his successor. But before leaving, de Germigny was able to deliver a parting shot at his rival, by inducing the new Grand Vizir to declare that he would undo the work of his predecessor and reopen the whole question of the English capitulations. Morosini, too, was recalled at the expiry of his ordinary three years' service, and was succeeded by Lorenzo Bernardo. Harborne remained

to face his new opponents and to consolidate, if possible, his initial successes.

Harborne's position was, indeed, far from secure. English trade at Constantinople languished; the opportunity to upset the Levant Company's business seemed favourable, had the new French ambassador been a man of diplomatic ability. But de Lanscome was not that; French historians note that his embassy was most disastrous for French interests in the near East. He arrived at Constantinople on March 29, 1586, and, in the very act of his official entry, succeeded in putting himself wrong with the Turks. When approaching the city, surrounded by a brilliant group of State officials, he was asked what he thought of it; he replied that it struck him as so magnificent that the Lord of it must be Lord of the whole world, and added that much of the Sultan's grandeur was doubtless due to his alliance with the King of France, who was now ready to place at his disposal 60,000 harquebusiers. The pashas burst out laughing and said, 'The Sultan is accustomed to lend, not to receive aid'; and with that they spurred on their horses and left him. Clearly de Lanscome did not understand the Porte, and was not the man to oust Harborne, who lost no opportunity of ingratiating himself with the leading pashas. His position improved. He was able to do much for English slaves in Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, and even secured favourable orders from the Sultan on the subject, though his activities in that direction brought him into violent conflict, and even to blows, with the Capudan. But Bernardo reported that it was clear the Turks were pleased with the English *entente*, as a counterpoise to Spain while they were engaged in the Persian war. The preparations for the Armada were known to the Turks, but its destination was still doubtful; it might be aimed against Islam; and in that case English help would be of the greatest service. That was the trump-card Harborne was always able to play in the diplomatic game.

There is testimony, moreover, from an unexpected quarter as to the growing prestige of England's sea-power, even before the defeat of the Armada established it beyond doubt. In conversation with the Venetian ambassador at Rome, the Pope said that he had news

that the Armada was ready ; ' but so too are the English,' continued his Holiness.

' Elizabeth is certainly a great Queen, and were she only a Catholic, she would be our dearly-beloved. Just look how well she governs ; she is only a woman and only mistress of half an island, and yet she makes herself feared by Spain, France and the Empire.'

In this satisfactory position Harborne left the Embassy. He set out on his homeward journey early in August 1588, and was succeeded by Edward Barton, who had already been employed on English business at Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. At the time of Harborne's departure Barton must have been in Constantinople, or near it, for his first despatch is dated Aug. 15, 1588. Barton's task was less difficult than his predecessor's. He had not to create, but inherited a position at the Porte. During the course of his Embassy his hands were strengthened, diplomatically, by the defeat of the Armada and the enhanced prestige of his country, as well as by the succession of the Huguenot, Henri IV, to the French throne ; while, commercially, the ' vent was now open and thoroughly cleared,' to use Faunt's phrase, though as yet there was no great traffic passing through it. In the process of consolidating the position of English ambassador at the Porte, Barton was opposed, of course, by de Lanscome, whom he finally routed. He was also concerned to thwart the renewed efforts of Spanish agents, the two Marigliani and Ferrari, to secure a truce ; and in this, too, he was successful. He could point to the disastrous results of earlier truces, which had allowed Spain to seize Portugal undisturbed, and, if renewed, would enable Philip to attack, and possibly crush, France. The death of Henri III, and the recognition by the Huguenots of Henry of Navarre as King, had seriously shaken de Lanscome's tottering position. Barton could now urge that he no longer spoke for France, but only for the Guises and the League ; that Henri IV was, to all intents and purposes, King of France, and, being a Protestant, was the natural ally of Elizabeth, the enemy of Spain, and therefore of necessity the friend of the Turk. So vigorously did Barton press the point that in August 1590 de Lanscome was told by the Grand Vizir

that 'Neither your King nor mine desires you to be ambassador any longer.' As a matter of fact, Henri IV was sending de Lanscome's nephew, François Savary de Brèves, to represent him at the Porte, with the intention of ousting de Lanscome, who clung to his post in spite of the Grand Vizir. Barton and de Brèves put their heads together for his final undoing; and this is how they accomplished it.

There was at Constantinople a certain renegade Englishman, Anthony Lane, passing as a Frenchman under the title of the Baron de la Saye. This adventurer had been to Rome, and, on representing that he could procure the return of renegades to the fold, he secured letters of commendation from the Pope through the Cardinal Santa Severina, who managed oriental affairs for the Vatican. With these letters he went to Venice, where he showed them to the French ambassador, M. de Maisse, who sent him on to Constantinople with instructions to place himself at Barton's orders. Barton thus relates his own proceedings :

'You may perceive there is nothing meant in all this practice for the furtherance of Christianity, so that the papers would have come to no good use; which I well pondering, and taking occasion to do some good service against those who wish Her Majesty's country and friends ill, I counterfeited a letter in Italian from Cardinal Sancta Severina, who has charge of all the affairs of the Levant for the Pope, having one of his seals with me, and directed the same to Lancosmo [Lanscome], by which I recommended the Pope's letters to him as if indeed they had been sent to him from the Pope, and I made Anthony Lane to affirm that he had a commission to deliver the same to Lancosmo; which device was not only the cause of his future troubles but also matter against the Spanish ambassador; by which I hope I have done no harm but rather, in my opinion, good service to Her Majesty and to the furtherance of the Christian Religion.'

The upshot of the affair was that the incriminating letter was seized by the Turks and de Lanscome consigned to the Tower of the Black Sea, 'where,' says Bernardo, 'he does not lose heart, but has taken to writing as the only relief for his restless spirit.' Meanwhile letters arrived from Henri IV, informing the Sultan that he intended to appoint de Brèves as his

ambassador and begging that de Lanscome might be handed over to Barton and de Brèves for deportation. The ambassador, about the beginning of 1593, was suddenly taken from the Tower of the Black Sea and delivered to Barton and de Brèves. By them he was placed on board a ship bound for Marseilles, whose master had orders to consign him to the Governor of Toulon. The ship was hurried out of Constantinople, but lay for months off the Island of Marmora, whence de Lanscome eventually made his way to Italy and Rome.

The apparent union of the French and English ambassadors seemed to present a powerful combination. But there were causes at work, some of which tended to weaken Barton's position, while others brought him into conflict with his French colleague. English trade remained intermittent, and the Company were behind-hand with the payment of the ambassador's salary, while the Queen showed herself tardy in sending credentials and the present. The interests of France and England, moreover, began to assume opposing complexions. In addition to friction over the coral fisheries on the Barbary coast, war-clouds were gathering to the north of Turkey. The tribute due from the Empire was in arrears. The dragoman of the Imperial ambassador had been arrested, and the embassy archives seized. It was in the interests of Henri IV to encourage a Turkish attack on the Empire. He was candidate for election as King of the Romans; and his influence at the Porte might count as a make-weight in his favour. 'The League made me King,' he said; 'who knows but that the Turk may make me Emperor?' Elizabeth, on the contrary, had no desire to see the Turkish forces directed towards Central Europe. Her whole object was to induce the Sultan to threaten, if not to attack, Spain or the Spanish dominions in Italy.

The conversion of Henri also produced a further cleavage between France and England, which was reflected on the Bosphorus. Barton urged that Henri's return to the Roman fold left his mistress the only bulwark of the Protestant creed, which he represented as a kind of Islam, and therefore the sole European ally of the Turk. The delicate question of the covering flag and the complete emancipation of English traders

from French protection was still unsettled, and tended to become more acute. Harborne had already secured the right of the English to fly their own flag; but Barton made a further claim, that the Flemings, whom Elizabeth had taken under her protection, should come under the 'consulage' of the English ambassador at Constantinople. This was an attack, not merely on French prestige at the Porte, but also on the emoluments of the French ambassador, whose salary was augmented by a five per cent. *ad valorem* duty on all goods introduced into the Turkish Empire under his consulage.

These various causes contributed to bring about strained relations between Barton and de Brèves. Times were ticklish for the representatives of foreign Powers at the Porte. War had been declared by Turkey against the Empire. The Imperial nuncio, von Krekwitz, had been arrested, loaded with chains, and brought into the Turkish camp outside Constantinople. The Christian Powers were naturally suspected of sympathy with their co-religionists; and their ambassadors were in danger. All usual channels of access to the Sultan were closed, but Barton hired a boat, and, with the help of a negro eunuch in the Seraglio, succeeded in presenting a petition to the Sultan himself, as he was sitting in his Kiosk by the water-side—'a thing which no one remembers to have happened before to a diplomatic agent,' says the Venetian. The Sultan's answer was favourable; nevertheless Barton was arrested by the Grand Vizir. Luckily, at this juncture, the ship bringing the Queen's present sailed into the harbour; and Barton was able to smooth the whole matter over satisfactorily.

In obedience to his instructions to secure, if possible peace between the Sultan and the Emperor, Barton joined the Turkish army and was present at the battle of Erlau. He was subsequently accused of having borne arms against Christians, but that was not the case. Soon after his return to Constantinople, Barton died and was buried on one of the Prinkipo Islands. Henry Lello, who had been acting as consular agent, was immediately appointed to fill his place.

The Sultan Murad III had died in 1594, before the outbreak of war with the Emperor; and, during Barton's lifetime, the customary present to the new Sultan had

not reached Constantinople regularly. Without it there was no hope of getting the capitulations confirmed. The Levant Company in London frequently urged upon Cecil the necessity of sending the present, but the Queen was slow to move where it was a question of spending money. Lello had to wait for credentials and the present before he could ask for an audience, establish his position as ambassador and demand the renewal of the capitulations.

In August 1599 the 'Hector' reached the Dardanelles with both essentials. She also brought a cargo of woollen cloth, as the Levant Company desired to open a trade in such goods. The Venetian ambassador reports that English cloth is very popular with the Turk, 'on account of its excellence and appearance,' and adds that the English will open factories throughout the entire Turkish Empire. The 'Hector' lay some days at Prinkipo, to clean up and dress; and then, on Sept. 10, she sailed in and dropped anchor off the Sultan's Kiosk. The chief gardener, the Bostangi Pasha, induced the Sultan to come down to his summer-house to see the arrival; and Lello reports that 'the sound of our English trumpets gave him so much pleasure as those about him say they have never seen him so delighted in any Christian Prince's strength and defence.' The present included a coach for the Sultana, plate for the Sultan, webs of English cloth, and, above all, Master Thomas Dallam's famous organ, 'very cunningly designed, which serves as a clock and can play several airs by itself.' Lello thinks the instrument 'will give the Grand Seigneur great content if any of his people can maintain the use thereof.'

Lello kissed hands on Oct. 4; and Dallam, who had come out with his organ-clock to show the Turks how to work it, attended him, dressed in 'a fair cloak of strange green silk.' The whole ceremony, as described in Lello's despatch, gives a vivid picture of the state maintained by the Levant Company's agent and Queen's ambassador. He went to audience attended by twelve gentlemen on horseback, vested in cloth of gold and silver, a gentleman usher, two pages in white damask, twenty men in livery gowns, twelve merchants, discreetly apparelled merchant-like in black, and himself attired as richly as he might. Arrived at the open

courtyard of the palace, in presence of the Grand Seigneur, his Pashas and Councillors, Lello declared Her Majesty's pleasure, salutations and requests, and touched on the peace between France and Spain, 'which they all seemed to dislike.' After a brief interval the banquet was announced. When it was over, the Sultan sent to summon Lello to his presence, but first he and his suite were clothed with vestments out of the Treasury; there were hardly enough to go round. In company with the Vizirs, Lello entered the presence, where he found the Sultan seated on a cushion of red satin, richly embroidered with pearls, and all the chamber draped with red satin, embroidered with gold. Lello again repeated the object of his mission; and the Sultan graciously answered that he would receive satisfaction of all he desired.

But, though Lello expressed himself as satisfied with the result of his audience, he soon found that the attempt to renew the capitulations raised once more the questions of the covering flag and the 'consulage of foreigners,' and brought him into direct collision with de Brèves. By the earliest capitulations the freedom of the flag had undoubtedly been conceded, and with it the consulage of the English. But the growing trade of the Flemings, and the fact that Elizabeth had assumed their protection, made it seem desirable that they should be brought under English consulage in the Turkish Empire. Lello, moreover, was seeking to expand the original capitulations by a clause which provided that all future concessions should be incorporated in the capitulations. De Brèves offered a stubborn resistance to the English consulage of Flemings, and endeavoured to wreck Lello's position. He fastened on the reported use of the word 'idolater,' when the English ambassador was discussing Henri IV's conversion; and he refused Lello's invitation to meet the Venetian ambassador at an entertainment given on board the 'Hector.' By the use of bribes he won over the Grand Vizir; and, in spite of the Sultan's promises, Lello's mission was in danger of shipwreck.

But de Brèves' power was on the wane. The conversion of his master irretrievably weakened his position. He himself asked leave to retire. In September 1600 Lello announces the speedy arrival of a new ambassador; 'God grant he may be of a Christian-like mind, for it is

expected that the present one (de Brèves) will surely turn Turk, being already married according to Turkish law,' or, in the picturesque language of the day, 'will capitulate his soul to the devil by becoming an accursed Mohametan.' Lello had from the first enjoyed the support of Cicala Sinan, Capudan Pasha, throughout the whole dispute with de Brèves over the consulage of Flemings; and, when the question came up for final consideration in Divan, Sinan expressed the opinion that the English were better friends to the Porte than any other Power. He carried the Divan with him; and the Grand Vizir reported the issue to the Sultan and explained the conflict between the French and English capitulations. The Sultan finally ordered that the Flemings, not being specially mentioned in the French treaty, should now sail under the flag and the consulage of England. On May 23, 1601, Lello reported his victory to Salisbury.

To have secured the covering flag and the consulage of English and Flemish traders was a diplomatic triumph for the three English ambassadors, Harborne, Barton and Lello. It is doubtful, however, whether the Levant Company was in a position to reap the benefit. In London the Company was in a state of transition between the period of temporary charters and its final consolidation under a perpetual charter in 1605. The Company, moreover, was remiss in supporting the embassy financially, and the Queen would not hear of any expenditure; the chief monetary support of the ambassadors was derived from the dues paid by the English shipping entering or clearing Turkish ports. There were serious thoughts of abandoning the Levant trade; only Staper, Harborne and a few others counselled perseverance. Moreover, the East India Company had been created in 1600; and it seemed that the interests of the two ventures must clash over the trade-route through the Mediterranean.

The question was further complicated by the rapid growth of piracy in the Mediterranean. The defeat of the Armada and peace with Spain had deprived a number of bold spirits—'the sea-sharkers,' as they were called—of their main legitimate source of livelihood and diversion in harrying Spanish shipping. These men, bitten with the buccaneering spirit of the Drake period, refused

to return home, and took to piracy in the Mediterranean, where they were supported by the Turkish Beys of Algiers and Tunis. They preyed on French, Venetian, and even occasionally on English shipping, ran their prizes into Turkish ports, and disposed of them there. The English got a bad name in the Levant—'good sailors and better pirates' was the general comment—and the Venetian ambassador confirms the same in more cautious language. 'The English,' he says, 'are wont to navigate with great security because, apart from their seamanship, they fit out their vessels excellently, and never let themselves be tempted to take such cargo as would hamper the handling of the ships or hinder them from fighting if occasion offered'; and, though this praise doubtless applied to the merchant service, these same merchantmen were strongly suspected of a readiness to snap up booty where they could; they were accused of carrying more 'murderers' than goods. It is certain that the Crown, in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, set its face against piracy. Burghley had pointed out that all such enterprises were intolerable to the genuine merchant; and Lello promised the Venetian ambassador at the Porte that the Queen would hang the pirates when she caught them, and, if no other way could be found to stop the mischief, would revoke the Levant Company's Charter rather than allow these scoundrels, under shelter of it, to molest the Republic. The question of piracy, in fact, led to the reopening of diplomatic relations between England and Venice. Scaramelli was sent as envoy to lay the matter before the Queen; from her and her council he received abundant promises, though Elizabeth made the characteristic remark, 'I would not be discourteous to the Republic, though in the question of privateers I would have you know that this kingdom is not so scant of men but what there may be found a rogue or two among them.' But the whole question of piracy belongs to the second phase in the growth of English sea-power in the Mediterranean.

HORATIO F. BROWN.

Art. 2.—THE ETHICS OF PRUSSIAN STATECRAFT.

1. *La Morale Politique du Grand Frédéric d'après sa Correspondance.* By Commandant M. H. Weil. Paris: Plon, 1917.
2. *La Guerre de Sept Ans. Histoire diplomatique et militaire.* By Richard Waddington. Tome V. Paris: Firmin Didot, [1917].
3. *Les Dessous du Congrès de Vienne, d'après les documents originaux des archives du Ministère Impérial et Royal de l'Intérieur à Vienne.* By Commandant M. H. Weil. Paris: Payot, 1917.

'Not every one can pursue the same policy,' said Frederick the Great to the Emperor Joseph II; 'that which does for me would not do for you; I have sometimes ventured on a political lie.' 'What's that?' asked the Emperor, laughing. 'It is,' replied the king, also laughing heartily, 'the invention of a piece of news which I knew would be discovered to be false within twenty-four hours, a matter of no consequence, since before then it had produced its effect.'

The Prince de Ligne, who recorded this conversation, was by universal consent the most perfect type of the great gentleman of the 18th century, famous alike for his wit and for a charm and courtesy of address which was no mere surface polish, but a genuine expression of character. It is, then, the more significant that he discovered in Frederick's attitude nothing that was not admirable. As a faithful servant of the House of Habsburg, indeed, he deplored that 'the preponderance of the Empire and the closeness of Bohemia to Silesia' interfered later with the sentiment which the great king had conceived for the young Emperor during this first interview; but there is a note of admiration in his epigrammatic account of Frederick's subsequent behaviour to him. 'You will remember, Sire,' he concluded his letter to the king of Poland, 'their correspondence on the subject of Bavaria, their compliments, the explanations of their intentions, explanations always given with politeness; and how from one politeness to another the king advanced into Bohemia.'*

* 'Correspondance du Prince de Ligne.' Ed. 1859, p. 57.

In his admiration for the politic qualities of Frederick the Prince de Ligne expressed the general sentiment of his age, an age—as Carlyle chose to describe it—‘of seething diplomacies and monstrous-wigged mendacities.’ The age admired him, not for any originality in the cynicism of his pose, but because he was the most perfect exponent of its own philosophy, which represented a reaction from the bloodthirsty hypocrisies of the 17th century. It admired him, above all, for the same reason as that which led Carlyle to hold him up to admiration at a later day, namely because, accepting this ‘Lapland-witch’ world as he found it, he ‘knew what he meant in it,’ and, keeping his aim star-clear before him, earned the only title to its praise—success.

It is not to be supposed that there was anything essentially new in the moral standards of 18th-century politics, based as these were on the principle that in affairs of State ‘interest ought to outweigh every other consideration, regardless of justice.’* This ‘Reason of State,’ according to the learned Bielfeld, was no more than the maxim *salus populi suprema lex*, which had been adopted by all peoples ancient and modern; and, if we confound the interests of peoples with those of princes, we may admit that it had been ruthlessly applied ever since, in the 15th century, the conception of the State had begun to take shape. It was in the Italy of the Renaissance, which invented both the conception and the name, that ‘statecraft’ was first systematised; and its rules and maxims had begun to affect the practice of all Europe even before the publication, in 1515, of Machiavelli’s ‘Prince.’ Nor was the immense influence of this wonderful book due to anything novel in its principles or want of principles; for Machiavelli merely held up the mirror to the world in which he lived, a world in which Might was Right, and the *virtù* which was esteemed the most admirable of human qualities had nothing in common with virtue.

This was the view of the great jurist Albericus Gentilis, according to whom the merit of Machiavelli was that he told the naked truth about princes—for the

* Count Ludwig von Cobenzl, quoted in Sorel, ‘L’Europe et la Révolution française,’ i, p. 19.

instruction of the peoples.* Bacon, on the other hand, praised Machiavelli's method without any reference to his motives. It is only men of large experience in affairs, he says, who ought to discuss them, and 'it is for this reason that we give thanks to Machiavelli and writers of this kind, who openly and without dissimulation set out what men are wont to do, not what they ought to do.'† Wicquefort, whose treatise on the ambassador and his functions became a text-book of 18th-century diplomacy, says the same thing in almost the same words: 'Machiavelli nearly everywhere says what princes do, and not what they ought to do.'‡

The records of princes known to the generations of these writers certainly bear out the truth of this. The motto of Louis XI, 'qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare,' seemed in the 16th century to have become that of all sovereigns and their ministers. Before the 'Prince' was published, Thomas Cromwell had studied in Italy the politic arts which he devoted to the service of Henry VIII. Henry's Most Christian contemporary, Francis I, was no less ready than the new Defender of the Faith to subordinate religion to the Reason of State. As Voltaire put it, he 'burnt Lutherans in France and paid them in Germany'; and he used the Church patronage secured to him by the new Concordat with Rome to set up that vast system of diplomatic espionage and intrigue which, as the *Secret du Roi*, was to be developed by Louis XV with a passion that almost amounted to madness. Charles V was so completely Machiavellian that there were those who, regardless of dates, held that the author of the 'Prince' had taken him as his model. Catherine de Medici not only studied Machiavelli herself, but was believed to have prescribed the 'Prince' as the political text-book for the education of her sons, Charles IX and Henry III. Mary Queen of Scots, most fascinating of dissemblers, had learned in the same school. Queen Elizabeth, in diplomatic fence with James VI of Scotland, declared roundly that she could 'put to school your craftiest counsellor,' which was true even in that

* 'De legationibus libri tres.' Ed. 1585, Lib. iii, cap. ix, p. 110.

† 'De augmentis scientiarum.' Ed. Louvain, 1652, p. 503.

‡ 'L'ambassadeur et ses fonctions.' La Haye, 1680, I, p. 174.

age of crafty counsel. King James, in his turn, though he resented Sir Henry Wotton's famous pleasantry, piqued himself on a statecraft that was certainly not scrupulous, and he handed on the worst part of the Machiavellian tradition to his Stuart successors. In them it was reinforced by the contemporary influence of the Court of France, the political morals of which under the Bourbons were no improvement on those under the Valois. Cardinal Richelieu regarded the maxims of Machiavelli as 'indispensable,' and he certainly acted on them. Of his successor Mazarin, another churchman, it was said that as a statesman he had one fault—that he was *always* a rogue.* It was at his suggestion that Gabriel Naudé wrote his 'Considérations,'† of which Voltaire said that 'the maxims of the Parisian make those of the Florentine seem mild,' but which was none the less so highly thought of that an enlarged edition was published so late as 1752.

But, in the end, it was Louis XIV who, by the magnificence of his pose and the prestige of his conquests, gave a general vogue to the idea that the monarch, as the vicegerent of God, stands above the moral law. Henceforward every princeling in Europe applied to his own case the Grand Monarque's formula 'L'État c'est moi,' with all that this was held to involve. It involved, among other things, the confounding of personal ambition with the reason of State. Machiavelli had praised the instinct of acquisition as laudable in itself; the 17th century began to conceive aggrandisement as not only the right but the duty of princes, 'since the weaker are at the mercy of the stronger, and the only frontiers of a State are those necessary to its own conservation.'‡ The principle which was to swell into the 'Weltmacht oder Untergang' of the Pan-Germans was already articulate—the principle that a State when it

* Don Luis de Haro, quoted in the 'Anti-Machiavel,' ed. 1740, p. 119.

† 'Considérations sur les Coups d'État.' The original edition (Paris, 1639) consisted of only twelve copies. It was reprinted at Rome in 1714. The dedication was to Cardinal De Bagni, a papal diplomatist, whose servant and librarian Naudé was. Naudé advocates political assassination as a justifiable *coup d'état*, and he is 'not afraid' to praise the Massacre of St Bartholomew as a master-stroke.

‡ Céleste, 'Louis Machon, apologiste de Machiavel.' Quoted by Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, p. 20.

ceases to expand begins to perish. The old political conception of unity and ordered interdependence, never effectively realised, had disappeared in the dreadful anarchy of the Thirty Years' War; and it was only a thinker here and there who, like Leibnitz, still valued as an ideal the legal fiction of the Holy Roman Empire. The Continent of Europe had, like the Italy of the 15th century, broken up into warring political groups, whose only hope of stability depended upon the balance of power among them. The analogy was, indeed, recognised; and the champions of the rival faiths of Christendom modelled their conduct on the example of 'atheistical' Italy. As to the general scope of their policy, that already foreshadowed the 18th century. Frederick William, the great Elector of Brandenburg, enlarged piously in his 'Political Testament' on 'the true virtues of a righteous ruler'; but in a sort of codicil to this testament he pointed out that the House of Austria was tottering to its fall, set out his own claims to the Duchy of Silesia, and developed in great detail a plan for seizing it by force the moment the death of the Emperor should be announced.* Beneath the mask of the 17th-century piety we already recognise the features of 18th-century diplomacy—'naked aggression veiled by genealogical pedantry, the struggle for the balance of power, the assertion of the *raison d'état* as the plea for all crimes.'†

In the vocabulary of the 18th century, 'philosophy' took the place of 'religion,' 'reason' that of 'faith,' and 'virtue' that of 'righteousness.' But, so far as political morals were concerned, the effect was much the same. Diplomacy, adjusting its language to the new fashion, merely invented a fresh jargon to disguise a realism offensive to the new canons of good taste; its exquisite politeness was but the reflexion of the elaborate manners of a society in which the slightest affront meant a challenge; and in the universal game of deception, of which the rules were perfectly understood, nobody was really deceived. The social prestige of sovereigns was exactly proportioned to their power; and power was

* Ranke, 'Preussische Geschichte,' ed. 1878, I, II, p. 518.

† Temperley, 'Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph. An episode of War and Diplomacy in the 18th century,' 1915.

calculated in terms of the taxable and conscribable 'souls' at their disposal. States were in fact estates, subject to all the rules of succession of private property; and sovereigns were great landlords (*Landesherren*, as the Germans still say), who strove to extend and round off their properties by judicious marriages, by exchanges, by buying reversions, and if need be by force.

The development of this unblushing *Realpolitik* had not taken place without protest. Machiavelli himself, after being patronised while alive by several Popes, was condemned when dead by another; and the 17th century, if it produced apologists, produced also indignant attacks upon him. The labours of diplomatists, moreover, had gradually evolved a mass of principles and precedents governing the intercourse of States, which jurists were busy building up into a system of public law; and amiable theorists, like the Abbé de St Pierre, saw in this the germ of a new Christian Republic which should realise at last the dream of perpetual peace. Clearly a political conscience was at work; and when, in 1740, there was published at The Hague, under the ægis of Voltaire, a drastic criticism of Machiavelli's 'Prince' and of the whole principle which it represented,* by a writer whose exalted rank was thinly disguised under the veil of anonymity, this was hailed as the dayspring of a new and nobler age. 'We congratulate our century,' wrote the editor of a French edition of Machiavelli's works published two years later, 'on seeing at last a system so pernicious, and so detestable, refuted in a fashion so thorough, so well reasoned, and so superior, that there is every reason to presume that it is about to fall into all the contempt and all the execration which it deserves.'† The anonymous author of the 'Anti-Machiavel' was Frederick the Great.

Of this essay in criticism Carlyle says that 'treatise

* 'Anti-Machiavel ou Essai de critique sur le Prince de Machiavel. Publié par M. de Voltaire.' La Haye, 1740. In this edition Frederick's text was much altered by Voltaire. The publisher, Jean van Duren, almost immediately issued another edition, with both Voltaire's version and Frederick's original, under the title 'Anti-Machiavel ou Examen du Prince,' etc.

† 'Oeuvres de Machiavel, nouvelle édition, augmentée de l'Anti-Machiavel et d'autres pièces.' La Haye, 1743, 6 tom. 12mo. Only extracts from the Anti-Machiavel are given in this.

fallen more extinct to existing mankind it would not be easy to name.' This contemptuous estimate is not deserved, for the 'Anti-Machiavel' is far more than a mere student's exercise in the application of abstract moralities. Though the whole argument rings the changes on the theme that honesty is the best policy even for princes, its youthful idealism is tempered by a keen sense of realities, and often there is revealed in it already the Frederick of the future. 'Princes,' he says, 'who look upon their people as the body of which they themselves are the soul, will be sparing of the blood of their subjects'; and 'war is an extreme resource which ought never to be used except in desperate cases.' But a prince's army is, none the less, 'his residence, his interest, his duty, his glory'; and he agrees with Machiavelli that he ought to lead it in person.

'I admit (he says) that there are unhappy circumstances in which a prince has no choice but to break his treaties and alliances; but he ought to quit them like an honest man, by giving timely warning to his allies, and above all he should never go to this extreme without being forced to do so by consideration for his people's good or by dire necessity.'*

The later Frederick peeps through more evidently in his remarks on the usefulness of treaties. It is a fact, he says, that treaties are seldom carried out in full and often broken, but they are none the less useful, if only in ensuring for a time the neutrality of a possible enemy.† As for the maxim that princes are under no obligation to keep their word, 'it is very bad policy on their part to be cheats and to dupe the world. They will only dupe it once, and lose thereby the confidence of all the princes.' 'A prince,' he said, 'is like a man playing cards with honest men and sharpers; in order not to be swindled he must know how he is being cheated, without himself having to cheat.'‡

The completeness with which Frederick violated every one of the moral maxims of the 'Anti-Machiavel' the moment he was in a position to put them in practice suggests that this display of dove-like innocence was but a serpentine device for putting the world off its guard; and this suspicion is strengthened by the fact that the

* Ed. 1740, p. 120.

† *Ibid.*, p. 65.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

publication of the book at The Hague was announced in Berlin just eight days before its author invaded Silesia without warning.* However this may be, the Frederick whom at the present time it is important to study is not the critic of Machiavelli but the aptest of his pupils, as revealed in his acts, in his correspondence, and in his own later apologies for his methods. This study is important because the vast prestige of his success not only strengthened for a time in all Europe an evil tradition in politics, but established it so strongly in the counsels of Prussia, that it has survived the influences that elsewhere have tended to weaken if not to destroy it, and has thus become the inspiration, both in their aims and in their methods, of those Powers with whom the idealism of the rest of the world is waging a war of life and death. It is for this reason that, at this supreme crisis, a debt of gratitude is owing to the two eminent French scholars whose labours have made more accessible the material for the critical understanding of the political methods of Frederick the Great.

Their books differ greatly in scope and method. M. Waddington's monumental work, of which the fifth volume has now appeared, is a brilliant study of the Seven Years' War, based on a mass of fresh materials gathered from the archives. It is largely concerned with Frederick's campaigns, which are described in great detail yet with a masterly breadth of treatment; but the author has not overlooked the characteristic of Frederick's statecraft, which has remained that of Prussia ever since, namely, what Commandant Weil describes as 'the combined and often parallel action of more or less secret diplomatic negotiations and military operations.'

Commandant Weil's '*Morale politique du Grand Frédéric*' is a reprint, with an introduction and running comments, of the bulk of the first two of the thirty-five published volumes of Frederick's political correspondence. It has a more limited object than that of M. Waddington, and it covers an even shorter period, namely, from Frederick's accession to the throne on

* '*Nouvelles privilégiées de Berlin.*' No. lxx. Jeudi, 8 Décembre, 1740. 'A la Haye chez Jean van Duren est imprimé Examen du Prince de Machiavel avec des Notes historiques et politiques, *in octavo.*' Frederick crossed the frontier of Silesia on the 16th.

May 31, 1740, to the autumn of 1742. But, as M. Weil says,

'the friend of Voltaire, the author of the *Anti-Machiavel*, was never more perfidious, more audacious, more lucky, and more clever, but also more unscrupulous and therefore more interesting to study, more fertile in stratagems and Machiavellism, than during the strange period which extends almost from the day of his accession to the preliminaries of Breslau and the treaty of Berlin, with the interlude of the conclusion and breach of the Act of Klein Schnellendorf.

'For the rest, he so little modified his principles, he remained so consistent with himself, that when, in 1775, he wrote the preface to the "*Histoire de mon temps*" he only developed and accentuated the ideas which he had first enunciated in June 1742, when he tried to explain to his friend Jordan why he had thought good to make peace and abandon his Allies.'

It is impossible here to follow the intricacies of Frederick's policy even during these two years; it must suffice to illustrate its character by particular instances and quotations. The invasion of Silesia itself involved the tearing up of every treaty signed by Prussia for sixteen years past, including the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction by means of which the Emperor Charles VI had fondly hoped to secure the peaceful succession of his daughter Maria Theresa to the undivided inheritance of the House of Habsburg. In this respect Frederick set a precedent which, as the world knows well, has been faithfully followed by his successors. To his servants and intimates he laid bare his motives with great candour. On Nov. 1, 1740, he wrote to Count Podewils:

'I give you a problem to solve. When one has an advantage, ought one to profit by it or not? I am ready with my troops and everything. If I don't take advantage of this, I hold in my hands a good thing which I don't know how to use. If I do take advantage of it, they will say that I am clever enough to avail myself of the superiority which I have over my neighbours' (Weil, p. 51).

The great thing, he said, was to occupy Silesia before the winter, which could then be spent in negotiation; 'we shall negotiate with success when once we are in occupation,' a dictum which might profitably be studied

by those who, during the present war, have shown a tendency to be beguiled by the German proposals to open negotiations for peace 'based on the military situation.' Podewils, in reply, pointed out that the ancient rights of the House of Brandenburg in Silesia had long since been exchanged for trifles (*bagatelles*) by solemn treaties, but he added that means could always be found for reviving these rights. Frederick's answer is an epitome of his whole attitude and policy. 'The matter of right,' he said, 'is the concern of the Ministers, it is yours; it is time to work at it in secret, for the orders to the troops have been given.'

The principle on which he based this and all his other political actions is given in another letter to Podewils, written on May 12 of the following year from Breslau :

'It is a very dangerous thing to play the part of an honest man among rogues; to be scrupulous with deceivers is a desperate counsel, and one of which the success is mighty doubtful. What, then, is to be done? War and negotiation: that is precisely what your humble servant and his Minister are doing. If there is anything to be gained by being honest, we will be honest men; and, if it is necessary to deceive, let us be rogues.'

In these confidential notes to his own servants the real Frederick appears undisguised, but it is only in his correspondence with his fellow-sovereigns and their ministers that his duplicity is revealed in all its artistic completeness. His most perfidious letters, indeed, have so perfect a ring of sincerity that one would be tempted to think that when he wrote them he was for the moment sincere, with the sincerity of a great actor performing a part, were it not for the fact that he would often write two or more letters, equally sincere in appearance, in a different sense to different people at the same time. There can be no doubt that in this respect his diplomacy was as masterly as his strategy. He had entered alone on his great adventure, and he had to deceive the Powers as to his intentions until he could embroil them with one another, range them in opposite camps, and take sides with those who were prepared to offer him the best price. He began by proclaiming aloud the purity of his intentions. Ten days before he crossed

the frontier he wrote to Maria Theresa to assure her that his only object was, while asserting his just rights, to succour the House of Austria and save it from ruin. Six days later he was instructing his envoy at Munich to urge the Elector of Bavaria to press his claims to the Austrian succession and take up arms, but to urge this so cleverly 'that it will not seem that I intend openly to support the Court of Bavaria against that of Vienna.' It was only if Austria proved obstinate that he intended to join an alliance against her.

Meanwhile he courted both France and her rivals the maritime Powers, and attempted by exciting their jealousy to make them outbid each other for his friendship. In June 1740, immediately after his accession, he wrote to Truchsess von Waldburg, his representative in Hanover, bidding him 'affect in the presence of the French Ministers and creatures a great cordiality towards the English Ministers, even if there isn't really much.' In a letter to his envoy extraordinary in Paris, Colonel von Camas, he enclosed a personal note to Cardinal Fleury, couched in terms of the most flattering friendship:

'I write to you with the same sincerity with which you have written to me. A frank revelation of the heart demands a like revelation. I earnestly desire that you may see into the depths of mine, and read there all the sentiments of esteem.'

'Study the expression of his face,' he instructed Camas, 'and see what impression my letter is likely to make. You will do your best to get round him (*le cajoler*).' He had no intention, as he was to say later, of allowing himself to be hoodwinked by an ecclesiastic. As for the maritime Powers, 'the English are playing the fool and the Dutch the poltroon,' he wrote to Podewils; 'let us profit meanwhile by surmises and hoodwink them both at once.' Podewils reported that the English had a conscience about the Pragmatic Sanction. 'Let us lull them to sleep,' replied Frederick, 'and do our best to make them believe that we will agree to everything.' A few days before, on Jan. 30, 1741, he had written to King George II to assure him that he still looked upon him as his ally, and that he regarded it as his own duty not to have anything secret or hidden from him.

Thus the game went on. To tell the truth, as M.

Weil remarks, all the Powers were equally engaged in it; all were busy negotiating with both sides, with the exception of Russia, which alone categorically upheld the guarantee of the integrity of Austria which all had signed. But Frederick was their master in duplicity. On March 18, 1741, he concluded a secret treaty with France; on the 24th he wrote to Truchsess von Waldburg 'to win over Hanover, and Great Britain if possible.' 'You can protest,' he said, 'that up till now I have my hands free, not having concluded any alliance with France.' This was so far true that the formal alliance was not signed until June 4. Frederick saw reason to prefer that of England, and he instructed Podewils to drag out the negotiations with France pending the arrival of the English 'charlatan.' 'Meanwhile,' he said, 'you will continue to negotiate secretly with England and Russia in order to take the course most profitable according to the circumstances of the moment.' That was on April 13. On May 6 he was assuring Cardinal Fleury, on his word of honour, that he had his hands entirely free; on the 30th he instructed Podewils to keep the French ambassador in play (*vous devez chipoter avec Valory*) until the courier from Vienna should arrive; if the Austrian offers were not acceptable, he was to conclude with France. The offers were not acceptable; the secret treaty of alliance with France was signed; and, pending the effective intervention of the French troops, it was now the turn of the English mediator, Lord Hyndford, to be kept in play. 'Leave no stone unturned (*remuez le vert et le sec*) to deceive and dupe the Englishman,' Frederick had written to Podewils on May 31; 'I will give him a very good reception, and hope to dupe him.' The episode of Klein Schnellendorf proved his success.

This episode, for which even Carlyle thought it necessary to apologise, is interesting at the present moment as illustrating the Prussian conception of the interdependence of diplomacy and strategy. Early in September 1741 Frederick was held up on the line of the Neisse, which he wished to cross in order to lay siege to the fortresses of Neisse and Glatz. In these circumstances he had recourse to the now thoroughly hoodwinked Hyndford, through whose good offices it was arranged, on Sept. 25, that, in return for the cession

of Lower Silesia with Neisse, Frederick should allow the Austrians under Neipperg to march away unmolested and himself retire from the war, though without appearing to do so. On the strength of these preliminary conferences Frederick was allowed to cross the Neisse unopposed on the 26th. On Oct. 2 he wrote to Fleury that Austria had offered him terms which he had refused. 'I have stolen (*dérobé*) the passage of the Neisse from M. de Neipperg,' he added. On the 9th he met Neipperg himself at the château of Klein Schnellendorf, and there, in the presence of Hyndford and of diplomatic representatives of Austria, agreed to what they believed to be the formal preliminaries of peace, in exchange for the immediate surrender of Neisse. To hoodwink them the more completely he went so far as to give the Austrians some perfectly sound advice as to their conduct of the campaign against his allies the French. The Convention was, as usual, to be kept strictly secret, and Frederick refused to sign it, persuading the simple-minded *coquin d'Anglais* that his own signature as mediator was sufficient, since it was appended 'on his word as a King.' This enabled him to deny the very existence of the agreement, and to do so with every sign of genuine indignation, when it had served its turn and the leakage of the secret threatened to become inconvenient. To cover its traces he wrote to Fleury, on Oct. 29, a letter which M. Weil justly describes as a *chef d'œuvre* of Machiavellism. The artful and perfidious Court of Austria, he said, had made him the most advantageous offers if he would desert his allies, help to expel the Elector of Bavaria from Bohemia, and vote for the Duke of Lorraine as Emperor.

'I leave you to judge what answer had to be made to so ridiculous a proposal. . . . Your correspondent, my dear Cardinal, may be a heretic in religion, but I assure you that he is not one in politics, or in friendship, or in gratitude.'

Frederick had on a previous occasion assured the Cardinal that he made a religion of his treaty obligations. The truth of these professions was put to the test when, in March 1742, he began to believe that it would be to his interest to make a separate peace. There were still hesitations, but these were due, not to any lingering reverence for the principles of just dealing which he

himself had loudly proclaimed, but to the changes and chances of the political and military situation. To the last he protested that he was bound to France by an 'indissoluble attachment,' and that 'the Most Christian King with an ally so faithful as the King of Prussia has no occasion to yield to any one.' Within a month of this last effusion he had signed at Breslau the preliminaries of a separate peace, the definitive treaty being executed at Berlin on the 28th of the following month and ratified on Aug. 12. Frederick had gained all that he had set out to gain; and it was less than nothing to him that he left his allies floundering in a sea of troubles.

Frederick knew well that this peace was but a truce; he set to work at once to render it as stable as possible and at the same time to prepare for the next war. To Podewils he pointed out the necessity for 'habituating the Cabinets of Europe' to the new situation in which the war had placed Prussia, which could be done, he believed, by a display of 'a great deal of moderation and gentleness toward all our neighbours.' It was the policy of Bismarck in the years following 1871. But Europe had studied Frederick in his part of serpent too closely to believe in this new pose of dove-like harmlessness. His very virtues as a ruler, ruthlessly directed to the efficiency of the State, excited the justifiable distrust of neighbours who, remembering his former exploits, watched with misgiving the increase of his wealth and the monstrous growth of his armies. In the end a powerful coalition was formed against him; but Frederick, true to his principle of the 'offensive defensive,' on Aug. 25, 1756, suddenly poured his troops into Saxony, and so opened the Seven Years' War.

It is impossible here to do more than mention a struggle in which Frederick displayed once more all the extraordinary qualities of his genius both as a general and a statesman. M. Waddington's latest volume deals with the final phases, including the discreditable episode of Lord Bute's attempt to persuade Russia to press the war and so force Prussia to make peace, an intrigue which Frederick defeated by playing on the vanity of the feeble-minded Peter III.* Peter reigned just long enough to save his hero from destruction, but the

* See Waddington, v, chap. viii.

accession of Catherine II made no essential difference in the relations of Russia and Prussia. In the new Empress, who mounted the throne over the body of her murdered husband, Frederick could recognise a genius akin to his own. Peter III, as the French diplomatist Béranger reported home, 'was an extravagant enthusiast who, in contempt of all decencies, exposed grossly the designs he had of hurting us'; Catherine 'delivers herself over astutely to our enemies while assuring us of her sisterly affection.' She had, indeed, as Lord Buckinghamshire reported home from St Petersburg, no intention of breaking with Prussia, which might have forced the latter to an *entente* with France, and so have increased the influence of this nation in the affairs of Poland. Thus was foreshadowed that sinister partnership which, cemented by the common crime of the partition of Poland in 1772, was to cast its shadow over Europe almost to the eve of the present war.

Frederick had denounced as 'appalling treason' the suggestion mooted in St Petersburg in 1741 that Prussia should be partitioned. The partition of Poland, which he himself first suggested to the Empress Catherine, seemed to him justified by every reason of State. The acquisition of West Prussia, Ermeland, and the districts of the Netze and of Kulm would join the dissevered halves of his monarchy and weld it into a compact whole; the anarchy of the Republic was a nuisance and a menace to its neighbours; and, above all, the Poles were now too weak to offer resistance. If Russia and Austria could be persuaded to agree, the thing would be easy. In the Empress Catherine he found a willing accomplice; Maria Theresa, whose conscience was a troublesome reality, made foolish moral objections, but in the end, as Frederick put it, 'she wept, and took her share.' Thus was consummated an act of which, thirty-four years later, Friedrich von Gentz said that it was 'incomparably more destructive to the higher interests of Europe than previous acts of violence,' since it originated in that very 'union of regents' to which the world had hitherto looked as 'a beneficial barrier against lawless power and the passions of an individual oppressor.'*

* 'Fragments upon the Balance of Power.' Eng. ed., 1806, p. 76.

Without sharing Gentz's views as to 'the old magnificent constitution of Europe' which Frederick had thus done more than any one else to undermine, we may agree with him that the precedent of Poland encouraged beyond measure that 'partitional spirit' which was to dominate European politics until the rise of the spirit of nationality, which was in its turn to develop a new doctrine of conquest. Catherine II turned from the partition of Poland to that of Turkey, of which the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 marked a fresh stage. In 1777 Joseph II, less scrupulous than his mother, thought to take advantage of the extinction of the elder line of the House of Wittelsbach to follow in the case of Bavaria the precedent set by Frederick, thirty-six years before, in the case of Silesia. The resulting war, that of the Bavarian Succession (1778-1779), in which Frederick took the field for the last time, illustrated once more to perfection all the characteristics of 18th-century statecraft as practised by its supreme master.* Even the French Revolution, which broke out ten years later, did not interrupt the tradition. In the troubles of France the partitioning Powers saw at first only a golden opportunity for completing the absorption of Poland and continuing that of Turkey; it was not until revolutionary France had herself turned aggressor that an effective coalition against her was formed. As for the French revolutionists, as Sorel has clearly shown, they accepted in full the traditional principle of the Reason of State; and the world knows well how the revolutionary gospel of peace was soon turned into the revolutionary doctrine of conquest. Frederick the Great was dead, but it was his teaching and example that still inspired the idealists of the Revolution. In 1792, Vergniaud, the greatest orator of the Gironde, thus urged his countrymen to war:

'Do not lose the advantage of your situation; attack, since everything now gives presage of a happy issue. If in the Saxon war Frederick had temporised, his successor would now perhaps be only margrave of Brandenburg. He attacked, and to-day the King of Prussia holds, with the Emperor, the political balance which has slipped from our hands.'

* See Temperley, 'Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph,' cited above.

And out of the Revolution sprang Napoleon 'fully armed, as Minerva from the brow of Jove.' He too had studied in the school of Frederick and his masters; and his diplomatic methods, utterly devoid of scruple, did not differ from those of his models. 'The kidnapping of the Duke of Enghien on neutral territory,' says Sorel, 'his summary condemnation and execution, were in reality a trap followed by an assassination; the invasion of Rome, the arrest of the Pope, the seizure of the Vatican archives, form the conclusion of the series.' As *coups d'état* they would have won the commendation of Gabriel Naudé.

The success, not the wickedness, of Napoleon produced a sort of moral reaction in Europe. The Governments allied against him needed a binding principle, and they affected to find it in that old 'public law' of Europe which, as Sorel scornfully remarks, had been known only 'through the declamations of publicists and its breach by the sovereigns.' This attitude was, indeed, in part sincere; and it is significant that it was most sincere in those countries where, as in Great Britain, diplomacy was 'hampered,' as Metternich put it, by the pressure of an articulate public opinion. But the extent and depth of this political conversion could not be gauged until the cause which had produced it was removed; and it is for this reason that a particular interest attaches to the revelation of the inner life of the Congress of Vienna given to the world by the publication of the reports of the Austrian secret police during its session, now admirably edited by Weil in two stout volumes.

To our knowledge of the serious work of the Congress these reports contribute little or nothing, for the throwing open of the archives has long made accessible the proceedings of the inner councils of the Powers, of which at the time only broken rumours circulated in Vienna and were duly recorded by the agents of the Government. But, as a revelation of the mental and moral background of the Congress, they are invaluable; and it is with political morals, rather than with policies, that we are here concerned. From this point of view the revelation is anything but edifying. In these documents—intercepted letters, reports by high-placed spies of intimate conversations and secret conferences, records of the comings and goings of any one, however exalted or

humble, who seemed worth watching—there is no sign of any change of heart. It is the revelation of a political world which has learned nothing and forgotten nothing. Hardly anywhere is there any mention of the interests of the peoples, still less of their will; but there is much talk of 'souls' to be won or lost by this Power or that.

There was, indeed, a parade of principles. Talleyrand, that veteran dissembler, preached his new gospel of legitimacy in and out of season, and thus attached to the interests of France all the little potentates who feared the insatiable appetite of Prussia and the vague ambitions of the Emperor Alexander. The mediatised princes of Germany raised in chorus the cry of 'Liberty'; but for them the word meant only the restoration of their microscopic sovereignties. The Pope, through Cardinal Consalvi, exalted once more the ideal of the Holy Roman Empire as 'the centre of political unity,' but all his practical efforts were directed solely to safeguarding his own temporal sovereignty as an Italian Prince.* The Emperor Alexander, inspired by the Pole Czartoryski and the Greek Capo d'Istria, talked of the rights of nationalities, but to his favourite of the moment, the Princess Bagration, he confided his true attitude in the matter of Poland: 'Poland is ours; I hold it with 200,000 men; we shall see who will drive me out.'† As for the Prussians, they too affected a lofty idealism, as the champions of Germanism and of constitutional freedom. When their claim to the whole of Saxony threatened to lead to immediate war with Austria, they proclaimed their intention of appealing to the German people. Their Government was at work on the new Prussian Constitution; and the people would turn to the Power whose institutions were most in harmony with the spirit of the age. The moment war broke out, the Constitution would be published; and in Saxony the masses at least would know on which side to be in what would be a war between democracy and aristocracy.‡

Poor *Turnvater* Jahn and the idealists of the *Tugendbund* were really deceived by this pose, the hypocrisy of

* See Weil, 'Les Dessous,' i, p. 209, No. 254, and ii, p. 227, No. 1870.

† *Ibid.* i, p. 206, No. 252. Cf. Anstett's statement, p. 510, No. 748.

‡ *Ibid.* i, p. 690, No. 1073.

which they were later to discover to their cost; but not so the cynics of Vienna, who were not in the least impressed when the Prussians 'acted the holy apostle and complained that doubt should be thrown on the purity of their intentions.'* 'Prussia,' said the old Prince de Ligne, 'has a great appetite.' The pious feebleness of Frederick William III, indeed, placed him beyond all suspicion of Machiavellism; but, as the Prince de Ligne said, 'he leaves everything to his Ministers, and in them the spirit of Frederick reigns absolutely.'† Their object, as every one knew, was solely the aggrandisement of Prussia and her predominance in Germany. This was the policy of Frederick the Great, the policy which later Bismarck was to carry to a victorious conclusion; and it is one of the strangest ironies of history that the defeat at Vienna of Prussia's aims on Saxony, and her establishment on the Rhine instead, should have in the end done more than anything else to contribute to this result. As for the political principle upon which, from first to last, Prussia has acted, this is vividly illustrated in these records by a retort of Humboldt to the Bavarian General von Wrede, who had appealed to 'God and Right.' 'You invoke God,' said the Prussian, 'and mix up religion with an affair which men alone ought to decide. We have nothing more to say to you.'‡

It cannot justly be said that at Vienna the attitude of the Prussians was in this respect singular. The *chronique scandaleuse* of the Congress, which forms a large part of these volumes, must not detain us, save to remark that it reveals an amazingly low standard both of public and private morals. An insatiable thirst for frivolous and low pleasures, a petty personal ambition, an almost naive personal vanity—these are the qualities which, to judge by these confidential reports, distinguished the exalted personages upon whom the future of the world's order depended. 'I was invited to come to an assembly of just men,' complained the King of Denmark, 'and I find myself lost in a labyrinth.'§ Some just men there were of course. Castlereagh, for instance—at whom Vienna mocked because of the *gaucherie* of his

* Well, 'Les Dessous,' i, p. 633, No. 964.

† *Ibid.* i, p. 648, No. 996.

‡ *Ibid.* i, p. 161, No. 197.

§ *Ibid.* i, p. 403, No. 559.

manners and his habit of walking arm-in-arm with his wife—laboured single-mindedly for what he considered to be the interest of Europe, namely, a lasting peace based on a 'just equilibrium,' and so did much to establish that new and higher tradition which, on the whole, determined the moral standpoint of 19th-century diplomacy.* But in this 'European' attitude he was practically isolated, in spite of the lofty pretensions of the Emperor Alexander, who became a byword even in Vienna for falseness and immorality. 'It has needed more than twenty years,' wrote the Marquis de Bonnavy, 'to open the eyes of the sovereigns with regard to revolutionary France. How many years will be needed to make them realise the folly and the curse of their rival ambitions?' †

'I have watched every day,' Castlereagh wrote home, 'the astonishing tenacity with which all the Powers cling to the smallest point of separate interest.' This tenacity was apparent from the first, and these reports are full of expressions of fear that the Congress would break up even before it had properly assembled. 'God grant,' wrote the Swedish envoy Loewenhjelm to his brother, 'that the members of the Congress won't act like the Fathers of the Council of Nicæa, who decided the question of the Trinity with their fists.' ‡ Of such invocations of Providence there are not many in these reports; but one other may be cited as summing up the whole spirit of the Congress. It was when the return of Napoleon from Elba once more threatened everything with ruin that the diplomatist Treitlingen, in a letter to the Princess of Turn and Taxis, expressed the pious hope that Providence might still bless the more important efforts of the Congress. 'God grant,' he said, 'that just indemnities will be assigned to the House of Your Most Serene Highness.' §

It is not germane to our purpose to criticise the settlement of Vienna. Opinion at the Congress itself expected at one time no more than another Peace of Amiens, a mere interlude in the 'bellum omnium contra

* See Professor C. K. Webster's admirable study on 'England and the Polish-Saxon Question at the Congress of Vienna.' (Spottiswoode, 1913.)

† Well, 'Les Dessous,' i, p. 538, No. 783.

‡ *Ibid.* i, p. 336, No. 453.

§ *Ibid.* ii, p. 397, No. 2049.

omnes.' Out of the labyrinthine intrigues of the Congress there was in fact, however, evolved a system which did ensure an unprecedented period of peace. But it was none the less true that this system contained all the germs of future war; and to the reasons for this not all at the time were blind. In concluding this all too short account of these interesting volumes we may quote in this connexion an appreciation of the work of the Congress given by the Hanoverian diplomatist von Reden in conversation with the Papal nuncio :

'To judge by the partitions sanctioned among the Powers, without any regard to the geographical position of the countries, to the moral and other idiosyncracies of the nations, or to the imprescriptible rights of the peoples, it appears that the sovereigns have merely done a deal (*marchandé*), and thus by a purely arbitrary process assigned to their Empires the territories which happened to suit them.' *

This is the one piece of evidence in all these reports that there was anywhere any realisation of the fact that the weakness of the work of the Congress of Vienna lay in the survival of the old 'partitional spirit' and in the total neglect of the new forces which were to determine the history of the 19th century.

However short-sighted and unjust the treaties of Vienna may have been, they did at least provide Europe with an authoritative code of International Law; and, however narrow and reactionary the Alliance which sponsored them, this at least tended to encourage a new sense of the community of interests between the members of the European body politic. During the 19th century a new standard of political ethics as between State and State was gradually established. To exaggerate the change would be absurd in view of the events of recent years; but that change there has been is proved by the all but universal reprobation evoked by the Prusso-German methods in diplomacy and war, methods which in the 17th and 18th centuries would have surprised nobody and shocked very few. The change is in the fundamental conception of the relations between States.

* Well, 'Les Dessous,' ii, p. 569, No. 2405.

The inventors of the old systems, as Mr Denys P. Myers * puts it, 'operated on a theory of innate enmities, which is now obsolete by intervening disproof.' Diplomacy was considered only as part of the mechanism of war, whereas before the outbreak of the present war its main concern had come to be with the mechanism of peace. The object of foreign policy, indeed, remained and remains, not abstract justice, but the advantage of the State; but it has become increasingly evident that the permanent advantage of one State cannot be based upon injustice to another. It is only within the last fifty years, says Mr Myers, that there has been any general conception of a policy of fairness as something inuring to the good of the State in the long run; and the diplomatist is still essentially an advocate whose duty is to make the weaker case seem the stronger. But in general we have advanced greatly from the time when a Gabriel Naudé could define the duties of an ambassador as 'to spy out the actions of foreign princes, and to dissemble, cover and disguise those of his own master.' When, in the middle of the last century, the Comte de Garden defined diplomacy as, *inter alia*, 'the art of reconciling the interests of peoples one with another' he was not so much proclaiming an ideal as announcing a change.

The 'to be or not to be' of this new ideal of international relations is the fundamental issue of the present war. When we speak of Prussian militarism, we do not mean the Prussian military power, but the whole spirit of Prussian policy, which has remained unaffected by the new ideas, stereotyped in the traditions of the 18th century, and firmly grounded in the principle of Frederick the Great that 'Distrust is the mother of security.' For Prussia-Germany, as is now only too clear, diplomacy has remained only a part of the mechanism of war, which is for her 'the father of all things.' Her diplomacy during the years of peace was, as we now realise, but a preparation for the day of war; she spread the network of her secret agents over every country in the globe, with an efficiency which the chiefs of the Secret du Roi

* See his 'Notes on the Control of Foreign Relations,' in the 'Recueil de Rapports,' issued by the 'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable,' Part III (The Hague, 1917). This is a brilliant criticism of the suggested 'democratic control' of foreign policy.

would have envied ; in her dealings with foreign Powers she took for her maxim Frederick's 'Let us lull them to sleep'—and she succeeded. In carrying on the war itself, too, she is true to the Frederician tradition in the cunning combination of diplomacy with military operations. At Brest-Litovsk the Bolshevik negotiators, blinded by fanatical devotion to a crude political and economic creed, fell into a trap similar to that prepared for the Austrians at Klein Schnellendorf, and with far more disastrous results. The repeated peace manoeuvres, nicely timed to suit the exigencies of the military situation, differ in form only from the similar manoeuvres of Frederick. He addressed himself to monarchs and their ministers, in letters admirably calculated to disarm suspicion ; the German Chancellor, as the times require, addresses himself to the peoples, in speeches of which the apparent candour and moderation are calculated to hide from the simple and ignorant the fact that they commit him to nothing. Their object is the same—to sow doubt and distrust in the ranks of their opponents, and so to weaken their power of military resistance.

It is to the credit of the democracies in arms that this false coin has gained so small a currency among them. Let them look to it that they persevere until the cry for peace from the enemy rings true, which it will never do until he realises that his great adventure has failed. For the free peoples are engaged in a life-and-death struggle 'with principalities and powers, and the rulers of darkness in high places' ; and upon their steadfastness the future of the world's order depends.

WALTER ALISON PHILLIPS.

Art. 8.—THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIVE RACES.

* MANY and diverse are the problems which present themselves to a political officer in the course of his work among the natives of Africa. The greatest of these, although it is sometimes relegated to the background as not calling insistently for immediate solution, is the question as to what is the final goal to the attainment of which all the energy which he sees exerted in the interests of the natives is directed. Is it our object so to establish the conditions now existing that they shall last for ever? Or, if not, what conditions are we trying to establish?

Races have been conquering each other since the dawn of history; and the practical results, in course of time, have been that the conquered race either fused with the conquerors, or was exterminated, or at length recovered its liberty. During the more recent past, the civilised nations of Western and Central Europe have conquered—or, it would be more accurate to say, gained dominion over—the coloured races of the world on a scale which has no parallel in history, so that full independence is to-day enjoyed by but few of those groups of human beings to whom we apply in common parlance the term 'native.' Not only have the groups 'dominating' and 'dominated' become far larger, but there is a greater divergence between their mental and physical characteristics than was to be found in earlier historical times. These differences have been accentuated by the appearance from time to time in history of great leaders of thought, and of the founders of religion. The lines of cleavage have thus become so pronounced that the fusion of European with native races has now become impossible without causing racial deterioration.

In the past, when the principle of *ex victis* was accepted, the conqueror might destroy, enslave or export the conquered to his own advantage. Such a principle is not tolerated to-day; it is not only opposed to our moral ideals, but it is obviously impracticable, owing to the vast populations involved; moreover it is generally recognised as economically unsound. If we cannot fuse with or exterminate the dominated races, what then is

going to happen to them in the future? Is it to be supposed that a large proportion of the human race will remain for ever in a state of tutelage, subject to a minority of other human beings, like themselves in all but mental equipment? Can it be conceived that the present abnormal conditions will be tolerated without demur by the dominated, or even be sanctioned by public opinion generally among the dominating races, if it were understood that they are to continue indefinitely?

Such an hypothesis is, I think, inconceivable; and it may be assumed that, history repeating itself, the dominated races will strive after and some day accomplish their emancipation. It is certainly possible to delay the process, and perhaps to retard it very greatly, but only at the cost of suspicion, and finally of hostility, between the rulers and the ruled. It is also possible, and in my opinion infinitely more politic, to assist and guide the dominated races towards an evolution which will secure friendly relations, profitable to both sides, during the process, and will result in the permanent establishment of such a nexus as exists between members of a federation rather than that which holds between conqueror and conquered. This can be done by adopting a policy which, by affording opportunities for the emergence of the native leader, and scope for the employment of his natural abilities and ambitions, tends to re-establish normal conditions of racial growth in the body politic of the dominated race.

There are two different systems, either of which may be adopted by a European government for the control of a native race. I am referring, of course, only to those areas where the native populations enormously exceed the European population, as is the case in West Africa, and not to such places as Barbados, where the conditions are quite different. One of these may be termed 'Direct Rule,' the other 'Indirect Rule.' A third, or intermediate system, a kind of mixture of the other two, may also exist, and indeed is sometimes, as we shall see, necessary; but we need not linger over this. The essential distinction is that between 'Direct' and 'Indirect Rule.' The intermediate system is only a halfway house on the road to one or the other.

By 'Direct Rule,' then, I mean that form of administration which places the government of the country entirely in the hands of European officials, minor posts only, such as clerkships, being filled by natives, while the policing of the country is entrusted to European officers, with coloured subordinates in government employ, wearing government uniform. This system necessarily entails either the abolition of the Emirs and Chiefs, or their retention as figure-heads only; and the abolition of native Courts of Justice, or such curtailment of their powers as to render them of little use. In short, it means replacing the native leader by the European official with his native staff. The underlying policy of this system is the establishment of European institutions and modes of life and thought among the natives as rapidly as possible.

By 'Indirect Rule' I mean a system of administration which leaves in existence the administrative machinery created by the natives themselves. It recognises the Emirs, Chiefs, and native Councils, native Courts of Justice (Mohammedan or pagan), native Police controlled by a native executive, as real living forces, and not as curious and interesting pageantry. It brings European influence to bear on the native indirectly, through his chiefs, and not directly through European officials; and under it the European, keeping himself a good deal in the background, leaves the mass of native individuals to understand that the orders which come to them emanate from their own chiefs rather than from the all-pervading white man. The underlying policy of this system is to assist the native to develop that civilisation which he can himself evolve.

The system of Direct Rule has many supporters; in fact, the vast majority of people who have not been in close contact with native affairs, and even many who have, would, I think, say that it is the only proper system. 'What is the good,' they argue, 'of bolstering up these corrupt, often ridiculous institutions? Make a clean sweep of the lot. Waste no time in trying to reform what has proved itself to be out-of-date and ineffective. Introduce an executive of wholesome-minded young British officers; let them learn the native languages; they will soon know more about the needs of

the natives than the natives themselves. Set up British Courts of Justice; a few modifications in English law will be necessary, but a criminal code can easily be drafted; let the native see that he is equal to the white man before the Law. Pay due respect to all religious institutions; these do not affect material issues, but, so far as possible, introduce the institutions which have been so successful in our own country. Encourage individualism, raise the native out of his servile state, teach him to be a man and look the world in the face. Show him how ridiculous and harmful are many of his superstitions. Possibly, after a time, you may find that a select few of the natives may be advanced to hold quite fairly responsible positions. Encourage capital to come into the country; lease or sell blocks of land, now unoccupied, to Europeans. By all means prohibit speculation, and keep out the company promoter, but encourage white men to settle. They will bring capital and brains; they will plant and irrigate; they will teach the native to farm his land. Thus all will be well, and there will be no necessity for any change ever to take place.' These arguments sound reasonable enough; and in point of fact large blocks of native subject races have been governed and are still governed in this fashion, not without some apparent outward success. Given extraordinarily good political officers, much may be done under this system.

You can certainly secure law and order and a high degree of material prosperity by such means; but all the nobler aspirations of human nature are not only disregarded, but are actually stifled. The fetters of tutelage are not gradually unloosed; they are rather the more firmly riveted as time goes on. By this system a few of the natives may be educated on European lines, and individually may develop abilities and qualities of a high order; but in the very process they become denaturalised. They lose touch with their own people; they come to view life more or less from the white man's point of view; the traditional customs, habits and behaviour of their own countrymen become strange and even distasteful or ridiculous to them; in short, they become just as much a class apart as the white men themselves. Suppose that you have been able to carry out

the system of Direct Rule to its ideal limits, and that you have educated a sufficient number of natives on European lines, and educated them sufficiently well to justify the placing of the government to a large extent in their hands, even so you will not have advanced appreciably in re-establishing the normal conditions of evolution in the race as a whole. The educated native officials will be just as much a class apart as were the European officials whom they have replaced. The best that can be hoped for will be that on the whole they will not do their work less well than did the Europeans.

Nor is that all. These natives educated on European lines are, on the one hand, by their education detached psychologically and materially from their fellows, and, on the other, they are not, by their education, attached to the European fold. They cannot live and work on terms of complete equality with Europeans either as officials or as private individuals. Of those who hold the contrary view I would ask, Do you consider that intermarriages between the two races are feasible, productive of happiness, or likely to elevate either race? For without such intermarriage there cannot be social equality. Unless the native can marry into the families of Europeans, and such marriages are recognised as normal, no amount of intercourse between the males at business or at the Council Board or occasions of official ceremony will establish anything resembling normal conditions of equality. Separated from his own people and their ideals, debarred from entering the fold of the European, the native, with very few exceptions, will be bound to feel that something is wrong somewhere; and this feeling will probably result in restlessness, discontent, and finally hostility towards the European who has brought about so unsatisfactory a state of affairs.

I have described Indirect Rule as the government of natives through their own institutions, possibly modified to some extent in order to avoid practices which we consider repugnant to reason and humanity. This sounds rational enough in theory, and it may be asked, who would question the feasibility of so obvious a proposal? In practice, however, the matter is not so simple as it appears. To put this policy into real effect means, first of all, that you must shut your eyes, up to a certain

point, to a great many practices which, though not absolutely repugnant to humanity, are nevertheless reprehensible to our ideas, and especially to those ideas which shape the mind of the British official. You must have patience with the liar, though he lie seventy times seven; you must at times have patience with the speculator of public funds (a hard pill this to swallow); you must very generally have patience not only with the honest fool but with the slacker too. You have to make up your mind that men are *not* all equal before the law, and cannot be treated as if they were. An important chief must not be made to work among a gang of felons from the common herd, even though his crimes be far blacker than any of theirs. This is difficult to do in practice. We read of notable persons even in English history accepting bribes and doing various acts which to-day we regard with horror, without at once condemning them as wholly bad, or regarding the regime under which they lived as one which should never have been tolerated for a day.

Nevertheless, if an African chief does any of these things, there are many who will not only want to cast him into the deepest dungeon but also to abolish the office which he held, and do away with the whole system which he represents as rotten to the core. It is hard to get some officials to realise that it is right to punish by imprisonment a policeman who, when travelling, every evening demands and is given by the villagers, free of charge, a fowl for his supper; whereas it would be crass folly thus to punish a native chief, travelling perhaps with a number of followers, who does exactly the same thing on an infinitely greater scale. If it is difficult for the officer in immediate administrative charge to wink at, or even to authorise, practices which stir the depths of his nature to holy indignation, it is ten times more difficult for the higher powers, subject as they are to the criticism of well-meaning but possibly ignorant persons at home, to risk incurring the odium which may be acquired by allowing, and even more by authorising, European officers under their control thus to countenance practices abhorrent to the public opinion of this country. Nevertheless I desire to say, with all the emphasis at my command, that, unless men are found with shoulders broad enough to carry such responsibilities, the British

nation will misunderstand, and fail to discharge, in a proper manner, those duties towards the native races which it has deliberately imposed upon itself.

Granted patience, careful study, administrative ability—qualities which are all at the disposal of the nation in a remarkable degree—there is no reason why the native should not be gradually led up the 'steep slope of civilisation,' to quote Walter Bagehot, without reducing him to a state of collapse on the journey. The process must necessarily be slower in some districts than in others, but I believe that there is one, and only one, road, however long it may be, by which we can truly assist the development of the native under our care. That path follows the natural evolution of the native race. We must lead him along that path, and not persuade or compel him to leave it and follow our path. We must teach him to be a good citizen of his own country first, and he may then become a good citizen of the Empire.

*The native
cannot be forced to
be made into a citizen.*

By implanting in his mind a contempt for his own institutions, by persuading him or compelling him to adopt our modes of life, we divorce him from his own natural entourage, and he becomes alienated. And what have we to give him in exchange? We give him stiff-fronted shirts and starched collars and clothes well-cut according to our own ideas; but these garments offend his æsthetic sense at least as much as they do our own, and reduce the natural vitality of his constitution. We may even give him, to a limited extent, the keys of learning, art and science. But what are all these things compared to fellowship, the society of equals, pride of race, patriotism? Of all these essentials we deprive him when we persuade him to leave the fellowship of his kind and the frame in which Providence has set him, and to enter within the pale of our society, where he must be as a stranger at a feast. When we balance the good we can do him against such disadvantages, the scale turns against us; and we incur a grave responsibility when we subject him to the temptations to vice which are inherent in our civilisation. x

An important point to be kept in mind, in connexion with the question of Direct or Indirect Rule, is the

influence of the House of Commons over the administration of the subject native races. There is a great measure of centralisation in the government of all these races. All attempts to decentralise are rendered unavailing, or are much restricted, by the fact that all action taken in any colonies or dependencies must be susceptible of explanation by the Government of the day to public opinion at home, as expressed by the House of Commons. Where the native is ruled 'directly,' the responsibility for every action taken is traceable from the District Officer or Resident who took such action through the senior officers of the government of the colony up to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with whom the ultimate responsibility lies. This fact renders centralisation unavoidable; every one of these officials must be in a position to prove, not only to the authorities, but to a crowd of persons entirely unacquainted with native affairs, that he has not been remiss. The result is what a great authority—I think I am right in saying Lord Morley—has described as 'a striving after over-efficiency.' Every officer in the service becomes over-anxious lest one of his juniors should commit, not a mistake—about which he does right to be anxious—but what may be construed as a mistake by a possibly hostile and misinformed critic.

Thus we get a continual tendency to over-centralisation. A Resident makes a mistake; we promptly set up a system under which neither he nor any other Resident will ever be in a position to make such a mistake again; quite forgetting the adage that he who never makes a mistake will never make anything. So, gradually, all power becomes more and more centralised, until the man who alone is in the best position to act wisely, because he is in closest touch with the native—that is to say the Resident or District Commissioner—is deprived of all opportunity to make mistakes, which is tantamount to saying that he is deprived of all opportunity of exerting any useful initiative. To a certain extent this disadvantage is an inevitable concomitant of foreign rule over native races, whatever system be adopted; but misinformed and ignorant criticism has far more power to damage a 'directly' than an 'indirectly' ruled native community. Public opinion, guided by a natural and

very sound instinct, is more likely to think actions that seem strange to European ideas may nevertheless be justifiable if they be performed by a native authority.

Direct Rule, therefore, has a tendency to centralise authority, and to render it difficult to introduce measures beneficial to the natives but strange to European ideas. 'Indirect Rule' has an exactly contrary tendency. The resultant of these various forces acting on the policy adopted often leads to a complete divergence between the theory and the practice of the government of natives. Not seldom one finds that the native chiefs and administrators are in theory being upheld, but that in practice they are deprived of all power and opportunity to exert initiative, and are in point of fact mere puppets in the hands of the European administrative officers. Who can wonder that, placed in such a position, they sometimes lose heart and that their characters deteriorate?

I can perhaps best illustrate the preceding remarks by describing the work of a Resident. It would not be possible within the scope of this article to give a detailed account of his duties; but, in order to elucidate, and I hope to enforce, the arguments which have been used to support the system of ruling natives indirectly, through the medium of their own laws, customs, and institutions, I will at least try to outline the manner in which such general principles can be, and are being in many cases, put into practice in some parts of Nigeria by the Political Department.

In the first place, the Resident, as administrator of a Province, is held responsible for the smooth working of the wheels of government within his jurisdiction. Should native unrest appear, or should the work of the technical Departments, such as those of Public Works, Forestry, or Agriculture, be hampered by lack of labour, the hostile attitude of the natives, scarcity of food, or other causes, the person who is first called upon for an explanation is the Resident. It rests chiefly with him whether the Government is a success or a failure, as all Government orders are conveyed to the natives by the political officers. I use the phrase 'all orders' literally, including orders which are given by means of laws as well as those which take a possibly more ephemeral

form and are called 'executive' orders. It is the political officers, and they only, who are in a position to see that these orders are carried out. They can rightly, therefore, be held responsible so long as they are not hampered either by the lack of a recognised policy or by over-centralisation, which, by necessitating reference to head-quarters for approval before the most trifling executive acts can be performed, causes the prestige of the white man, as well as that of the native Administrations to be impaired. Such references are justifiable only in cases where the head-quarters authorities are in a position to assist the Resident. All references *pro forma* are, in my opinion, mischievous.

In an advanced group, such as one of the Filane Emirates or great Yoruba Chieftainates, the machinery of a small Government is already in being. At the head is the Emir with his Council (the Diwan of India), to whom the District Heads and Village Heads, the native Courts of Justice, native police, etc., are responsible. The revenue is collected by this machinery, one half being paid to Government, the other half into the Emir's treasury. The Residents, as the Emirs' advisers, of course exert a great influence over all this machinery (sometimes there may be over a thousand native officials and funds up to £100,000 of annual expenditure to be supervised); and in addition they are entrusted, through the Provincial Courts, with great judicial powers. Thus the responsibility borne by a Resident and the power entrusted to him are very great. Nevertheless he should not, in my opinion, as I have just stated, be unduly interfered with in its exercise, nor be continually called upon to give a why and wherefore for his every act; he must often act on intuition. He will of course make mistakes, and, if called upon to give lengthy explanations, will certainly make more. He should rather be judged by results generally, and given a fairly free hand within the limits of the policy laid down by the Government.

Before our occupation of these territories, the great Emirs and Chiefs, though nominally autocrats, were nevertheless subject, and also very susceptible, to public opinion. As a result, whatever harm they may have done to the independent tribes on their borders, they generally ruled their own people with moderation and justice. The

position has now changed. The Emirs and their Chiefs are no longer restrained by the public opinion of their own people; they are responsible to a power which works from afar. The functions of public opinion as a restraining force are now vested in the Political Department.

In order to carry out his duties, which are, in brief, to see that the people are well and justly ruled, but on native lines, a Resident must, so far as possible, keep his authority in the background, concealed, if not from the Emir and his immediate entourage, at all events from the people generally. At the same time he must be on the alert to stamp out and if possible forestall the growth of the innumerable devices by which oppression and malpractices can be introduced. When abuses arise he must, generally speaking, put an end to them, not by outward and visible acts of his own, but by causing the Emir to move in the right direction. To do this he must be fully and correctly informed as to all that is going on among the people; and, to attain this end, he must be in touch with the people; he must get his knowledge at first hand. It follows that he must be readily accessible to the common folk. At the same time he has to be on his guard lest, by so doing, he should encourage the people to despise their own Courts and thus impair the authority and prestige of the Emir. Should he fall into this error, he will, as a first result, place the Emir in a difficult position, lessen his power over his people, and engender hostility in his breast towards the European Administration; and, as a second result, he will find himself spending hour after hour, day after day, settling the ownership of a goat, a fowl, or a native robe worth five shillings.

It may readily be supposed that this keeping-in-touch with the people without impairing the authority of the Emir, and consequently of the whole Native Administration, is no easy task, and one on which any amount of administrative tact and ability can be exerted. It is generally the case that the Resident has to deal with an Emir or Chief extremely sensitive about his dignity, but by no means always inclined to play a fair game, or averse from doing a little extortion for his personal advantage. The Emir is surrounded by a group of

powerful subordinate Chiefs, each of whom is playing for his own hand, greedy of power, as jealous and sensitive as the Emir himself, and all too ready to take advantage of any opportunity to play off the Resident against the Emir, and to commit acts of oppression if they see their way to debarring the Resident from contact with the common people. Finally, there is a populace prone to vacillate between two extremes, at one time bringing frivolous complaints against their Chiefs, at another submitting without complaint to surprising exactions. It will be evident that, under such conditions, the Resident must keep himself in the background, and resist the temptation to become a popular hero with the people (a comparatively easy thing to do), to fill the position of a big native Chief, or to wear, figuratively speaking, the turban of the Emir—a temptation to which human nature renders him susceptible. But, on the other hand, he must be a living force, regarded with confidence by the people as their protector in the last resort, and with respect by the Emir and his Chiefs, who must feel that they cannot throw dust in his eyes, but at the same time can rely on him to support them in the exercise of their legitimate authority.

To carry out these duties, it is of course necessary that a Resident should be naturally sympathetic towards natives—or he will not have the endless patience necessary—and should possess many other qualities, such as aptitude to pick up native languages. But, above all, he must possess a sense of proportion. He must be able to judge the comparative urgency of reforms; and also to know when a reform, however much to be desired, cannot be put into effect. He must be able so to gauge a situation as to know where patience should be exerted and where prompt punitive action should be taken. More especially he must be able so to judge character as to know how and on which individuals he can exert his influence so as to secure the widest results; otherwise he will waste half his efforts on natives of mediocre capacity and little weight.

* It is often said that, while such an ideal as I have described may be attainable in cases where the natives have already made considerable advance, the adoption

of the policy of Indirect Rule is impossible in the case of the more primitive tribes. From this view I venture to differ. I do not admit that any tribe can be found without any organisation. Without some organisation how comes it to be there? How has it survived in the struggle for existence which has been going on for countless generations? Some organisation must exist; and, though for a time it may be necessary for the Resident to do much himself, and to bulk large in the eyes of the populace, yet all his efforts should be directed towards fostering the development of the best native customs and modes of government, starting from the family unit if necessary. In other words, the underlying policy should be the same, though the mode of putting it into effect may differ.

Under the system of Indirect Rule, the influence of the European is not only brought to bear on the native in such a manner as to foster the growth of a healthy self-respecting national spirit among all classes of a native unit, but it is brought to bear in the most effective manner possible through the agency of natural leaders. Where the native organisation has been swept away, this influence cannot be brought to bear on the natives generally, but only on a few with whom the European comes into personal contact. I assume, as a postulate, that the influence exerted by a European official over the natives of whom he is in charge is the most important of administrative assets. The opening-up of new markets and the spreading of commerce, the provision of means of transport, railways, ships, etc.—all these are matters of the highest importance from the point of view of the administrator; but I submit that, when we are gauging our duties and responsibilities as a whole, they are a secondary consideration. Our first duty is to ensure that our rule shall operate as an elevating and not as a degrading force on the character of the subject race. We may take the son of a Kano farmer and make him a highly skilled mechanic, or even turn him into a barrister (a vocation for which the native mind, alas! is only too well suited); we may enable him thus to earn what for him may be termed fabulous wealth; yet, if we have, in the process, damaged the moral side of his character, we shall have

failed to discharge our first responsibility towards the man himself, and the community to which he belongs. It would be far better for all concerned to have left him in a state of comparative simplicity, to bring up a family and to carry on elementary but all-important work.

It is only by preserving all that is best in his own institutions, by encouraging, instructing and supporting the born native leader, that we can exert an influence of an enduring description on the native in the mass. There is always a great deal of good in native institutions; if we foster that, discouraging only what is bad, there is no limit to the progress which these native races may not secure under our rule. In some parts of Nigeria we found them already far advanced and able to a great extent to manage their own municipal affairs and finances; in other parts it will take long before they can be given any great measure of responsibility in respect to their own government, without being closely supervised; but the aims of our policy should, I submit, be the same in all cases.

By working on these lines, the Residents in Nigeria have achieved admirable results, not only among the more advanced Filane and Yoruba people but among the more primitive groups, those in the Bassa forests for instance. It is true that, even in Kano—to take the most advanced native State—a captious critic could point out matters where there is room for improvement. We know, for instance, that the native judges sometimes still take bribes, and have to be punished accordingly. Some of the Chiefs appear to be spending more money than their salaries would warrant. Some peculation of public funds before they reach the treasury, we think, takes place. But all these phenomena have occurred elsewhere; sticky palms are not confined to Africa. At the same time, we know that improvement is taking place, that the natives are on the whole prosperous and happy, and that a healthy self-respecting national spirit exists. We think that we can secure further improvement by pursuing the course of normal racial development rather than by attempting to pour the native mass into a mould fashioned after our own likeness.

It may be asked how modern material improvements

can be effected under a system of Indirect Rule. For instance, how can the native Emirs and their staffs build railways? I do not suggest that they should. A certain elasticity must be allowed in the application of every principle. No doubt the Native Administrations will be able to perform such tasks in the future, if we handle them rightly, but for the present a certain degree of Direct Rule is I admit generally unavoidable. Great public works must be done by Europeans; and it is not, except in rare cases, expedient that such Europeans should be paid, promoted and dismissed by native Emirs. All the same, it is not necessary, in order to effect such useful purposes as these, to upset the whole social fabric of a people's existence.

It may also be asked how native groups already living under Direct Rule, whose institutions have been so interfered with and disarranged that they are moribund, are to be dealt with. With regard to such areas the solution is, I think, to resuscitate the native institutions. I believe that this would be perfectly feasible; and from conversations which I have had with natives who may be said to belong to the 'denationalised' class, but whose characters and mental abilities are strong enough to bring their judgment through the ordeal unscathed—and I am happy to say there are many such—I gather that this policy would meet with a large measure of support among these natives themselves. How often have I, after passing in review the work of some of our native clerks in Government service, or transacting business with 'denationalised' natives of the non-official classes, thought to how great an extent the man's energies and talents, character and ability, are being wasted! How infinitely greater would be the services which he would render to the community, how infinitely greater would be his own contentment, were he acting as a leader of native thought and development in some responsible post for which nature appears to have intended him!

In conclusion, it will be readily seen that the policy adopted, whether it be 'Direct' or 'Indirect,' affects almost every single act performed by the Government. The question whether our aim is to support and educate the native leaders to develop themselves and their people on native lines, or, on the other hand, to abolish

the native institutions and to rule the people ourselves or with the help of other natives who have become like ourselves, affects fundamentally every relation between the governed and the governors. An action wise under one policy would be crass stupidity under the other. It is therefore of vital importance that, even if it happens that the same system cannot be equally applied all over a colony or protectorate, it should be clearly understood under which of the two systems it is proposed to administer any given tribe or unit.

Every administrative officer placed in charge of natives will, even if the policy to be followed be not clearly defined by the Government, inevitably think the matter out for himself and adopt one system or the other. Of course where there is a government policy, he will put that into effect, whatever his own views may be. But, where no policy is declared, or if it be not distinctly defined, a divergence of views among the political officers will certainly occur. The result is incalculable hardship to the natives of all classes, especially to the Chiefs. One Resident may blame them for not exerting enough authority; the next may blame them for interfering too much. One Resident will encourage the people to go with complaints to their own chiefs; another may blame them for doing so, saying that they should have come to him. Thus jealousy and distrust is sown between the Chiefs and their people; and this finally leads to general discontent with the white man. My own view, based on considerable experience, is that, by following the principles of Direct Rule, we lead the natives, and ourselves, into a *cul-de-sac* from which it will be hard to escape. But at all events, in such a case, we march in more or less order. On the other hand, when we follow neither one policy nor the other, or both together, we land in the same *impasse*, but in a state of great disorder, which it will be still more difficult to rectify.

x

CHARLES L. TEMPLE.

Art. 4.—THE PRINCIPLES OF RECONSTRUCTION, II.*

1. *Ministry of Reconstruction. A List of Commissions and Committees set up to deal with Questions which will arise at the Close of the War.* [Cd 8916.] Wyman, 1918.
2. *Ministry of Reconstruction. Committee on Relations between Employers and Employed: Second Report on Joint Standing Industrial Councils.* [Cd 9002.] Wyman, 1918.
3. *Ibid. : Supplementary Report on Works Committees.* [Cd 9001.] Wyman, 1918.
4. *Ministry of Labour. Industrial Reports, No. 2: Works Committees.* Wyman, 1918.
5. *Past and Future.* By 'Jason.' Chatto & Windus, 1918.
And other works cited in Part I of this paper (Q.R., April, 1918).

II. SOME PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE.

IN discussing the views of certain representative groups with regard to the policy to be adopted after the war, we suggested last April that the logical completeness of their proposals was in some measure a defect, inasmuch as a tendency was thereby created to lay the chief emphasis on the legislative regulation of national life rather than on its animating principle. It is impossible to deny the attractiveness of proposals so concrete and so wide in scope as those contained in, for instance, the Labour Party Report on Reconstruction; but our hopes of a national renaissance must be based on something which goes deeper than organisation, and the 'full and conscious participation of every citizen in the national life' is likely to be impeded rather than facilitated by the imposition of a rigid and uniform system.

The principles underlying our idea of a renaissance have already been discussed, but, when we turn to the practical application of those principles in the life of the community, there is bound to come a sense of anti-climax such as is not felt in the working-out of a political or economic theory. For in the former case it is not possible, as it is in the latter, to embody in a concrete

* For Part I of this article see Q.R. for April, 1918.

and comprehensive programme the conceptions we have formed. This does not mean, however, that we are to be content with a merely emotional appeal. We have, not, it is true, any single specific of universal applicability by which to solve all the many and complex questions with which we shall be faced at the close of the war; but it should be possible to deduce from the principles we have discussed an attitude towards the more representative of those questions which will indicate the general lines of their solution.

In the first place, it is essential to distinguish between what may be termed the emergency problems arising immediately out of the destruction and dislocation caused by the war, and the problems of permanent constructive policy which arise from its reactions upon the minds of men. In the former category fall all questions relating to demobilisation and to the economic situation created by war losses and by the prolonged interruption of productive activity. In the latter are comprised many questions of public policy to which the war has given a new prominence or an altered significance, such as the nature and limitations of democracy, the part to be assigned to the State in the initiation and direction of industrial and social progress, and the means by which a minimum standard of material and social welfare may be assured to the individual citizen. The emergency problems are in the main questions of expediency. They relate to the practical methods of passing through an economic crisis with the least possible suffering and disturbance. The constructive problems are of a more fundamental character. They are questions of principle which derive their urgency from the growing conviction that the exertions and sacrifices made during the war can be redeemed from futility only if the conclusion of peace becomes a definite landmark in human progress.

It will be observed that the emergency and constructive problems are in many respects closely related. The provision of employment, either for returned soldiers or for those whom they displace, raises many questions which cannot be disposed of without reference to the claims of Labour to a larger share in the control and in the fruits of industry. The combination of abnormal

needs with inadequate supplies in the years immediately following the war will challenge the adequacy of the whole existing economic system.

In this connexion between the necessities of the immediate crisis and the requirements of the future there is an obvious advantage, since it may be possible so to frame the emergency measures as to lay the foundations of a more permanent reconstruction. At the same time, this connexion involves serious dangers. Preparation for the task of dealing with demobilisation and with the other problems of transition economy cannot be postponed until the end of the war. Already the Ministry of Reconstruction has published a list of eighty-seven commissions and committees which are taking into consideration subjects ranging from the reinstatement of demobilised workers to the 'Machinery of Government,' from the legal position with regard to *ante-bellum* contracts to the broad questions of future commercial and industrial policy. In respect of many of these subjects, considerations relating to the immediate and to the more remote future are inextricably entangled; yet the need for immediate action is so urgent that it will hardly be possible to defer the preliminary steps until the nation has become familiar with the issues before it.

Although the emergency problems themselves arise from abnormal circumstances which justify their being met by the application of unusual remedies, the measures adopted will inevitably be seized upon as precedents for future policy. Especially will this be the case with regard to the extension of State control over economic activities. It is obvious that the new powers and functions acquired or exercised by Government during the war cannot be suddenly dropped. The disorganisation of the ordinary economic life of the country has been so complete that traders and manufacturers would find it impossible to take up once more the threads of business activity, without some assistance from the State in restoring the machinery which has been dislocated by the State's own action and necessities. It is obvious, too, that the assistance of the State will be required in meeting the abnormal demands caused, as in the case of housing, by a long suspension of productive activity

due to the absorption of labour and material by war industries. But the State Socialists have already announced in the clearest terms their intention of seizing this opportunity to press their own programme of progressive State control and ultimate nationalisation of industry ; and there are many indications of a prospective alliance between the Labour Party and the new bureaucracy, to secure this end. On the other hand, the evidence of certain weaknesses in our industrial position revealed by the war has been hailed in some quarters as an opportunity of insinuating, almost without discussion, a radical change in our whole fiscal policy.*

Whatever may be the merits of these and other proposals, there is a serious danger that the nation may find itself committed to revolutionary changes in its economic and social policy without having had sufficient opportunity to consider the consequences, or even to become fully acquainted with what is being done. This danger might be averted, and the quick passage of emergency legislation assisted, if it were possible to arrive at a general and genuine agreement that steps taken in connexion with the transition from war to peace should be treated on their merits as emergency measures, without prejudice to future policy. Emergency legislation and organisation have always, however, a tendency to become permanent. A precedent is created ; the onus of proof is shifted ; and the weight of inertia, previously opposed to the innovation, is transferred to its support. In these circumstances it is particularly desirable that what is done under the pressure of the immediate crisis should be restricted so far as possible to genuine emergency measures, designed to meet specific difficulties, and not to introduce new principles of general application. It is always much easier to effect changes in the political or economic structure of society than to undo what has been done ; and the danger of premature commitments is much greater than that of a more cautious policy proving a stumbling-block in the way of future progress.

These considerations are the more important because

* See the Report of the Commercial and Industrial Policy Committee (Cd 9085) and press comment thereon.

the conditions of life and men's ideas with regard to it are alike in a state of flux. No one can as yet predict with certainty the manner in which the conditions and habits of life of the community and of the individual will be affected after the war by the consequences of its appalling cost both in lives and treasure. It is equally impossible, while public attention is concentrated on the war and discussion is fettered by the limitations imposed by military exigencies, to gauge accurately the force and depth of the disturbance of ideas to which the great upheaval has given rise. All we do know is that, whenever we penetrate a little behind the decent reserve of the press and the platform, we find a tendency to challenge, even with some impatience, the worth of every existing human institution.

In such an atmosphere we need to beware especially of the two besetting sins of reformers: the tendency to consider problems as stabilised, and the tendency to compare the practical working of an existing system with the theoretical working of a proposed alternative. The desire to 'settle things once for all' is very strong and very pardonable, but it is a fruitful source of blunders. The life of men and of nations is not static but dynamic; and the conditions produced by their reaction upon each other and upon their environment undergo a perpetual change. The assumption of the stability of existing conditions in the pledges made to Labour has been the cause of endless disappointment and friction during the war. The grouping of powers or parties upon a basis of common policy is continually being shifted by the emergence of new forces which affect that policy itself. The attempt to fix permanently prices or wages is defeated by the perpetual fluctuation of money values. A rigid economic policy is liable to be stultified at any moment by the development of new markets, the discovery of new sources of supply, or the invention of a new process. Hence the policies and institutions marked by the greatest vitality are not those which are the most logically complete, but those which are most adaptable and capable of readjustment.

The temptation to confuse incidental errors of administration with the defects inherent to a system has been

strikingly illustrated in recent controversies. It has been displayed by critics both of the competitive economic system and of the manner in which State control has been exercised during the war. It has been seen in the controversy raised over secret diplomacy and democratic control, and in much of the criticism of democracy based on the collapse of Russia. Mistakes arising from human stupidity and human depravity are, unfortunately, inherent in the imperfection of humanity, and will arise under any system. It may fairly be argued that one system imposes a more satisfactory check than another upon such errors; but it is hopelessly unpractical to compare the ideal working of a proposed alternative with the actual results of an existing system, without allowance for the imperfection of the instruments which both must employ. At a time of intellectual ferment such as the present, there is grave danger of an unnecessary breach in the continuity of national traditions and development, through the hasty abolition of institutions whose vitality is not yet exhausted, in a moment of emotional reaction against their occasional abuse.

If we can shake ourselves free from these dangerous prepossessions, the period of transition will afford us an invaluable opportunity of studying the larger problems with which we have to deal, and testing the various methods by which it is proposed to deal with them. But, whether in dealing with the emergency or the constructive problems, the spirit in which we approach them will be the determining factor of our success. There has been an increasing tendency during the war to adopt expediency as the only test of policy, and to scout as impracticable and almost unpatriotic all appeals to national traditions or moral standards. Whatever excuse may be made for the adoption of this attitude during the progress of a life-and-death struggle, it is urgently necessary in the discussion of our future policy to re-establish the application of ethical standards to public affairs. The economic, political and social factors in human life are so inextricably entangled that, if we accept quality of life and not mere power or wealth as the touchstone of national success, we dare not, even in the consideration of economic or political questions, lose sight of the moral issues.

It is in the light of these issues that we shall have to examine that challenge to the existing social order which is being so generally flung down. Political institutions and economic systems alike will be assayed by their adaptability to that new and higher development of social relationships after which the nations are groping. It is by the opportunity offered to the individual human being to attain to 'a life fit for the dignity of man' that the success of our national policy will be tested; and no vested interests or traditional institutions can claim a prescriptive right save in so far as they conduce to this end.

Tried by this standard the existing social order shows to little advantage. The large proportion of the population whose means are insufficient for the attainment of a low minimum standard of food, clothing, and accommodation; the mass of preventible disease directly traceable to overcrowding, poverty and ignorance; the cramping routine which has deprived the majority of workers of any kind of joy or pride in their work; the purely material standard of success; the bitterness of class hostility—these things forbid us to accept without question the continued existence of the present framework of society. It is evident that there has been something wrong either in our social institutions or in the spirit in which they have been worked.

It is here that we are brought face to face with the first great problem which we have to solve. Can the existing political and economic systems be so transformed by the introduction of a new spirit as to bring them into line with the demands of an awakened public conscience, or must they be swept away to make room for a new social organisation, inspired by a loftier ideal?

It is in the latter sense that this question is answered by many influential groups of reformers. Socialists of all parties desire to subvert the existing economic system by the abolition of private ownership of capital and of the competitive principle. Fundamental changes in the Constitution are advocated both by the exponents of government by a single chamber, supplemented by a series of popularly elected administrative committees, and by those more extreme revolutionaries who desire

to replace the State itself by a multiplication of self-contained local or functional units.

Freely as we admit the claim that the institutions thus threatened must be judged by their fruits, we cannot afford lightly to abandon that body of corporate achievement, corporate traditions, and corporate ideals, which has been built up by the common effort of many generations; nor can we admit that the possibilities of further progress on the lines of organic development have yet been exhausted. The failures of the past have been due mainly to an insufficient recognition of civic obligations on the part of the community as a whole; and without a more active sense of these obligations no mere reorganisation of machinery will do much to improve the quality of national life. The economic doctrines of Socialism are rightly based upon the conception of all productive and distributive activity as a form of public service; but it is impossible, under any conceivable socialistic system, to compel any man to serve the community to his maximum capacity, and the difficulty increases in proportion with the value of his services. You can compel a man by law to work at a particular job in the public interest for so many hours a day; but you cannot compel him to put his maximum powers of hand and brain into that work, and you cannot compel an inventor to invent. Whether we remove the element of private profit altogether or allow it to remain as an additional incentive to effort, and—what is still more important—a tangible index of the demand for special products and a criterion of successful service, we shall obtain the maximum improvement in our economic and social condition only by the development of a deeper sense of responsibility on the part of all who are engaged in production and distribution. Nor is this spirit excluded by the competitive principle so long as competition is confined to the perfecting of organisation and the improvement of quality, so long, that is to say, as the object of competition is the privilege of service. In the same way, no reorganisation of the machinery of government will bring us appreciably nearer to Utopia so long as any considerable section of those charged with the task of legislation and administration, or of the electorate itself, is governed by the desire to promote sectional

interests, by fallacious ideas of what can be achieved by legislation, or by a low and material standard of human life. Nor is it possible by the widest adoption of decentralisation and democratic control to exclude the possibility of undue influence being exercised by active and well-organised minorities, or of measures which are not approved by the public conscience being carried by the bargaining of groups for mutual support.

To say that a suggested innovation will not of itself bring about the millennium is not, of course, sufficient to put it out of court; but, in view of the very grave difficulties and dangers attendant upon sudden, sweeping changes in the constitution of society, it is at least worth while to see how far the working of the existing systems can be transformed by the introduction of a new spirit, before embarking upon a vast and uncertain experiment. The clean sweep may involve a false start, and the effort to attain mechanical perfection is apt to strangle natural growth.

We shall be met, of course, by the familiar argument that any attempt to remedy obvious and pressing grievances, which leaves the main outline of the existing political and economic systems unchanged, tends to divert attention from their fundamental evils. Thus, the Guild Socialists, who avow themselves to be 'revolutionary in purpose, and, for the time being, reformist in tactics,' assert that their immediate work 'is directed solely to the prosecution of that class-war aim, and in no way to the securing of reforms for making tolerable the existing order'; and it is for this reason that they refuse to co-operate in the Whitley Scheme of industrial organisation.* With regard to this attitude, it may be said that a very strong faith in the infallible and exclusive efficacy of a single specific is needed to justify the contemptuous rejection of every other form of effort and experiment. It is, however, more important to observe that the whole assumption on which that attitude is based is demonstrably false. The experience of the past goes to prove that every step gained in freedom, knowledge, or material welfare, tends to create new demands so long as anything is left to achieve; and that

* Letter in the 'Nation,' March 16, 1918.

real and stable progress is more often the result of gradual organic development than the production of revolutions, which have a knack of yielding results widely divergent from those contemplated by their promoters. Success in the reshaping of our national life will be attained not by the tactical triumph of any one group in imposing its particular shibboleth upon the community, but by experimental measures containing within themselves the seeds of development and expansion, and possessing sufficient elasticity to respond to new demands arising from the gradual development of the public conscience or from the teachings of experience.

It is not by unqualified acceptance of any single standpoint that we shall solve what is likely to be the most pressing problem of the immediate future—the reconciliation of freedom for personal development with the due discharge by the State of its functions as Trustee for the community. The criticism both of State Socialism and of bureaucratic centralisation in Part I of this paper was based mainly on their transference of responsibility and initiative from the individual to the State; and it is evident that, if character, rather than power or wealth, is adopted as the touchstone of national life, it is necessary to leave an ample field for individual activity and self-expression. The general right of each man to determine his own actions and to exercise his own judgment is essential to all moral, as distinguished from merely mechanical, progress. But we are not necessarily thus committed to accepting in its entirety the doctrine of *laissez-faire* preached by the 19th-century economists. The freedom which we seek for the individual members of the community is not an unrestricted licence to pursue selfish interests, but freedom to receive and render reciprocal service. Within certain limits, the pursuit by each individual of his own interest may conduce to the common good, inasmuch as profit can be derived only from those services for which there is a general or particular demand; but it is evident that, where the motives of activity are purely selfish, and bargaining power is unequal, the personal end may be attained at the expense of others; and, however clearly we may recognise the superiority of moral influences over legislative checks, there is an evident necessity for

imposing some restraint upon those who, in pursuit of their own aims, impede the legitimate activities of others. It is, in fact, for this very purpose that the State, as the instrument and expression of the common will, has been brought into being.

Moreover, the possibilities of self-development and self-expression which are open to any individual, and consequently the extent of the service which he can render to the community, are dependent not only upon his own character or energies, but upon the conditions of his environment, and upon his ability to attain that standard of physical and intellectual development which the conditions of the communal life demand. If his opportunities are cramped or his faculties blighted by ignorance, lack of leisure, or unhealthy conditions of life, he can neither obtain for himself his proper share of the fruits of the common effort, nor contribute effectively to the development of national life. While, therefore, we are prepared to oppose the claim of the State to prescribe and direct the daily activities of its citizens, we must not deny its duty to ensure conditions favourable to the free exercise of their powers.

It is for this reason that we support the provision by the State of *educational facilities* and the exercise of compulsory powers to ensure their utilisation. Compulsory education has been opposed in the past on the ground that it interfered with the liberty of the parent in the discharge of his parental responsibilities. This argument is obviously fallacious. The child is not the personal property of the parent, but a member or prospective member of the community, with a right to such equipment as is required for playing a worthy part in the national life; and the community has a right to expect that it shall be so equipped. It is desirable that there should be, so far as possible, a free choice of schools, and that the door should be kept open for private educational experiment; but it lies undoubtedly within the province of the State to insist that every child shall receive what the public conscience recognises as the minimum educational equipment, and that those capable of profiting by a more extended education should have the opportunity to acquire it.

It is in regard to the standard to be fixed that the greatest difference of opinion is likely to arise. The old idea that the education of working-class children should be mainly confined to immediate preparation for industrial employment dies hard even among the workers themselves, though there are many signs of an increasing demand for a greater share of humanistic culture.* Many enlightened employers freely admit that a good general education affords a better foundation for subsequent technical instruction than a purely vocational training; but the real point at issue goes somewhat deeper than this. The purpose of education is to fit the child and the adolescent to play his or her part in the world and not merely in the workshop. For this purpose the formation of character, the development of intelligence and of the capacity to observe and reflect, are of greater importance than the actual instruction imparted; and no small share in acquiring the great and difficult art of living together is derived unconsciously from the organised games, the delegated responsibilities, and the daily associations of school life in work and play. The pursuit of these aims does not exclude direct vocational training during the years of adolescence; but it does forbid the idea of that training occupying the primary position in the curriculum, and it requires its application during the later years of the educational course to be linked as closely as possible with the development of general culture.

Indeed, the formative influence of education on character and intelligence during the years of adolescence is the strongest argument for the raising of the school age, and it is mainly on this account that we regret the apparent concessions recently made to those employers, happily fast diminishing in number, whose chief interest is in maintaining the supply of cheap child and adolescent labour. It is necessary, however, to recognise that there are many homes in which the urgent need for supplementing an inadequate family income renders every restriction on juvenile employment a real and immediate hardship. Yet such restrictions are absolutely necessary both in order to enable an adequate educational course to be provided and to enable full advantage to be taken

* See pamphlet 'What the Worker wants of Education,' published by the Workers' Educational Association.

of the opportunities offered. Apart from the question of the leaving age, it is impossible for children to derive full benefit from attendance at school if they come to it wearied out; and, on this account alone, the prohibition of juvenile employment is amply justified.

The provision of educational facilities is equally useless in cases where children are prevented from profiting therefrom by curable *physical defects* or by weakness arising from *malnutrition*. The work of the Medical Inspectors and Care Committees has done much to reduce the percentage; but this work could be rendered far more effective by better organisation and the granting of more direct compulsory powers. Here again there is no real question of interference with individual liberty. The majority of parents are only too glad to avail themselves of advice and assistance in the medical care of their children; and, as in the case of school attendance, they should be made to feel that the process is one of co-operation rather than of compulsion. In the comparatively rare cases of real indifference, it is unjust that the children should be allowed to suffer.

The nature of many medical defects and the question of feeding necessitous school-children bring us, however, on to very difficult ground, which includes also questions such as housing, sanitation, infant welfare and maternity assistance. In these cases the issue is complicated by the fact that the evils from which we are suffering have their root in the economic and social blindness of the past. We have to face the fact that a large percentage of the population are unable to pay an economic rent for accommodation attaining a low minimum standard of decency and comfort, to provide themselves and their children with adequate food and clothing, or to pay for proper medical assistance.

There is here a strong case for State provision of *housing* at rents adjusted to the capacity of the poorest class, for extended free provision of medical assistance, especially in the case of infants and mothers, for the feeding of necessitous school-children, and for the subsidisation of school attendance from the time at which the child would be capable of contributing to the family income. It is futile to expect satisfactory self-development or a keen sense of social obligations from those

whose whole environment is equally detrimental to health, decency, and self-respect. It is absurd to talk about interference with personal or parental responsibility in the case of those whose circumstances and conditions give them no opportunity rightly to exercise it. The real objection to State subsidisation is that it tends almost inevitably to divert attention from the fundamental problem of the position of unorganised and ill-organised workers. While the urgency of the problems may compel direct State action of a palliative nature, the primary essential of permanent reform is the introduction in the worse-paid industries of such organisation as will enable the employers to pay higher wages and the workers to demand them.

The means by which this may be accomplished will be discussed later; but the guiding principle of the policy adopted should clearly be, while removing so far as possible the obstacles presented by the results of past mistakes or inefficiency, to raise the economic condition of the mass of the people to the level at which they can procure for themselves the elements of a decent and healthy life. Only when this has been done can it be said that the individual members of the community are really free to exercise the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship.

The provision of *amenities* which are in their nature public rather than private possessions, such as open spaces, baths and gymnasia, will in any case remain in the hands of the State or the Municipalities; but, in so far as the fundamental aim is accomplished, it will be possible for the State to abstain from the direct provision of private amenities, and to confine itself to the imposition of standards, representing the minimum demanded by the public conscience, to which private enterprise must conform. The vexed question of housing, for instance, will never be finally settled until the labourer, whether in town or country, is able to pay an economic rent, or to effect purchase through a building or co-operative society at a price yielding a fair margin of profit; but it will always remain for the State to see that the accommodation which he receives in return conforms to hygienic standards, and that town-planning is carried out with a due regard to social interests.

Of still greater difficulty is the question of ensuring that *access to land*, whether for building or for cultivation, which is an essential condition of free individual development. The difficulties at present existing in the way of such access arise, in large measure, from the restricted resources of those who need it, and may to a great extent be overcome by an improvement in the economic condition of the rent-payer, and by the association of small holders for more effective cultivation and the hire of capital and machinery. A simplification of the system and reduction in the cost of transfer and registration of titles would prove of considerable assistance. But it is impossible not to recognise the fact that there may be urgent social needs for the acquisition of land which the owner has no desire either to sell or to develop. The issue has been obscured by the exaggerations of those who expect the deer forest to blossom like the rose and ignore all augmentation in values through clearing, fencing or improvements. The right to withhold large quantities of an urgently needed commodity from the market cannot, however, properly be conceded. At the same time, the exercise of an autocratic power of expropriation is objectionable both in practice and in principle. It is possible to conceive the establishment in particular districts of special tribunals, representative of landowners and purchasers, with members appointed by the State or the Municipality, and the assistance of agricultural or building experts, to decide whether a case for the compulsory acquisition of undeveloped land had been made out, and if so, to adjudicate upon the terms of purchase.

It is not sufficient, however, in order to ensure freedom of self-development, that opportunities and facilities should be provided. It is necessary also to restrain those who abuse their freedom by using it in a manner directly detrimental to others, or by which the legitimate activities of others may be impeded. There are some who would go still further, and contend that it is the right and duty of the State to regulate the private life and habits of its citizens, on the ground that a man who, by his own folly, diminishes his value as a social unit, is thereby defrauding the community of the services to

which it is entitled. The plea is specious but untenable. It is not possible in practice to enforce a standard of positive conduct, and to compel a man by law to be generous and prudent, or even to be chaste and temperate. And, if it were possible, compulsory conformity with an external standard would be a poor exchange for the surrender of free-will. Moreover, such regulation usually implies, as in the case of *prohibition*, the sacrifice of the majority who make good use of their liberty, for the sake of the minority who abuse it. The prohibition of actions directly injurious to others stands on a different footing; and few to-day would deny the right of the State to take action in such matters as the adulteration of food and the failure to isolate persons suffering from infectious diseases, or to prohibit methods of production, whether commercially profitable or not, which are injurious to the health of those employed.

A stronger case for positive compulsion can be made out with regard to the regulation of production in the interest of 'first things first.' But it is very doubtful whether any centralised authority could effect the perpetual delicate adjustments of supply to demand requisite for the correlation of production to public needs, without a margin of waste and failure still larger than that produced by the operation of economic laws under the existing system. It would be necessary, moreover, to exercise a control over the consumer as well as the producer, which would be strongly resented by the very classes whom it was intended to benefit. The most effective stimulus to the production of necessities will come from an increase in the purchasing power of the majority and a more equitable adjustment of taxation.

There is, however, one field in which an increase of State regulation of industry during the next few years may be looked upon as certain. The enormous power wielded by great *financial and industrial combinations* has constituted them to some extent *imperia in imperio*; and their activities may easily become a disturbing influence in the social order. Combinations having for their object the elimination of wasteful competition and overlapping, better organisation of methods, or the exchange of information, may fairly claim to derive their profits from the rendering of better service, but

there are also combinations whose object is not service but exploitation, and whose profits are derived from concerted, artificial manipulations of the market.

Apart from this danger to the consumer, an unhealthy feature of the tendency to amalgamation is the obstacle thus placed in the way of individual enterprise. While many big associations are purely voluntary in character and many are based on the idea of co-operation rather than of amalgamation, there are others whose object, avowed or unavowed, is to crush out or absorb the individual trader by cornering materials, cutting prices, tying down customers, and gaining control over the channels of information. The elimination of the small trader entails distinct social disadvantages, involving as it does the stereotyping of products, the progressive dehumanisation of trade and industry, and the loss of valuable elements in the social life of the nation. Moreover, this use of competitive methods to crush out free competition is an instance of interested interference with the legitimate activities of others which justifies and calls for the intervention of the State. The methods by which the State can most effectively intervene for the protection either of the consumer or of private enterprise are at present receiving consideration from a Committee of the Ministry of Reconstruction; and the problem is undoubtedly one of the most urgent and important of the immediate future, especially in view of the stimulus given to combination and consolidation by State encouragement during the war and by the Report of the Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy.

This necessity for State supervision in the interests of the individual and of the community extends not only to trading associations but to all great industrial, commercial and professional organisations. There are very grave dangers in the development of the political strike, in which the power acquired by a Labour organisation for industrial purposes is employed to force on the community—by cutting off the supply of essential services or products—schemes for which it has been unable to find acceptance by argument and persuasion. It must be remembered, however, that precisely the same objection applies to the undoubted, though less obvious, deflexion of national policy by financial interests. Indeed,

the whole question of the use of economic organisations and influence to affect social and political policy requires careful investigation.

This adjustment of power and responsibility between the State, as representative of the whole nation in all its various phases of activity, and autonomous bodies representing particular groups, acquires additional significance from the overwhelming arguments in favour of a great extension of both *local and functional devolution*. It has become evident that the result of over-centralisation is to clog the legislative and administrative machinery of the country with a mass of minutiae, which handicaps it seriously in attempting to deal with the wider questions of national policy; while, at the same time, the attempt of the central authority to legislate in detail for the country as a whole is apt to be defeated by a lack of sufficient acquaintance with the varied conditions and requirements of particular localities and of particular industries or professions.

Even more important than the question of administrative efficiency is the relation of devolution to questions of national life and character. If we are to base our hopes for the future upon the development of a deeper sense of civic obligations and personal responsibility, rather than upon State compulsion, it will be essential that there should be a conscious recognition by individuals of their privileges and responsibilities as members of a great community, and of their full participation in the national life. This sense of participation will not be given by mere inclusion in the Parliamentary electorate; for the opportunities for the exercise of the franchise are too few and far between, the influence of the individual vote too small, and the issues frequently too complex and too remote from the daily life and experience of the majority of voters. In order that the ordinary man may feel that he plays an effective part in the national life, it is necessary to give him some share of control over his immediate environment, the conditions in which he lives and works. He is more easily and more keenly interested in the limited questions which concern his daily personal life than in the larger but more remote problems which concern the whole community

in its corporate aspect. The responsibility which he recognises most readily is that which he feels towards those with whom he is thrown in daily personal contact ; and the strength of local feelings and associations, the pride of place, and the tenacity of local customs and traditions, may all become invaluable means of linking up the life of the individual with that of the community.

The development of Local Government has made great strides within the last half-century, and has done much to preserve and to reawaken a feeling of local patriotism which is by no means incompatible with patriotism in its broader aspect. A man will make all the better citizen of the nation if he feels that he plays an effective part in controlling the affairs of his parish, his ward or his municipality. The exercise of the local franchise, where the individual vote plays a larger part and the issues are familiar, is an invaluable education in the intelligent use of political power which will have its effect in the use made of the Parliamentary vote.

It should be the object of Government to foster as much as possible this interest in local affairs by an extension of the powers of option and initiative possessed by local authorities, and to enlist the active co-operation of all who are willing to assist in the administration of local affairs by service on executive or advisory committees, as school managers, or in any other capacity. Whatever may be said as to the executive weakness of committees, the committee system does afford some guarantee that administrative policy shall reflect the common conscience and the common will ; and it ensures the leavening of public opinion by an increasing number of men and women who have acquired some practical familiarity with the issues of public policy and with the possibilities and limitations of administrative action.

If, however, interest in local administration is to be sustained, it is necessary that the authority and responsibility conferred upon local bodies should be real and definite. At present, generally speaking, the powers of local authorities are confined to those specifically assigned to them by Parliament. The principle should rather be to extend their powers to anything not specifically forbidden. The sense of responsibility awakened would be

far greater, and the nation as a whole would gain by the increased elasticity of administration and the wide field opened to social experiment, while the veto of the State would provide sufficient guarantee against action being taken which might prove detrimental to other areas, or to the general interests of the nation.

The successful development of Local Devolution depends in large measure upon the extent to which the spirit of local communal life is fostered by the growth of Voluntary Associations. Educational, recreative, or productive societies, which bring together those associated in daily life for the fulfilment of a common purpose, have an important share in producing the necessary recognition of mutual dependence. Co-operative societies of consumers, whatever their economic value, have no particular significance in this respect; but the co-operative societies of producers, which are rapidly increasing in numbers, may not only go a long way towards solving some of our agricultural and industrial difficulties, but are based upon the very fundamentals of communal life. The co-operative housing societies have also their social as well as their economic side; and in the State and municipal housing programme necessitated by the suspension of building during the war, due provision should be made to prevent injury to such societies by the competition of subsidised accommodation.

The principle of Functional Devolution has always been recognised in the powers and status conferred on such professional associations as the Bar and Medical Councils and the Incorporated Law Society. It is exemplified also in such bodies as Port Authorities and Harbour Trusts. The creation of similar administrative organisations, representative of all industrial interests concerned, of the consumer, of the Municipalities, and of the State, may prove the most practical method of dealing with such great branches of internal transport and supply as are essentially monopolistic in their nature.

The most important aspect of Functional Devolution is, however, its bearing on the great problem of the organisation of industry for the purpose of ensuring more effective production and more equitable distribution of wealth, and of introducing a new spirit and purpose into all industrial activity. It is this question

which is the subject of the three reports issued by the Whitley Committee. The scheme which they have worked out has the great advantage of providing both for the autonomous administration of each industry as a whole by Joint Councils representative of all engaged in the industry, and for the consideration of local problems and specific questions arising in particular establishments, by District Boards and Shop Committees, representative of those immediately concerned. It is an additional advantage of the scheme that it is voluntary, elastic in constitution, and based not on the supersession but on the utilisation of the existing organisations—the Trade Unions and Employers' Federations.

In all Functional Devolution there is a certain danger of conflict between the powerful organisations created—of tyranny within the unit, and of undue prominence being given to a single phase of communal life. The first of these dangers does not yet appear to have been considered by the Committee, and it will probably be necessary to create some machinery by which the competing claims of various industries may be adjusted; but the risk of internal tyranny and the possible neglect of social interests are provided against both by the organisation proposed and the objects for which it is created.

For the purposes of the scheme all industries are divided into three categories. Those in which organisation is still rudimentary would be dealt with by the establishment of Trade Boards, representative of employers and employed, with a proportion of 'nominated members.' Such boards would possess authority in all matters of wages and working conditions; but they would also concern themselves with encouraging and facilitating such growth of organisation within the industry as would justify the Ministry of Labour in sanctioning the replacement of the Trade Board by a Joint Industrial Council representative of the Employers' Federations and Trade Unions. In industries where organisation, though imperfect, had reached an advanced stage, the creation of a Joint Council would receive immediate sanction; but the assistance of one or two members appointed by the Ministry would be given for so long as the Council itself should desire their presence. Finally, fully organised industries would be left to work

out their own salvation by means of a Joint Industrial Council, upon which the Ministry of Labour would be empowered to confer, at its own request, the status and authority of a Trade Board. In the case of both the latter categories, District Boards and Works Committees would be associated with the Council; and Trade Boards, linked with the Council, would be provided for special areas or branches in which organisation was backward.

These recommendations are on the right lines, and it may be said in general that proposals for making membership of functional organisations compulsory, or for the legislative application of their decisions outside their own membership, should only be carried out in cases where these bodies are so fully representative as to embody the corporate conscience of the industry or profession concerned. There is a valuable suggestion in the Builders' proposal for the creation of two distinct codes: one a compulsory code for which legislative sanction would be sought, confined to measures on which there was general agreement; the other a voluntary code proposed for experimental adoption. It must not be forgotten that compulsory powers are not essential to the exertion of widespread influence. Obedience to an unwritten code of professional conduct is a familiar feature of many walks of life; and the influence of unofficial organisations often extends far beyond their own membership. The nature and growth of the authority exercised by such bodies as the Jockey Club and the M.C.C. in the world of sport are well worthy of examination by students of social phenomena.

As regards the scope and object of the Whitley Councils, this embraces not only questions of wages and hours, but the improvement of methods of production and the general status of the industry. The agenda proposed for the Builders' Council includes the closer approximation of commercial and æsthetic requirements; and there is amongst both employers and employed a growing recognition of the fact that those engaged in production have a duty to the community, and that a man's work forms so important a portion of his life that his interest in it extends, beyond the money he receives and the conditions under which he works, to the worthiness of the work performed. Moreover, the connexions

between industry and social life are so close that the Councils may well come to play an important part in the consideration of many social problems, with the result of contributing valuable elements to the discussion, broadening their own outlook, and emphasising the indivisibility of national life.

It is not to be expected that the establishment of these Councils, which involves many difficult questions of industrial demarcation, should proceed rapidly, especially during the continuance of the war, nor is it to be expected that blunders will not be made at the outset; but the experiment is so important that a large amount of patience and tolerance may fairly be demanded. 'At the outset it might often happen that much of the discussion, either in a Works Committee or a National Industrial Council, was obstructive or irrelevant. But it has been proved again and again that contact breeds mutual understanding and responsibility calls forth capacity.'* The principle of Devolution involves faith in the willingness and ability of the nation to shoulder responsibility and to recognise obligations. It involves, also, the acceptance of certain risks. But the most highly centralised State direction can afford no guarantee of immunity from blunders, and the blunders of autocracy go deeper and are harder to rectify.

When all is said and whatever machinery is adopted, our national future depends upon the conception we form of national and individual life, its nature, its value, and its purpose. If we place our trust in power or wealth for its own sake, we may attain our end, but at the cost of all that is best in our national traditions and character. If we base our conception of national welfare on the fulfilment of the mutual obligations of the citizens, upon the sanctity and dignity of the individual life, and upon the nobility of service, we shall not go far wrong, whatever development our institutions may take.

C. ERNEST FAYLE.

* 'Memorandum on the Industrial Situation,' issued by the Garton Foundation.

Art. 5.—THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL.

1. *The Law Reports*, 1908-1917.
2. *The Criminal Appeal Reports*.
3. *Le Système Judiciaire de la Grande Bretagne*. Par le Comte de Franqueville. Paris : Rothschild, 1893.
4. *Die Englische Gerichtsverfassung*. Von Prof. Dr H. B. Gerland. Leipzig : Göschen, 1910.
5. *The Court of Criminal Appeal*. By R. E. Ross, LL.B., Principal Clerk of the Court. Butterworth, 1911.
6. *Outlines of Criminal Law*. By C. S. Kenny, Downing Professor of the Laws of England. Eighth edition. Cambridge University Press, 1917.

It is just ten years since the greatest innovation made by one stroke in English law empowered judges at once to reverse the verdict of a jury on the facts of a criminal case and to revise sentences. It has been said that no institution ever does only what it is designed to do ; it always does something else as well. So it has been in this instance. This we enquire into presently ; but first let us see how the new institution came into being. The records of the Court now contain material enough to illustrate its origin, its development and its efficiency.

For our immediate purpose we need not carry back our researches to any precise date. For centuries before 1848 the twelve common-law judges had been in the habit of meeting to consider, on the suggestion of that one of their brethren who had presided at a trial at which a criminal had been convicted, whether his doubts on some point of law which he had ruled at the trial were well founded, and whether, if so, they would recommend a pardon or some mitigation of sentence. They had no other constitutional power, for they were an informal body. The simple and august machinery of the royal prerogative to which they resorted, was as old as kingship, and has always been exercised, independently of judicial initiative, on the merits of the case ; and this prerogative remains undiminished. It is still the only refuge after appeal for belated exculpations, due, perhaps, to the discovery of demonstrative testimony or to remorseful confession. The only other alternative to these

merciful deliberations was the cumbrous technical process known as 'error,' which was a very costly expedient.

These conclaves of judges were superseded in 1848; but once, in 1885, in order to review a decision of the superseding tribunal—the Court for Crown Cases Reserved—it was found convenient to revive the old 'assembly of the judges.' That Court, composed of at least five members, was created in 1848 to enable a Judge of Assize or a Recorder, or a Quarter Sessions bench, when a jury convicted, to take its opinion whether he or they had determined some point of law correctly at the trial; if not, it had power to quash the conviction. The flaw here, as experience has shown, was that the case could only be thus 'stated' with the consent of the Judge or the bench whose law was impugned; if he or they had no doubt, nothing could be done for the defendant.

It is a mistake to suppose that the sensational Beck case of 1904 created the demand for reorganisation, though no doubt it quickened it. There were just men before 1907; for half a century at least a series of bills had been brought in to establish a court of criminal appeal; one introduced by Mr Fitzroy Kelly in 1844 is before us. But the crucial point in the Act of 1907 is that the initiative comes from the defendant, and not from the Judge* at the trial unless he chooses to give leave; no one's leave need be sought to test a point of law; and on a question of fact the only leave necessary is that of a Judge who has had nothing to do with the trial or, if he refuses, that of three other Judges. In short, the scene of preliminary contest for appeal has been transferred from the local court, in effect, to the King's Bench Division.

The epoch, then, of the new Court is marked by the recognition in law that a jury's verdict is not infallible. The jury could indeed often be a near approach to tyranny. Yet it had in the course of ages become sacrosanct; and the proposal to subject its primeval privilege, the determination of facts, to the revision of three lawyers naturally gave a shock to the John Bull tradition, and was promptly met by the outcry that the authority of the jury would be undermined. Trial by

* 'Judge' here means president of the bench and includes lay-chairmen.

jury—Blackstone's 'Palladium'—was to be replaced by trial by judges. This has, in fact, occasionally happened—with the result which attended the malediction of the Abbot of Rheims; nobody has been one penny the worse, and a few prisoners have been sensibly the better. The jury stands in public opinion exactly where it did in 1908, but its absolutism is now limited.

For the new Court has been a success. The last constructive experiment with which it can be compared is that of the Commercial Court established in 1895, which may fairly be described as a legal novelty. Both marked an abandonment of precedent and a bold adaptation of means and materials to ends, and both have been successful. In the ten years under review no doubt some mistakes have been made, but in the handling of facts we believe that in only two instances has the Court been demonstrably—by its own admission—wrong. Those cases sufficiently reveal the triple bulwark of legal safeguards—no longer, owing to the abeyance of the Grand Jury, quadruple. In one case, a man convicted on July 10, 1910, was refused leave to appeal; on Aug. 10 he petitioned the Home Secretary, who exercised his right to refer the matter back to the Court; the conviction was quashed on Aug. 18, 1911. In the other instance, it was a second conviction, which, as in Beck's case, led to ultimate rehabilitation. After a conviction which took place on Dec. 18, 1911, a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment with hard labour was imposed; leave to appeal was refused on Jan. 22, 1912; eight days later the same man was sentenced, for a similar offence, to three years' penal servitude (to be concurrent with the other term); the Home Secretary intervened, and on March 25 both convictions were quashed. It is a commonplace that in England some guilty persons escape conviction in order that no innocent person may be convicted; yet, even at this price, total immunity cannot, as we see, be attained, even at second hand, or indeed under any system. But, at any rate, this risk has been reduced to a minimum in jury cases; some people think that the time has come when police-court convictions should be similarly handled.

In a few cases the Court has quashed convictions where appellants had actually served their sentences or

part of them, to the abiding joy of those reformers who regarded it as a chronic grievance that before 1908 there was no relief for such unfortunate persons except by pardon. It may be added that, in one case, the House of Lords has loosed where the Court had bound, while, in another, the parts have been reversed. In three out of five such super-appeals in all, the Lords have confirmed the Court. The correction, then, of mistakes of 'fact' has been one of its primary duties.

Yet, if it be asked wherein the Court has done its best service to the country, we are disposed to think that it has been by its discipline of the benches of jury-courts—that is, of lawyers and lay-chairmen as much as, if not more than, of juries. Its chief diet was supposed to consist of verdicts, but it has in fact consisted of summings-up. Error, which long gave its name to the most stately legal protest—which still survives, though not perhaps in great vigour, in Ireland—is now chiefly represented in what used to be called the charge to the jury and is generally spoken of as the direction or the summing-up. Here the Court has, at any rate in expert opinion, done its most valuable work in regulating and inspiring; and the code still grows.

'Misdirection' is the burden of most of such appeals. In other words, the most frequent complaint on a point of law is that, when the whole case is finally handed to the jury with a commentary from the bench, the defence has not been fully or fairly reproduced. That commentary is naturally a target for the lawyer and the layman. The former is the guardian of his science as well as the *patronus* of his client, and has been jealous for his law since the date of the Twelve Tables. The apparatus for nailing down bad legal currency in our courts is almost perfect, and little more need be said about it. It was, as we saw, refurbished in 1848; and its enormously greater employment since 1908 is due, no doubt, to the simple fact that the appellant may be, and generally is, put to no expense for legal aid.

It is true that, generally speaking, no law is required in directing a jury; common sense is enough. But, after all, there is an art of oratory; and every occasion for its display has its temptations. For this the Court makes full allowance by declining to dissect these speeches

'microscopically' or as a 'treatise' on the law. It must be remembered that over most County Quarter Sessions a country gentleman presides. He is, of course, a valuable national asset, but his chairmanship is nowadays that function of his which is exposed to the strongest professional and unprofessional criticism. There are indeed to-day few survivals of the Pepys who wrote in 1660: 'We were sworn Justices of the Peace for Middlesex, Essex, Kent, Southampton, with which honour I did find myself mightily pleased, though I am wholly ignorant of the duties of a Justice.' The worst that can be said under this head is that such chairmen are not always good speakers; and, since they are acting as oracles—for so juries happily regard the bench—the expression of the critical last word becomes important. Yet it cannot be denied that the occasional forensic vagaries of a county magnate are often matched by those of lawyers who ought to know better; and, among the severe lessons which the Court has from time to time read to such public servants, the most emphatic have been addressed to the gentlemen of the robe.

At any rate, here the Court reverts to the time-honoured rôle of the King's Bench—its other self, so to say—as *corrector Bestius* of all inferior criminal (and other) jurisdictions in the country. In fact, every class of presiding judicial officer, including their brother Judges of the High Court, comes in turn before the Court for judgment in respect of their charge. The spectacle was once fairly common (and is not unknown now) of Judges concurring in 'reversing' themselves, though this can seldom happen in the new tribunal, because of the prevailing convention that the trial Judge should not sit on an appeal from his own Court. The net result is that the Court has practically created a new learning, a pathology of 'misdirection.'

Popular interest, however, concentrates on something less scientific. 'Reasonable' in English law often means what you can get twelve plain citizens, at least, to agree upon. The great reform of 1907 did not ignore this principle, and had no intention of letting loose a flood of attempts to reverse conviction from every dissatisfied criminal in the country. Serviceable breakwaters, which have weathered well, were accordingly constructed. An

appeal against conviction must either be certified by the Judge at the trial or must run the gauntlet of one other Judge or more before it can be heard. The principle on which the Court allows a verdict to be challenged was speedily formulated. In an early case the late Lord Alverstone, who as titular guardian of the Common Law devoted himself to moulding the procedure of the new Court, said: 'The Court has been asked to re-try this case; this, as the Court has already stated, it will not do. . . . The administration of the Act will become impossible if they [counsel] address the Court on topics proper only to be addressed to the jury at the trial.' In other words, the Court is not the place for a mere re-hearing.

Here we venture on our first criticism, for a re-hearing is exactly what the public, which clamoured to Parliament, thought that it was going to get. And surely this is what the Legislature intended that the country should get, when it enacted as follows:

'The Court . . . on any appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.'

This is a plain charter to the smaller jury of three—the least and the usual but not the only number of appeal Judges—to review the finding of the larger body. Nor has the Court ever hesitated to do so 'in a proper case,' in which, oddly enough, they have not invariably included that in which the presiding Judge thought there ought to have been an acquittal. For instance, in 1912, during a trial for theft, the foreman of the jury remarked that nothing had been said about the previous character of the accused. Information on this point is forbidden, and none was given. After the man was convicted, with a recommendation that he should be treated as a first offender, it came out that the sceptical foreman had imparted his suspicions to his fellows, and thus, presumably, influenced their decision. The man had, in fact, been previously convicted eighteen times and had often been in penal servitude. The Court quashed the conviction, 'though in all probability the verdict was right,' because it was arrived at in a wrong way. By all

means be on the safe side, but why disclaim re-trying cases? Again, in 1913, a judgment says:

'This Court has said that it does not proceed on such lines as these—to look at the evidence, see what conclusion the Court would have come to, and set aside the verdict if it does not correspond with such conclusion. There have been cases where the Court has done so on a question of fact alone, but only where the verdict was obviously and palpably wrong. . . . It is not necessary to say whether we [that is, three judges] would have given the same verdict.'

But surely, if they would not, it was their function to say so, which comes to the same thing. If they—at any rate unanimously—come to a conclusion contrary to that found by the jury, are they to sit still and allow some one whom they believe innocent to be condemned? Even the single judge of first instance is not reduced to that necessity, for he can impose a nominal sentence or advise the Home Secretary.

Then there is a type of cases where the Court does not doubt, or rather, will not examine the guilt of the accused—so that no question of the verdict on its merits arises—but, owing to some technical misdirection on the law or some omission ('non-direction') declines to assume that the jury would have found the same verdict if the mistake had not been made. Thus, a lucky three-card trickster (suspected, too, of drugging his victim) escaped in 1913 because a point in the theory of possession had not been expounded to the gentlemen in the box. As this is *in favorem libertatis* we applaud the decision; but we should like to be sure that, when the Court itself would have given a different verdict on the whole facts, it will not be deterred from insisting on its own, merely because it has no technical 'call.' When Parliament set up a court of three judges to try Mr Parnell and his party on the Piggott forgeries and much else, that tribunal was freely defended as an ideal one in cases where a man's honour or freedom was at stake.

It is true, however, that the Court of Appeal does not as a rule hear witnesses. There was a case in 1914 where in some ribald revels in and outside a low tavern some women were accused of robbing a man. The Court said roundly that there was not enough evidence against

one of them and discharged her. Yet antecedently it might have been supposed that this was just a case for the jury who saw and heard the witnesses—which their lordships did not. By all means acquit, but then why object to 're-try' cases? And how shortly they can deal with a 'perverse' jury which sets at defiance the Judge and the facts, an appeal heard on July 11, 1917, attests. Finally, in 1914 there was a case in which a lady going home was violently assaulted on a lonely country road about 4.30 p.m. on a February day. The convicted man, a soldier, set up an *alibi*. The lady picked him out of no less than 3500 men on parade, but she had previously given a description of her assailant 'quite irreconcilable' with this man's appearance; two other independent persons had identified him as being near the scene of the attack at the time. It may, therefore, be presumed that the accused bore some resemblance to the footpad. The verdict was merely one of assault; beyond question, if the man in the dock was guilty at all, he was guilty of a much more serious offence. The rest may be told in the words of the quashing judgment:

'Quite apart from the *alibi*, this conviction must have raised serious doubts. A jury must be sure beyond reasonable doubt; and they ought to be unanimous and clear in their belief in the identity of the man charged before convicting; a compromise verdict is a very undesirable thing in any circumstance. In a criminal case . . . it is not only undesirable; it is wrong. The verdict was quite out of keeping with the facts proved and must have been a compromise verdict. The jury must have really doubted whether the case was made out.'

Before the Court existed, this man's only chance of redress would have been a petition to the Home Secretary for a pardon; what machinery that overworked official had for reinvestigation or whether he would have used what he had, we can only guess, but we doubt whether he would have moved. If, then, the systematic control of juries is all to the good, as we believe it is, why depreciate or deprecate it?

A sense of symmetry suggests a further mention of the category of 'mixed' verdicts, if that phrase may be permitted to mean those findings of facts which it is suggested have taken a false colour from bad law. The

section of the Act already quoted (p. 347) proceeds to enact roundly that a conviction shall be quashed if 'on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice,' but it adds, 'Provided that the Court may, notwithstanding that they are of opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.' There is a sterling ring about the first and last phrases of these passages which echoes popular antipathy to 'technicality.' As a matter of fact, both parts of the canon have long practically governed civil appeals (which, however, may produce the *via media* of a new trial); while the gist of its wholesomeness—the enquiry whether 'on the premisses' justice has been done or not—can be traced in criminal cases at least to the respectable antiquity of 1781 (*R. v. Tinckler*). That problem, however, as it presents itself each time, is not necessarily easy to solve; and, owing to its nature, it is not surprising that no general rule can be extracted from the numerous cases that have occurred. But the whole section is plainly an invitation to the Court to override juries—*sub modo*.

Popular opinion is interested not only in the relief of the victims of downright juridical error, but also in the gradation of sentences according to circumstances; for crime only repeats itself, as history repeats itself, with a difference. Now, no one ever supposed that punishment can be awarded on a 'flat' rate; and the Court very soon expressed its own view, in a case where a man had pleaded guilty.

'Where there has been a trial (i.e. on a plea of not guilty) the judge who has tried the case has a far better opportunity of justly and adequately determining the proper sentence than the Court reviewing the matter after sentence. . . . Where there has been a trial, the Court will be slow to interfere with a sentence which does not appear to be wrong in principle, *although members of the Court may feel that they themselves would have imposed a different sentence.* . . . But we do not think that the same reasons extend to cases where the appellant has pleaded guilty, in which case the circumstances before the Court of trial are also before this Court to very much the same extent; although even then there may be local circumstances known to the judge . . . which are not before

this Court, such as the prevalence of a particular form of crime in the district. We think that the Legislature must have intended by this Act (1907) to do something in the way of standardising sentences where the prisoner has pleaded guilty, although cases vary to such a large extent in the circumstances that affect the punishment' (Justice of the Peace Reports, vol. 73, p. 30).

Here again we must demur to another *idée mère* of the Court, expressed in the passage above underlined and often elsewhere. Surely, if no one of the three appeal Judges would have inflicted the given sentence, it is not only reasonable but imperative that they should reduce it. If the Legislature intended anything on the subject, it intended this; why, then, this abdication of jurisdiction? And *a fortiori*, on their own principle, why should they ever increase punishment—of their ample power for which they have been sparing to the point of parsimony? Otherwise the record of the Court in this respect is admirable. No plea for mitigation—the only mercy within their prerogative—that has been urged by the convict in person or in an illiterate scrawl from his cell, or launched by the more artistic methods of advocacy, but has been sympathetically studied.

Exclusive of the numerous cases in which fresh evidence or facts have come to light since the trial, and in which the Court only professed to give effect to what the trial Judge would have decreed or the jury found had that information been before them, there remain to be considered those cases in which the Court has used this distinctive power of mitigation. In a few of these a sentence of death has been set aside. In two, in 1908 and 1914, juries had refused to accept the medical testimony of the defence (and, apparently, in one case, of the Crown doctors) that the accused was insane, and on that testimony alone the Court substituted the proper verdict. In 1911, for the first time, it was forced to liberate without qualification a man under the capital sentence 'without the slightest expression of opinion' whether he was guilty or not, because the Judge at the trial had made a serious mis-statement in his direction; well might the Court again lament, by no means for the last time, that it has no power to order a new trial. The next case, which occurred in December 1914, has a special interest;

the condemned man, a naturalised alien, was German Consul at Sunderland on the outbreak of the war, and for his official acts he was convicted, on Aug. 5, 1914, of high treason. The presiding Judge gave him leave to appeal, both on the facts and on the law as laid down by the Judge; and he was actually liberated by reason of a mistake in that law, admitted as possible by the Judge himself. In 1915 the Court was confronted with the problem, than which at times there is none nicer in criminal law, of murder or manslaughter on the admitted facts. The jury, having reason to believe that there was no middle course between acquittal and a verdict of murder, and characteristically objecting to impunity for any homicide, found the prisoner guilty of murder. It was pretty clear that they would have found the lesser offence had they known their power; and the Court gave the prisoner the benefit of the doubt.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to summarise the principles which the Court, overcoming its avowed reluctance, has adopted in remitting penalties; obviously the amount of punishment, be it incarceration or fine, is a matter about which Judges, like other men, will always disagree. But it may be said generally that their example has had a steadying effect on the local tribunals—an effect which will strengthen with time. Acting in harmony with the spirit of the hour, they have sensibly lowered the standard of severity; the savage sentence is a thing of the past. Thus, they have insisted that the maximum legal penalty should be reserved for the worst cases of the crime, and that detention before trial should be allowed for in the term; they have strongly discouraged the imposition of penal servitude after imprisonment with hard labour or of hard labour after penal servitude, and of penal servitude for a first offence, or, if such a penalty is inevitable, they have preferred the minimum term of three years; while they have repeatedly favoured the merciful policy of ‘winding up a delinquent’s moral bankruptcy’ by indicating how, when a defendant is riddled with charges from several quarters, he should be punished once for all and start again ‘with a clean slate.’ In short, even their failings have leaned to leniency’s side. Perhaps, before long, even Deputy-Chairmen will accept this bias.

Another grievance which has been at least modified, is that of the long delay, spent generally by the appellant in prison, between sentence and 'appeal' in the old forms. The present interval is about a fortnight, or three weeks at most. Formerly there was no allowance if the conviction was confirmed; now, to say nothing of the increased facilities for bail, the expedient has been devised of a sliding scale of incarceration. The appellant has the option of letting the whole or part of the time while he is *sub judice* run for sentence, or not; if he adopts the latter course, he is 'specially treated,' and in a proper case even this comparative freedom counts for the term; the last phase may be liberation.

Few laymen know enough of legal processes to realise that the only certain pathway to justice is through law—technical, scientific, text-book law. What, then, has the Court of Criminal Appeal done in ten years for the progress of criminal law? We would suggest that they have, at least, developed the jurists' doctrines of corroboration, the limits of relevant evidence, the admissibility in evidence of 'similar acts,' and the criteria of guilt—all points which may be included in the one category of Evidence. That law is an ocean which only expert lawyers can navigate in adverse weather with hope of a port, but a few observations may be made on each of these themes.

Misreception of evidence runs misdirection as a ground of appeal very hard. A distinctive mark of English legal procedure is the careful exclusion of any deposition not clearly relevant to the charge on trial. No doubt reasonable persons may and often do differ gravely whether a given statement is perceptibly relevant; and he will be a great jurist who can invent a formula of universal application. The Court has given innumerable decisions under this head, notably in cases under the statute of 1898, which permitted the accused to give sworn evidence in his own behalf, and provided due safeguards for his cross-examination. Their contributions under this head form quite a little *corpus* by themselves, which, of course, binds the practitioner.

Another part of their teaching, though it too is authoritative, has not met with equal acceptance; we

refer to their tendency to admit as evidence the fact that a person accused of a specific offence on a given date has been guilty of other similar offences before or after that date. This is not the place to argue the general question—which at bottom is ethical—how far you are entitled to lay bare a man's past in order to convict him. The extent to which it is permissible must depend on circumstances. Our immediate point is that the new Court has in fact modified the old doctrine, and has been criticised therefor. To prove this statement, compare the following cases.

Take first the famous case of Palmer in 1856. On this Sir James Stephen writes as follows :

'He was actually indicted also for the murder of his wife and for that of his brother, and it was commonly reported at the time that he had murdered in the same way many other persons. Under the French system the *acte d'accusation* would have paraded these, with all the other discreditable incidents of his life, before the eyes of the jury. He would have been questioned by the president, probably for days, about them; and it would have been practically impossible for the jury to consider calmly and impartially whether the fact that he had murdered Cook was properly proved. As it was, no one of these matters was introduced or referred to except so far as it directly bore upon the case of Cook. . . . The suggestion that he had murdered his wife (as he most unquestionably had) was never made or hinted at.' So of his brother. 'The evidence on all these matters was confined to what was absolutely necessary for the purpose of showing motive' ('A General View,' etc., p. 270).

In the 'Three Brides' case (1915), the law was laid down as follows :

'The prosecution may, in order to prove the quality of the act charged in the indictment, give evidence of subsequent criminal acts by the prisoner and the facts and circumstances surrounding the same, other than that covered by the indictment, when a *prima facie* case in law has been established against the prisoner' (Law Journal Reports, vol. 84, p. 2153).

Here the Crown had given evidence of the deaths (for which indictments were pending) of two other wives of the accused in their baths, besides the similar death

then on trial. It cannot be denied that since 1856 there has been a development of the doctrine of 'similar acts,' which is not favourable to the accused.

Here may be conveniently noticed the inherent vice of extraneous (i.e. remote) supplement of evidence, which is a common and, to us, somewhat amazing feature of trials in France. In the second of the cases just mentioned and in many others, the Courts below have emphatically instructed the jury, with the approval of the Court above, that the only use they could make in law of the suggestion that the man in the dock had committed another crime was to compare it with his defence—that, for example, he had no knowledge of facts necessarily imputed to him by the prosecution, or that his impugned act or acts were purely accidental. Thus, in the 'Three Brides' case, the jury were warned that they were not enquiring and must not enquire into the two other suspicious deaths, references to which were introduced to reinforce the charge with which they were concerned. But the fact is that neither they nor any one else could prevent their minds being influenced by such parallels; and so Lord Brampton, *more suo*, said bluntly in such a case some years ago. The mind is subject to the laws of nature and not to the *minutiae* of legal regulations. Every practitioner knows that, in a doubtful case, after the revelation of 'similar acts,' the mischief is done, and the prisoner has no chance.

The difficulty upon this point of evidence appears to indicate a flaw in our criminal jurisprudence; and we have dwelt on it because it is one of two problems—the other being the responsibility of the mentally deficient (see below)—with which the Court seems not to have grappled, but which ought to be finally settled. We have no intention, however, of minimising the substantive merits of the Court in developing the principles and the administration of the criminal law. It should be said with gratitude that they have welded into a consistent whole the Law of Corroboration, not only in those cases where statute insists upon it but in those in which reason and practice require it; and notably, with regard to accomplices, they have practically ensured that, whether strict law goes so far or not, no conviction shall take place on the unsupported evidence of an accomplice. They have

settled the vexed question of *onus* in trials for receiving stolen property with guilty knowledge; it is for the Crown to prove that defendant's knowledge was guilty, not for him to prove that it was innocent. They have 'keyed up' to a correct pitch police methods of identification, which have been sometimes wanting in scrupulousness: and out of their decisions a *rationale* may be constructed for the use, by the Bench and the police, of the documents, extraordinarily 'human' sometimes, known as prisoners' statements, e.g. what they say when they first come into physical contact with the Law. The vagaries, too, of an undefended prisoner have always received a merciful interpretation from judges who recognise the infirmities of lay nature. Their constant advice to defendants not to reserve their defence before the magistrates has been wholly in the interest of the accused, especially of the undefended accused. Here, too, it is apposite to mention the benevolent acceptance by the Court of the recognised criterion that evidence equally consistent with innocence or guilt is to be interpreted charitably; and consequently, when juries have failed to give the accused 'the benefit' of a real doubt, it has not hesitated to do it for them.

Of one whole section of neo-penology they have had seisin from its origin, viz. the treatment of the 'habitual criminal,' a creature of the law since 1908 (though the phrase is found in a statute of 1869); and they have deliberately fashioned its administration. Rarely has a new law been launched on its career so well equipped by a judgment as was this by Sir Arthur Channell's judgment in November 1909. The invention of 'preventive detention'*—for the benefit of 'the habitual'—has afforded another opportunity for the Court to moderate sentences.

The other problem which the Court has left untouched is the criminal responsibility of the 'mentally affected'—a phrase which covers every variety of abnormal intellect. In no case has it granted relief on the ground that the law was unsatisfactorily expounded at the trial, so that there has been less opportunity of formally

* This phrase is taken from French law, where it has quite a different meaning, viz. detention before trial, i.e. no bail.

considering whether there has been adequate progress in the criminal law of insanity (as it may be called) since the Judges corporately pronounced on the question in 1843, after M'Naughten's case. The new Court has simply affirmed again bodily the rules then formulated, leaving the discretion of life or death in the individual cases—for they are almost without exception capital—to the Home Secretary, which is generally the most merciful course they could take. In one or two instances there have been frontal attacks from the Bar on the M'Naughten doctrines; but, though theoretically the Court is not bound by them, it can hardly be expected to dissent without the authority of the Legislature from the considered opinion of all the Judges advising the House of Lords. In one case (Nov. 2, 1914) the significant remark was made in argument that at the trial it was contended for the Crown that the doctors were expressing an opinion on the applicant's sanity 'from the medical rather than from the legal aspect of the question.' If, as that distinction implies, those views may differ, then it is clear that only the authority of Parliament can decide between them: and such a decision should be given without delay. Is it the case that the voices of Science and Law tell different tales? On this point the Downing Professor of Law in the University of Cambridge remarks, in his well-known 'Outlines of Criminal Law,' as follows:

'Though the doctrines laid down in the Judges' answers . . . remain theoretically unaltered, the practical administration of them has been such as to afford a wider immunity than their language would at first sight seem to recognise.* For many forms of insanity, which do not in themselves constitute those particular defects of reason which the Judges recognised as conferring exemption from responsibility, are now habitually treated as being sufficient evidence to show that one or other of those exemptive defects was also actually present. . . . How far an insane impulse to do an act is to be regarded as affecting the criminal responsibility for doing it, is a question which is not yet definitely settled . . . The

* 'Had the M'Naughten dictum been rigidly insisted on, it would have been the means of hanging more than half the women who are now in Broadmoor, as criminal lunatics, for the murder of their children.' Sir Clifford Allbutt's 'System of Medicine,' viii, 456.

defence of insane impulse is now rarer than that of unconscious automatism, as in sleep-walking or epilepsy. But our Courts, unlike Continental tribunals, have not yet become familiar with the plea that a crime was committed under the influence of post-hypnotic "suggestion," exercised by some designing person who had induced hypnotic sleep in the offender. It remains to be seen what exemptive effect will ever be accorded in England to such "suggestions," or to those affections which (like hysteromania and neurasthenia) have been called the borderland of insanity. Such questions have become of great practical importance, now that modern science has come to recognise so clearly, in addition to the ordinary "Intellectual" insanity which impairs a man's judgment, a "Conative" form which affects his Will, whether by weakening his natural impulses to action or by inspiring abnormal impulse and "Affective" insanity which disturbs his Emotions of love or hatred (cf. Ribot, "Les Maladies de la Volonté").'

We do not possess enough of the science invoked to presume to endorse what its sponsor says, but can any one doubt that in the above quotation (mutilated as it is) a *prima facie* case is made out for revising our criminal law of insanity? Probably a Royal Commission of doctors and lawyers would be the best preparation for bringing the law up to date.

Another large question in regard to the whole system is sure to recur: Is the Court to have the power of ordering a new trial? The question was not overlooked when the Court was created, as Hansard, for July 29 and Aug. 5, 1907 (645-'58, Commons; 1471-'83, Lords), shows. But for ten years since that date the Court has been asking for this power; and surely its opinion ought to be regarded as decisive. On the other hand, the objections then urged still exist; the chief being the difficulty of getting together again the same band of witnesses on both sides and the additional expense and loss of time. And, apart from the difficulty of reconstituting the enquiry, there will always be the popular objection that, if a man has been tried once and the charge against him has, through no misconduct on his side, miscarried, he ought to get the benefit of his luck; otherwise it is like a player—in such a case, the Crown—asking for a move back at chess.

Indeed, Sir F. Pollock and the late Prof. Maitland point out ('History of English Law,' vol. ii, c. 9, s. 4) that one view in this country has long been that the Judge

'stands like the umpire of our English games, who is there not in order that he may invent tests for the powers of the two sides but merely to see that the rules of the game are observed. It is towards this ideal that our English mediæval procedure is strongly inclined. We are often reminded of the cricket-match. The Judges sit in Court not in order that they may discover the truth but in order that they may answer the question "How's that?"'

In short, the House of Commons, which in 1907 rejected the proposal by 116 to 41, would have to be converted to the belief that to re-try a convicted person in a doubtful case where there has been some irregularity is compatible with fair play. In some cases it undoubtedly is.

Perhaps one suggestion may be diffidently hazarded. It is that legal aid, both that of counsel and that of solicitor, should be afforded, not indiscriminately but more freely than at present, to appellants who ask for it. Take this case, which occurred in 1908. A man convicted of murder prepared his own notice of appeal. His counsel at once stated that he could not support it, as 'it was opposed both to the defence [at the trial] and to the evidence'; and the Court, remarking that it must take the whole circumstances into account, including the statements in the notice, added, 'If this Court had had any doubt about the verdict on the evidence given at the trial, that doubt would have been settled by what the appellant had said in his notice' (Justice of the Peace Reports, Vol. 73, p. 11). It is obvious that, if a solicitor had advised this man, his case would have been presented very differently to the Court. Moreover, in less grave cases, the time of the Court is often wasted by the reading of long, rambling and incoherent writings by appellants, a large proportion of whom are quite illiterate and cannot express what they mean.

The evil goes even deeper. The Poor Prisoners' Defence Act (1903) permits both counsel and solicitor being assigned by the court of trial to a 'poor prisoner' without expense to him; and the Court of Appeal has encouraged a more liberal grant of these facilities in

some classes of cases, but in practice it frequently happens that counsel alone is assigned. Now experience has shown that sometimes a convicted man, in such circumstances, loses his chance of appeal. It is not becoming for counsel, except in a very clear case, to urge his client to appeal, though he may think that some legal point might succeed. This, of course, he cannot discuss with the accused, even if he were not in prison, which he almost always is; it is impossible for defending counsel to carry on a correspondence with a man 'doing time.' But to a solicitor he can speak confidentially; and we are certain that many a prisoner would have appealed with success if he had had the services of a solicitor. It is too late to say that appeals on technical legal points should not be encouraged. There is a good deal of misconception on this head. It is not usually the case with indicted persons that they are quite innocent or quite guilty. They have generally done something wrong; pleas of guilty are frequently 'given away,' so to say, by ignorant persons who know that they are not morally innocent. But by our constitution the bad, as such, cannot be punished; we leave them to the laws of nature. The only practical justice is legal justice, whose most useful champion in many cases is a solicitor.

The outcome of our analysis is, then, that the new Court has been a valuable addition to the institutions of the country. It has been a boon to the profession above all, because it has inspired a secure sense that there is no point in criminal law, conspicuous or obscure, on which they cannot look to it for authoritative guidance. It has done a great work of co-ordination; to it in its sphere

'No high, no low, no great, no small;
It fills, it bounds, connects, and equals all.'

It carries on the immemorial English tradition of Justice with mercy. 'Spiritus intus alit.'

HERMAN COHEN.

Art. 6.—CICERO AND THE CONQUEST OF GAUL.

1. *Ciceronis Epistolæ*. Edited by Tyrrell and Purser. Vols. I and II. (Third edition.) Dublin University Press, 1906-1908.
2. *Julius Cæsar*. (Heroes of the Nations Series.) By W. Warde Fowler. Putnam, 1892.
3. *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*. By G. Ferrero. Translated by Alfred E. Zimmern. Vol. II. Heinemann, 1909.
4. *Cæsar's Conquest of Gaul*. By T. Rice Holmes. (Second edition.) Oxford University Press, 1911.
5. *Cicero of Arpinum*. By E. G. Sihler. Yale University Press : New Haven, Conn., 1914.

CÆSAR'S conquest of Gaul may well be thought to be the most important event in the whole history of Western Europe; it settled once and for all the line between Latin civilisation and Teutonic barbarism; it laid the foundation for the French nation, the greatest of all Rome's great creations; it saved Mediterranean culture from the destroying flood which threatened to overwhelm it. The fact that the conquest led immediately to the destruction of the Roman Republic is in itself less important, for the Roman Republic was doomed to perish from its own internal weakness; but it is on this, the constitutional result of Cæsar's work, that our modern historians lay most stress.

The great series of campaigns which accomplished the conquest of Gaul has at last received adequate treatment in English. The 'De Bello Gallico' had too long been treated as a mere introduction to Latin; it had been used as a school book in which uninterested boys might be shown countless examples of ablative absolute and *oratio obliqua*. To Mr Rice Holmes belongs the credit of having produced a book which deals fully, and in an up-to-date manner, not only with the actual narrative, but also with all the problems, ethnological, geographical, social, which are raised by Cæsar's book. The second edition, the publication of which had been rightly secured by the Oxford Press, is not a mere reissue of the first; students of Cæsar ought to retain their old copy,

while getting the new one, for the first edition contains a good deal which has not been republished in the second. But one or other edition ought to be in the possession of every student of the great things in European History.

The conquest of Gaul, as it happens, falls within a decade of Roman History on which we have fuller information than on any other decade, except that immediately following it. It can even be claimed that, thanks to Cicero's letters and, to a small extent, to other sources such as Plutarch, we know this period better than we know any other period of history before the invention of printing. Now that the interest of our own nation is concentrated on the greatest of all wars, it may be worth while to compare the attitude of Rome to this great war, more especially as Cæsar's campaigns were fought in part on the present battlefields and, to some extent, for the same ends as our own.

There is no doubt that the events in Gaul were closely followed in Rome. Our information as to what was felt and thought there depends chiefly on the fact that Cicero had, during some three years of the period,* as correspondents in Cæsar's camp, his brother Quintus, and his friend, the lawyer Trebatius. Unluckily it is only during a period of about twelve months, beginning with the spring of 54 B.C., that we have letters to them—thirteen to Quintus Cicero, and a similar number to Trebatius; why this is so, we can only conjecture. Still more unluckily, their answers, which would have been even more interesting to us, have not been preserved. The usual time that a letter from Gaul took to reach Rome was from twenty to thirty days; Cicero in September 54 B.C. receives a letter from Quintus 'on the twentieth day,' though rather oddly a time nearly half as long again, viz. twenty-eight days, was taken by a letter from Cæsar, which was written in the same

* Q. Cicero was at Ariminum on his way to Gaul in May 54 (Q. Fr., II, 12, 1, T. 139); he was there till the end of the campaign of 52 B.C. (Cæs. B. G., VII, 90), but unfortunately no letters to him in Gaul are preserved later than the beginning of the winter of 54 B.C. As to the letters of Trebatius we are a little more fortunate; the 'summer campaign' (*æstiva*) referred to in Ad Fam., VII, 14, 1, must be that of 53 B.C., though the letter is not dated. But in any case, the letters that bear directly on the Gallic campaigns concern only one single year—54 B.C.

month from Britain, to relieve Cicero's possible anxiety* about his brother's long silence. It is characteristic of Cæsar's attitude to Cicero and of his humane courtesy that, even amid the anxieties of the British campaign, he made time to write this considerate letter. So again † we find Cicero anxious because 'a more than fifty days' interval' had elapsed since he had had letters or 'even any rumour.' As he had had Cæsar's letter of explanation, just referred to, less than a month before, Cicero must be considered a somewhat exacting correspondent. But his impatience shows at any rate how close was the intercourse between the capital and the seat of war.

On the whole, in matter of time, correspondence with Gaul compares quite favourably with our own correspondence with our men in Mesopotamia, and not altogether unfavourably with the letters which come from Salonica. It is true that Roman correspondence had other drawbacks which were worse than even our worries from the censorship; letters were apt to arrive in bundles as they do with our men at the front, and sometimes much 'out of date' (*pervetus*). Moreover, it was necessary to be careful of your letter-carrier; if Cicero wished to send anything, he had to depend on Cæsar's special messengers, who were managed by his friend Oppius; more private correspondence went by confidential freedmen, like Hippodamus, because it might cause trouble if it fell into wrong hands.

Cicero's close correspondence with his brother and his friend is no doubt typical of that maintained by many Romans with relatives and connexions at the front. There is no reason to suppose that in 54 B.C. intercourse with Gaul was unusually well maintained; it may rather be assumed that the amount of interest shown in that year is typical of the general feeling of Rome during this eventful period. In the absence of further letters from Gaul, we are driven, in estimating the state of

* Q. F., III, 1, 25, T. 148. In all quotations from Cicero's letters, I have added the number in Tyrrell's edition (1879-1890) as the most convenient for reference.

† Q. F., III, 3, 1, T. 151. This letter is not dated, but it was written two days before the first trial of Gabinius (*ibid.*, § 3), which took place on Oct. 24. Cicero reckons his 'more than 50 days' from the date of Cæsar's writing, not from the date of his receiving the letter, which was Sept. 28. Impatience made him very unreasonable.

feeling in Rome, to make the best of casual allusions in Cicero's correspondence during other years, combining with these the hints given by Cæsar himself in his Commentaries, and the few mentions of the attitude of parties at Rome to Gallic matters, which occur in later writers.

The apparent interest in Gaul was great, but it certainly was not based on much knowledge. Cicero's own ignorance of the real strength of the country may be judged from his casual statement in his third Catilinarian oration that the Allobroges were the 'only Gallic tribe who had both the power and the will to attack Rome.' Two years later we find the first allusion in Cicero's letters to the great series of events which were about to begin in Gaul; it is typical of his lack of real interest in the subject, and it shows from the very first how little grasp he had of the importance of that province. In March 60 he writes to Atticus :

'In public affairs at the present time Gallic terrors are very much to the fore. Our brothers the Ædui have lately been badly defeated; the Helvetii are undoubtedly in arms, and are attacking the Province. The Senate passed several votes, (1) that the consuls should have the two Gauls for their provinces; (2) that all leave should be suspended; (3) that ambassadors with full powers be sent to visit the Gallic States and to take measures to prevent them joining the Helvetii.'

The occasion was indeed a critical one; already there were 120,000 Germans* in Gaul, and more were expected at once; the Gap of Belfort, the weak place in the mountain defences of Western Europe, was in their hands. And, as had happened half a century before, when the migration of the Cimbri and the Teutones seemed likely to anticipate the destructive work of the fifth century A.D., and prematurely to end Mediterranean civilisation, the German movement had started a 'wandering of the nations'; the Helvetii were planning a march of conquest westwards. Rome was within measurable distance of a danger as serious as that from which the genius of Marius had saved her.

* Cæs. i, 31. Both Cæsar's narrative and all probability are against Rice Holmes' suggestion that three-fourths of the 120,000 were women and children ('Class. Quart.', iii, 204).

The resolutions of the Senate were as thoroughgoing as could be wished, and continued the policy of the previous year,* when it had voted that 'whoever was governor in Gaul should, so far as state interests allowed, defend the interests of the Ædui and of Rome's other allies.' But it was no longer an 'assembly of Kings,' as it had been when it defeated Pyrrhus and Hannibal. Like the Athenian assembly in the days of Demosthenes, and many other more popular bodies since, it was satisfied with a policy on paper. When, about three months later, it found that the consul for next year, who would have to carry out the above resolutions, was to be the Opposition leader, Julius Cæsar, it stultified its own motions by voting for him and his colleague the charge of unimportant home departments—'the Woods and Forests of Southern Italy.' It is not surprising that Cæsar, who saw that Rome's interests could not wait, upset the senatorial arrangement by direct appeal to the people, and secured for himself the command in Gaul by the motion of his tribune, Vatinius. Cicero's own remarks on the debate of March 60 reveal the general senatorial indifference to the danger from the North; what interests him in the whole business is the personal fact that, when he was the first consular to be chosen by lot as commissioner, a crowded Senate unanimously voted that he could not be spared from Rome.† A similar compliment was paid to Pompey; but it may well be doubted whether the senatorial protest was really as flattering ‡ to Cicero as he imagined. The work of the commissioners was only diplomatic, but success required armed force behind it; and for this reason the Senate was not likely to give it to the orator, who had no military experience at all, or to Pompey, whose military experience was an object of bitter jealousy to the majority of his fellow senators.

* Cæsar, B. G., i, 35.

† Roman History is still written from the same narrow standpoint. In the latest life of Cicero, that of Prof. Sihler of New York, this interesting passage is briefly epitomised without note or comment. But it must be added that this is the general character of Prof. Sihler's work; he gives the materials for Cicero's life, but there is little or no criticism or comment of any value.

‡ He and Pompey were to be kept 'quasi pignora reipublicæ.' Ad Att. i. 19. 3.

The real interest of the debate lies elsewhere. In the first place it shows (along with the resolution of 61 B.C. quoted above) that the danger in Gaul was a real one, and that Cæsar's vigorous dealing with it, two years later, was not prompted by personal ambition only, as has often been suggested, but was urgently required in the interests of the State. And secondly, the whole treatment of the incident by Cicero is typical of the attitude of his party at Rome, which looked on all foreign affairs as primarily important in their bearing on personal careers. Cicero's blindness to the real importance of the occasion is the less excusable, since he had had Divitiacus as his guest in Rome, at the time when the Æduan was pleading the cause of his people and urging the necessity of supporting Rome's partisans among the Gauls. It was fortunate for Rome that one of her own statesmen was more able than Cicero to understand the importance of the friendly tribes in Gaul, and the imminence of the German danger, when these matters were put before him.*

How completely Cicero looked at the Gallic question from the point of view of home politics is seen from his next reference to it, about two months later; the report that peace was assured only elicits the remark that the consul Metellus Celer was 'displeased, as he had wished for war and a triumph.' In his letter of a few days later (about June 1) Cicero is less certain; he only 'hopes for peace in Gaul.' His general attitude to Gaul is well shown in a casual reference in a contemporary letter to his brother Quintus:† 'Had it fallen to your lot to govern Africans, Spaniards or Gauls, nations savage and barbarous, it would only be your duty, as an educated man, to think of their interests'; the contempt here displayed is a striking proof how little Cicero realised that the Græco-Roman civilisation he loved was to find a new home and a new life among these 'barbarians.'

Cicero had indeed attended as prætor, six years before, the lectures of the Gallic rhetorician, Gnipho, the tutor of Cæsar; but they were a mere incident in his intellectual life, while to Cæsar they had been an inspiration.‡

* Cæsar, B. G., I, 31.

† Q. F., I, 1, 27, T. 30.

‡ I borrow this point from Mr Warde Fowler's admirable 'Life of Julius Cæsar' (pp. 13-14).

We may probably attribute to them some of the insight into the real state of affairs on the Rhine frontier, which marked the great proconsul's policy throughout. The literary world at Rome had not grasped the great distinction between Gaul and German; even twenty years later, the historian Sallust could still speak of the Cimbri as 'Gauls.'* But Cæsar had realised the fundamental difference between the races, which still, twenty centuries later, is a leading motive in European politics. He established a claim on Gallic sympathy by driving the intruders across the Rhine in his first campaign; he never swerved from his determination to keep that river as a political and a racial boundary. Yet with admirable daring, in 52 B.C., he ventured to call in his beaten enemies, the Germans, to aid him in holding down those very Gauls, in whose cause he had fought against the Germans. Only a great soldier and a great statesman could have ventured on so bold a step. The best parallel to it in history is when John Lawrence enlisted thousands of those Sikhs, who had given us so hard a struggle at Chillianwallah and Gujerat only eight years before, to fight against our old comrades, the mutinous Sepoys.

Of such a step Cicero would never have been capable, for Gaul and its problems lay outside his sphere of interests; and, though we have some seventy of his letters distributed over the next four years (60-57 B.C.), there is not a word of reference to Gaul. This is the more surprising, since the beginning of the period saw the interest of Roman politicians keenly concentrated on Gaul. While Cæsar was securing by popular vote that sphere of duty on the Gallic frontier which Roman interests required, but of which the Roman Senate was seeking to deprive him, his political opponents were not shrinking from communication with Rome's deadliest enemies. There is no reason to doubt the statement of Ariovistus, that he was informed by 'special envoys' from 'leading men' in Rome, that Cæsar's death would be a welcome event, and that he could earn their gratitude by defeating the army of their countrymen.†

* Jugurtha, 114.

† Cæs. B. G., I, 44. I have not attempted to deal with the reconstruction of the events of the year 59 B.C., and of Rome's policy in Gaul, which is put forward by Signor Ferrero in his *History* (vol. II, Appendix D, pp. 336 f.).

This indifference (or worse) to Rome's real interests, and this willingness to sacrifice everything to the narrowest party spirit, are characteristic of the senatorial party throughout the last days of the Republic. It is the same spirit which, when the Civil War actually broke out, allowed the Roman nobles to purchase Juba's support in Africa by sacrificing Roman civilisation to Numidian barbarism, and which made the 'noble' fugitives after the Civil War take refuge with, and fight for, the Parthians, Rome's deadliest enemies in the East. This preference of party to patriotism is well shown in a passage in a letter to Cælius, though this is some years later in date : *

'As for Cæsar, numerous rumours arrive which are not at all favourable; at any rate they are whispered about. Some say he has lost his cavalry, which I think is certainly a fiction; another says that the 7th legion has been well thrashed, and that Cæsar himself is blockaded among the Bellovaci, and cut off from his main force. So far there is nothing confirmed, and even these unconfirmed rumours are not current generally, but they are openly told as secrets in the clique you know of; while Domitius, putting his finger to his lips—'

The *aposiopesis* which ends this quotation expresses admirably the attitude of the teller of alarmist rumours, who has been such a familiar figure in England for the last three years.

In view of this party bitterness, we need not attach much importance to the condemnation at Rome of Cæsar's proceedings in Gaul, which is from time to time recorded. The evidence for this is furnished mainly by Suetonius; his life of Julius Cæsar is clearly based in great part on the speeches and memoirs of Cæsar's opponents in the Senate. He says that Cæsar waged war on every

It has been crushingly refuted by Rice Holmes in the 'Classical Quarterly' (iii, 203 f.), and must be looked upon simply as one more of the unprovable and improbable hypotheses with which 'criticism' encumbers the study of Ancient History. Ferrero attaches great importance to the statement of Pliny (Nat. Hist., ii, 170) that Ariovistus negotiated with Metellus Celer, the consul of 60 B.C.; but the story, which rests on the respectable authority of Cornelius Nepos, is discredited by the impossible detail that, among the presents sent to Rome, were 'Indians who had been driven ashore on the coast of Germany.'

* May 51 B.C.; Ad Fam., VIII, 1, 4, T. 192.

occasion, 'however unjust and dangerous, attacking without provocation tribes in alliance with Rome, as well as hostile and barbarous tribes, so that the Senate voted to send a commission to inquire into the condition of Gaul, and some proposed that Cæsar should be given up to the enemy.' The reference is undoubtedly to Cato's protest against Cæsar's dealing with the Germans who had crossed the Rhine in 55 B.C. According to the *chronique scandaleuse* of Tanusius Geminus,* he (Cato) considered that Cæsar's 'breach of faith' was so grave as to call down the anger of heaven on Rome; and, to avert this, he proposed the surrender of the proconsul to the Germans. Cato in home politics was looked upon as embodied Justice; but our own experience tells us how easily the most virtuous persons can bring themselves to see only the facts on their own side, and not even to see these right.

The nobles at Rome condemned everything Cæsar did, at once from remembrance of his past attacks on the Senate, and from a well-grounded, though only half-realised, dread of the use he would make of his power, if completely victorious. Cicero may be acquitted of this extreme anti-patriotism; but it is difficult to think that the silence in his letters at this period is purely accidental, or merely due to eccentricity in selection on the part of the editor, Tiro. There are in them, as will be seen, brief allusions to Gaul; but they are purely personal and do not concern the main interests of Rome on the north-western frontier.

This aristocratic indifference to the great struggle is the more remarkable, since it is clear that there was somewhere a large class of Roman citizens who appreciated, though somewhat unintelligently, the successes in north-western Europe. The brief notices with which Cæsar ends his accounts of his second and fourth campaigns are significant. In 57 B.C. he writes, 'On receipt of Cæsar's despatches, a thanksgiving of fifteen days was voted, an honour which no one had previously enjoyed.' Two years later he ends his account of the first campaign against Britain thus: 'Two British States sent hostages, the rest failed to do so. After these campaigns, on

* Plutarch, Cæsar, c. 22.

receipt of Cæsar's despatches, a thanksgiving of twenty days* was voted by the Senate.' It is impossible not to see a touch of humour at his own expense in the last record; the 'unprecedented honour' of 57 B.C. is actually increased two years later, for a campaign which, as Cæsar frankly records, was almost a failure, and which we may add, was nearly a disaster. But, as will be seen later, Britain had a real fascination for Roman imagination, which obscured a more sober judgment.

Such honours would never have been voted, had there not been somewhere in Rome a real appreciation of the Gallic struggle. The strength of this is best judged from Cicero's own description of the successes of Cæsar in the 'De Provinciis Consularibus.' Perhaps he never spoke so well as in that speech; certainly there is no passage in all his works which appeals so much to modern imagination as the famous one beginning 'C. Cæsaris longe aliam video fuisse rationem'; for once the orator had a subject of real world-importance, not one merely concerning the political parties and the petty personalities of his own time. A part of it must be quoted, even with the certainty of doing injustice to its sonorous periods:

'Senators of Rome! in old days we enjoyed but a right of way through Gaul; all the rest of that country was inhabited by tribes either hostile to our empire, or untrustworthy or unknown, or at any rate savage, uncivilised and warlike. Every one always desired that these nations should be crushed and subdued; every one who had any wise policy for our State, ever since our empire began, thought that Gaul was an especial danger to it. But such was the strength and the extent of those nations that never, before our own time, did we venture on a general war with them; our policy was always mere resistance to attack. Now the result has been achieved that the boundary of our empire and of those lands is one and the same. Nature had of old given to Italy the rampart of the Alps; in this we see the working of Divine Providence; had Italy lain exposed to the savagery and the overwhelming hordes of the Gauls, Rome would never have become the home and seat of the greatest of empires. Now the Alps may disappear; there is nothing for Italy to dread, from those lofty mountains to the Ocean.'

* B. G., II, 35, IV, 38; a similar honour was voted also in 52 B.C. (ib., VII, 90) after the defeat of Vercingetorix.

The climax anticipates the boast of Mazarin that 'the Pyrenees were no more'; but the political prevision of the Roman orator surpassed that of the French cardinal in accuracy as much as it did in the greatness of its scope.

Cicero was carried by his subject beyond himself, yet it is significant that he was ashamed of this speech. It is doubtful whether it can be identified (as Mommsen argued) with the 'somewhat humiliating apology' which he told Atticus 'that he had such difficulty in swallowing'; but at any rate it is an expression of the change of front in politics which he felt as a bitter humiliation. The same inconsistency is seen in his letters; the proposals, which were made early in 56 B.C., formally to recognise Cæsar's successes and to legalise the measures by which he had raised his forces, seemed to Cicero 'outrageous'; and, when later they were voted by the Senate, he suppressed, in his letter to Lentulus Spinther, the fact that he himself had supported them. Cicero's political attitude during these four years is the best possible indication of the fact that in Rome at this time there were two nations, one clinging to the old Rome of the past, and hating every change, however necessary, that widened its limits, the other looking forward to the new Rome of the future, whose extension was to preserve all that was best in the old.

It has already been said that Cicero's letters during the early years of Cæsar's campaigns in Gaul say nothing about the great struggle. The rolling-back of the tide of German invasion in the first campaign, the breaking of the power of the great northern confederacy in the second, the dramatic conquest of the Atlantic seaboard in the next year, the invasion of Britain in 55 B.C.—all these events are passed over in silence. One touch in Cicero's later letters shows how ignorant he was of all that was happening. 'Where are your Nervii?' he asks his brother in the winter of 54, when Quintus was quartered among them. But the name of the Nervii ought to have been as familiar to a patriotic Roman as the defeat of the Prussian Guard at Ypres to an Englishman of to-day; for there the Roman army had fought for dear life, and had won a soldier's victory by a struggle in which Cæsar himself took part like a common soldier. It was these same Nervii, of whom Cicero is

contemptuously ignorant, who almost robbed him of the brother whom he really loved. The contrast between Cæsar and Cicero is well seen when we compare the indifference of the orator with the burning chapters of the fifth book of the 'Gallic War,' in which Cæsar drops his usual cold style, and lets himself go in praise of his legionaries and of Quintus Cicero, their commander.

The silence of Cicero as to the all-important Gallic campaigns between 59 and 54 B.C. is the more significant when we notice that Gaul not infrequently appears in his correspondence at this time; but it is in a quite different connexion. The general who was conquering it was a politician, and his soldiers were voters; hence it is mentioned, but only when it has some influence on the city politics which were all-absorbing to Cicero. The visit of his friend Sestius to Cæsar in the winter of 58 B.C., to secure the orator's own recall from exile, is not mentioned in the letters; but we may be sure that Appius Claudius was not the only candidate for office who went to the all-powerful proconsul to secure his influence for the consular elections;* the matter was so notorious that it was made a subject of jests in the Senate. Moreover, the Roman politicians did not find the same difficulty in taking the army vote as did His Majesty's late Government. A convenient tribune† would postpone the elections at Rome till the campaigning season was over, and then the legionary electors were marched to Rome under their own commanders; they counted doubly, for they not only voted themselves, but they also prevented any one else voting against their candidates. It was in this way that the election of Pompey and Crassus as consuls was secured in 56 B.C.; young Crassus, fresh from his victories in Aquitaine, brought a band of Cæsar's soldiers to Rome to secure the election of his father and Pompey;‡ and blood was actually shed before their opponent, the stubborn Domitius, would give way.

* Q. F., II, 4, 6, T. 105: Appius, however, went in the winter, when Cæsar was at any rate south of the Alps. Whether this is the same visit as that referred to in Q. F., II, 13, 3 (T. 141), it is impossible to say for certain; but probably it is not the same, as in the later letter the object of Appius is said to be to secure the patronage of Cæsar for others, not for himself.

† E.g. C. Cato in 56 B.C.

‡ Dio Cass., 39, 31.

Elections at Rome at this time were decided by steel or by gold; the Gallic campaigns were as influential through the latter metal as through the former. Cæsar set himself steadily to use the spoils of Gaul to buy support in Rome. The definite statement of Suetonius to this effect is well illustrated by Cicero's letter to Atticus * in 54 B.C. :

'So we, friends of Cæsar—I mean myself and Appius; you may split yourself with anger if you like—have sent 500,000*l.* flying, on the public work you used to be so enthusiastic over, I mean the opening up the Forum and clearing it right away to Liberty Hall. We could not settle private claims for less. We shall do the business splendidly; for, in the Campus Martius, we intend to build of marble the polling-booths for the Comitia Tributa, and to roof them and surround them with a lofty colonnade a mile in extent.'

Down to 54 B.C., as has been said, the evidence which Cicero's letters give as to events in Gaul is mainly negative; it is quite otherwise in that year, thanks to the presence of Q. Cicero and Trebatius on Cæsar's staff. Of these correspondents, it is not necessary to speak at length. Quintus Cicero can only be called interesting for his brother's sake; as for Trebatius, it must suffice to say that he is somewhat interesting for himself, as one of the founders of the science of Roman Law, though many will think him even more important as the friend of Cicero and of Horace. It argues in him tact as well as good fortune that he managed to survive two Civil Wars and the proscriptions of 43 B.C. Like the Abbé Siéyès, after the Revolutionary Terror, he might have said '*J'ai vécu*'; and it would have been no light boast. But in some ways Trebatius is even more interesting as a type than he is in himself; he was one of the many young men who flocked from Rome to Cæsar in Gaul, in order to have their fortunes made. Cicero's letter of introduction for him is a model of what a testimonial should be; and no doubt the orator, in several other cases,† took full advantage of Cæsar's friendly invitation to send him such aspirants for fortune. Cæsar's humorous exaggeration, 'I will make the man you recommend a king in Gaul,' really meant something substantial.

* *iv.* 16, 8, *T.* 144.

† *Q. F.*, *III.*, 1, 10, *T.* 148, for Curtius as another instance.

Cicero's *protégé* in this instance did not at first do him credit. Trebatius had hardly gone before he wanted to be back in Rome; and his patron's early letters are full of friendly rebukes. Cicero quotes the 'Medea' of Ennius to show that 'Home-keeping youths have ever homely wits,' and gently rebukes his 'headlong haste' to have his fortune made. He reminds him that a letter of recommendation is not 'a draft at sight,' while he points out that friendship with Cæsar is worth, in actual hard cash, more than 'drafts' on certain Eastern potentates. The conduct of Trebatius was all the more unreasonable, because Cæsar offered him his commission without requiring any military duties. There was certainly a danger that he would turn out to be one of Rome's 'gilded youth,' of whom Cæsar had to make a clean sweep from his army after the disgraceful panic in the first German campaign. But the great commander bore with Trebatius, at first for the sake of his patron, and then for his own, since the young lawyer proved, in the end, to have good stuff in him. Before the year was out, Cæsar writes that he is content; and it is significant that Trebatius remained faithful to his leader's fortunes to the end.

Even now, with two correspondents at the front, public interests are the last thing in Cicero's mind. It is true that in one letter (April, 53) he asks for news of the 'campaign,' telling Trebatius in friendly banter that he will have most confidence in the report of so 'chicken-hearted' a correspondent; but his more usual attitude can be judged from his remark to his brother (Sept. 54), touching the second British campaign: 'I gather from your letter that there is no occasion for fear or for pleasure.' This remark as to the retirement from Britain might well have summed up the feelings of many Englishmen after the evacuation of Gallipoli; but this one sentence is the only reference, in one of Cicero's longest letters, to the army at the front. The campaign claims a line and a half in a letter of 217 lines; the rest gives interesting details on Q. Cicero's estates, family affairs, and politics at Rome. The attitude of Cicero to things military is seen in his remark to Trebatius, written about the same time: 'I am glad you did not go to Britain; you were spared the trouble, and I suppose I should have had to hear about the campaign there.'

Yet references of a certain sort to Britain are much more common than references to Gaul; Cicero shared that interest in the 'out-of-the-way island,' which made his countrymen vote so splendid a thanksgiving for the most indecisive of Cæsar's campaigns. Even then men knew that Britain was 'proudly ramparted with rocks'; Cicero has to the full that dread of the sea, which has so often warded off continental attacks from our island. On the principle that the grapes were sour, he is 'well informed that there is not a pennyworth of silver in the island,' and that the prospect of slaves is not encouraging. But he cannot keep Britain out of his letters. Its 'war chariots' play as prominent a part in his jokes as they used to do in the school histories of English boys, when those books were more picturesque and less scientific than they now are. He tells Trebatius that, had he gone to Britain, he would have been easily the 'best lawyer in the island,' and that as a 'British lawyer' he will be a 'comic part' in Roman farces, if he returns penniless. He congratulates his brother on having such a splendid subject for verse in the tribes and the customs of Britain, not to mention the campaign and Cæsar himself; he is willing to give his assistance in the composition of the verses, though he modestly tells Quintus that Marcus, in helping him with poetry, would be 'teaching his grandmother.' Shortly afterwards he writes to his brother that he has actually composed a poem to Cæsar, 'very attractive, as I think.'

This prominence of Britain in the contemporary view of Cæsar's conquests is seen also in the works of Catullus. Only in one poem * does he refer definitely to the great proconsul's campaigns; and three of the references in it, and those the most distinct, are to our island. The most definite of these is contained in the lines beginning

'Eone nomine, imperator unice,
Fuisti in ultima occidentis umbra?'

The rest of the passage, attacking Cæsar and Muræna, is unquotable and, still more, untranslatable. Catullus,

* 29, 11-12; the three other poems (54, 57, 93), which may refer to Cæsar contain no definite geographical allusions.

as a Gaul by descent, might have been expected to appreciate the greatness of the work of Cæsar; but he had adopted to the full the prejudiced tone of the aristocratic circles at Rome.

Perhaps it is not surprising that the interest of Cicero in the Gallic campaign was largely literary, when we see how great a part literature played in the life of some of those actually serving at the front. Quintus Cicero wrote to his brother that he had actually composed four tragedies in sixteen days; Cicero naturally assumes that he had only translated them. Quintus Cicero's original tragedy, the 'Erigone' was lost on its way to Italy, 'the only thing that had not a safe journey while Cæsar was general.' Whether other members of Cæsar's staff were equally literary, we do not know; but the commander-in-chief himself, apart from his Commentaries, which he composed probably in his last year in Gaul, found time to write a work in two books on Grammar—the 'De Analogia'—which he dedicated to Cicero. It would be hard to find a more splendid and a more well-deserved compliment than that which Cæsar paid to the great orator: '*Quanto plus est ingenii Romani terminos in tantum promovisse quam imperii.*'* This from the conqueror of Gaul, who was adding the fairest gem to Rome's crown, was a compliment worth having. Cæsar knew the value of moral and intellectual force better than his panegyrist, Mommsen, whose character of Cicero is a typical instance of German insight. Mommsen writes: 'He [Cicero] was in fact so thoroughly a dabbler that it was pretty much a matter of indifference to what work he applied his hand; by nature a journalist in the worst sense of the term.' Cæsar, on the other hand, recognised in the prose of Cicero a work as glorious and enduring as his own conquests.

But probably most of the Roman officers in Gaul amused themselves in other ways than by literature. Even Quintus Cicero combined erudite conversation with dinners; and no doubt the gaiety at Samarobriua,

* Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, vii, 118. I have borrowed this point from Boissier's charming '*Cicéron et ses Amis*,' p. 263, from which I may have unconsciously taken other suggestions.

which makes Cicero chaff his friend Trebatius about turning Epicurean, had a good deal of the material side of that philosophy, which appealed so keenly to the Roman mind. The winter quarters of 54 B.C. were probably gayer than usual, for Cæsar himself in that year stayed north of the Alps, owing to the disturbed state of Gaul. There is no reason to doubt the story of Suetonius that the commander-in-chief found the Gallic ladies very attractive;* but it is not necessary to believe in the gross buffoonery which some commentators would read into the allusion to the Sophoclean play of the 'Banqueters.'

Of all this we would gladly have learned something, but the letters from Gaul have not been preserved; and Cicero himself is far too self-centred to have much room for comment on the news he receives. The Ædui, the connexion with whom was the very basis of the Roman empire in Gaul, he jestingly says, were to him as nothing compared to a meeting with Trebatius, in which they might 'deep thought resolve to drench in mirth.' The Treviri, whose name was to be perpetuated in a city which would be the centre of Roman civilisation in the North four centuries later, a city the Roman antiquities of which still surpass those of many towns in Italy itself, are to him only the material for a frigid legal pun.†

It is not uninteresting to compare Cicero's letters with those of Horace Walpole during the Seven Years' War, when Britain, under the Whig obligarchy, was enjoying a series of victories which may rival the most glorious conquests of Rome. The Englishman had not a brother or a close friend at the front as the Roman had; he professed, with some reason, that 'Europe is a dull magnificent subject to one who knows little and thinks less about Europe. Even the King of Prussia, except on post days, doesn't occupy a quarter of an inch in my memory. He must kill a hundred thousand men a fortnight to put me in mind of him.' But references

* Julius, 51; but Tacitus (Hist., iv, 55) declines to accept the scandal in the case of Cæsar's pretended great-grandson, Sabinus.

† Fam., vii, 13, 2, T. 171. 'Vites Treviros censeo. Audio capitalis.' The Cambridge mistranslation is much more amusing than the original joke: 'I give my vote for the wines of the Treviri; I hear they are capital.' But its unfortunate author was 'ploughed' in his Tripas.

to successes abroad are frequent in Horace Walpole, and overwhelming in number when compared to the Roman orator's references to his countrymen's victories in Gaul.

The result, then, of a careful reading of Cicero's correspondence at this time is negative, so far as Gaul is concerned. We learn absolutely nothing about the course of military affairs; the references to Roman successes are of the scantiest; even the personal exploits of his correspondents are not alluded to, though Marcus must surely have written to congratulate Quintus on the heroic defence of his camp against the Eburones. Yet Cicero was a typical Roman of the governing classes; alike in education, in sympathies, in policy, he represented the best elements of the Senate. We can only infer that the spirit and wisdom which had built up the Republic were dead. But fortunately there was coming into existence a new Rome, to carry on the old tradition and to extend it. The thanksgivings for Cæsar's victories, already referred to, show that some elements in Italy at any rate were keenly interested in affairs in Gaul. The Commentaries were written to stimulate that interest; but they would never have been written, had there not been a public which was likely to appreciate the importance of the Gallic campaigns.

This public was made up of the Roman middle class, the traders and the financiers who had penetrated into Gaul, even before Cæsar took it as his province,* and who flocked thither in far greater numbers in the track of his victorious armies. It was this class, we may be sure, which furnished Cæsar's soldiers, whether they came from old Italy or from the valley of the Po. It is certain that his officers came largely from a new social stratum; his best marshal† was connected with a country district, Picenum; and the head of his Army Service Corps had come to Rome as a slave from the same part of Italy.‡ Of seven at least of his army-corps commanders we know nothing till they appear in his Commentaries, while even of those who bear the great names of Rome's past, hardly any had any special position

* Cic. Pro. Font., 11.

† Labienus; cf. Cæs. B. G., i, 15.

‡ Ventidius; cf. Aul. Gell., xv, 4, and Juvenal, Sat., vii, 199.

before they served under Cæsar. The two sons of Crassus (the 'triumvir') and Q. Cicero are exceptions that prove the rule; there were special family circumstances to associate all three with Cæsar. And it is significant that Cæsar's own personal friends belong largely to the middle class of Rome. His financial agents, Oppius and Balbus, were naturally drawn from it; but no such business connexion can be traced in the case of Matus, the wealthy *equus*, whose letters on the death of Cæsar show a real feeling, which few or none of the 'noble' politicians display.

Everything points to the fact that Rome's greatest conquest was the work of the classes which found in the Empire a new opportunity. It is true that 'liberty' at home was sacrificed for development abroad; perhaps Rome herself lost by the change, but certainly Europe and the world gained by it. Cæsar founded the Empire in more senses than one. He not only broke down the power of the senatorial families; he introduced into political life, and provided careers for, the new citizens whom Rome had taken to herself; this was the consistent policy of most of the rulers who succeeded him. Gaul as a province was especially connected with the Roman democratic party; its conquest was completed by the man in whose work Roman democratic principles were carried to their full conclusion and finally absorbed; Gaul was the field in which their contributions to civilisation were most strikingly developed.

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Art. 7.—WAR POETRY (1914–1918).

1. *The Muse in Arms*. Edited by E. B. Osborn. John Murray, 1917.
2. *Philip the King, and Other Poems*. By John Masefield. Heinemann, 1914.
3. *The Winnowing Fan*. By Laurence Binyon. Elkin Mathews, 1915.
4. *Battle*. By W. W. Gibson. Elkin Mathews, 1916.
5. *Children of Love*. By Harold Monro. The Poetry Bookshop, 1915.
6. *A Highland Regiment*. By E. A. Mackintosh. John Lane, 1916.
7. *Marlborough, and Other Poems*. By C. H. Sorley. Cambridge University Press, 1916.
8. *Georgian Poetry* (1916–1917). Edited by E. M. The Poetry Bookshop, 1917.
9. *Fairies and Fusiliers*. By R. Graves. Heinemann, 1917.
10. *The Lily of Malud, and Other Poems*. By J. C. Squire. Martin Secker, 1917.
11. *Ardours and Endurances*. By Robert Nichols. Chatto & Windus, 1917.
12. *The City of Fear*. By Gilbert Frankau. Chatto & Windus, 1917.
13. *The Old Huntsman, and Other Poems. Counter-Attack, and Other Poems*. By Siegfried Sassoon. Heinemann, 1917, 1918.

And other works.

THE experience of the present war ought surely to have taught believers in prophecy a trenchant lesson. Never in the history of the world can there have been a time when the prophets have proved more consistently wrong; and nowhere have they wandered further astray than in those doleful predictions which foretold the temporary overthrow of literature and literary interests. In the first months of the war it seemed generally agreed by critics and creative artists alike that the genius of expression itself was doomed to disappear in the immediate future. Works of imagination, we were assured, must cease to trouble the mind of man; no poetry worthy of the name was likely to be written during the next twenty years. It was a depressing prospect; but

fortunately the prophecy was no sooner uttered than the event asserted its fallacy. A torrent of poetry began at once to pour from the press; and the voice of criticism found itself obliged to swing round to the opposite pole. The war, we were then told, had become a very forcing-ground of poetry; it was recreating the poet's heart out of its own fires; we were face to face with an almost miraculous renaissance of the poetic spirit. This access of enthusiasm has also faded in its turn; and its wild confidence is shown to have been no less deceptive than the vain depression which preceded it. We are beginning, in short, to arrive at a more equable condition of judgment, and to see things in more accurate perspective.

The time therefore appears propitious for taking stock of the influence which the war has exercised upon contemporary poetry, and, conversely, for considering the contribution which this poetry has of its own initiative made towards an understanding of the true meaning and significance of War. Of the two considerations, the second is likely to prove the more fruitful. For it would seem to be not so much a fact that the war has made poetry, as that poetry has, now for the first time, made War—made it in its own image, with all the tinsel and gaud of tradition stripped away from it; and so made it perhaps that no sincere artist will ever venture again to represent War in those delusive colours with which Art has been too often content to disguise it in the past. From that dual point of view, at any rate, it is proposed in the following pages to consider the best of the war poetry of the last four years, and to attempt to estimate its spiritual effect upon the character of the nation.

It has been widely argued that the war must have been an inspirer of poetry because so many volumes of verse have been published during the last three years, written by young officers who have fallen in active service. It is the war alone, we are asked to assume, that has of its own creative power forced these otherwise 'mute, inglorious Miltons' into song. But every one who has owned friends among public-school and University men must know that the impulse to record emotion in verse is one of the commonest attributes of educated adolescence. As a

rule these youthful exercises languish in the privacy of the author's bureau; and it is only the perfectly worthy ambition of bereaved parents, to raise some personal memorial to a dead son, that has recently haled so many of these manly tributes into the light of publicity. Many of them bear witness to very creditable metrical proficiency; most of them are distinguished by highly meritorious sentiment. But it would be the falsest of compliments to pretend that they make any real addition to the poetry of War. For the most part they record pleasant memories of school and college, breathe a boyish loyalty to grey cloisters and green glades, but touch the essence of life no deeper than is possible to the soldier's honest determination to go out and do his best. Their mental and spiritual attitude to war, in short, is radically conventional; and they are thus entirely separated from the really significant poetry of the present war, of which the outstanding characteristic is its absolute freedom from convention, demonstrated in an eager, almost passionate determination to picture War as it reveals itself, not to the outsider, but to the enlightened combatant himself.

And here, at the outset, we find ourselves face to face with the differentiating quality of the best new poetry of War. It is written, not by lookers-on, but by the soldiers themselves. The relation between war and poetry, of course, is as old as either war or poetry itself; and we stand in no need of the picturesque *pastiches* of Sir Walter Scott to remind us of those wandering minstrels who strayed from castle to castle, singing by the fireside of the doughty deeds of dead heroes, to the end that the young men might be stirred to go out and fight, and the maidens' hearts preserved from breaking while their lovers were away. Most of the war poetry of the past has been the legitimate descendant of these glib eulogists, of whom the first thing to remember is that their whole business is to encourage and to praise, to set romance twittering among the leaves—in short, to tell noble lies about War, that the purpose of the country may be served. Poetry, in fact, has to plead guilty to misrepresenting War, in the cause either of politics or of art—of misrepresenting it as something intrinsically splendid, beautiful, and inspiring. It has persistently

confused the issue with the process. Splendid things are done in war, of course; but they are the issue of war, not its process.

For the mere process of warfare is indisputably a vile, inhuman, devilish abomination, plunged in squalor and filth. It is approached through seas of mud, and pursued amid vermin and all uncleanness. It degrades the body of man; more than that, it would destroy his very soul itself, were it not for the divine fire that burns at the heart of humanity, and consumes even the weapons of war in the white heat of its truth. And in the present war, when, for the first time since the nation became articulate, fighting has ceased to be the business of a professional class, and has become perforce the bitter duty of the whole manhood of the race, we have had something approaching its true meaning revealed to us in poetry; not because war had any virtue in it that would 'make a poet out of a man,' but simply because the poet has himself turned soldier, and concentrated upon the ugly and monotonous business of war the keen searchlight of interpretation. The professional soldier is inevitably an unimaginative product; of all classes of the community, he is, perhaps, most completely the victim of tradition. His 'not to reason why'; his, in the very nature of things, to do what he is told, and to do it as quickly and as effectually as possible. But, now that war has ceased to be the concern of a professional class, its secrets have been revealed to the world at large. And so, for the first time, we have had the clear lights of intellect and interpretation playing upon the battlefield; and, whatever may be thought of the gain or loss to poetry, there can at least be no question about the extraordinary actuality of this new presentment, about its sincerity, or about the arresting revelation which it affords of the evil and the horror of modern warfare between civilised communities.

The contrast is the more vivid because of the high ideals and the exalted purpose with which the yoke of battle was at first accepted by the nation at large. It has been repeated so often as to have grown tedious that no nation ever entered upon war with a cleaner conscience than Britain in the summer of 1914. And repetition does not dull the edge of that truth; it is

indisputably true. No one could accuse Mr Thomas Hardy, for example, of sentimentalising a situation of this kind. If there had been an atom of false pretence about it, his searching gaze would have tracked it down in its secret corner. But for once, as the drums are heard in the village street, the old poet is stirred out of his cynicism, and stands, as it were, to attention at the window in the dim light of the early dawn, proud of his fellow-countrymen, and confident in their cause.

‘What of the faith and fire within us
Men who march away
Ere the barn-cocks say
Night is growing gray,
To hazards whence no tears can win us?
What of the faith and fire within us
Men who march away? . . .

‘In our heart of hearts believing
Victory crowns the just,
And that braggarts must
Surely bite the dust,
March we to the field ungrieving,
In our heart of hearts believing
Victory crowns the just.’

This sense of a just cause, almost of a sacred crusade, may be said to have inspired all the war poetry written during the closing months of 1914. In Mr Laurence Binyon's rich and high-hearted ‘For the Fallen’ it is presented as the one sure amulet of consolation.

‘With proud thanksgiving, a mother for her children,
England mourns for her dead across the sea.
Flesh of her flesh they were, spirit of her spirit,
Fallen in the cause of the free. . . .’

Something of the same sentiment, too, broods over the harvest-fields in Mr John Masefield's ‘August, 1914,’ linking to the present sacrifice all those sons of the soil who in the past have left home and loved ones and hope, for the sake of an immortal dream of freedom :

‘And died (uncouthly, most) in foreign lands
For some idea but dimly understood
Of an English city never built by hands,
Which love of England prompted and made good.’

This was the universal sentiment of our poetry at the outset of the war ; but it was a sentiment which, in the nature of things, would scarcely survive the insistent claim of personality. In particular, it could not be expected to survive the ordeal of individual experience. It was detached, remote—the sentiment, in a word, of the onlooker. It was once more the true descendant of the old ballad poetry, made by men who stood outside the fiery trial of battle. It philosophised the situation, but it did not embody it realistically.

Now, as it happened, the chief tendency in English verse for several years before the outbreak of the war had been a tendency towards crude realism, finding its inspiration in themes which had hitherto, perhaps, been considered impossible to the idealising spirit of poetry. The younger generation, perceiving that the idyllic school of verse had inevitably exhausted its capacities, appeared to have set its heart upon proving that no subject lies intrinsically outside the limits of poetic treatment, and that poetry can draw to its service, and ennoble by its interpretation, even the most uncouth and hideous circumstance. The war, therefore, may be said to have afforded our young realists the richest possible opportunity for concentrating their art upon the vital moments of life and death. It was an opportunity at once pictorial and psychological. Its appeal was equally to the eye and to the heart ; and it was immediately accepted with the eager frankness characteristic of our younger writers, and with the prevalent determination to speak the truth about the ugly things of life, and to strip suffering bare of all concealing veils of sentimentality and pretence. The work of revelation has been undertaken with untrammelled honesty ; and its completion raises a very important problem. How far, we must ask, can poetry proceed in the vivid portrayal of death and destruction, and yet remain what poetry must always be, if it is to be worthy of its traditions—a spiritual interpretation of the soul of man in conflict with his environment ?

The first stage, at any rate, of the poet's initiation in the school of war brings with it no difficulty at all ; it is purely and intimately introspective. It follows tradition with unfaltering step ; and the first change to be observed is a rather startling retrogression from the universal to

the purely personal point of view. It is comparatively easy for the onlooker to be eloquent in behalf of a cause; but the man who is swept into the field of action becomes, at the first onset, disconcertingly conscious of his own individuality and of his immediate personal risk. The young man trained to an intellectual life, with the plans for his future career plain before him, can scarcely break with so many associations unmoved by a sense of sacrifice; and the first poems to be written by soldier-poets were almost inevitably touched by a certain irresistible sense of self-pity. Rupert Brooke's sonnet 'The Soldier' is the natural utterance of a young man who is leaving behind him everything that made life worth living, and who, faced by the prospect of an untimely death, seeks his consolation in bringing the future into some sort of permanent relation with the past. Wherever he falls, he will carry with him some spirit of his home, some tribute to his training, some memorial of his love. And other poems, like Mr Robert Nichols's 'Farewell,' and the 'Into Battle' of Julian Grenfell, are inspired by the same vague uncertainty, the same tremulous trust that a man may be remembered as having shown the courage which all the education of his youth was designed to breed.

'They shall not say I went with heavy heart:
Heavy I am, but soon I shall be free,
I love them all, but oh, I now depart
A little sadly, strangely, fearfully,
As one who goes to try a mystery.'

And again :

'The kestrel hovering by day,
And the little owls that call by night,
Bid him be swift and keen as they,
As keen of ear, as swift of sight.

'The blackbird sings to him, "Brother, brother,
If this be the last song you shall sing,
Sing well, for you may not sing another;
Brother, sing."'

In these first moments of solitude it is perhaps inevitable that a man should be thinking of himself, but the mood passes with extraordinary rapidity; and the next change in the poet's attitude to War can be traced in almost every one of the young writers who have actually

been into the front lines. The sense of a cause vanishes; the sense of self vanishes; and over all spreads an impenetrable, absorbing prepossession that War is after all merely another form of toiling, moiling business, beset with detail, loaded with obligation, in which the individual soldier is of no more significance than the proverbial cog in a vast mass of labouring machinery.

Men, as Mr Gilbert Frankau sees them clearly, have become the slaves of the guns.

‘These are our masters, the slim
 Grim muzzles that irk in the pit;
 That chafe for the rushing of wheels,
 For the teams plunging madly to bit
 As the gunners swing down to unkey,
 For the trails sweeping half-circle-right,
 For the six breech-blocks clashing as one
 To a target viewed clear on the sight—
 Dun masses, the shells search and tear
 Into fragments that bunch as they run—
 For the hour of the red battle-harvest,
 The dream of the slaves of the gun.’

In these Kiplingesque lines the creak of the machine has practically drowned the voice of poetry altogether; but the authentic note sounds less uncertainly in Mr Robert Nichols’s ‘On the Way Up.’

‘The battery grides and jingles,
 Mile succeeds to mile;
 Shaking the noonday sunshine,
 The guns lunge out awhile
 And then are still awhile.

‘We amble along the highway;
 The reeking, powdery dust
 Ascends and cakes our faces,
 With a striped, sweaty crust.

‘Under the still sky’s violet
 The heat throbs in the air . . .
 The white road’s dusty radiance
 Assumes a dark glare.

‘With a head hot and heavy,
 And eyes that cannot rest,
 And a black heart burning
 In a stifled breast,

'I sit in the saddle,
I feel the road unroll,
And keep my senses straightened
Towards to-morrow's goal.'

These pieces, which are grouped together in Mr Osborn's suggestive anthology, under the general title of 'The Approach,' may be said to bridge the gulfs that separate the three stages in the poet's initiation. In the first, where the battery has halted by the wayside, a sudden paroxysm of fear attacks the soldier. For a moment he is absorbed once more in himself. In the next, he has become a part of the machinery of war; the battery itself is the unit, and community of task the whole duty of life. In the third, community of task has opened out into human sympathy. 'Men I love about me!' The machinery of war has revealed itself as composed of an infinity of human atoms, every one with a history, and a significance of its own. The man has passed out of himself into the heart of others; and, while life is seen to be made up of an endless sequence of little things, nothing in life, now so perpetually at odds with death, appears to be unworthy of care and consideration. This is, perhaps, the one and only helpful lesson that war brings home to the common soldier's heart, and it is instilled in a variety of different guises.

The life of the soldier lumbers along, revealing itself in broken glimpses through a mist of grey monotony. One thing which home-keeping age finds it difficult to realise is the interminable dulness which slowly settles down upon what once promised to be an heroic campaign. There are stretches of irksome inaction, during which the mind labours to reconcile itself with its uncongenial occupation. Weary detail, uninspired vigil, perpetual repetition of duties only half understood, throw the mind back upon itself and feed it with memory. In such lonely hours the impressions of the past become importunate, and flashes of the old life penetrate through the most unlikely environment. Wyndham Tennant describes this poignantly in 'Home Thoughts in Laventie.'

'Hungry for spring, I bent my head,
The perfume fanned my face,

And all my soul was dancing
In that little lovely place,
Dancing with a measured step from wrecked and shattered
towns
Away—upon the Downs.

‘I saw green banks of daffodils,
Slim poplars in the breeze,
Great tan-brown hares in gusty March
A-courting on the leas;
And meadows with their glittering streams, and silver scurrying
dace,
Home—what a perfect place!’

And gradually the very contrast between the broad
calm of the past and the infinite restlessness of the
present draws the man out of himself into some sort of
philosophic resignation.

‘Here there are the great things, life and death, and danger,
All I ever dreamed of in the days that used to be,
Comrades and good-fellowship, the soul of an army,
But oh, it is the little things that take the heart of me.

‘For all we knew of old, for little things and lovely,
We bow us to a greater life beyond our hope or fear,
To bear its heavy burdens, endure its toils unheeding,
Because of all the little things so distant and so dear.’ *

Many of the soldier-poets recur naturally to their
school-days, fighting old battles over again on field and
in class-room. In this context in particular there
emerges the new type of student-in-arms, the bookman,
the classical scholar, the meditative yet virile public-
school product, bred on good literature and good sport,
who carries Homer in his haversack, and dreams of
Achilles in the trenches. Of this type a brave and
stimulating example is afforded by Charles Hamilton
Sorley, whose imagination seems to flood the squalid
present with the picturesque heroism of the past. He
carries the sunlight of ancient Sparta into the drab,
drenched flats of Flanders, and sees the end of conflict
in an ideal city of dreams, built ‘half in heaven’ and
half upon the windy Marlborough downs:

* ‘A Highland Regiment.’ By E. A. Mackintosh.

'Soon, O soon, I do not doubt it,
 With the body or without it,
 We shall all come tumbling down
 To our old wrinkled red-capped town.
 Perhaps the road up Ilsley way,
 The old ridge-track, will be my way.
 High up among the sheep and sky,
 Look down on Wantage, passing by,
 And see the smoke from Swindon town ;
 And then full left at Liddington,
 Where the four winds of heaven meet
 The earth-blest traveller to greet.
 And then my face is toward the south,
 There is a singing on my mouth :
 Away to rightward I descry
 My Barbury ensconced in sky,
 Far underneath the Ogbourne twins,
 And at my feet the thyme and whins,
 The grasses with their little crowns.
 Of gold, the lovely Aldbourne downs,
 And that old signpost (well I knew
 That crazy signpost, arms askew,
 Old mother of the four grass ways).
 And then my mouth is dumb with praise,
 For, past the wood and chalkpit tiny,
 A glimpse of Marlborough *ἐπαραινὴ* !
 So I descend beneath the rail
 To warmth and welcome and wassail.'

So Rupert Brooke, in a well-known poem, dwells with love and longing on the calm beauty of Grantchester, familiar to generations of Cambridge men.

Dreams like these mingle inextricably with the rough-and-ready consolations of companionship. Life has run to waste in a tangle of things imagined and things seen ; in the confusion of values the mind grasps at any kind of respite or relief, and, when the pressure is relaxed, and the company is back in billets, as in Captain Charles Scott-Moncreiff's cheery ballad, the simplest, silliest jests have a savour, merely because they help the soldier to forget the perpetually-brooding cloud that lies ahead. Here is no longer, it must be recognised, any dream of heroism, of a cause or a crusade, of brodered banners or a watchword. As dreams merge into reality, men, and men alone, become the material of life ; and through

the machinery of war the young officer is drawn into sympathy with all who are part and parcel of the same machine. There is no sentimentality about it. The communion of endurance makes them all kin.

Mr Siegfried Sassoon, perhaps, has expressed better than any one else this emancipation of the soldier's heart from the taint of selfishness. It is the animating spirit of his vivid little piece of realism, 'In the Pink.' The young subaltern, who records the impression, has entered into the very soul of the private, as he scrawls a letter home to his rustic sweetheart, comforting her with consolations which his own environment belies.

'So Davies wrote: "This leaves me in the pink."
Then scrawled his name: "Your loving sweetheart, Willie,"
With crosses for a hug. He'd had a drink
Of rum and tea; and, though the barn was chilly,
For once his blood ran warm; he'd pay to spend.
Winter was passing; soon the year would mend.

'He couldn't sleep that night. Stiff in the dark
He groaned and thought of Sundays at the farm,
When he'd go out as cheerful as a lark
In his best suit to wander arm-in-arm
With brown-eyed Gwen, and whisper in her ear
The simple, silly things she liked to hear.

'And then he thought: to-morrow night we trudge
Up to the trenches, and my boots are rotten.
Five miles of stodgy clay and freezing sludge,
And everything but wretchedness forgotten.
To-night he's in the pink; but soon he'll die.
And still the war goes on; *he* don't know why.'

The war goes on, moreover, through a panorama of cruel inequalities, which serve to strip militarism of its last vestiges of glamour. David, as Captain Graves reminds us, no longer triumphs picturesquely over his towering giant. Brute force is stronger than the human heart.

The inevitable response to such experiences is, on the one hand, an honest, deep, and undemonstrative sympathy with the men who suffer; and, on the other, an intolerant contempt for the false sentiment with which ignorant people at home so fatuously invest the horrors of war. Sometimes, as in the late Lieut. Mackintosh's touching

'In Memoriam,' the sentiment wavers towards an almost feminine air of protectiveness. The young officer pictures himself as filling a parental relation to his men, losing something of his own life with every man who falls.

'Oh, never will I forget you,
My men that trusted me,
More my sons than your fathers',
For they would only see
The little helpless babies
And the young men in their pride.
They could not see you dying,
And hold you while you died.'

The same feeling, revealed in a scene of the finest dramatic quality, animates Mr Robert Nichols's 'Comrades,' where the dying subaltern, Gates, struggles back to the trenches, mortally wounded, every movement an accentuation of his suffering, out of sheer determination to die among the men for whom he is responsible.

'Inch by inch he fought, breathless and mute,
Dragging his carcass like a famished brute. . . .
His head was hammering and his eyes were dim,
A bloody sweat seemed to ooze out of him
And freeze along his spine . . . then he'd lie still
Before another effort of his will
Took him one nearer yard.

The parapet was reached.
He could not rise to it. A look-out screeched,
"Mr Gates!"

Three figures in one breath
Leaped up. Two figures fell in toppling death;
And Gates was lifted in. "Who's hit?" said he.
"Timmins and Jones." "Why did they that for me?
I'm gone already!" Gently they laid him prone
And silently watched.

He twitched. They heard him moan,
"Why for me?" His eyes roamed round and none replied.
"I see it was alone I should have died."
They shook their heads. Then, "Is the doctor here?"
"He's comin', sir, he's hurryin', no fear."
"No good . . . Lift me." They lifted him.
He smiled and held his arms out to the dim,
And in a moment passed beyond their ken,
Hearing him whisper, "O my men, my men!"

So powerful indeed does the immediate influence of a common life become that by degrees all other associations fade before its white-hot vehemence. The present detaches the soldier altogether from the past. Home, love, even the one loved above all, are forgotten. Tenderness seems like a far-away memory ; the soldier's concern is with the soldier's life alone.

'Faces cheerful, full of whimsical mirth,
Lined by the wind, burned by the sun ;
Bodies enraptured by the abounding earth,
As whose children, brothers we are and one.

'And any moment may descend hot death
To shatter limbs ! pulp, tear and blast
Belovèd soldiers who love rough life and breath
Not less for dying faithful to the last.

'O the fading eyes, the grimèd face turned bony,
Oped, black, gushing mouth, fallen head,
Failing pressure of a held hand, shrunk and stony !
O sudden spasm, release of the dead !

'Was there love once ? I have forgotten her.
Was there grief once ? grief still is mine.
O loved, living, dying, heroic soldier,
All, all my joy, my grief, my love, are thine !'

To those whose life has for months been riddled with visions such as these it is no wonder that a return to home, and the sudden recognition of its false sentiment and falser humour should assault the mind with the sting of intolerable resentment. The old, familiar glosses upon war are indeed effectually held up to scorn by our young realists. Mr Siegfried Sassoon's 'They,' with its bitter arraignment of episcopal platitude, is well-balanced by the same poet's almost vindictive cameo of a London music-hall in war-time.

'The House is crammed ; tier beyond tier they grin
And cackle at the Show, while prancing ranks
Of harlots shrill the chorus, drunk with din ;
" We're sure the Kaiser loves the dear old Tanks !

'I'd like to see a tank come down the stalls,
Lurching to rag-time tunes, or "Home, sweet Home,"—
And there'd be no more jokes in Music-halls
To mock the riddled corpses round Bapaume.'

The reflective attitude of modern poetry to war can hardly go further. Sympathy has merged itself in a furious detestation of all those false pretences which in the past have presented the military spirit as a sort of enclosed garden of the poets' fantasy. The men who have seen the thing as it is have left the rest of us in no sort of doubt upon one indisputable fact. The poetry of the future will hardly venture to sentimentalise an experience which can prompt so sincere and so overwhelming an indignation. And indeed it is already to be noted that among those poets also who have not themselves made personal trial of war a new and restrained spirit may be recognised.

The truth has come home to the civilian no less than to the soldier. Mr Harold Monro's picture of the family gathering the night before the soldier returns to the front labours under no vain illusion with regard to the compensating glory of loss. Every moment, viewed from the stay-at-home's standpoint, is heavy with apprehension; every tick of the clock is like the warning of a death-watch. Suffering has become personal, intimate, homely, as all deep suffering always is. And when the news of loss comes home, as in Mr J. C. Squire's exquisitely poignant poem 'To a Bull-Dog,' it is no longer decorated with conventional comfort, but accepted, simply and honestly, for the devastating thing it is. The dog and one of his masters are left alone; the other master has fallen at the front. The poet addresses his dumb companion.

'When summer comes again,
And the long sunsets fade,
We shall have to go on playing the feeble game for two
That since the war we've played.

'And though you run expectant as you always do
To the uniforms we meet,
You'll never find Willy among all the soldiers
In even the longest street,

'Nor in any crowd; yet, strange and bitter thought,
Even now were the old words said,
If I tried the old trick and said "Where's Willy?"
You would quiver and lift your head,
'And your brown eyes would look to ask if I was serious,
And wait for the word to spring.
Sleep undisturbed: I shan't say *that* again,
You innocent old thing.'

Simple, direct pathos could scarcely be expressed in simpler, more direct phrase; and yet the metrical scheme of the poem is full of subtlety, rising on the wave of the long line just as the thought rises in intensity, and sinking back into repose in the short. Expression seems to be matched quite perfectly with thought; and the sentiment, purged of all self-pity and protestation, becomes almost intolerably sincere.

Sincerity, indeed, is the essence of the light with which the poetry of the last four years has slowly and increasingly flooded the crowded theatre of war. The quotations which we have given may surely speak for themselves. They must be acknowledged as presenting a broad panorama of the soldier's life from the day he leaves England until the hour of his death upon the field of honour; and their outstanding virtue is the penetration with which they probe to the essential spirit of warfare. Springing from various and diverse temperaments, they illustrate in turn the honest soldier's fear of fear, his pilgrimage from self-consciousness to altruism, his absorption into the machinery of war, and his gradual appreciation of that complex machine as a collection of human characters, each individual and all interacting, combining at last into a unity in which self is merged absolutely in a sense of common purpose and general obligation. The comparison of this poetry with the poetry of any other war in the history of the world can hardly fail to reassure the critic that, so far as the spiritual interpretation of war is concerned, the poets have risen manfully to their opportunity, and have abundantly justified the claim to sincerity and directness which appears to be the staple ambition of modern poetry, whatever its theme and occupation.

So far, it will be noted, we have been considering the

function of Poetry in offering a representation of War, psychologically and through its influence upon the soldier's mind; there remains to be considered the value of the material which War in its turn has offered to poetry, from the actual or realistic standpoint. And here, we believe, there has been a general tendency to overrate the value of the contribution. It has been claimed, for instance, that in the sister-art of painting the war has furnished artists with inspiration of the liveliest possibility. Can this be said with equal truth of Poetry? It seems very doubtful; and in any case the ground was ready-made for Poetry long before War had been dreamt of outside the impenetrable councils of Berlin. In the years immediately preceding the war there had been, as we have already noted, a growing fashion in English verse to seek crude and violent subjects for poetry; and this fashion was perilously fostered by the popular success of such realistic exercises as Mr John Masefield's 'The Everlasting Mercy' and 'The Widow in the Bye-Street,' which may perhaps be said to display the method to its most effectual advantage.

The fashion was already exhausting itself before the autumn of 1914, but it has been adopted by a few experimentalists in an attempt to represent the outward aspects of War, condensed and vitalised to a single vivid and entirely external impression. It is noticeable, however, that the attempt has not been so much encouraged by those who had already affected this particular kind of realism, as accepted by others in a sort of faint discipleship. Such poems as Mr Masefield himself has devoted to the war have been almost entirely psychological and interpretative; and of the older of the Georgian poets it has been left to Mr Gibson to whittle poetry down to its barest core, in the effort to present a keen and undecorated outline of fact. It cannot be said that the experiment is altogether fortunate.

' This bloody steel
Has killed a man.
I heard him squeal
As on I ran.

' He watched me come
With wagging head.
I pressed it home,
And he was dead.

'Though clean and clear
I've wiped the steel,
I still can hear
That dying squeal.'

Or again :

'I watched it oozing quietly
Out of the gaping gash.
The lads thrust on to victory
With lunge and curse and crash. . . .

'The lads thrust on to victory,
With lunge and crash and shout.
I lay and watched, as quietly
His life was running out.'

The consensus of critical judgment would almost certainly decide that such experiments as these are failures. They fail, because they are concerned exclusively with external facts; imagination has not got to work upon them; the poet's art has not even made the effort of fusing the fact with the idea. And the same is true of Mr Robert Nichols's 'Assault,' an elaborate attempt to give instant and compelling expression to the sights and sounds of onslaught, which nevertheless falls completely short of the true, interpretative service of poetry to life. ✓

'I hear my whistle shriek
Between teeth set;
I fling an arm up,
Scramble up the grime
Over the parapet!

'I'm up. Go on.
Something meets us.
Head down into the storm that greets us.

A wail!
Lights. Blurr.
Gone.
On, on. Lead. Lead. Hail.
Spatter. Whirr. Whirr.'

The true test of poetry must always be the test of reading aloud. Unless a poem can bear recitation, its workmanship is condemned. And to read Mr Nichols's

'Assault' aloud is to be persuaded of a creaking chain of artistic improprieties, which strain vehemently towards effect, only to end in incoherence.

'Ha! Ha! Bunched figures waiting.
Revolver levelled: quick!
Flick! Flick!
Red as blood.
Germans. Germans.
Good! Oh, good!

Cool madness.'

This is neither metre nor *vers libre*. It has no form or true proportion; the fever of war has infected it, and left it void.

The fact is, of course, that Poetry can only be produced when imagination has fused fact; and that this fusion is possible, even to emphatically realistic verse, is proved by the impressive success of Captain Robert Graves's 'It's a Queer Time,' where the poet reproduces, with provocative fidelity, that familiar state of mind under which a man is conscious of acting with his bodily functions in one world while he is living with his brain in another. Past and present are commingled in a riot of confusion.

'You're charging madly at them yelling "Fag!"
When somehow something gives and your feet drag.
You fall and strike your head; yet feel no pain
And find . . . you're digging tunnels through the hay
In the Big Barn, 'cause it's a rainy day.
O springy hay, and lovely beams to climb!
You're back in the old sailor-suit again.
It's a queer time.

'Or you'll be dozing safe in your dug-out—
A great roar—the trench shakes and falls about—
You're struggling, gasping, struggling, then . . . hullo!
Elsie comes tripping gaily down the trench,
Hanky to nose—that lyddite makes a stench—
Getting her pinafore all over grime.
Funny! because she died ten years ago!
It's a queer time.'

This realism of the intellectual aspect of War, as

contrasted with the merely material realism of lamp-black and lightning, has indeed afforded poetry a new scope for the imagination; and particularly in the work of Captain Graves, Mr Siegfried Sassoon, and some of that of Mr Robert Nichols, it has produced verse of a quality which could not, perhaps, have found inspiration at all in times of peace and contentment. But it will be noted at once that it is a realism which depends, for its very essence, upon a transcendental interpretation. The war, in other words, has only furnished poetry with material, when Poetry has brought to its aid a secret interpretation which is, in effect, the very antithesis of War itself. The concomitants of War are noise, squalor, filth—the worst antagonists of the poet's art. So long as the poet is content with merely superficial pictures of noise, squalor, and filth, War affords him no adequate opportunity. Its entire world is too barren, too hard, too hideous to issue in poetry. Even Captain Graves goes artistically wrong with his bloated portrait of the dead Boche. The image is starkly repellent; imagination has failed to light it up. But directly imagination gets to work, it finds the soul beneath the surface, and then at last Poetry issues from the union.

A comparison of the spirit of this new poetry with that of the generation which preceded it would seem to suggest that War has most certainly not been without its purging influence upon the artistic soul of youth. For the new poetry is honest; it is strong; and it is often very beautiful. Decadence, at any rate, has vanished; triviality is no more; eccentricity has almost disappeared. And with these inadequate tricks of manner there has also disappeared a certain narrowness or selfishness of outlook upon the world around. The old formula of youth in the Ibsen period, the formula that clamoured for every man to live out his own life after his own fashion, has yielded before a realisation that no man's life can belong to himself, even for a moment; and that, when all is said and done, the individual life is of very little concern to the world at large. Sentimentality has been most healthily lived down; there is an almost universal distrust of conventional consolation. Religion, perhaps, has lost the vigour of its hold upon the imagination, and one can trace very little faith in any survival

of personality after death. But a larger and an austerer hope still finds the dead inseparable from every haunt of old association.

'Walking through trees to cool my heat and pain,
I know that David's with me here again.
All that is simple, happy, strong he is.
Caressingly I stroke
Rough bark of the friendly oak.
A brook goes bubbling by: the voice is his.
Turf burns with pleasant smoke:
I laugh at chaffinch and at primroses.
All that is simple, happy, strong, he is.
Over the whole wood in a little while
Breaks his slow smile.'*

We end, then, with the conclusion that Poetry, in spite of many tribulations, is well justified of its supreme ordeal. It has gone down into the darkness, and has carried light in its hand. Our young men, indeed, have grown old, as befits those who have been face to face with death. It may be true that the war has made Stoics of our Hedonists, but in the process it has also made men. And, being men, they have not feared to speak the truth about the bitter discipline under which they have emerged into manhood. It is a terrible truth, wounding the speaker and the hearer alike; but it is a truth that may yet help to set free the soul of humanity for nobler victories in the years of peace.

ARTHUR WAUGH.

* 'Fairies and Fusiliers.' By Robert Graves.

Art. 8.—CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN INDIA.

1. *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, presented to both Houses of Parliament.* [Cd. 9109.] H.M. Stationery Office, 1918.
2. *India and the Future.* By W. Archer. Hutchinson, 1917.
3. *Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government.* By Lionel Carter. Macmillan, 1918.
4. *India in Transition.* By H.H. the Aga Khan. Philip Lee Warner, publisher to the Medici Society, 1918.
5. *The Future Government of India.* By K. Vyasa Rao. Macmillan, 1918.
6. *India under Experiment.* By G. Chesney. Murray, 1918.
7. *The Evolution of Mrs Besant.* By the Editor of 'Justice.' Madras: Justice Printing Works, 1918.

IN the Joint Report recently laid before Parliament, the Secretary of State for India, Mr Montagu, and the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, have produced, together with an exhaustive survey of the existing structure of government and present conditions in India, a carefully reasoned scheme for carrying into effect the definite declaration of policy made on Aug. 20, 1917, on behalf of His Majesty's Government and in complete accord with the Government of India.

The Report begins by reciting that declaration, which it rightly describes as 'the most momentous utterance ever made in India's chequered history.' Certainly, never since Queen Victoria's proclamation in 1858 has there been any utterance of such grave import to the future of India and the British connexion as the announcement that the purpose of British policy is not only

'the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration,' but also 'the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.'

This statement was followed by the reservation that

'the British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian people, must be judges of the time and measure

of each advance; and they must be guided by the cooperation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility.'

Nevertheless it was made clear that the declaration of policy was not to be a mere enunciation of principles.

'They [His Majesty's Government] have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible; and that it is of the highest importance, as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be, that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India.'

For this purpose Mr Montagu was himself to proceed to India, in response to an invitation addressed originally to Mr Austen Chamberlain and extended, after his resignation, to his successor at the India Office.

Within the space of this article only the merest outline of a Report which covers 300 octavo pages can be given, and a few of its main features selected for not unfriendly criticism. The policy which it proposes to carry into effect is surely, one may hope, beyond recall. It went forth to India a year ago, unchallenged by a single responsible statesman in this country, with the *imprimatur* of a Government in which at a great crisis in the history of the Empire every school of political thought was formally represented. To go back upon it now would be regarded, and reasonably regarded, in India as a breach of faith which would do more to shake the foundations of British rule than would the worst consequences which its gloomiest critics foresee from persistence in it. Those consequences, should they ensue, can be dealt with and corrected in due course, but the consequences of a breach of faith would be irreparable. The policy itself, moreover, may well be regarded as an inevitable corollary of the principles for which the British Empire and its Allies have committed themselves to a life and death struggle. India herself is bearing no mean part in that struggle; and her admission at the hour of the Empire's peril to partnership in its supreme councils would have been but a hollow pretence, had it not been followed by a genuine attempt to train her

peoples in the principles of government upon which the unity and strength of the British Commonwealth of self-governing nations have been built up.

Long before the war led to any wide recognition of the need for such a policy, Sir Alfred Lyall, whose profound knowledge of India and of the Indian mind still stands unrivalled, had already outlined it with a prescience and authority which the authors of the Report have wisely called in aid at the head of the chapter they devote to 'The Conditions of the Problem.'

'It may be affirmed that the moral and material civilisation of the Indian people has made more progress in the last fifty years than during all the preceding centuries of their history. Yet it has inevitably come to pass that the differences of wealth and learning, frequent intercourse with Europe, and the saturation of the educated classes with Western ideas and political axioms, have stimulated the desire for a larger share in the government of their country among the leaders of native public opinion. An efficient administration no longer satisfies them; on the contrary, it has created ulterior hopes and aspirations. We began with great organic reforms. . . . Latterly we have undertaken the gradual introduction of representative institutions . . . we are seriously preparing for the devolution of local and provincial self-government.

'But the task of building up any substantial edifice of constitutional government in India is by no means easy, for all wide and uniform measures of reform are hindered by the immense area of the country, and especially by the number and diversity of its population; . . . It must certainly be conducted within the limitations necessary to preserve undisturbed and indisputable the fabric of British sovereignty, which is to the political machine what the iron rails are to the locomotive, the foundation and permanent way upon which all progress must move. Nevertheless some solution of this difficulty is demanded; for, now that the English have accomplished the building up, after the high Roman fashion, of an immense polyglot empire, the stability of the structure must depend upon a skilful distribution of weight, because excessive centralisation is radically insecure, and supports are useless without some capacity to resist pressure. The solution of these problems requires the sympathetic insight as well as the scientific methods of statesmanship, supplemented by the goodwill and the growing intelligence of the Indian people' (Report, p. 108).

Since Sir Alfred Lyall wrote those words, the task has become no easier, for 'the ulterior hopes and aspirations' of the educated classes have grown with their increasing influence. They monopolise practically all the liberal professions; they control almost the whole of a much more widely read press; they fill the subordinate public services; they occupy a larger proportion of important posts in the superior services; they play a much more conspicuous part in the enlarged legislative councils, and have been admitted even to the Executive Councils of the Viceroy and of the Presidency Governors. Even so conservative an Indian as H.H. the Aga Khan endorses, in his 'India in Transition,' their demand for radical changes in the Indian system of government which shall allow 'to the people themselves the right to direct policy.' To believe, with Mr George Chesney, that these classes who, whatever their shortcomings, are essentially the product of British rule and of the educational system which it has imported into India, are banded together in implacable hostility to us, and that their 'ulterior hopes and aspirations' therefore deserve no hearing, would surely be to admit the bankruptcy of our trusteeship in one of its most vital aspects. The Report, though it underrates the dangerous elements compounded of reactionary and revolutionary forces which exist amongst the educated classes, takes a much saner and truer view of the part they have come to play in the Indian polity.

'In estimating the politically-minded portion of the people of India we should not go either to census reports, on the one hand, or to political literature on the other. It is one of the most difficult portions of our task to see them in their right relation to the rest of the country. Our obligations to them are plain, for they are intellectually our children. They have imbibed ideas which we ourselves have set before them, and we ought to reckon it to their credit. The present intellectual and moral stir in India is no reproach but rather a tribute to our work. The *Raj* would have been a mechanical and iron thing if the spirit of India had not responded to it. We must remember, too, that the educated Indian has come to the front by hard work; he has seized the education which we offered him because he first saw its advantages; and it is he who has advocated and worked for political progress. . . . We owe him sympathy because he has conceived and pursued

the idea of managing his own affairs, an aim which no Englishman can fail to respect. . . . Helped by the inability of the other classes in India to play a prominent part he has assumed the place of leader; but his authority is by no means universally acknowledged and may in an emergency prove weak.'

'The prospects of advance very greatly depend upon how far the educated Indian is in sympathy with and capable of fairly representing the illiterate masses. The old assumption that the interests of the ryot must be confided to official hands is strenuously denied by modern educated Indians. They claim that the European official must by his lack of imagination and comparative lack of skill in tongues be gravely handicapped in interpreting the thoughts and desires of an Asiatic people. On the other hand, it is argued that in the limited spread of education, the endurance of caste exclusiveness and of usages sanctioned by caste, and in the records of some local bodies and councils, may be found reasons which suggest that the politically-minded classes stand somewhat apart from and in advance of the ordinary life of the country. Nor would it be surprising if this were the case. Our educational policy in the past aimed at satisfying the few who sought after English education, without sufficient thought of the consequences which might ensue from not taking care to extend instruction to the many. We have in fact created a limited *intelligentsia*, who desire advance; and we cannot stay their progress entirely until education has been extended to the masses. It has been made a reproach to the educated classes that they have followed too exclusively after one or two pursuits, the law, journalism or school teaching: and that these are all callings which make men inclined to overrate the importance of words and phrases. But even if there is substance in the count, we must take note also how far the past policy of Government is responsible. We have not succeeded in making education practical. It is only now, when the war has revealed the importance of industry, that we have deliberately set about encouraging Indians to undertake the creation of wealth by industrial enterprise, and have thereby offered the educated classes any tangible inducement to overcome their traditional inclination to look down on practical forms of energy. We must admit that the educated Indian is a creation peculiarly of our own; and, if we take the credit that is due to us for his strong points, we must admit a similar liability for his weak ones' (Report, pp. 115-116).

While anxious to do justice to the 'politically-minded' classes, the Report is not by any means unmindful of our responsibilities towards the overwhelming majority of the people of India, whom Western education has never yet directly touched. Still divided amongst themselves by deep lines of racial, sectarian and social cleavage, and often contemptuously branded as 'the voiceless millions of India,' they cannot be dismissed as voiceless or as unworthy of a hearing, because they still prefer to carry their grievances to the official whom they regard as their representative in the councils of government. Their case is not less powerfully stated.

'It is just because the Indian ryot is inarticulate and has not been directly represented in our deliberations that we feel bound to emphasise the great claim he has upon our consideration. The figure of the individual cultivator does not often catch the eye of the Governments in Simla and Whitehall. It is chiefly in the mass that they deal with him, as a consumer of salt or of piece-goods, or, unhappily too often, as the victim of scarcity or disease. But the district officer and his lieutenants know well the difficulties that beset him, and his very human needs: and in the local revenue offices these make up nine-tenths of the public business done. What matters most of all to the ryot are his relations with his landlord: but his fortunes are by no means to be disposed of by considering them solely from the standpoint of "agrarian legislation." Much of the activity of Government comes home to him eventually; and whatever helps him in his difficulties adds enormously to the happiness of the country as a whole. It is not merely a matter of securing him in possession of his plot of land, of assessing his dues equitably and collecting them with discrimination, of advancing him money in bad days and waiting till he is in a position to repay it. A simple, cheap and certain system of law is one of his greatest needs. He greatly requires to be protected against the intricacies of courts and the subtleties of law and enabled to defeat the advantage enjoyed by long-pursed opponents. The working of all the great procedure Codes, the law of usury, of registration, of limitation of contract, the Court-fees Act, the Stamp Act, is felt in the remotest village in the land. The ryot and hundreds of thousands of his kind may be lifted from penury to comfort by a canal project costing millions of pounds. One of his constant needs is protection against the exaction of petty

official oppressors. Improvements in seed or stock, manures, ploughs, wells; the building of a new road or a new railway: facilities for grazing his cattle or getting wood for his implements; the protection of his crop from wild animals, his cattle from disease, and his brass vessels from burglars; co-operative banks to lend him money and cooperative societies to develop his market; the provision of schools and dispensaries within reasonable distance—these are the things that make all the difference to his life. They have all been dispensed for him by an official government in the past; and we must always bear in mind that he will not find it easy to learn to arrange them for himself in future. He has sat on caste *panchayats*; he has signed joint petitions to official authority; but he has never exercised a vote on public questions. His mind has been made up for him by his landlord or banker or his priest or his relatives or the nearest official. These facts make it an imperative duty to assist and to protect him while he is learning to shoulder political responsibilities' (Report, pp. 114–115).

These two passages deserve to be quoted because they contain the essence of the twofold problem to which the authors of the Report have applied themselves, namely, how to meet the reasonable claim of the educated Indian to be not merely a subordinate agent but an active partner in the government and administration of his country, and at the same time to preserve in British hands, until he has proved himself fit for powers and responsibilities to which he is still untrained, the authority required for preventing any serious mischief to the peace, order and good government of India as a whole or to the interests of the vastly more numerous classes of Indians who view with great misgivings the changes for which he so insistently pleads. The problem is one of political education, which must be practical and also experimental. The 'politically-minded' classes, as the Report calls them, must be given an opportunity of learning how to govern and administer; and the other classes, which have hitherto accepted unquestioningly the government and administration given to them, must be taught to exercise the critical rights of intelligent citizenship. A sphere must be found in which Indians can be given work to do, and be held accountable to their own people for the way they do it. That sphere

must be circumscribed at first so as not to endanger the foundations of government, and yet capable of steady expansion if and in proportion as the experiment succeeds, until the process of political education is complete and Indians have shown themselves qualified for the same measure of self-government as the Dominions already enjoy within the British Empire.

From a careful examination of the existing structure of government and an exhaustive review of present conditions in India, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report deduces two definite conclusions :

(1) It is on the Central Government, i.e. the Government of India, that the whole structure rests; and the foundations must not be disturbed pending experience of the changes to be introduced into less vital parts. The Government of India must therefore remain wholly responsible to Parliament, and, saving such responsibility, its authority in essential matters must during the initial stages of the experiment remain indisputable.

(2) While popular control can be at once largely extended in the domain of local government, the Provinces provide the sphere in which the earlier steps towards the development of representative institutions and the progressive realisation of responsible government promised in the Declaration of Aug. 20, 1917, can be most usefully and safely taken.

Local self-government need not detain us, for the Report only moves in this respect along a line of advance to which the Government of India is already committed by a Resolution of 1915, largely based on the recommendations made ten years ago by the Royal Commission on Decentralisation. If greater progress has not yet been made along that line, the blame must rest in part on the educated Indian himself, who has been slow to value its importance. The most interesting, though by no means a novel feature is the stress laid in the Report upon the infusion of fresh vitality into the ancient *Panchayats* or Village Councils—a point long since and very persistently urged upon Government by such enlightened Indians as the late Mr Gokhale. The subject of local government is, moreover, one that may well be included within the scheme of devolution contemplated as the first instalment of responsible government in the

provinces; progress in the one sphere will therefore depend largely upon progress in the other.

For the great experiment in the provincial sphere, which will profoundly affect executive, legislature and administration, the eight provinces of Bombay, Madras, Bengal, the United Provinces, Behar and Orissa, the Punjab, the Central Provinces, and Assam, are deemed to be already ripe. Burma (which is not really India at all, and whose people belong to another race and to another stage of political development), the North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan (which for strategical reasons must remain under the direct control of the Government of India), and a few smaller areas, whose population is altogether too backward, are not to be touched at present. Even within the eight selected provinces one may doubt the wisdom of trusting the Punjab, the Central Provinces and Assam on the same footing as the other five, which have for the most part reached a considerably higher level of development.

The essential feature of the scheme is the division of the functions of the Provincial Government into two categories; the one comprising what are termed 'the reserved subjects,' i.e. those with which the maintenance of peace and order and good government is immediately bound up; and the other, those which, though less vital, very closely affect the daily life and common interests of the people, and which are called 'the transferred subjects' because it is proposed to transfer at once the largest possible measure of power and responsibility in regard to them to exclusively Indian shoulders. While all essential power and responsibility in regard to 'the reserved subjects' is to remain vested in the Governor-in-Council, i.e. the executive body consisting of the Governor and (under the new scheme) one British and one Indian member of Council, real power and responsibility for dealing with 'the transferred subjects' are to be conferred on Indian Ministers accountable to a Legislative Council in which there is to be a large Indian non-official majority, elected on the broadest possible franchise. The Provincial Government will thus itself be divided into two compartments; in the one the Governor-in-Council, responsible as heretofore to the Government of India and to the Secretary of State, i.e. the British

Parliament; in the other the Governor—but not in Council—acting with Indian Ministers responsible to an Indian legislature.

'It is our intention,' the Report says, 'that the Government thus composed and with this distribution of functions shall discharge them as one Government,' and that 'as a general rule, it shall deliberate as a whole.' The Report hopes to escape in this way the disadvantages of the more open dualism involved in a scheme known as that of the 'Joint Address,' under which the experiment of devolution to an exclusively Indian Executive and Indian Legislature would have been first made in smaller provincial areas by a subdivision of each province for the purpose into 'States' approximating to the size and importance of the States in the American Union. Mr Lionel Curtis strongly advocated this scheme in his 'Letters to the People of India,' the influence of which can be clearly traced in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, though it rejects the creation of 'State' areas as impracticable for the present. Whether the covert dualism inherent in the composite form of provincial government recommended in the Report will prove less dangerous than the overt dualism involved by the creation of subordinate 'State Government' areas within the larger area of Provincial Government, will depend in practice on the amount of goodwill required on both sides to secure the hearty cooperation of the two wings of Provincial Government, and above all on the spirit that will animate the elective bodies to which the purely Indian wing is to be made responsible.

It would be easy to point out how numerous and serious may be the occasions of friction arising out of the annual allocation of ways and means to the 'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects respectively, as well as out of administrative questions on the borderland of the 'reserved' and 'transferred' domains; and how difficult must be the position of the Governor who will have not only to run his two teams in double harness, but also to decide, in the event of conflict either with his Indian Ministers or his Indian Legislature, at what moment it will be his duty to exercise, by the 'certification' of a Bill which he deems it essential to place on the Statute Book, or in other ways contemplated by the Report, the

restraining and controlling powers still reserved to him in case of emergencies. The burden placed on a Provincial Governor's shoulders will be certainly far heavier than at present; and great discrimination will have to be shown in the selection of those sent out from home to rule over Indian provinces with a larger and more diverse population than Great Britain.

But it is premature to speculate on the working of the complex and elaborate machinery described in the Report, so long as two very important and closely interconnected questions, which it has left open for further investigation by special committees to be appointed *ad hoc*, remain unsettled.

One of these questions is that of defining in each Province the actual subjects that can at once be 'transferred' to the Indian Ministers, and those that must for the present be 'reserved' to the Governors-in-Council. The Report merely suggests in an Appendix, by way of illustration, a list of subjects considered generally suitable for immediate transfer, such as local government, excise, primary, secondary and technical education, medical, sanitary and veterinary services, cooperative credit, certain classes of forests and fisheries, minor public works, etc. On the handling of such 'transferred' subjects by Indian Ministers and Indian assemblies will depend the gradual enlargement of the list by successive additions until it finally includes all the subjects treated meanwhile as 'reserved,' and the whole executive power passes automatically under the control of the Legislative Council, to which it will then be solely responsible. Only when the Provinces have achieved complete self-government, does the Report propose to apply a similar process within the sphere of the Government of India.

The other and even more crucial question held over for inquiry is that of the constitution of the new electorates; for upon it must hinge the success or failure of any scheme, however admirable in theory, for the establishment of representative institutions in India. The methods of election introduced under the Morley-Minto reforms must be held largely responsible for their relative failure, though, it must be remembered, they were never intended even by Lord Morley to lay the foundations of parliamentary institutions or responsible

government. As Mr Curtis says, the image of oligarchy is stamped on that travesty of an electoral system; and it would be deplorable if the same image were stamped on the electoral system that will make or mar the future advancement of India.

The Report rightly considers that 'the system of indirect elections should be swept away,' for under it there can be no genuine relation between the representative ultimately elected and the original voter. It recognises the need for a careful electoral survey of the whole country before any final decision as to the new system can be reached.

'We must measure the number of persons who can in the different parts of the country be reasonably entrusted with the duties of citizenship. We must ascertain what sort of franchise will be suited to local conditions, and how interests that may be unable to find adequate representation in such constituencies are to be represented.'

The problem is admirably stated; and doubtless the terms of reference for the Committee which is about to explore it during next winter in India will be drawn up on these broad lines. It will not be in any way bound by the pious opinions to which the authors of the Report have somewhat prematurely committed themselves on such an important point as 'communal representation,' i.e. the creation of separate constituencies for various communities, which, however important or however much entitled to make their voices heard, might be submerged in constituencies based solely on territorial representation. 'Communal representation' was conceded to so powerful a minority as the Mahommedans under the Indian Councils Act of 1909; and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report admits that it cannot now be withdrawn from them, and that it may have to be conceded to other communities, such as the Sikhs. At the same time it develops at great length all the theoretical arguments against the principle, viz. that it is opposed to history, that it perpetuates class division, that it stereotypes existing relations based on traditions and prejudices which we should do everything to discourage. But theories cannot dispose of the facts set forth by another contributor to this issue of the 'Quarterly

Review' in an article entitled 'Is India a Nation?' The 'politically-minded' classes are strongly opposed to communal representation. But it lies very largely with them to shorten the period during which it may be a necessary expedient, by endeavouring much more earnestly than they have hitherto done to remove the deep lines of ancient social and religious cleavage which still constitute the gravest obstacle to genuine democratic progress and national unity.

Even the limited measure of provincial self-government which the Report contemplates, merely as a first instalment, must inevitably carry with it some relaxation of the very close administrative, legislative and financial control—especially rigid in the matter of finance—hitherto exercised by the Government of India over the Provincial Governments. Few will quarrel with recommendations already to some extent anticipated by those of the Decentralisation Commission and by the Government of India Resolution of 1915. Many will think they might with advantage go further. They still leave large opportunities of interference to the Government of India.

More questionable are some of the changes which it is proposed to make at one and the same time in the Viceroy's Executive and Legislative Councils. The Report recommends the substitution for the existing Legislative Council—in which Lord Morley decided to retain a permanent official majority—of two chambers, a lower one, largely elective, to consist of about 100 members, and to be called the Indian Legislative Assembly, and a higher one with only 50 members, to be known as the Council of State, in which alone the official element is to retain a bare majority. The qualifications for election to the Council of State are to be settled later by the Governor-General-in-Council; and the Report merely expresses the hope that, 'inasmuch as the Council of State will be the supreme legislative authority for India on all crucial questions and also the revising authority for all Indian legislation,' it will 'attract the services of the best men available,' and 'develop something of the experience and dignity of a body of Elder Statesmen'—an expression presumably borrowed, but not very aptly, from Japan, where the

Elder Statesmen have had no doubt great influence, but never any constitutional status.

It would be even more futile to speculate on the character of the Indian Legislative Assembly, as the question of the franchise for it is left over to the same Committee which is to deal with the franchise for the Provincial Councils. The Report, however, itself anticipates the possibility of serious conflicts of opinion between the Assembly and the Governor-General-in-Council, for it deems it necessary to arm him with the 'affirmative power of legislation' necessary to place on the Statute Book, after full publicity and discussion, 'measures essential to the discharge of his supreme responsibilities to which the majority of members in the Legislative Assembly are unwilling to assent.' That is one of the safeguards to be provided in accordance with the fundamental principle laid down in the Report—that in all essentials the authority of the Government of India must remain beyond dispute, until India is ripe for complete self-government. But why couple it with the irritating farce of an official majority voting to order? The Report itself subjects the official 'block' to merciless but not undeserved criticism, as one of the worst features of the Morley-Minto Reforms, and rejects it both for the Provincial Councils and for the Indian Lower House. Yet it maintains it in the Council of State. Is that the way to develop in it 'something of the dignity of a body of Elder Statesmen'? or is the prestige of Government—to say nothing of its officials—likely to be upheld by seeking to disguise behind such a transparent fiction responsibilities which, whenever it is its duty to assume them, it should assume openly and unreservedly?

The appointment of another Indian member to the Viceroy's Executive Council is less likely to arouse opposition than the abolition of the 'statutory' restrictions by which the presence on that Council of three members drawn from the Indian Civil Service has been hitherto assured. It is scarcely conceivable that any Viceroy will consent to deprive himself altogether of the only advisers who have personal knowledge and practical experience of the working of the administrative machine. But, if this recommendation means anything more than

an ostensible and quite unjustifiable concession to the Extremists who have made the extrusion of the Civil Service one of the chief features of their rabid campaign against the 'bureaucracy,' it is in direct conflict with the whole spirit of the chapter in which the Report deals with the public services and upholds the retention of a strong European element 'so far in the future as any man can foresee.'

Subject to the above criticisms, the desire expressed in the Report to secure 'greater elasticity in respect both of the size of the Government and the distribution of the work' is no less reasonable than the desire to bring the Government into closer touch with Indian opinion by placing the Indian Legislative Assembly on a broader basis, while providing at the same time a counterpoise in a Council of State representing presumably more conservative elements, which will be still further strengthened by the institution of a Council of Princes as a permanent consultative body. Here the authors of the Report break new ground. They have wisely recognised that the effects of great constitutional reforms which can be enacted only for that part of India that is under direct British administration must necessarily react upon that other smaller but still very considerable part of India which enjoys more or less complete internal autonomy under its own hereditary rulers. A growing number of questions, and especially economic questions, must arise in future, which will affect the interests of the Native States as directly as those of the rest of India; and their rulers may legitimately claim, as the Report plainly admits, to have constitutional opportunities of expressing their views and wishes and of conferring with one another and with the Government of India. The Report even suggests that, on matters of common interest, the Council of Princes may be drawn into joint deliberation with the Council of State. These far-reaching proposals are and must be subject to the spontaneous and willing assent of the Princes, who are naturally very jealous of their own treaty rights; but they are conceived in a broad and statesmanlike spirit.

It is all the more remarkable that the Report, while admitting that the control of the Government of India

over the Provincial Governments, and also the detailed control of the India Office over the Government of India within the sphere to be set apart for the beginnings of Indian responsible Government, must be relaxed, appears almost to ignore the larger issues arising out of the exercise by the British Government of its control over Indian policy. It mentions, it is true, certain cases in which the interference of the British Government has been attributed in India to 'political exigencies at home.' But it scarcely realises how damaging to the authority of government in India is the impression produced when instructions from Whitehall compel the Government of India to defend and to carry out a policy which it may be generally known to have deprecated and opposed. When that policy appears, moreover, to be dictated by a narrow conception of home interests, not only the authority of the Government of India but the confidence of Indians in the good faith of the British Government is seriously shaken.

In his 'Future Government of India,' which is the most notable contribution from any Indian writer to a constructive study of the problem, Mr K. Vyasa Rao devotes a whole chapter to this aspect of the question. He points out, with concrete instances to reinforce his argument, how anomalous is the position of a Viceroy who is the personal representative of the King-Emperor and the responsible trustee for the interests of India, but who at the same time may be compelled to defend, without even being allowed to disclaim his own responsibility, a policy imposed upon him from Whitehall which he and his Government entirely disapprove. Mr Vyasa Rao urges, in fact, as the first preliminary even to provincial autonomy, some readjustment of these relations which shall secure a reasonable measure of autonomy to the Government of India. He disclaims any desire to see the essential supremacy of the British Parliament impaired, but there lies the rub; and that is doubtless the reason why the Secretary of State and the Viceroy have shrunk from propounding any radical solution of so real and serious a difficulty.

A practical remedy might be at any rate to give the Government of India a greater latitude in the initiation and public advocacy of the measures it deems necessary

in the interests of India, while of course reserving to the Secretary of State the right of disallowance in the event of such measures being disapproved as conflicting with the main lines of British policy. The Government of India would thus be relieved from much undeserved odium, and the necessity for publicly justifying disallowance would enable the Secretary of State to resist any undue pressure brought to bear upon him in selfish or merely party interests at home. Some years ago, before the war had brought the possibility of Indian self-government within the range of what I then conceived to be practical politics, I wrote that we ought to make up our minds at any rate 'not to force upon India things which we should not dream of forcing upon our self-governing Dominions, especially in matters in which British material interests appear to be closely concerned.' Our duty in this respect is doubly clear to-day, when we have decided to set the feet of India firmly in the path towards self-government.

The relationship between the British Government and the Government of India will be more than ever one of practical and not merely theoretical importance if the brief but very pregnant observations of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy on the economic situation in India receive the consideration they deserve. They constitute a remarkably frank avowal of our past sins of omission and commission. If the Congress party had been composed of practical business men rather than of political theorists, and had preferred the study of economics to constitution-mongering, the late Mr Ranadi would not have preached to deaf ears when he pointed out, twenty-five years ago, that the economic domination of one country by another is far more formidable, because more insidious, than its political domination. Except for its annual protests against the Indian cotton excise, which was too obvious a grievance to escape its notice, the Congress never seriously addressed itself to economic questions until, as the Report points out, economic discontents merged in political agitation and found a vent in the extravagant *swadeshi* and boycott movements. Engineered by political extremists for political purposes, those movements were bound to fail, and they failed ruinously. But they were partly the unhealthy

manifestations of a real economic awakening, which Lord Curzon had done much to produce by creating a Department of Commerce and Industry, and encouraging technical and scientific education and agricultural research.

The poverty of a large part of the population of India is a lamentable fact which cannot be denied. The Congress formerly delighted to impute it to the 'drain' of Indian revenues to England—a theory which Mr William Archer, though a warm sympathiser with Indian aspirations, has thoroughly exploded in his admirable book 'India and the Future.' Many intelligent Indians have now realised that the only genuine remedy to India's poverty is the systematic development of her natural resources, the fostering of her industries (as Messrs Tata, the great pioneers of the Indian iron and steel industry, are already showing), and the improvement of her methods of agriculture, since agriculture must always remain the greatest of Indian industries. The war has abundantly proved how seriously India has been handicapped by her industrial backwardness, which, as the Report admits, Indians themselves are apt to attribute to the selfishness of British manufacturing interests. The appointment during the war of an Industrial Commission of Enquiry under the presidency of Sir Thomas Holland constitutes an important if belated recognition of the part which the economic question is going to play in future. Sir Satyendra Sinha, who has represented India in the Imperial War Conference, told a London audience before he left England that he valued the proposed measures of constitutional reform mainly as a pledge that India shall be allowed and helped to work out her economic salvation; for without the latter no political reforms would avail to make India prosperous and therefore contented. But this involves not only a complete departure from the *laissez-faire* doctrines imported from this country into India, but much greater freedom for the Government of India actively to shape its economic policy in accordance with Indian wishes and interests. In this respect a considerable relaxation of the control hitherto exercised by the British Government over the Government of India becomes imperative.

The Report, however, does not contemplate any such relaxation, unless we are to assume that it is expected

to follow from the more vigilant and intelligent interest which Parliament is exhorted to take in Indian affairs. The House of Commons is asked to appoint in future, at the beginning of each session, a select committee before which the Secretary of State for India would himself appear to answer questions and give information. Moreover, it is to Parliament that the Report would again commit the same sort of task which it used to perform in the days of the East India Company before every renewal of the Charter. It suggests that a Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry into the working of the new Indian institutions, and the general progress of the people of India, shall at stated intervals determine the further stages of advance towards the final goal of self-government. To prepare Parliament for the discharge of such responsible duties it is clearly desirable that, so soon as the Government Bill has been drafted to give effect to the recommendations of the Report, a Committee of both Houses shall be appointed to consider it. Such a Committee, armed with power to examine witnesses, would be able to probe both Indian and British public opinion in a much more searching way than can be done by impassioned and irresponsible arguments and counter-arguments in the Press and on platforms; and it would at the same time materially assist Parliament to master from the outset the many-sided problem whose progressive solution it will have constantly to watch and periodically to determine.

A Report of such magnitude and complexity must offer room for varied criticism, which, so long as the fundamental principles laid down in the declaration of Aug. 20, 1917, are frankly accepted, is quite compatible with a hearty recognition of the generous statesmanship and resourceful ingenuity displayed by its authors. They may already feel themselves in no small measure justified by the effect they have produced in India. In a significant passage of the Report, they insist that

‘now that His Majesty’s Government have declared their policy, reasonable men have something which they can oppose successfully to the excitement created by attacks on Government and by abuse of Englishmen, coupled with glowing and inaccurate accounts of India’s golden past and

appeals to race-hatred in the name of religion. Many prominent Indians dislike and fear such methods. A new opportunity is now being offered to combat them, and we expect them to take it.'

Those expectations are already being fulfilled. The Home Rule rump of the Indian National Congress and Moslem League, whose resolutions the Report has subjected to courteous but merciless criticism and emphatically rejected, may still prefer to listen to such a fanatical Egeria as Mrs Besant, whose strange evolution is ruthlessly exposed by the leader of the Madras non-Brahmins in a volume published apparently with impunity under her very nose. They may also disregard the grave strictures unanimously passed upon Mr Tilak's political career by a semi-judicial Committee composed of eminent Indians and Europeans presided over by a Judge of the Court of King's Bench, Mr Justice Rowlatt, specially sent out to India. But the bulk of the Indian Moderates have openly taken their stand against Extremism by holding a Conference of their own, free from such compromising associations, and have testified thereby to their belief that, as Mr Vyasa Rao tersely puts it, 'to become self-governing, it is India that needs England indispensably.' In our own country, where, under the pressure of war preoccupations, changing conditions in far-distant India had attracted very scanty attention, the Report has also been, on the whole, well received by moderate men of all parties. It is only the rigid conservatives, representing the opposite pole to that of Indian extremism, who deny not only the expediency but the possibility of any policy directed towards Indian self-government, and deride the faith which has inspired both the Declaration of Aug. 20 and the scheme propounded in the Report. They might be invited to ponder the words written nearly a century ago by Sir Thomas Munro, one of the ablest and most far-sighted British administrators that India has ever known.

'What is to be the final result of our arrangements on the character of the people? Is it to be raised or to be lowered? Are we to be satisfied with merely securing our power and protecting the inhabitants? Or are we to endeavour to elevate their character and to render them worthy of filling higher stations in the management of their

country and devising plans for its improvement? . . . We should look on India not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitious prejudices and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that British control over India should be gradually withdrawn.'

Sir Thomas Munro did not live to see the Government of India Act of 1833. But it was his ideas that bore fruit in that first great endeavour to formulate the principles of British rule on lines which, but for the catastrophe of the Mutiny, would have probably brought India by this time much nearer than she is at present to the goal that has once more been set definitely and deliberately before her. It cannot be contended that another century of British rule has rendered the task contemplated by Sir Thomas Munro impossible for us to achieve. The conditions have changed. The habits of government have become more set. Education has bred greater impatience of them among influential classes of Indians. On the other hand, the majority of Indians have acquired a reasoned faith in the permanence of the destiny which has bound India and Britain together. We on our side have learnt by experience that within the British Empire there is room for many nations to enjoy the largest possible measure of self-government without impairing its essential unity. Have we, in the light of what India has done for the Empire during the war, the right to go on assuming that she alone is incapable of self-government? That she is capable of it to-day, only Indians blinded by racial pride and hatred venture to assert. The majority are content to demand that she should be steadily trained to it, and as rapidly as possible. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report contains a carefully thought-out scheme for initiating her training to it, and for a gradual quickening of her progress within the limits of prudence and safety. That scheme may undergo amendment in a good many details, but, taken as a whole, and failing some substitute which is not at present in sight, it holds and must hold the field.

VALENTINE CHIROL.

Art. 9.—IS INDIA A NATION?

1. *General Report of the Census of India*, 1911.
2. *Royal Commission on the Public Services in India: Report of the Commissioners*, 1917.
3. *Indian Speeches*, 1907-1909. By Viscount Morley. Macmillan, 1909.
4. *Indian Nationalism*. By E. Bevan. Macmillan, 1914.
5. *India and the Future*. By W. Archer. Hutchinson, 1917.
6. *Nationalism*. By Sir R. Tagore. Macmillan, 1917.

It is more than thirty years since Sir John Seeley in his 'Expansion of England' told us that 'if there could arise in India a nationality movement similar to that which we witnessed in Italy,' British rule in India would come to an end; and he went so far as to say that all desire for its continuance ought also to be given up. The question that many persons are asking to-day is, whether the agitation that recently has caused so much excitement in India amounts to a movement of the kind that Prof. Seeley indicated. Many who are in entire sympathy with the principle recently enunciated anew by Mr William Archer,* that British rule is 'a means, not an end'—a means, namely, whereby the people of India are being trained to govern themselves—will nevertheless deny emphatically that the demand for Home Rule is to be regarded as proving that a real spirit of Indian nationality has sprung into being.

If it be 'the fashion (as Mr Archer says) to preface all accounts of India with the statement that it is not one country but a "sub-continent," and to enlarge upon the diversities of race and language contained within its boundaries,'† there are good reasons for this; among others, it is a method of representing the difficulty of the task that any one undertakes when he endeavours to form a judgment on a question affecting all India. India has a perfectly obvious unity; though many countries are packed into it, it is 'conspicuously a geographical unit'; it is also at present a political unit under the British *raj*; but, when so much has been said, its claim to unity is exhausted. Not that a further and

* 'India and the Future,' *passim*.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

more organic unity is entirely absent; 'we are giving India what she never had before—unity, cohesion, in a word, nationality,' says Mr Archer again; but as yet it is only a feeble growth. The following examination of the returns given in the Census Report, 1911, will show that, if the essential diversities are less than they are sometimes represented to be, they are still great enough to present formidable, though not insuperable, barriers to the creation of a nationalism representative of the whole of India.

To begin with language—it is very necessary to recall how great is its diversity, for, when the Census was taken in 1911, it was found that many educated Hindus were led by political considerations to 'belittle the great differences which actually exist between the different parts of the Empire; and it is sometimes alleged that there is only one language spoken throughout northern India.* One is indeed at first staggered when confronted by the statement that the vernaculars of India number 220. But an analysis of the returns shows that the great majority of these 'languages' (many of them may be more properly called dialects) have very few speakers in proportion to the total population; and we find only fourteen languages that are spoken by at least five millions each, or in the aggregate by 283 millions. Of the remaining 206 languages, no less than 186 are divided among a total of sixteen millions, while twenty are divided among sixteen millions more.

There are of course in India, as in Europe, a great many persons who speak two or more languages, but here account is taken only of the mother-tongue, 'the language which each person ordinarily uses in his own home.' If the number fourteen appears less sensational than the 220 with which we set out, the smaller number is still large enough to present a serious hindrance to that freedom of intelligent communication between the various sections of the population using them which would tend to secure some approach to unity of opinion and aspiration.

Without going into the question too minutely, it may be stated roughly that nine of the fourteen languages

* Census Report, p. 320.

are spoken by the people who dwell north of a line drawn across the peninsula from Kolhapur in the west to Puri in the east,* and that these nine belong to the Indo-European family of languages. South of the line indicated are to be found the four languages of the Dravidian family. The geographical area of the representative of the Tibeto-Chinese family, Burmese, is sufficiently indicated by its name.

Another figure that quite rightly may awaken surprise is found on examining the statistics of education. The standard of literacy adopted for the Census cannot be described as high—all persons were enumerated as 'literate' 'who could write a letter (in any language) to a friend and read his reply'—yet with this low standard the whole population of India yielded only six per cent. of literates, or 18·9 millions of persons in a population of 315 millions. The Government is sometimes blamed for this backwardness, but, while it may be admitted that Government ought to have been more active in the promotion of vernacular education during the past sixty or eighty years, those who advance the criticism too often ignore certain obvious facts. One is that for the direct control of immense tracts in central and north-western India Great Britain has been responsible for only a comparatively short period of time, in some cases not much more than half a century. Another is that money is necessary for the diffusion of education, and that money means taxes. The creating of the immense army of teachers required takes time, while money is needed both for their training and for their adequate remuneration, so that the profession may be rendered sufficiently attractive to secure a steady flow of recruits. Then, again, many persons fail to realise that education is not desired by great masses of the people—the poorer peasants, for example—while among the great bulk of the population it was rare to find till the other day a female who was allowed to receive education beyond the most elementary stage. Such an indictment as that which Sir R. Tagore frames against 'the Nation' is therefore grossly unjust.

'The benefit of the Western civilisation,' he says, 'is doled

* The course of the Godavari for some distance coincides with the line, but at its source it is too much to the north, and at its mouth too far south.

out to us in a miserly measure by the Nation, which tries to regulate the degree of nutrition as near the zero-point of vitality as possible. The portion of education allotted to us is so raggedly insufficient that it ought to outrage the sense of decency of a Western humanity.*

This arraignment disregards all these facts, and in addition, the general neglect by intelligent, responsible Indians of the opportunity and benefits offered by the Halifax Dispatch of 1854, the tendency of certain classes to expect everything to be done for them at the public expense, and the familiar conservatism of tropical and sub-tropical races, which makes them indifferent to such advantages as education presents.

This conservatism has been most marked in the slow advance of female education, so that, though the women of certain smaller communities, such as the Parsis, Indian Christians, and Buddhists, reach a creditable average of literacy, the percentage for the whole female population amounts only to one. Setting aside the female population, the percentage of literacy for males is between 10 and 11. The number of literates is greatest, as might be expected, in the older provinces, Bengal, Bombay and Madras, in which the percentage amongst males is respectively 14, 12, and 13·8, while in the more recently acquired provinces, Punjab, United Provinces and Central Provinces, there is a fall to an almost uniform level of six per cent. The degree of literacy attained by Burma, namely 37 per cent. for males—due, we are told,† to the free instruction imparted in the Buddhist monasteries—is so high that it must, though the province has a population of only 12 millions, affect the average for all India. But Burma is so distinct from the rest of India in geographical position, in race, language and religion, that it may fairly be excluded from our further reckoning. As the political areas of higher literacy coincide with those in which a particular language is chiefly spoken, it may be concluded that literacy is highest amongst the speakers of Bengali, Marathi, and the four languages of the Dravidian family—Telugu, Tamil, Kanares and Malayalam.

* 'Nationalism,' p. 20.

† Census Report, p. 293.

In considering the question of the diffusion of general literacy in the provinces in which the percentage is highest, another limiting factor has to be taken account of, namely, Religion, which divides the population into distinct communities with widely varying educational attainment. Thus in Bengal the literacy of Hindu males amounts to 21 per cent., while among Mussulman males it falls to 8 per cent. This is a serious matter for Bengal as a province, for out of a population of 45·5 millions almost 24 millions are Mohammedans. In Bombay a somewhat similar state of things prevails.

If a *lingua franca* is to be sought for, it will not be found in any one of the six languages which stand high in respect of literacy. The nearest approach to such a universal language is that popularly known as Hindustani, which, in its various dialects, is now classed as either Western or Eastern Hindi. But, while one or other of its dialects may serve one indifferently well, at least along the lines of railway, over a great part of northern and central India, Hindustani will not carry one far to the south of the line Kolhapur—Puri. For the more highly educated classes throughout India it is well known that English is the common language; and it is sometimes urged that no set of figures brings out more clearly than those for literacy in English the doubtful character of the claim made by those who use this *lingua franca* that they are voicing the wishes of the peoples of India. Though a knowledge of English is spreading rapidly through the country, there were in 1911 only 1,700,000 persons in all India who were literate in English. This figure, however, may be made to appear less insignificant in relation to the total population, if again females are set on one side, and attention be concentrated on the male population of the older provinces. But even with this concession, it is found that in Bengal only 1·9 per cent. of the male population is literate in English, 1·4 in Bombay, and 1·2 in Madras. In the other larger provinces the percentage falls well below one.

Inconsiderable though the numbers of the English literates are, it has perforce to be admitted that their influence far exceeds their numerical strength. Thus the Commissioners in their Report on the Public Services in India (p. 15) point out how unwise it would be

'to ignore that growing body of Western educated opinion which is gradually creating a new atmosphere all over India. Even those who most strongly deprecate some of its manifestations realise that it has contributed largely to the great social and religious movements which are aiming at giving a new direction to old beliefs, and at harmonising ancient doctrines with the teachings of science. It is reflected in that new sense of unity which is displacing the idea of ordained separation hitherto prevalent in Indian society.'

However deplorable may be some of the 'manifestations' referred to—and in more recent times they have deserved stronger terms of reprobation than those used by the Commissioners—the 'Western-educated' section of the people is the only one that has some width of outlook and knowledge of world movements. Eighty years ago the paramount Power set itself deliberately to create this class—a decision described by Seeley as 'the greatest landmark in the history of our Empire considered as an institute of civilisation.' The momentous experiment has justified itself both in its primary object and in many other respects, though it is unfortunate that some of the consequences, not altogether unforeseen, have been allowed to take care of themselves.

So much being admitted, it does not follow that this class has developed, except here and there, anything that may be described as political wisdom or statesmanship. They can organise a clamour against the Arms Act, or, more justifiably, against Indentured Emigration, but, so far, they have shown little power of constructive statesmanship. 'They wanted,' as Sir R. Tagore puts it, 'scraps of things, but they had no constructive ideal'

The commitments of Great Britain in India are much too great to allow the admission without reservation of the principle implied in the saying, 'good government is no substitute for self-government'; yet this is what the memorialists mean when they say, 'What is wanted is not merely good government and efficient administration, but government that is acceptable to the people because it is responsible to them.' But, when we ask who the people are whom the 'acceptable' Government is to represent and to whom it is to be responsible, the answer is not easily found.

When we ask the further question, Who are to form the

government for which the British bureaucratic oligarchy should make way? we find it already answered in the words of one of the Nineteen. Mr Srinivasa Sastri showed more courage than discretion when, in the Legislative Council at Delhi, he recently declared, 'How should a Brahman oligarchy, if oligarchy it was, rising from the soil and rooted in the soil, with interests far more permanent than those of the British oligarchy, be the less acceptable of the two?' This need not be interpreted as an avowal that the real object of the agitation for Home Rule is to have the destinies of the country transferred to the hands of a particular class of Indians; but Mr Srinivasa Sastri spoke the truth more nearly than perhaps he intended, when he suggested the alternative of a Brahman oligarchy.

The claim that, unlike the British, Brahmans such as himself 'rise from the soil and are rooted in the soil,' is a mere rhetorical way of saying that they are Indian born, though the Madras paper, 'Justice,' the organ of the non-Brahman community, no doubt thinking of the exactions of Brahman priests and lawyers, promptly replied, 'They are only parasites on those who are rooted to the soil'! But, apart from that, can it be shown that the Brahmans are the class who in all probability would supply the alternative Government, or at any rate have a preponderating influence in it? A presumption may at least be established that Brahmans would immediately secure a controlling influence in any Government formed on the principle of free election.

The first fact favouring this presumption is the high place taken by Brahman males both in general literacy and in literacy in English. Thus, in the Madras Presidency, about 70 per cent. of them can claim general literacy, while only one other caste touches 50 per cent.; and in literacy in English they far surpass every other caste, the Tamil-speaking Brahmans reaching 22 per cent. and those speaking Telugu 14·7 per cent., while no other caste touches three per cent. In Bombay again they stand highest by a long interval in literacy of both kinds; and, if in Bengal they are beaten by the Baidyas and the Subarnabaniks, it is not by much.

If these figures by themselves only show that the Brahmans have been more alive than any other class of

Hindus to the advantages to be derived from education, the Report of the Public Services Commission brings out in addition that they have benefited by their unquestioned enterprise to an extent far in excess of their numbers. There are in all India 11,064 civil appointments carrying salaries of 160*l.* a year or more. Of these 4573 are held by Indians of all communities, 3119 being held by Hindus. Brahmans, though in all India they number only 14·5 millions, hold 1455 of these posts, no other caste having half as many; while the whole Mohammedan community, numbering 66·6 millions, has to be content with 771.* Had the Commissioners pursued their investigations below the salary limit of 160*l.* a year to appointments of, say, 60*l.* a year, an even greater preponderance of Brahmans would undoubtedly have been found in the Public Services. The higher appointments have attached to them ordinarily a power, if not of direct patronage, still of selection and recommendation for the lower posts in a department; and it is but human nature—as it certainly is the Brahman nature—to use it in favour of one's own castemen.

In the profession of Law Brahmans outnumber all other classes, and frequently attain great distinction, a conspicuous instance being seen in Sir S. Subrahmanya Aiyar, K.C.I.E., who, now that he has retired from the Bench of the High Court, Madras, has taken a foremost place in the agitation for Home Rule in its most extreme form. Brahmans, again, are very numerous in the teaching profession, where, if they be politically-minded, their influence in the same direction often proves to be very great indeed; and, as is well known, they are to a large extent the controlling power of the native Press, both English and Vernacular.

It is altogether to the credit of this caste that they occupy the position they do in that modern India which is the creation of British rule. They have shown an alertness, a persistence, a suppleness and adaptability such as no other class of Indians can claim. They are the leaders of the *intelligentsia* of India, with the added advantage that, in spite of all the advance in education

* See also Census Report, pp. 429, 430.

and the influx of liberalising ideas from the West, they still exercise a subtle religious sway over all Hindus.

The class distinctions of the West are no counterpart of the Indian caste system; and it is only the veriest sophistry that would identify them. 'In India there is no common birthright.'^{*} No Hindu can become a Brahman or obtrude himself into the prerogatives of the caste; a man is born a Brahman or not; if he is so born, he may assume such of the prerogatives as he chooses. It is not even a matter of religious confession; 'no one is interested in what his neighbour believes, but he is very much interested in knowing whether he can eat with him or take water from his hands;'[†] and of course also whether inter-marriage is permissible. Seeley regarded religion as 'the strongest and most important of all the elements which go to constitute nationality'; and he thought that in India Brahmanism might supply this element. It is striving hard to do so to-day, but, if it were to succeed, would it be able to secure for India 'fellowship on terms of equality with the civilised nations of the earth'? It may well be doubted, for, with the dawning of a new day for democracy, there could be no close cooperation with a Government which, based on an aristocracy of birth, would be essentially oligarchic, and which, besides, if not religiously intolerant, would secure a new lease of power for a social tyranny of the most intense type.

Mr Archer has unerringly put his finger on the real sore of India when he says with reference to caste, 'The tragic paradox of India's fate is this. She is unified by that which at the same time divides and enfeebles her.' In whatever way the origin of this or that caste may be explained, 'the spirit of exclusiveness is everywhere the same'; 'all castes are hemmed in by similar restrictions against inter-marriage and commensality';[‡] they are, the 'countless compartments' of 'the magnificent cage' that India has manufactured, and worships 'with all ceremony.'[§]

It is therefore not easy to supply a common interest of sufficient strength to overcome the interminable

^{*} Sir R. Tagore's 'Nationalism,' p. 123. [†] Census Report, p. 113.

[‡] Census Report, p. 371.

[§] Tagore's 'Nationalism,' p. 116.

cleavages produced by the system, and so to draw together that enormous mass of 217·3 millions of human beings called Hindus. If it be one of the ironies of fate that Great Britain is daily creating just such a common interest, to her own increasing embarrassment, it ought also to be regarded as being to her greater glory. Had Great Britain followed the policy of 'Divide et impera,' her own difficulties would have been fewer; instead, she has not only, so to speak, pulled India together physically, but by seeking to confer on all classes, from the proudest Brahman to the most degraded 'untouchable,' on Mussulman, Sikh, Christian and Buddhist alike, equal benefits and privileges, she has facilitated the advance of India towards the realisation of nationality.

As India is so lacking in homogeneity, it will be necessary, with a further extension of self-government, to extend also the principle of communal representation. There is not only the great religious division between Hindus and Mohammedans; there are divisions among the Hindus themselves which in this connexion probably deserve consideration. A strong anti-Brahman current has set in in the South, which may lead to a cleavage of such magnitude as to require political recognition. It has grown to great volume and influence since the demand for immediate Home Rule was launched. It is a striking indication of healthy, vigorous self-assertion to get rid of an intolerable religio-social tyranny. The non-Brahman Hindus, while not losing sight of self-government as the ultimate goal, are demanding communal representation, so that their interests may meantime be delivered from Brahman overlordship; and they recognise that it is only by the continuance of the firm and just government of Great Britain that they will be guaranteed the time necessary to fit them for that share in the government of their country to which their numbers and their wealth entitle them. Moreover, there are other religious communities which, though numerically small, have interests that deserve to be safeguarded, such as the Christians of the South, with a high percentage of literacy, and the Sikhs of the North-West, who, while probably caring little about representative government, have by the help they have rendered in

this war earned for themselves a right to generous treatment.*

Again, the landholding, the agricultural, the industrial, the commercial, and the Anglo-Indian interests, in short, the capitalist and productive interests, must be carefully protected in a representative system in which without checks of a communal kind all control would pass into the hands of professional politicians. How vastly important, for example, the agricultural interest is, may be seen from the statement in the Census Report (p. 405) that of actual workers 'in India 71 per cent. are engaged in pasture and agriculture, and only 29 per cent. in all other occupations combined.'

The facts that have been adduced amply justify the conclusion that conflicting interests are so many and so great that India cannot yet be regarded as a nation speaking with a voice of unchallengeable authority. If the balance is to be held even, so that the opposing interests may in time come into some sort of harmonious cooperation, it can only be done by the continued rule of the Power which, in virtue of its attitude of detachment, has given proof of its capacity for the task. Whatever measure of self-determination may be regarded as now due to India, it must fall far short of the extravagant demands of the extremists; for to surrender at this stage of India's development the destinies of the many inarticulate millions to a microscopic minority of individuals, congregated for most part in the cities would be a gross betrayal of a trust. As Sir Rabindranath Tagore has said, 'The narrowness of sympathy which makes it possible for us (Hindus) to impose upon a considerable portion of humanity the galling yoke of inferiority will assert itself in our politics in creating the tyranny of injustice.' That tyranny will surely not be allowed to rear its head.

J. M. RUSSELL.

* In all India there are 3·8 millions of Christians, and of these 1·2 million are in the Madras presidency, and 1·1 million more in the contiguous Native States, Travancore and Cochin. The Sikhs number 3·0 millions, almost all in the Punjab.

Art. 10.—A TAME HOUSE OF LORDS.

Report of the Conference on the Reform of the Second Chamber. Letter from Viscount Bryce to the Prime Minister [Cd. 9038]. H.M. Stat. Office, 1918.

THE Second Chamber Conference was appointed on Aug. 25, 1917. It began work on Oct. 2. During the next six months it held forty-eight sittings and it reported in April last. Its members were chosen in equal numbers from both Houses, but one member, Mr T. P. O'Connor, was throughout absent in America. The experience of the members was wide and varied. Lord Bryce, the Chairman, and Mr J. A. R. Marriott brought wide historical knowledge and a special study of constitutions and second chambers to the service of the Conference. Law was represented by Lord Loreburn. Many members had held high office at home and abroad, and all had long been trained in public affairs. Few of the Peers would be called strong House of Lords men, and some had sat in the House of Commons so long that they might have no little bias in favour of the Commons House. The other half were probably decided House of Commons men.

Of the many recommendations of the Conference two stand out conspicuous: one is the mode in which the Second Chamber is to be constituted; the other is the method in which differences arising between the two Chambers are to be composed. Even more remarkable perhaps than these recommendations, as to which there was some difference of opinion, were the preliminary assumptions, as to which it seems there was none. The Conference began by considering what functions were appropriate to a Second Chamber; and 'it was found that agreement existed' on four points. Theoretically, no doubt, this procedure was logical, but one cannot help wondering whether all those who agreed about the appropriate functions quite foresaw to what political proposals those premises would lead them in the long run. The Conference was discreetly handled. If the members had begun by going through the actual powers of the House of Lords and considering *seriatim* what should be taken

and what should be left, there might not have been so much unanimity.

The four functions agreed upon were these: (1) 'the examination and revision of Bills brought from the House of Commons'; (2) 'the initiation of Bills dealing with subjects of a comparatively non-controversial character'; (3) 'the interposition of so much delay (and no more) in the passing of a Bill into law as may be needed to enable the opinion of the nation to be adequately expressed upon it'; and (4) 'full and free discussion of large and important questions . . . at moments when the House of Commons may happen to be so much occupied that it cannot find sufficient time for them.' It was also generally agreed that the following 'elements' ought to find a place in the Second Chamber; (1) persons of experience in various forms of public work, and persons who possess special knowledge of Imperial Questions; (2) 'persons who, while likely to serve efficiently in a Second Chamber, may not have the physical vigour needed to bear the increasing strain which candidacy for a seat in the House of Commons and service in it involve'; and (3) 'a certain proportion of persons, who are not extreme partisans, but of a cast of mind which enables them to judge political questions with calmness and comparative freedom from prejudice or bias.'

When one contemplates this Second Chamber, including, if not consisting of, persons ripe in experience of public work, too feeble for the House of Commons, too old or too cold for prejudice or bias, occupying itself in revising other people's bills, in initiating bills of its own on subjects of comparatively non-controversial character, and in discussing quite large questions, fully and freely too, at moments when the other House happens to be busy with questions not so large or so important, one cannot help thinking that its members will have rather a quiet time of it.

The Conference then went on to describe (and still, it seems, with unanimity) the *morale* of this assembly. Its members ought not to aim at becoming rivals of the House of Commons, for which reason they ought not to have equal powers with it. Still much is asked of it. The Second Chamber should not habitually act

under the influence of party motives. It should not set itself to oppose the People's Will but rather should try to comprehend it. From the confidence which their characters and careers are fitted to inspire, its members should be able to secure for it moral authority, and, by exercising this moral authority and by evincing a superiority to factious motives, they should try to enlighten and influence the People through their debates. Certainly the Second Chamber has an uphill task before it. If it manages to rise superior to factious motives without being dull, and to attract to mere moral authority that popular attention which generally belongs only to actual power, it may induce the newspapers to report its debates, and then it may have some chance of influencing the People. Otherwise its debates will not much enlighten the People or anybody else, however earnestly the members may 'aim at ascertaining the mind and views of the nation as a whole.'

It is natural that, in prescribing the functions and character of its ideal Second Chamber, the Conference to some extent should do so by relating it to the actual House of Commons, with which it would have to work. No one proposes to reform the House of Commons; it follows that, in reforming the House of Lords, the new organ of the Legislature must be made to fit in with the peculiarities of the old one. The House of Commons, as it is and is to be, seems then to have presented itself to the mind of the Conference as possessing certain characteristics which are very material for the present purpose.

They regard the House of Commons as an organ of Legislation, whose bills stand regularly in need of examination or revision. By this is not meant mere drafting amendments by the Government's legal advisers; the revision required is that which can best be given by a large and composite deliberative assembly. The House of Commons, too, is one in which the necessity for acting 'under special rules limiting debate' is evidently to be regarded as a permanent feature. The passage of bills through it cannot be expected to be easy, for, even in the case of comparatively non-controversial subjects, a bill will find an easier passage, if it has first been fully discussed in the Second Chamber. The mere voice of

the House of Commons, even though expressed on a second and third reading, cannot be taken as in itself adequately expressing the opinion of the nation. Delay may be necessary to enable the opinion of the nation to be expressed adequately, though whether such adequate expression can be found anywhere but in a General Election does not appear. Certainly no method for expressing it is indicated.

Service in the House of Commons, to say nothing of courting and canvassing a constituency, is so arduous that it involves the possession of bodily vigour, which persons, whose brains are still good enough for the Second Chamber, cannot always hope to possess. It happens, and must be expected to happen in the House of Commons now and then, that time cannot be found for the full and free discussion of large and important matters, among which questions of foreign policy are conspicuous, although discussion of them ought to take place somewhere in the Legislature, and, like some other things, will not brook delay. It is not quite clear whether it is anticipated that the House of Commons may be too busy to give a full discussion to foreign affairs, or only incapable of giving them a free one. But, at any rate, there is one obstacle to profitable discussion in the House of Commons, from which it is thought better that the Second Chamber should be free; and that is the danger that, if a majority of the House of Commons were to speak or at any rate to vote according to its convictions, the Government might have to go out. Accordingly, it was thought that the utility of a Second Chamber as a medium of discussion, complementary to the discussions of the House of Commons, conditioned as they are by 'special rules limiting debate,' and by the fact that they may 'involve the fate of the Executive Government,' is enhanced when its proceedings may convince a Minister's reason but can have no effect in turning him out of office.

The Second Chamber being thus related to the House of Commons in permanence, and to a House of Commons of such permanent characteristics, the Conference was led at once to consider two difficult questions. Since it is part of the function of a Second Chamber in proper cases to revise House of Commons bills and to interpose

delay in passing such bills into law, plainly it is part of its duty, in proper cases, to differ from the opinion of the House of Commons and to stick to its own. Since it cannot turn out a Ministry and, if the newspapers will not report its debates, cannot appeal to the People, how is it to obtain a decision? Doggedly to throw out bills would not work; this would preserve only too well the continuity between the recent House of Lords and the new Second Chamber. There must be some machinery for settling such disputes; but, as its frequent use is hardly desirable, the composition of the Second Chamber and the mode of selecting discreet and docile persons as members of it become supremely important. On these matters the Conference have produced recommendations of great weight and of extreme ingenuity, but here they parted company with unanimity, for here they had to descend from the abstract to the concrete.

In case of a definitive difference of opinion between the two Chambers, the plan adopted for its final settlement is this. A Committee or Free Conference of the two Houses, not exceeding sixty in number, is to be chosen at the beginning of each Parliament; and to it differences between the Chambers may be referred. If this Conference fails to arrive at a compromise acceptable to both Chambers, the matter goes over to the following Session and then is taken up in the same body again. If the same compromise is then arrived at by a majority of three, it goes before both Houses again.

‘If they both agreed to it, it would pass. If they both disagreed to it, or if the House of Commons alone disagreed, it would lapse. If, however, the House of Commons alone agreed to the Bill and it had been accepted by the Free Conference by a majority of not less than three of the members present and voting, it would be submitted for the Royal Assent.’

Thus it will be seen that if, in the discharge of its chief function, that of revising House of Commons Bills, the Second Chamber should adopt an amendment, in no case could that amendment be passed into law, unless the House of Commons accepted it; in no case could the Electorate be consulted or have anything to say to it, unless the Government should think fit to advise a dissolution; and in every case, in which the Commons

members of the Free Conference stood firm and obtained the concurrence or even the absence of three of the Second Chamber members, the House of Commons would get its way after a postponement merely to the next session. If so much is to depend on the discovery of three just men in the Second Chamber moiety of this Committee, the composition of the Second Chamber and the selection of its members become the crux of the scheme.

How then shall we choose these members, who are to make good the weaknesses of the House of Commons, to correct its errors, to revise its bills, to enlighten the People, to comprehend its will, if they can, and to give effect to it, when it is adequately expressed? Is it the People itself that is to choose? Is it the Crown? Neither; it is the House of Commons, but the House of Commons decently disguised.

This remarkable result was arrived at by a process of exclusion; and, so far as the Report goes, the Conference was moved more by the reasons against the five alternative plans rejected than by any stated argument in favour of the plan chosen. First, nomination by the Crown, acting through (which presumably means on the advice of) its Ministers, was rejected. Naturally so. This plan or the threat of it may do once, but after that it is exploded. It was all very well for passing the Parliament Act of 1910, but the Parliament Act has no friends now. The reason given, however, is worth noting.

‘This plan appeared unlikely to find favour with the country, because it did not provide any guarantees for the fitness of the persons who might be nominated, and because it would be liable to be frequently employed as a reward for political party services.’

Apparently, in the view of the Conference, the country does not think much of Ministers.

Direct Election was then considered and rejected, less on its merits than in the interests of Ministers and of the House of Commons. Second is second, and first is first. A second chamber directly elected by the People might not know its place; it might become the more attractive, possibly the more influential, body. That would never do. Besides, coming straight from the

People, enjoying their confidence, mirroring their views and ideas (and let us hope also fulfilling its function of comprehending them), it would inevitably become a rival of the House of Commons. That would be very awkward. 'Ministers would have two masters to serve and to fear.' No doubt one master is enough; but the Conference does not seem to think much more of Ministers than, in its opinion, does the country.

Election by Local Authorities was of course rejected. Who wants a Second Chamber of local nobodies? Nor did selection by 'some weighty, important and independent authority' find favour. It sounds well, but what it really comes to is election by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses, and one is not surprised that it was rejected, though not unanimously. The reasoning, however, is odd.

'The majority thought it essential to provide a broader basis for the Second Chamber than election by any Commission, even one set up and renewed by Parliament, could furnish. These members sought that broader basis in the election of a Second Chamber by Parliament itself. . . . What was necessary was that it should be, as far as possible, a representative body. They held that since direct election by the voters had been ruled out by difficulties . . . which had been deemed insuperable, the nearest approach to the advantages claimed for the method of direct election was to vest the selection of the bulk of members of the Second Chamber in the persons whom the voters had chosen to represent them in Parliament.'

At this point the Conference apparently found itself confronted by that characteristic of the House of Commons, which its members seem to think regrettable but inherent, namely, its subjection to the party system and to party spirit. Enough members thought this objection insuperable, even if the panacea of Proportional Representation were applied, to lead the Conference to seek some electing body for the Second Chamber other than the House of Commons as a whole.

'An election by the whole of the House of Commons must inevitably become a purely party contest; a contest which would be managed by the party Whips and would turn upon the party pledges or party services of the persons to be elected, too little regard being paid to their personal qualifications.'

What, then, was to be done? If the House of Commons acts as a whole, its elections become party contests. What will prevent this? Why, to be sure, let the House of Commons act in parts. That this will be successful is rather assumed than proved. In itself it is not very obvious. Still, there is no doubt that a mob will do things from which individuals will recoil; and it may be that members of the House of Commons in groups may scruple to be guided by that party spirit and party system, which is supposed to govern the House as a whole and is good enough for taxing the People, making and unmaking Ministries, and so forth.

The grouping plan evolved by the Conference and adopted by a substantial majority is exceedingly ingenious. More than three-fourths of the Second Chamber (246 members) are to be elected by those members of the House of Commons who sit for constituencies in Great Britain. As for Ireland, for the present it is left out, for nobody just now can tell what to make of Ireland, but, in any view, there can be no doubt that, when enough is known of the wishes of the Irish People to make it possible to settle their rights, there will be a considerable unsettlement of the nicely balanced scheme recommended by the Conference.

Great Britain is divided into thirteen areas for the purpose of electing members of the Second Chamber; and the members for the constituencies in each area, to whatever parties they belong, are to form groups and to elect in groups their allotted number of Second Chamber members. The plan treats counties as the units; and the thirteen areas are formed by aggregations of counties. The report takes credit, and very justly so, for having contrived to invest these thirteen areas with a recognisable individuality; and, though they differ much in area, population, character and history, if the thing is to be done in this way at all, probably it could not be better done. The number of the members of the Second Chamber allotted to each area differs considerably. There is a solid Scotland with 30 members; a solid Wales (with Monmouth) has 15; London has 27; Lancashire 27; Yorkshire 24; most of the rest have 15 each. One thing is worth notice. The House of Lords, as it at present exists, is on the whole preponderantly

representative of the agricultural interest. This representation will be greatly diminished under the scheme proposed. The predominantly agricultural areas are only three out of the whole 13, with 48 members to elect out of 246; and of these East Anglia, which includes Essex, must contain many Londoners, while the South-Eastern, which includes Kent and Surrey, is in like case. Of course the agricultural interest in Scotland, Yorkshire and all the rest may make itself felt, but that entirely depends on the way in which members of the House of Commons may vote, when acting in groups and more or less freed from party associations.

The hopes and convictions of the supporters of this plan are thus summarised.

‘The responsibility of Members of the House of Commons, electing in groups, to their own constituents and to the great mass of voters of the large area which they would for this purpose represent, would restrain that partisanship which was so much feared. The groups would be anxious to return persons of high political standing and also to study local sentiment. Thus they would not be subservient to the control of party managers and whips; and this responsibility would give a guarantee against the exercise of the kind of undue influence which was apprehended.’

This is a most remarkable argument. It proceeds from assumption to assumption and piles one *non sequitur* upon another. What is this responsibility, say, of the 66 Lancashire members, meeting and voting as a group in a Committee Room, that it should make of each one of them a different and a better man from what he is, when he passes through the lobbies with his fellows in the usual way? It seems to rest on their ‘responsibility to their own constituents and to the great mass of voters of the large area.’ Surely this is a fallacy. The constituents of a particular member are the voters in his electoral division, not the voters for the whole of Lancashire. A member, no doubt, has duties extending far beyond the limits of the constituency for which he sits, duties to the whole of the country, duties to the whole of the Empire, duties to himself and his career; and among those duties there would, if this scheme became law, be the duty of taking

a share in the selection of members for the Second Chamber. The hypothesis is that a member might in this connexion be forgetful of his duties to the nation at large and mindful only of the call of his party. If it be so, what warrant is there for crediting him with a sense of duty to a county or a group of counties, when he would be insensible to the clearer duty to the country at large? If from party blindness or party feeling a man cannot do his duty simply as a member of Parliament, he is not likely to be sensitive to it as a member of one thirteenth fraction of one part of Parliament. What magic is there to purge his eyesight or his passions in thus dividing the substance?

The matter may be looked at in another way. Nowhere do party interests assert themselves more strongly than in the selection of candidates; nowhere is party organisation more efficacious than here. If the system of selecting members of the Second Chamber by geographical groups of constituencies is to be a useful check upon party spirit, it must surely exclude the influence of the wire-puller and the party manager as much from the selection of candidates as from the choice of members. How is this to be done? We are told that the persons selected should be men of ripe experience, of known virtue, experts in the arts of administration at home and abroad. Some by age or temperament may be unfit to go canvassing; many will be too old to care much where they sit or whether they sit anywhere at all, except at home. Does any one suppose that men of this kind are to be had for the asking? Some one must hunt them up. The retired Governor, the Satrap *en disponibilité*, the proconsul *rude donatus*, the Professor Emeritus, is likely to think that the work of the Second Chamber is laborious, unimportant and dull, and that instead of seeking to undertake it he will wait to be asked. On the other hand there will be no lack of local notabilities not unwilling to serve, or of elderly politicians whom younger rivals are not unwilling to elbow gently out of the way. How are the thirteen groups to ensure the first class and eschew the other? As each group will consist of diverse and antagonistic elements, none can possess any common machinery, by which to prepare a list of suitable candidates.

The Conference expressly refrained from considering whether members of the Second Chamber should be paid or not; it does not even say what they are to be called or what the name of the Chamber is to be. These things may have some practical bearing on the readiness of candidates to come forward; but, whatever attractions of the kind there be, the members of the House of Commons, geographically grouped, will still have to exert themselves to find, in sufficient numbers, men of the kind which the scheme contemplates, so that their choice may not be too much limited to men of another sort, who, whatever their merits, do not conspicuously enjoy the distinctions of experience and comparative freedom from bias unanimously demanded in the Report. It is tolerably certain that the members of the House of Commons would take the line of least resistance, and would do, when geographically grouped, what they are accustomed to do and think it right to do, when they tax and legislate, make and unmake Ministries, and so forth. They would look to the central offices of their Party organisations at least to provide them with a list of candidates; they would not turn a deaf ear to the recommendations of their Party whips or Party leaders; and, if they recalled that, in the words of the Report, 'the Second Chamber ought not to be so strongly entrenched as to dispose it to engage in frequent contests with the House of Commons, so as to embarrass the Executive and clog the wheels of legislation,' and took care to choose safe men who would be free from such temptations, who should say them nay? Naturally room will be found for Viceroy and Field Marshals, Ambassadors and Captains of Industry; but, when these jewels have been assembled, they will find their place in a setting which, with some fine gold, will probably include a good deal of alloy.

It is proposed, however, that in addition to 246 persons elected by Members of the House of Commons grouped in territorial areas, there should be a further body of 81 persons, elected by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses. The reasons given for this are curious.

'The large majority of the Second Chamber having been thus constituted upon a principle which was deemed such as would give a thoroughly popular character to the Chamber

as a whole, the Conference had next to consider the means by which the historical continuity of the reconstructed Second Chamber with the ancient House of Lords could be preserved.'

This is what the 81 are meant to do. They are to be chosen by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses, say five from each. 'Such a Committee might be trusted to see to it that due representation was given to every shade of political opinion.' Again the Conference was haunted by the spectre of party spirit. If the 81 were 'chosen by the whole body of Peers' (which appears to be a precious hint at the style of the members of the future Second Chamber), it seemed that, as in the House of Commons, 'the election would be likely to fall under the control of party motives and party managers.' It is much to the credit of the uprightness of the Conference, that it should have been so scrupulous to avoid so great an evil, but it is less to the credit of its intelligence to have adopted such a method. Here is a small Committee of Selection, five from each House, expected to make such a choice of 81 persons as will give due representation to every shade of political opinion. There is no casting vote; any five acting together can prevent the election of any particular person; any six acting together can ensure it. What an opportunity for compromise! What a field for traffic! If the members of this Committee pay much attention to anything but the voice of party, they must needs be scarcely human.

The Conference recommends that, in the first instance, the whole 81 should be chosen from the Peers who were such at the passing of the Act, but that the number to be so chosen should be gradually reduced, till, after three elections, they should only be 30, though Peers are to be eligible like other people for the remaining 51 places. Thus the Peerage would always have thirty members in a House of 327. Why? Here is the answer.

'The respect which it is desirable that the nation should feel for the Second Chamber will be all the greater, if it be regarded as an ancient institution remodelled in accordance with modern views and feelings rather than as a brand-new creation. . . . The Great Council of the Nation, from which the House of Lords directly descends . . . is the oldest and most venerable of all British institutions, reaching back

beyond the Norman Conquest and beyond King Alfred into the shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity.'

This is one reason ; the other is that

'among the existing peers there are many men of distinguished ability and long experience in legislation and administration, men whose services the country would desire to retain.'

This must be very gratifying to the House of Lords, but all one can say is that, if the Nation can regard such a Second Chamber as an ancient institution remodelled, and not as a brand-new creation, or can believe that members of it, selected by members of the House of Commons, will be chosen by the People but without taint of party spirit, the Nation can believe anything.

The Second Chamber, then, starts with a complement of 81 existing peers. This is 'in order to find room for those peers who had been taking an active share in public business' before the scheme becomes law. For this purpose half as many would have sufficed, but no doubt a politic and temporary liberality of this kind was thought likely to disarm opposition and smooth the passage of the scheme. After a few years 30 peers would be chosen, and, as peers, would presumably be compellable to serve by the Sovereign's writ of summons, so as to recall to an imaginative People the memory of the most venerable of all British institutions and to reach back (as well as they can) into the shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity. This seems to be a piece of exaggerated sentiment. Historical continuity is all very well, but this is not continuity ; it is antiquarianism. This contingent of Peers would resemble the herds of indigenous cattle, long preserved at Chillingham or Cadzow, at most seasons of the year shy and inoffensive, though curious visitors are warned not to approach them without precaution. What part they may be expected to play in enlightening and influencing the people through debate is another matter ; but if, with some assistance from the Spiritual Peers, they maintain a sufficient air of hoary antiquity they will, no doubt, have justified their existence.

It is in connexion with the scheme for resolving differences between the two Houses by means of a Free

Conference, that the practical significance of this plan for the composition of the Second Chamber is fully brought out, for, as observed above, the House of Commons will always get its way, if it chooses to stand firm, and will get it, too, no later than the following session, except in one unlikely event, namely that in a joint conference, not exceeding sixty in number, half chosen by the House of Commons itself from among its own members at the beginning of each Parliament, and the other half chosen by a body mainly of its own creation, a majority of three of the members present and voting cannot be got.

The procedure of this Free Conference is very remarkable. It is to debate in secret; the names of those voting are to be kept secret, unless the Conference itself otherwise orders; and even the numbers of those voting are to be secret too unless the Conference itself discloses them. In ordinary deliberations a man is so far supposed to propound his real opinion, that he is expected afterwards to make his action accord with it. Not so in this Free Conference. 'Its members ought to be at liberty to make suggestions for compromise, without prejudice to their own subsequent action in further sittings or when the matter comes before each House as a whole.' Could anything be more cynical? Except in bodies swayed by mere faction, the considered decision of a majority ought to represent what it thinks is right. Anything else is something which, in greater or less degree, it must deem wrong. The attitude of this Free Conference is quite otherwise. Decisions of two branches of the Legislature, which, though each seems right to its authors, are inconsistent decisions, are to be regarded by the Conference not as things decided and to be maintained because they are right, but as things indifferent, to be set aside in favour of something else, which, not being the same as either, must in the eyes of both Chambers be *pro tanto* wrong.

There may be another plan. One party may consent to what it thinks wrong on one point, in consideration of the other party doing the same on another. This is called Compromise. The thing is conducted in secret. It may be carried by the votes of persons whose names are never disclosed, every one of them so free to follow

his convenience or his orders, that on later occasions he will be free to vote the contrary, if his decision is to be given personally or in public. It is all very well to say that the Free Conference

'would address itself to the solution of the controversy by friendly methods, exploring the various points involved and seeking to find a way out of the difficulty either by compromise or by discovering some new plan, which might prove more acceptable to both Houses than that contained in the Bill passed by one House, or in the amendments passed by the other.'

When it is examined, it is seen to be a conclave for secret traffic. It can satisfy those alone who believe that in legislation one thing is pretty much as good as another, if only people can make up their minds to say so. It may be practical, although, if the 60 members sit at a Round Table, experience leads one to expect a negative result; but, as a plan, it hardly warrants the complacency with which its authors regard it.

As the numbers of those dissenting on the occasions, fairly numerous too, when the Conference was not unanimous, are only twice given, there is some danger of doing injustice to individuals by attributing to the Conference or to any part of it particular reasons or intentions beyond those which are expressly stated in the Report. Still it may reasonably be taken that, to some of the members at least, it was a matter of moment to enquire whether particular proposals and features would be likely to get through the House of Commons. It would be hardly censorious to suppose that on some points there was, perhaps unconsciously, a stronger desire to please the House of Commons than to select an ideal plan. At any rate the scheme adopted by the majority is carefully contrived to ensure that the Second Chamber shall be as light a fetter on the freedom of the First as it was possible to devise.

No one, however, can have thought much about the other question, namely, what would be likely to get through the House of Lords; for, except for the dubious case of the thirty peers perpetually standing with one foot in the present and the other in the shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity, there is nothing about the scheme

to appease the House of Lords, outside of the 81 peers 'who had been taking an active share in public business.' This is intelligible, if the 'agreement which was found to exist' upon the points mentioned in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, really was a unanimous agreement. If the fifteen peers who were members of the Conference fully accepted the 'Functions appropriate to a Second Chamber,' the 'Elements that ought to find a place in the Second Chamber,' and the 'Position which the Second Chamber ought to hold in our Constitutional System,' then the absence of any feature likely to conciliate the House of Lords, as it is, may be understood. The truth is that those Peers who accepted these paragraphs gave up the present House as hopeless and useless. Though in form a series of affirmative abstract propositions, these paragraphs were to them a General Confession. One can almost hear them murmur, 'There is no health in us.'

Still, any bill for the reformation of the House of Lords, any bill for the constitution of a Second Chamber as it ought to be, has to pass the House of Lords as it is; and it seems to have been overlooked that the House of Lords is still a co-ordinate branch of the Legislature. At present, by a majority of one of those present and voting, who might be several hundreds in number, a bill to enact this scheme could be killed. Of course there is the Parliament Act, though even under that instrument twice as great a delay can be imposed as this scheme contemplates; but the Conference's bill would hardly be a Parliament Act matter. It is not a cause to live and die for. Indeed one might surmise that a hardworked Ministry would thankfully drop any bill for the reform of the House of Lords which the Upper House rejects, and say that all pledges had now been redeemed and that, since the House of Lords preferred it, things could go on as before. The only practical points about the scheme, from the House of Lords point of view, are the provision for the inclusion of 81 peers in the Second Chamber first selected and that for including some Spiritual Peers among the 30 who are always to be members of subsequent chambers.

It is possible that parliamentary life under the Parliament Act may in the future be found more tolerable

than is generally expected. One is apt to forget that in years to come it will probably not be so very terrible after all. As it is, the House of Lords possesses real power if it chooses to use it. Over and over again during the last two years it could have forced a general election, or, if the Government of the day held strong views against the wisdom of an appeal to the People, it could have been brought to a compromise. Again and again this Parliament has passed bills for extending the statutory term of five years. If the House of Lords had thrown out one of those bills, the days of this Parliament were numbered. There was no time in which to bring the slow-moving machinery of the Parliament Act into play. Of course the country might have condemned such a step, but that is by no means certain. It would have been, to say the least of it, an arguable case, that a Parliament elected for five years, shortened in its life by two years in consideration of the great increase of its powers and elected without any mandate to prolong its own existence from time to time, ought to renew its authority from the People at the polls, all the more so because of the gravity of the times and the burden of its responsibilities. The House of Lords took no such step; probably hardly any one stopped to consider that it was constitutionally possible. It made no attempt to use the most potent implement it will ever have, or to seize the best opportunity that it will ever enjoy.

In any survey of the lines on which the present position of that House is to be altered, it ought to be remembered that the House has now shown itself to be free from faction, and that it still possesses great powers, which, till the People manifests its will to the contrary, it remains free to use. It ought also to be remembered that the Parliament Act, for all its terrors, is hardly a working weapon of war. As long as it stands, the prerogative to create voting brigades of obedient peers is laid up in lavender; and, while it stands, it can but rarely be put into use. A Ministry, which had to keep marching its supporters through the lobbies of the House of Commons session after session in order to get its bills, at long last, passed over the head of the House of Lords would find itself ridiculous.

It is easy to understand how a concurrence of two

opinions in the Conference led to its being taken for granted that the present state of things is past praying for. There is the opinion of the stout House of Commons men, who hold that the Upper House must always give way, and promptly too; and that, as the creature cannot set itself up against its creator, the result is best assured by letting the House of Commons appoint the members of the other House. There is, on the other hand, the aspiration of the eager House of Lords men, who think that the future of Peers lies in the House of Commons, and desire to be free from the pedantries which exclude them from it. To both it may well seem desirable that an Act should pass, beginning 'From and after the appointed day the assent of the Peers in Parliament assembled shall not be necessary to the enactment of any statute, but, in lieu thereof, it shall suffice if the assent be given of the Second Chamber hereby constituted and in manner hereinafter provided.' There are, however, other opinions to be considered. It is a pity that there was not a fuller representation on the Conference of persons willing to urge the view that something may still be done with the House of Lords; and that there are other ways of remodelling our ancient institutions in accordance with modern views than by making a revolution and calling it a reform.

'All political parties were represented in the Conference.' It is only one of the difficulties, which surround the whole system of these Conferences, that, whatever pains are taken to appoint representative men, true representation is hardly attainable. Conferences of this kind really have no place in our constitution, and, if resorted to as ordinary incidents of political life, would soon undermine the authority of the House of Commons and the responsibility of Ministers themselves. The questions which are referred to Conferences are precisely those whose complexity and magnitude are so great, that their examination under ordinary Parliamentary forms would occupy a large part of the time and energy available for the whole of one or, it may be, more than one Session. It is the natural desire of the members of a Conference to arrive at some agreed scheme, if possible, and at least to go hand-in-hand as far as they can. The result is apt to be an avowed

compromise, or to present a greater appearance of unanimity than really exists.

Yet the price of challenging it may be the loss of every prospect of other legislation for a couple of years to come. Thus there is a concurrent desire to accept the scheme rather than try to make a new one. Everybody admits that the conclusions of a Conference do not bind either House of Parliament; but they are pressed upon Parliament on all hands as something already agreed between all parties, admitting of little modification without almost a breach of faith, as the material of a bill which it will save a world of trouble to pass, and about which discussion will make nobody any the wiser. If the House of Commons were to let itself accept this view, it would sink to the position of a mere registering machine. It would admit that it leaves the heavy work to be done out of doors, and reserves its interest and its time for more piquant or more personal contests. Its authority would be steadily impaired. If, on the other hand, it asserts its rights, insists on full discussion and proceeds to remodel the scheme, it must do so for itself, ill fitted as it is for the origination of complicated measures. It cannot hold Ministers to the ordinary obligations of leadership in such a case. The object of a Conference is to relieve the Administration of responsibility. Ministers' attitude is 'This is not our scheme; we created a body composed of men of all parties, and it is that body which evolved this scheme; we cannot take on ourselves to produce another. Alter it, if you will, but remember, we are not responsible. We do not stand or fall by it, nor can we give it much time. We may have to drop the subject and pass to other things.' No doubt Ministers do not say so, but this is what the Conference system really means.

If Ministers are to be fully responsible to the House of Commons for projects of legislation, and if the House of Commons is to retain its full authority as representative of the People, Ministers themselves must frame these projects and make them their own, and must submit them to the full original judgment of Parliament. The humbler the position of the Second Chamber, the more important is this consideration in the interest of the House of Commons itself. Parliament

cannot afford to leave its own work to others. Devolution is intelligible; delegation is not. It is of course the right of Ministers to seek what expert assistance they will, but for that purpose these composite bodies, in which 'all political parties are represented,' are inappropriate. If they do not agree, Ministers are no wiser than before; if they do, their agreement tends to take the responsibility away from those who ought to propose, and those who have to decide upon, a bill. The party system and the party machine are framed for the purpose of giving to Ministers that power which their responsibility involves, so that they may ensure the passage of the measures for which they are responsible, or fall if they fail. Such machinery is inappropriate to ensuring the passage of measures which are not the product of the mind of those whom the majority of the House support, but are the composition of selected persons who bear no real relation to that majority at all.

It is only fair, in criticising the report of the Second Chamber Conference, to bear in mind how much its scheme must suffer from the defects inherent in Conferences in general. It is an ingenious effort, and discussion of it at any rate serves to throw light on a difficult subject, but satisfactory it cannot be called. For one thing, however, the public has cause to be grateful. 'We had to remember that a plan, which philosophers might approve, would not necessarily find like favour with the bodies by whose will it would have to pass into law.' Let us at least thank the members of the Conference for trying to be practical men and for resisting the temptation to be philosophers.

SUMNER.

Art. 11.—A GREAT NATURALIST: SIR JOSEPH HOOKER.

The Life and Letters of Sir Joseph Dalton Hooker, O.M., G.C.S.I.; based on material collected and arranged by Lady Hooker. By Leonard Huxley. Two vols. Murray, 1918.

It often happens in the progress of human thought that periods of special importance are marked, not, as rarely occurs, by the emergence of a solitary genius, but by the appearance of a group of gifted men of like habit of mind and enthusiasm for a given branch of study. Their coincidence in mental activity has been due sometimes to family connexion and local association, sometimes to the system of universities in which a professor of genius is succeeded by his pupil and he again by his, so that a 'school' originates which may spread its members and its teaching far and wide.

In the middle of the 19th century a group of naturalists appeared in this country, who were destined to bring about a momentous change in human thought, by placing on a firm basis the doctrine of 'organic evolution'—a doctrine which includes the gradual and 'natural' development of living things from non-living matter, and further the gradual and 'natural' development of man from an animal ancestry. The group we have in view has Charles Lyell (born in 1797) as its starting-point. Devoted from his earliest years to the study of natural history—his father being an accomplished botanist—Charles Lyell, when an undergraduate at Exeter College, Oxford, was attracted to geological study by the lectures of Dr Buckland. He was called to the bar, but fortunately his inherited property enabled him to abandon that profession when he was thirty years old, and to give all his energy to his favourite science.

In 1830–32 Lyell published his memorable work entitled 'The Principles of Geology: an Attempt to explain the former Changes of the Earth's Surface by Reference to Causes now in Operation.' That book and personal friendship with its author had a commanding influence upon two younger men, Charles Robert Darwin and Joseph Dalton Hooker, the former twelve years and the

latter twenty years Lyell's junior. Darwin, who had studied geology with Sedgwick of Cambridge, was away on the voyage of the 'Beagle' from 1831 to 1836, when Lyell's great book was published, but came immediately under its influence on his return, and in 1838 was closely associated, as secretary of the Geological Society, with Lyell, for whom he conceived a profound admiration and life-long regard. Hooker left England in 1839, being then twenty-two years old, to accompany Captain (afterwards Sir) James Clark Ross, the experienced Arctic navigator, on the expedition of the 'Erebus' and 'Terror' to the southern hemisphere and Antarctic polar regions. The main purpose of this expedition was to make observations on terrestrial magnetism and to determine the position of the southern magnetic pole. But Ross was an ardent naturalist and anxious to observe and collect both plants and marine animals, and accordingly managed to take young Hooker as surgeon (he was M.D. of Glasgow) to the 'Erebus' and botanist to the expedition. Ross not only gave his young surgeon every facility to collect plants in the various lands visited, but also employed him to work the towing net and make drawings of marine invertebrates when at sea. Some sixty years later a large portfolio of these beautiful and interesting drawings, which had never been published, were placed in the hands of the present writer by their venerable author, to ascertain whether, after so long an interval, they might have scientific value.

Young Hooker had Charles Darwin's example before him, and the recently published 'Journal of a Naturalist on H.M.S. Beagle' in his cabin, when he sailed on the 'Erebus,' but did not make Darwin's acquaintance until 1847, four years after his return from the Antarctic. Hooker's association with Lyell was earlier, for the Lyells of Kinnordy were intimate friends of his father; and it was from Sir Charles Lyell's father that he received the newly-issued copy of Darwin's 'Journal,' just in time to take it with him to the Antarctic. With Charles Lyell's great book he had early familiarity, and he had also read Robert Chambers's 'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,' which appeared in 1832. Though not a very convincing work, it turned his thoughts, with very definite results, to the question of

the mutability of species—already raised by the essential nature of Lyell's geological doctrine and widely discussed at that time in consequence of the writings of Lamarck and St Hilaire.

To this group of three—Lyell, Darwin and Hooker—who were richly stored with knowledge of living things by their explorations in many parts of the globe, there was now added a fourth, T. H. Huxley. He made Hooker's acquaintance first at the British Association meeting at Ipswich in 1851, having recently returned from the voyage of the surveying ship 'Rattlesnake,' to which he had been appointed surgeon with a view to the opportunities thus provided of making studies in marine zoology. Old Sir John Richardson, the Arctic explorer, a first-rate naturalist and head of Haslar hospital, whither in those days young naval surgeons were sent on probation, had detected Huxley's abilities and secured for him the post on the 'Rattlesnake' in 1847, just as eight years earlier he had used his influence to secure for Hooker a similar position on the 'Erebus.'

These four men, Lyell, Darwin, Hooker and Huxley, were the actual 'begetters' and the chief propagators, both in the more restricted world of science and among the larger public, of the vivifying doctrine of organic evolution. The close personal ties which linked the first three were strengthened by the marriage of Joseph Hooker in August 1851 to Frances Henslow, eldest daughter of the Cambridge Professor of Botany, the man who turned Charles Darwin to a scientific career. Huxley came to them—to use Hooker's own simile—'as steel to a magnet,' and was soon admitted to the closest intimacy, giving them and receiving from them, the warmest affection. A tie of fellowship between Hooker, Darwin and Huxley was that they were all three 'old salts' and had the training and 'the knowledge of men' given by service in the Royal Navy. Huxley also met and sealed a close alliance with John Tyndall at the Ipswich gathering of the British Association in 1851, and so brought that physical philosopher into close and permanent relationship with the Darwinian 'nucleus.' He too brought Herbert Spencer into constant relation with the group; whilst young John Lubbock (afterwards Lord Avebury), who was a neighbour of Darwin's, now

settled at Down in Kent, became both by his scientific work in zoology, botany and geology and by his personal charm, a welcome associate.

In 1864 Hooker, George Busk (surgeon and naturalist), Spencer and Tyndall, who had been close friends of Huxley's ever since his return from the voyage of the 'Rattlesnake,' together with Frankland the chemist, Hirst the mathematician, old colleagues and allies of Tyndall, and Sir John Lubbock and Spottiswoode, friends of them all, founded the 'X club,' which met once a month for dinner, its purpose being, as Mr Leonard Huxley tells us,

'to afford a definite meeting-point for a few friends who were in danger of drifting apart in the flood of busy lives. But it was in itself a representative group of scientific men destined to play a large part in the history of science. Five of them [there were nine in all] received the Royal Medal of the Royal Society, three the Copley Medal, the highest scientific award; one the Rumford; six were Presidents of the British Association, three were Associates of the Institute of France; and from amongst them the Royal Society chose a Secretary, a Foreign Secretary, a Treasurer and three successive Presidents. . . . They included representatives of half-a-dozen branches of science—mathematics, physics, philosophy, chemistry, botany and biology; and all were animated by similar ideas of the high function of science and of the great Society which should be the chief representative of science in this country.'

Not unnaturally the club exercised, during its twenty-eight years of existence (it expired in 1892, owing to the dispersal of its original members and the decision not to elect new ones), a great influence on the progress of scientific organisation, an influence which assuredly was not sectarian nor exercised for party purposes. While the club, though bound up with the Darwinian movement, did not comprise the originators of that new doctrine, Lyell and Darwin himself—on account of their health and absorption in special pursuits at a distance from the town—it also, for a similar reason, did not include Alfred Russel Wallace, who had lately returned to England from his long sojourn in the tropics. His name can never be forgotten as that of one who, independently of Darwin's and while exploring in the tropics, conceived and stated the identical theory of the origin of species

by the natural selection of favoured varieties in 'the struggle for existence,' which had been more fully worked out, though held back from publication, by the elder naturalist. Wallace, as all the world knows, gladly gave all credit in the matter to Darwin, and contributed by his original observations and arguments, and by the lucid exposition given in a series of invaluable books for a period of more than forty years, to the establishment of Darwin's doctrine of organic evolution. Wallace held himself very much aloof from the London whirlpool, finding happiness and full occupation for his long life in scientific work.

It is perhaps a coincidence, but in any case a very fortunate fact, that we have a series of remarkable volumes giving in an unusually complete form the 'Life and Letters' of Lyell, of Darwin and of Huxley. Happily they wrote many letters, fortunately preserved for publication, in which their scientific work and the development of their views, as well as delightful revelations of character, of their tastes, their likes and dislikes, and of their heroic struggles and daily occupations, are recorded. These volumes can perhaps hardly be called 'biographies'; they are the materials for considered well-balanced biography. They have been gathered by loving hands and connected by a thread of narrative and explanatory notes. Now we have a similar 'Life and Letters' of Hooker, the material for which has been arranged by his widow, and presented in due order by Mr Leonard Huxley, who had already done for his father's memory what he has here, with skill and experience, done for that of his father's closest friend. The letters here given, taken with those of Darwin and Huxley and Lyell, interweave with and complete one another, giving a remarkably close picture of the growth of a great scientific theory.

We have indicated in bald outline the place which Hooker occupied in the little group of naturalists who established, in the later half of the 19th century, the doctrine of organic evolution. Since we are here concerned with the story of his life and work, it is now time to state more specifically what was his actual contribution to the science of his time; and then to point

out, as these volumes of his 'Life and Letters' enable us to do, to what native gifts of mind and character, on the one hand, and to what fortunate circumstances of training and association on the other, this contribution was due. Those are the enquiries which must always be of foremost interest when we are in possession of the detailed story of a great man's life.

Hooker was before and beyond everything else a great botanist, the greatest 'knower' of plants of his day, whether we estimate the immense number and variety of plants which he knew, or the thoroughness of that knowledge, or the vast area—that of the whole earth's surface—the vegetable population of which became familiar to him, either in the dried collections of travelers or (to an extent never achieved by any earlier or cotemporary botanist) in their living condition. The latter result was attained in two distinct ways: firstly by his prolonged and often perilous journeys to the southern hemisphere, to India and the Himalayan region, to Palestine and the Lebanon, to the Atlas mountains and to North America; and secondly by his control of the most extensive and admirably organised botanic garden in the world, where living plants were almost daily received or were raised from seed sent from every part of the earth's surface.

Probably the greatest permanent benefit conferred on mankind by Hooker—his greatest contribution to science—was his organisation, as a great and permanent State-institution, of the gardens, plantations, glass-houses, museums, laboratories and the incomparable herbarium, at Kew, together with its highly trained staff of all grades, its splendid and continuous series of publications, its world-wide correspondence and close relations with botanical institutions in the colonies and India, so as to form a vast living mechanism, working under his incessant care for the increase of botanical science. The indifference, the opposition, the sheer brutality, by which his efforts were too frequently opposed, and the ultimate triumph by which his tenacity of purpose, his honesty and unworldliness of character, were rewarded, can be realised and appreciated by the reader of this book. So also can one learn with pleasure of the fine men, both among his scientific colleagues and

the few intelligent officials with whom he had to deal, who sympathised with and helped him.

Here we may read the full story of the ignorant insolence of one Ayrton—an obscure politician who became a minister of the Crown, and proposed to make Kew into a mere pleasure-garden and to give his orders to Hooker as to a head-gardener, but was, by a timely rally of wiser statesmen and lovers of science, brought to heel like a whipped dog. Here too we read of the mean financial tricks of the East India Company, the delays of the Admiralty, the stupid parsimony of the Treasury relieved by the generosity and friendship of Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India, the goodwill of fine old Admirals and the enthusiasm of many high-placed officials (such as Bertram Mitford, Lord Redesdale) and well-trying friends who valued pure science and were spell-bound by Hooker's abilities, persistence, freedom from all desire for personal profit, and simple-minded devotion to one noble end—the building up of what were for him two inseparables, Kew and Botanical Science.

Hooker's more direct contributions to scientific botany are parallel in importance to the creation of the great institution (founded by his father and completed by the loyal help of his son-in-law and successor), wherein he worked out during many years the enormous collections of plants brought thither by himself, and amplified by official and private collections. His first scientific paper, on some new mosses, was written and published in 1837, when he was only twenty years of age; his last in 1911, on some Indian species of the Balsams (genus: *Impatiens*)—a large and difficult group to which he gave minute study, dissecting them under the microscope and drawing them with all the skill and assiduity of his youth, until within a few days of his death in his ninety-fifth year. The mere titles of the papers and volumes which Hooker produced in those seventy-four years of work occupy twenty pages in the 'Life.' No mere enumeration of their number can give an idea of their bulk, of the number of drawings and often coloured pictures which illustrate them, of the tireless industry which produced them, or of their scientific weight and purpose.

For the convenience of ready publication, he carried

on throughout his life (with the assistance in later years of other botanists, his chosen colleagues) 'Hooker's *Icones Plantarum*,' founded by his father in 1837, and the 'Botanical Magazine,' founded by William Curtis in 1787, which has appeared regularly every month during one hundred and thirty years! It was edited for forty years by Sir William Hooker, on whose death in 1865 Sir Joseph became editor and chief contributor, handing it over in 1904 to his successor as director of Kew, Sir William Thiselton Dyer. For seventy-eight years the two Fitches, uncle and nephew, were the only artists—without rivals for the perfection of their work—employed on the production of the hundreds of plates picturing new or rare plants published in the 'Botanical Magazine.' But Hooker's greatest works were published as separate volumes, usually by the aid of grants from Government departments. Such were the 'Flora Antarctica' (1844-47), 2 vols, with 198 plates; the 'Flora Novæ Zelandiæ' (1853-55), with 130 plates; the 'Flora Tasmaniae,' with 200 plates; and the 'Flora of British India' (by J. D. H. assisted by various botanists), 1872-1897, 7 vols. A great number of important papers of smaller bulk, but always of special significance, were published by him in the Transactions of the Linnæan Society, in the journal of the Geographical Society and other journals, and as contributions to the works of other authorities, British and Foreign.

Hooker did a vast amount of work with his own hands, his own pencil and pen. The mechanical work of sorting the 'hay-stacks'—as collections of dried plants are irreverently called—the selection of specimens for description and incorporation in the herbarium and of duplicates for distribution to other botanical institutions and individuals (a proceeding by which exchanges were obtained and the completeness of the Kew herbarium assured), was always a delight to him; the mechanical labour and the mere 'handling' of plants being, as he tells us, a relief from closer work and yet conducive to thought and reflection bearing on his one great purpose. Of course he had an efficient staff and distinguished botanists as volunteer assistants, attracted by the unique conveniences for study afforded by the great herbarium, the library and the working-rooms, for which by degrees,

following out and developing the cherished scheme of his father, he succeeded in getting the reluctant officials of the Treasury and the Board of Works to disburse the necessary funds.

The great interest for Hooker in all this accumulation of knowledge touching the flora of every part of the world, over and above the mere record of new plants and their 'habitat,' was the discovery of the causes which have led to the present geographical distribution of plants. The problem continually presented itself to him in his travels. Take for instance the following passage in a letter written to his father from the Thibet frontier in 1848—

'To-day I went up the flanks of Donkiah to 19,300 feet. . . . The mountains, especially Kinchin-jhow, are beyond all description beautiful; from whichever side you view this latter mountain, it is a castle of pure blue glacier ice, 4000 (*sic*) feet high and 6 or 8 miles long. I do wish I were not the only person who has ever seen it or dwelt among its wonders. . . . I was greatly pleased with finding my most Antarctic plant, *Lecanora miniata*, at the top of the Pass; and to-day I saw stony hills at 19,000 feet stained wholly orange-red with it, exactly as the rocks of Cockburn Island were in 64° South. Is not this most curious and interesting? To find the identical plant forming the only vegetation at the two extreme limits of vegetable life is always interesting; but to find it absolutely in both instances painting a landscape so as to render its colour conspicuous in each case five miles off, is wonderful.'

How does it come about that this plant flourishes in two such widely remote regions? How can we account for hundreds of other instances of the presence of identical plants in isolated localities thousands of miles apart, and for the absence of others in regions contiguous with one in which they abound?

The great botanists preceding Hooker had believed in the 'special creation' of this endless variety of species and widely differing grades and elaboration of vegetable life, as an ultimate fact. Buffon, at the end of the 18th century, had pointed out the connexion of climate with the distribution of plants, and argued that vegetation must have commenced where the cooling globe was first cold enough to support it, i.e. at a pole. He

remarks that 'the same temperature might have been expected, all other circumstances being equal, to produce the same beings in different parts of the globe both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms.' To him also we owe the recognition of the limitation of groups of species to regions separated from one another by 'natural barriers.' Tournefort had, still earlier, pointed out the likeness between the vegetation of successive elevations, implying successive reduction of temperature, and that of successive degrees of latitude carrying the same successive change of climatic condition. Humboldt (whom Hooker met in Paris in 1845) showed that many great Natural Orders of plants (Gramineæ, Leguminosæ, Compositæ, etc.) are subject to certain laws of increase or decrease relatively to other plants in going polewards (in both hemispheres) and skywards. The construction of the 'isothermals' of the globe, which we owe to Humboldt, was a great instrument towards the advancement of Geographical Botany. Hooker regarded him (as he says in a letter to Darwin in 1881) as the greatest of scientific travellers; and in 1895 he writes of him (vol. i, p. 185), 'He was never tired of coming to ask me questions about my voyage [the Antarctic expedition with Ross]; he certainly is still a most wonderful man, with a sagacity and memory and capability for generalising that are quite marvellous.'

Lyell had shown that distribution is not a thing of the present only or of the present condition of climates and present outline and contours of lands. He also showed that our continents and oceans had experienced great changes of surface and climate since the introduction of the existing assemblages of plants and animals; that there had been a glacial period, and long before that a warm Arctic period, as proved by the abundant fossils (brought back by Arctic travellers) of plants belonging to a warm temperate zone. But these relations of flora and climate were looked upon as the outcome of direct adaptation by sudden and inexplicable acts of creation. It was Hooker's special merit and privilege to be the first to introduce into the attempt to explain the facts of the geographical distribution of plants, the conceptions already current in the scientific world of (a) the *mutability* and derivative origin of

species and (b) the *migration* of floras. This he did independently, by his own 'self-thought,' as Darwin termed it. His views are apparent in his earlier publications but are most fully set forth in his 'Introductory Essay to the Flora Tasmaniae,' dealing with the Antarctic flora as a whole.

His study of Darwin's plants from the Galapagos Islands and their relation to those of other tropical islands and of the South-American continent brought him into close relation with Darwin, whom he visited in 1847. This was the beginning of their memorable intimacy and continuous exchange of letters (contained in these volumes and the similar 'Life and Letters' of Darwin). These letters were really conversations as to endless botanical details—enquiries made and answered, criticisms and arguments submitted by one to the other. They form a record of surpassing interest to all future generations of biologists. Hooker's stores of knowledge of fact in every department of botanical science were of essential service to Darwin, while Darwin's marvellous fecundity in original suggestions as to the explanation and the significance of facts and his remorseless criticism of those suggestions by appeal to other facts and to experiment, were a perennial stimulus to Hooker, who was himself a theorist, a generaliser—what is sometimes called 'a philosopher'—of large outlook. Lyell wrote in 1859 to Hooker of the 'Introductory Essay to the Flora Tasmaniae': 'I have just finished the reading of your splendid Essay on the Origin of Species, as illustrated by your wide botanical experience, and think it goes far to raise the variety-making hypothesis to the rank of a theory, as accounting for the manner in which new species enter the world.' And Darwin wrote, 'I have finished your Essay. To my judgment it is by far the grandest and most interesting essay on subjects of the nature discussed I have ever read.'

Hooker was the earliest prominent naturalist to declare his adhesion to the theory of the Origin of Species by Natural Selection set forth by Darwin in his historic volume of 1859, but his complete adhesion to it was only arrived at by long and minute discussion with Darwin of his data, his arguments and inferences, extending over some years both before and after 1859,

in which the two naturalists were in constant communication. It must be borne in mind that Darwin's theory of the survival of favoured varieties by natural selection was something additional to the hypothesis of the derivative origin of species which Hooker had supported. Darwin's theory gave an *explanation* of that derivation, and showed it to be the necessary result of existing natural causes.

Hooker continued during the next twenty-two years to take a leading part in the development of an understanding of the geographical distribution of organisms on the earth's surface in the light of Darwin's great doctrine of Natural Selection. He was at times much perplexed by the attempt to demarcate natural phyto-geographical provinces and sub-provinces, as distinct from merely topographical areas; and finally he seems to have come to the same conclusion as that which he reached in the classification of the vegetable kingdom adopted by him in the monumental work which he produced in collaboration with Bentham, the 'Genera Plantarum' (3 vols, octavo, 1862-83). This conclusion was that, while we are still seeking a closer knowledge of the phyletic connexions of the floras and faunas of the world, it is, in view of *practical* purposes (that is to say, for facilitating the accumulation and orderly arrangement of our knowledge), better to adopt a frankly arbitrary series of groups and provinces agreed upon and accepted because they are traditional and serviceable for purposes of reference, than to assume prematurely that we are in a position to define the limits and connexions of all natural phyto-geographical provinces and of all phyletic groups. To do this we have not yet (he thought) sufficient knowledge, though we already see clearly much of the outlines and the needful lines of enquiry.

The means and the causes of the migration of plants were matters of extreme importance in the great problem of distribution and the closely connected problem of the changes of land and water on the earth's surface. These were the subject of speculation and enquiry by both Darwin and Hooker. Hooker had at first put forward the hypothesis of a lost circumpolar continent in order to account for the facts of plant distribution in the southern hemisphere. But Darwin favoured the view

of the persistence even from Silurian times of the great continental masses at present existing, and the radiation from the northern temperate and sub-arctic region of successive floras by spreading along the cold mountain chains which extend through the tongue-like southward projections of continental land—to-day traceable as South America, Africa, and Indo-Malaya. Transport of seeds, etc., by ocean currents, by wind and by birds and other such agencies was shown experimentally by Darwin to be possible in many cases, but the emergence and submergence of large tracts of land as bridges or connexions across the deep ocean-beds were rejected by him. Hooker writes to Darwin in 1881—

‘Were you not the first to insist on this [the permanence since the Silurian period of the present continents and oceans], or at least to point this out? Do you not think that Wallace’s summing-up of the proof of it is good? I know I once disputed the doctrine or rather could not take it in; but let that pass’ (vol. ii, p. 224).

He goes on to say, in reference to the address which he was preparing for the British Association meeting at York, in which after many years’ labour he expressed his final conclusions on Geographical Distribution,

‘I must wind up with the doctrine of general distribution being primarily from north to south with no similar general flow from south to north—thus supporting the doctrine which has its last expression in Dyer’s essay read before the Geograph. Society and referred to in my last R.S. address (1879).’

The conclusions at present held on this great subject, which so long occupied Hooker’s attention as well as that of his friends Darwin and Wallace, are fully and admirably stated by Hooker’s son-in-law and successor at Kew in his article on the Distribution of Plants in the last edition of the ‘*Encyclopedia Britannica*’—an essay which permanently associates the name of Sir William Thiselton Dyer with those of Hooker and Darwin as a great master in this many-sided field of scientific speculation.

While Hooker never ceased to carry on by his own individual work and that of his staff the preparation

and publication of systematic 'Floras' of all parts of the British Empire, with a view to a full understanding of the origin of species and their geographical distribution (perhaps we should reverse the order of those terms), his botanical work was by no means limited to this. The 'Life' gives a full picture of his activities, which we may briefly summarise by mentioning some of his publications, while his letters, there reproduced, to his father, to Lyell, Darwin, Harvey (of Dublin), Bentham, Bryan Hodgson, Asa Gray, Huxley, Paget, and a host of other friends and fellow-workers, reveal the methods of his scientific work as well as his aims and struggles, the steps of his official and public career and his family life. From them too we can gather his views not only on scientific problems but on art, literature, politics, education and religion.

From the long list of his works (other than those already cited) we select first that on 'The Rhododendrons of Sikkim-Himalaya' (1849-51), edited by his father from material sent home by him while he was away collecting, drawing and mapping in the Himalayas. It is a sample of the beauty of form and colour which entrances the true naturalist however austere may be his devotion (as was Hooker's) to pure science. He writes, 'It is a far grander and better book than even I expected. . . . All the Indian world is in love with my Rhododendron book.' Then we have his 'Himalayan Journals; or notes of a naturalist in Bengal, the Sikkim and Nepal Himalayas, the Khasia Mountains, etc.' (1854, re-issued 1905), a book like Darwin's 'Voyage of the Beagle' and Wallace's 'Malay Archipelago' for all to read and enjoy; his 'Students' Flora of the British Islands' (1870), which has run through three editions; and his 'Primer of Botany' (1876), which has been reprinted twenty times in three editions—'the rashest and most profitable of all my undertakings,' as he called it in a letter to Asa Gray. His paper 'On the Diatomaceous Vegetation of the Antarctic Ocean' (Brit. Assoc. Reports, 1847) was the forerunner of that study of oceanic deposits which many years later became (especially in connexion with the voyage of the 'Challenger') a great and important branch of research. Similarly his papers on *Stigmaria* and *Lepidostrophi* in the memoirs of the Geological Survey,

1848, were the starting-point of the study of the tissues of ancient fossil plants by means of the microscope. He was the first to have sections of fossils cut sufficiently transparent for that purpose, a method which in the hands of a later generation has yielded very important results.

In the domain of Physiology, besides some other contributions, there stands out his remarkable work on the attraction, capture and digestion of insects by the Pitcher Plants (Brit. Assoc. Reports, Belfast, 1874, and 'Nature,' 1870). The work was suggested by Darwin when investigating the carnivorous habits of the Sundew (*Drosera*). Experiments as to the digestive ferment and microscopical investigation of the glands, etc., were made by Hooker, aided by Dyer, at Kew. In the special study and exploration of remarkable morphological characters, Hooker's investigation of the root parasites known as *Balanophoræ*—curiously simple in structure, without leaves or petals—formerly thought to be allied to the Fungi but shown by Hooker to be degenerate mistletoes, is a sample of his morphological work (On the structure and affinities of the *Balanophoræ*, Linnæan Society Transactions, 1856). He made acquaintance with these strange plants both in New Zealand and in the Himalayas.

But the most striking thing which he did in this way was his description of the morphology, development and histology and the determination of the affinities of a weird-looking South-African plant discovered by Dr Welwitsch in dry country inland from Walfisch Bay, and sent by him to Kew. Hooker named it after its discoverer; and specimens of it (since received through other travellers) have been kept in cultivation ever since in one of the hot-houses at Kew ('On *Welwitschia*, a new genus of *Gnetaceæ*,' Trans. Linn. Soc., 1863). Hooker's triumph in this investigation was that of showing, by microscopic examination of the tissues and of the reproductive structures and their development, that this strange-looking plant is one of the *Gnetaceæ*, a family including the little European *Ephedra* and grouped with the Cycads, the Gingko trees and the Conifers in the great assemblage called *Gymnosperms*. In the 'Life and Letters' we have a delightful picture (which will stir the sympathy of every morphologist) of his excitement,

his hard work with the microscope, his reasoning, his results, and the reaction that followed. He writes, Jan. 20, 1862, to Huxley—

‘This blessed Angola plant has proved even more wonderful than I expected—*figurez vous* a Dicotyledonous embryo, expanding like a dream into a huge broad woody brown disc, eight years old and of texture and surface like an overdone loaf, 5 feet *diam.* by $1\frac{1}{2}$ high above the ground, and never growing higher, and whose two *cotyledons* become the two and only two leaves the plant ever has, and these each a good fathom long. From the edges of this disc above the two leaves, rise branched annual pannicles, bearing cones something like Pine cones, which contain either all female flowers, or all hermaphrodite flowers; the hermaphrodite flowers consist of one *naked* ovule absolutely the same as of *Ephedra*, in the organic axis of the flower, surrounded by six stamens and a four-leaved perigone. The female flower is quite different!

‘Lastly, fancy my joy at discovering the key to the development of this hypertrophical embryo taking to become a plant after the fashion it does; and at my being able to show that . . . it is undoubtedly a member of the family Gnetaceæ amongst Gymnosperms, as the structure of the ovule and development of the seed and embryo clearly show. It is out of all question the most wonderful plant ever brought to this country—and the very ugliest. It re-opens the whole question of Gymnosperms as a class, and will (in the eyes of most) raise these, as I always said they would be raised, to equivalence in these respects with Angiosperms.’

At this moment he was fortunate enough to receive five splendid specimens from a Mr Monteiro of Loanda, who ‘like a trump’ sent down the coast at his request to get them. Much help, he says, was given by one of his staff, Prof. Oliver, who had been examining the tissues where he had left off, making ‘some charming drawings that will save me a world of trouble.’ The completed monograph was read at the Linnæan Society in December 1862 and published in the ‘Transactions.’ The reaction after a heavy and exciting piece of work set in, as so many ardent investigators know it has a way of doing. When it was finished he wrote to Darwin:

‘My wife went to Cambridge and enjoyed it; I stayed at home (and enjoyed it), working away at ‘*Welwitschia*’ every day and almost every night. I entirely agree with you, by

the way, that after long working at a subject, and after making something of it, one invariably finds that it all seems dull, flat, stale and unprofitable. This feeling, however, you will observe only comes (most mercifully) after you *really* have made out something worth knowing. I feel as if everybody must know more of Welwitschia than I do, and yet I cannot but believe I have, ill or well, expounded and faithfully recorded a heap of the most curious facts regarding a single plant that have been brought to light for many years. The whole thing is, however, a dry record of singular structures, and sinks down to the level of the dullest descriptive account of dead matter beside your jolly dancing facts anent orchid-life and bee-life. I have looked at an orchid or two since reading the Orchid book, and feel that I could never have made out one of your points, even had I limitless leisure, zeal and material. I am a dull dog, a very dull dog. I may content myself with the *per contra* reflection that you could not (be dull enough to) write a "Genera Plantarum" which is just what I am best fitted for. I feel that I have a call that way and you the other.'

A splendid and illuminating revelation of a generous and too modest character.

As a concluding item in our necessarily incomplete but representative selection from the long list of Hooker's varied work in and for science, we must cite his action when President of the Royal Society in 1878 in raising a fund of 10,000*l.* (chiefly by subscription from wealthy friends of his own among the Fellows of the Society), by which new Fellows were relieved of the large entrance fee and all were in future to pay a reduced annual subscription of only 3*l.* This admirable measure, entirely due to Hooker's initiative, had the result that, as Mr Leonard Huxley writes, 'no man henceforth need be kept outside the Society on the score of money.' Of the many services in Economic Botany, which under his direction Kew rendered and continues to render to distant parts of the Empire, we have no space to say more than that they comprise the introduction from South America to India of the Quinine plant, and of the Rubber tree (*Hevea*), and the scientific supervision of the cultivation in the West Indies of the neglected sources of wealth—the Sugar cane, Tobacco, and Jamaica oranges.

When we examine, as the 'Life and Letters' and our

own observation of him enable us to do, the personal qualities which carried Hooker through his exceptionally long life with such splendid success, such unfailing spirit and contentment, and such lasting benefit to humanity (he was, we learn, selected by the Japanese, soon after his death, as 'one of the twenty-nine Heroes of the World that Modern Time has produced'), we find that the emergence of those qualities was not due to heredity alone but largely to the training which they received from a gifted and affectionate father, for whom he had profound sympathy and filial devotion. Hooker was born with a vigorous constitution and great physical endurance. He had an inborn tenacity of purpose and single-minded attitude to life, and was as remarkable for his frank honesty as for his courage. He inherited from his father and his maternal grandfather (both botanists) his aptitude for botanical science, but it was the teaching and example of his father which, from his earliest years, trained and developed that aptitude. He modestly, but with characteristic insight, said of himself when at the age of seventy he received the Copley Medal of the Royal Society, that he had no genius, no exceptional powers or exceptional talent, but that he possessed that inward motive power—some heat, some fervour which compels us to exercise our faculties and to ripen the fruits of our labours—which he would call 'the wish to do well,' expressed in the modest motto chosen for himself four hundred years ago by Prince Henry the Navigator, 'Talent de bien faire.'

His constant association, from boyhood onwards, with his father in the garden and herbarium created by the latter in Glasgow after his appointment as professor, made botany a part of his very existence. At the same time the aptitude for it must have been born in him. It was not inherited by his elder brother William, who, having the same opportunities, showed no liking for the subject, and, though more vivacious than his younger brother, displayed no scientific bent. From this point of view it is interesting to note that not one of Joseph Hooker's six sons has been attracted by botany or by scientific research. Sir William Hooker, a man of distinction in science and of influence in the official world, was able to communicate to his son his own tastes and

ambitions, and to secure for him that early official employment which started him on his career as an investigator and established him for life in the great centre of botanical science created by Sir William.

The intimate association of father and son, and the complete devotion of the younger man to the development of the elder's cherished projects, find a parallel in the life-work of Alexander Agassiz, who realised, on a magnificent scale, the plans for a great museum and institution of zoological research at Cambridge, Mass., designed by his father Louis Agassiz, and only in part carried into execution. Alexander Agassiz, as a young man, deliberately set to work as a mining engineer in order to procure that pecuniary independence which he decided to be necessary in the United States for one who wished to become a great zoologist. Before he was thirty years of age, a copper-mine in Michigan made him a millionaire and stood to him in the place of the official income and vast State-supported apparatus which awaited Joseph Hooker at Kew. Both men became great leaders in their science, and, in greatly developing and completing their fathers' work, left splendid monuments of their heritage and their devotion. It is interesting to note that the sons of Alexander Agassiz, like those of Joseph Hooker, though always on terms of affectionate intimacy with their father, have not become 'men of science.'

Hooker frequently acted in younger days as examiner in botany for various boards and universities. He was a member of the Senate of the University of London. Some valuable records of his views on education, which deserve special consideration at this critical moment, are to be found in these volumes. His views are of especial value because he was above all things a practical man, seeing his aim clearly and bringing his trained judgment and vast experience of men to bear on the means to be pursued in order to attain it. He was also absolutely frank and fearless in the expression of his conclusions. We quote below ('Life,' vol. ii, p. 329) a letter of his to his friend the Rev. J. D. La Touche, dated May 24, 1893. He says :

'You must not think that I oppose education of the

labouring classes, but I should like it conducted towards the future life of the average, and not to the high education of the few who can profit by the complex education of the Board Schools. Mind you, I am just as much against the higher school and College education of the *masses* of the upper classes! Surely it would be far better if much of their teaching were devoted to making them more useful members of society. . . . To return to technical education, my notion of it is that it should be begun early, at the expense of some of the Board's literature, classical English, etc., and be accompanied throughout by semi-scientific teaching; i.e. the cobbler should be taught what tanning is, what bristles are, and how developed, and so forth. If any Board School child shows a genius for the higher education, push him on by all means to school and college; but it is no use trying to "make silk purses out of sows' ears."

From his earliest days onwards, Hooker shrank from public speaking; he disliked lecturing, and never held a professorial post. He detested newspaper discussions as well as the poms and vanities of official ceremony. They all seemed to him as using up the time and strength which he ought to give to his one purpose—the increase of science. His natural and strong determination was to the most thorough and strenuous work in pure scientific investigation. He desired no popularity, but cared only for intimacy with and approval by the select few who were able to participate in his scientific work and thought, or were bound to him by long association. He was a man of the family, not a man of society. Nevertheless his long life, his high position and wide-reaching activities brought to him a vast number of acquaintances, inspired by admiration and affection for his kindly, frank and energetic character. With his children and numerous family connexions he found relaxation and refreshment in music and dancing and in reading works of fiction and romance. He became an enthusiastic admirer and collector of Wedgwood ware, and fully indulged in the collector's joy of picking up good pieces in the shops of second-hand dealers. He retained from early life the habit of constant, regular and uninterrupted work, and the simplest tastes in regard to food. He attributed his long life and the preservation of his health and mental power (as he said to the writer,

who visited him on his ninetieth birthday) to the fact that he had made it his practice throughout his life to dine in the middle of the day, drinking only a light wine, and to take nothing but a light tea in the evening.

Hooker was, it is true, fortunate in his friends—fortunate because he merited such fortune. We read in these volumes of their passing away one by one—until he at last was left alone, but not downcast. His mind, to the end, was full of happy memories, and he still had new plants to describe and was tended by his wife and interested in his garden. His long and fraternal association with Darwin was of vital importance to each of them. The genius and originality of his friend fed, as it were, on Hooker's immense stores of botanical knowledge; and Hooker, in turn, was stimulated by Darwin's enquiries into new lines of activity and acquired, in aiding his friend in those enquiries, a convincing proof of the decisive value of his own vast labours in building up the knowledge of plants. The 'Life and Letters' form a fascinating record of that romantic, well-nigh legendary period in the history of biological science, when great men ravished the globe of its secrets and revolutionised human thought. It was the privilege of the present writer to be personally associated—in many cases intimately so—with the heroes of this story from Lyell onwards, to grow up in their midst and to be thrilled by the daily triumphs of those mighty warriors. Many long years ago he was greeted by Hooker as 'a friend and the son of a friend!'; and it is with those words ringing in his memory that he closes the book of that great man's life.

E. RAY LANKESTER.

Art. 12.—LA QUESTION POLONAISE ET L'EUROPE
AU COURS DE LA GUERRE.

Pour votre liberté et pour la nôtre. (Devise polonaise.)

DEUX grands principes dominent la guerre que font les Alliés à l'impérialisme allemand, le droit des peuples et l'équilibre européen. A la base de l'une et l'autre de ces préoccupations, on retrouve la question polonaise. Ce peuple, debout sous l'oppression depuis plus d'un siècle, a manifesté plus qu'aucun autre son droit à l'existence. Il n'a rien perdu, sous le joug étranger, de ses fortes qualités; il est demeuré un élément de civilisation occidentale dans l'Orient de l'Europe; il a marché de pair avec ses maîtres, au point de vue moral, intellectuel et économique; il a prouvé, au milieu de tribulations, sa profonde vitalité. Les raisons historiques et morales qui assignent aux Polonais une place à part au milieu des autres peuples opprimés ne suffiraient cependant pas à leur assurer un droit à l'assistance active des Alliés, s'il ne s'y joignait des motifs actuels et positifs. On ne saurait demander aux peuples de verser leur sang et de prolonger une guerre effroyable pour des intérêts étrangers. Mais le sort de la Pologne n'est étranger à aucune nation en Europe; c'est le problème central de la politique européenne, le gage de l'équilibre, et sans équilibre il ne peut y avoir de liberté pour personne sur le continent.

L'Allemagne ne saurait être tenue en respect par les seules forces des nations occidentales; l'existence d'un contrepoids sur la frontière orientale est une condition absolue de l'équilibre européen. Cette constatation a été la base de l'alliance franco-russe. Mais l'absence d'une Pologne indépendante, en même temps qu'elle obligeait la France à s'allier avec la seule grande puissance d'Orient, fût ce la Russie des Tsars, agissait aussi dans une direction opposée. Elle liait la Russie à l'Allemagne, par un intérêt commun, basé sur une complicité. La question polonaise a attaché la Russie, à la fois, aux deux groupements hostiles qui se partageaient l'Europe; elle a rendu fatales et l'alliance et la défection. Aussi longtemps que la Pologne est restée en servage, l'Entente ne pouvait pas se passer contre l'Allemagne du contrepoids russe, et la Russie ne pouvait pas se passer

davantage du contrepoids allemand contre la Pologne. La question polonaise a ainsi plongé l'Europe dans le duplicité.

Maintenant que la Russie n'existe plus comme force organisée et comme élément d'équilibre en Europe, c'est à la Pologne que revient ce rôle indispensable à la paix du monde. Les circonstances peuvent changer ; les apparences du continent peuvent se modifier ; la question polonaise demeure l'un des termes constants de la politique européenne. C'est pour l'avoir oublié que le Congrès de Vienne a préparé à l'Europe un siècle de déchirements et à notre génération des épreuves sanglantes ; et il en serait de même si les Alliés se voyaient obligés un jour de transiger sur la question polonaise, de laisser toucher à l'une des pierres angulaires de l'Europe future.

Lorsqu' éclata la guerre mondiale, tous les belligérants cherchèrent à attirer la Pologne de leur côté. Le chef des armées austro-hongroises adressa aux Polonais une proclamation leur annonçant la libération du joug russe ; et le commandement allemand, de son côté, leur assura que les Allemands apportaient à la Pologne " la liberté et l'indépendance." Le 6 août, 1914, le général Pilsudski passa la frontière du royaume, à la tête d'une compagnie des légions polonaises, qu'il avait organisées dès le temps de paix en vue de la lutte contre le tsarisme.

Élément nécessaire de toute majorité parlementaire en Autriche, fidèles serviteurs de la Couronne et détenteurs de hautes charges de cour, les Polonais font à Vienne, depuis fort longtemps, la pluie et le soleil. Dans une guerre où la Russie se fût trouvée seule en face de l'Autriche-Hongrie, les vœux des Polonais n'eussent pas été douteux. Mais l'alliance de l'Autriche avec la Prusse d'une part et de l'autre le crédit dont jouissaient en Pologne les puissances libérales, en particulier la France, vinrent rendre les sentiments des Polonais plus complexes et plus incertains.

Les Polonais ont toujours été d'accord entre eux sur les grandes lignes d'un programme minimum, comportant les trois points suivants : (a) la question polonaise est un problème international, qui échappe aux décisions internes et unilatérales de l'un des belligérants et devra être réglé

par le congrès de la paix ; (b) la Pologne doit recevoir sa complète indépendance, et devenir un Etat, l'autonomie, notion interne et subordonnée, devant être écartée comme insuffisante ; (c) la Pologne doit être unifiée et posséder un accès direct à la mer, condition de son indépendance économique et politique.

Toutefois, au début de la guerre, bien que d'accord sur la théorie, les Polonais se divisèrent sur la tactique. Dès le 8 août 1914, les députés polonais faisaient à la Douma et au Conseil de l'Empire, à Pétrograde, une déclaration de loyalisme, faisant appel à l'union des Slaves et demandant l'unité de la Pologne sous l'égide du Tsar. Le 16 août, le Grand-duc Nicholas adresse aux Polonais sa proclamation fameuse : 'L'armée russe vous apporte une assurance de réconciliation. Elle détruira les frontières qui divisent le peuple polonais et réalisera l'union sous le sceptre du Tsar de la Pologne ressuscitée, libre dans sa religion, sa langue et son autonomie.' Les représentants de la nation polonaise en Russie remercient le Grand-Duc et prennent acte de ses déclarations ; et, le 25 août, le Comité national polonais de Pétrograde déclare, dans un manifeste, que le pire ennemi de la Pologne est l'Allemagne, et que la seule idée de tous les Polonais est l'union des trois parties de leur pays. Il conjure tous les Polonais d'oublier leurs rancunes contre la Russie.

En Russie, les Polonais pensaient donc, en général, que la Pologne devait tout d'abord réaliser son unité, que l'armée russe pouvait seule lui donner, et qu'elle saurait bien conquérir ensuite son indépendance. En Autriche, au contraire, les Polonais insistaient de préférence sur le postulat de l'indépendance, l'unité leur paraissant irréalisable. Seuls les Polonais de Prusse sont toujours restés intransigeants sur l'ensemble du programme national.

Il ne s'agissait là d'ailleurs que de différences tactiques. Les Polonais d'Autriche, pas plus que ceux de Russie, n'ont jamais confondu leur cause avec celle de leurs maîtres ; et le maréchal Dankl a pu déclarer à la Chambre des Seigneurs, à Vienne : 'Nous étions en Pologne en pays ennemi, entourés et suivis, pas à pas, par la trahison. En Galicie même, nous n'avons nulle part trouvé l'appui que nous étions en droit d'attendre d'autorités autrichiennes. Les Polonais du Royaume ne se sont pas

d'avantage montrés enthousiastes d'être libérés du joug russe.' Ce témoignage peu suspect, au travers duquel perce une profonde déception, prouve que les Polonais de Russie, encouragés par le manifeste du Grand-Duc, se conduisirent en sujets loyaux du Tsar. Mais leur loyalisme et leur confiance furent bien mal récompensés par la suite des événements.

C'est une erreur de croire que toutes les questions posées par l'histoire et par la politique sont solubles. Au point de vue russe, la question polonaise ne l'était pas. Vouloir concilier les intérêts de Pétrograde et ceux de Varsovie, les conceptions du Tsar et celles du peuple polonais, était une entreprise chimérique et périlleuse. L'opinion publique occidentale ne le comprit pas immédiatement; elle ne vit dans la Pologne que la Posnanie, et, réalisant d'instinct la guerre sous son angle moral, elle y vit une croisade pour la Justice, pour la Liberté, pour les petites nations. Elle mesura en même temps les services que la Pologne pouvait rendre à la cause des Alliés, et sur ce point ne se trompa pas. Elle inspira indirectement la proclamation du Grand-Duc, qui fut, en un certain sens, un acte profondément politique, puisqu'il rallia, au moins dans le royaume, l'opinion polonaise à la cause russe. L'opinion occidentale n'eut pas de peine à reconnaître dans ce document, sous quelques réserves et réticences, la pensée qui l'avait inspiré. De ce côté, l'adhésion devait être unanime et elle le fut; elle contribua à l'enthousiasme que rencontra en France, parmi les gens les plus avancés, la guerre aux cotés de la Russie absolutiste. Mais cet enthousiasme reposait sur un malentendu. Entre les conceptions occidentales et celles du gouvernement russe, il y eut, dès le premier jour de la guerre, une opposition inconsciente; et la ligne de démarcation, sur le terrain, entre les unes et les autres, passait par la Pologne.

Aux yeux des Russes de l'Ancien Régime, la Pologne n'était pas seulement, en droit, une partie intégrante et indissoluble de l'Empire; elle en était, en fait, une partie indispensable. C'est en Pologne que la Russie avait son centre industriel; et il paraissait impossible d'élever entre Lodz et Moscou une barrière douanière sans susciter à l'Empire les plus graves difficultés. Les Allemands le savaient bien lorsque, dès les premiers jours de la guerre,

ils cherchaient à mettre la main sur les trésors de Lodz et de Czenstochau, qui ne consistent pas seulement dans la Vierge fameuse. Dans une foule de métiers auxquels les Russes se montraient impropres, les Polonais jouissaient d'un véritable privilège. Il eût paru impossible de faire vivre la Russie sans les médecins, les techniciens et les fonctionnaires polonais ; tenus à l'écart des charges publiques en Pologne, les Polonais formaient, dans le reste de l'Empire, une élite intellectuelle. Le problème d'une Russie sans Pologne paraissait insoluble, au point de vue économique et administratif.

Il ne l'était pas moins au point de vue moral et politique. Ceux qui reprochaient alors au Tsar de ne pas se montrer assez généreux envers ses sujets polonais ne se rendaient sans doute pas compte des répercussions politiques infinies de chacun de ses actes dans cet immense empire, aux cent peuples hostiles. Lui-même, s'en rendait-il bien compte ? Savait-il que la moindre concession aux Polonais susciterait des convoitises, des rancunes, des revendications en Ukraine, en Lituanie, en Russie blanche, plus loin encore, jusqu'aux confins de la Sibérie et du Caucase ? L'Allemagne, du moins, comprit quelle imprudence les Allies—et le Grand-Duc, à leur imitation—avaient commise en jetant au milieu de ce chaos le principe dissolvant des nationalités ; et elle ne laissa pas perdre sa constatation.

Au point de vue russe, la proclamation du Grand-Duc, malgré l'effet immédiat favorable qu'elle eut en Pologne, fut donc une imprudence. Mais la manière dont cette promesse fut exécutée, ou plutôt annihilée, en fut une plus grave encore. Lorsque le vin est tiré, il faut le boire. Les espoirs des Polonais ayant été éveillés et même surexcités, rien ne pouvait être plus dangereux que de les décevoir brutalement. La conduite des Russes en Galicie, leur zèle à convertir de force les catholiques, auxquels ils avaient promis la liberté de leur culte, les abus et les exactions de tout genre dont s'accompagna la conquête, confinèrent à l'inconscience politique. Le 13 octobre, le comte Bobrinski déclarait dans un discours que la Galicie 'faisait partie intégrante de la Grande-Russie.' Le gouvernement du Tsar, loin de ratifier les promesses du Grand-Duc, cherchait à les noyer dans des chicanées d'avocat : 'Ces promesses (disait-on aux

Polonais) sont sans valeur, car le Tsar n'y a pas souscrit.' M. Sasonof, l'un des membres les plus polonophiles du cabinet, et qui est tombé plus tard sur un programme de réformes polonaises, disait même à un Polonais qui lui rappelait ces promesses : 'Vous parlez, Monsieur, comme si nous n'étions pas à Lwow.' La Russie avait donc une parole pour la victoire et une pour la défaite.

Puis vint la retraite, et ce fut pis encore. Les Russes se retirèrent en pillant et en saccageant tout sur leur passage, comme l'on faisait il y a un siècle, sans utilité militaire, pour la rage de détruire et de tuer. Des milliers de Polonais, chassés dans les bois, y périrent de faim. Cinq jours avant la prise de Varsovie par les Allemands, le gouvernement russe n'avait encore rien oublié et rien appris ; et il fallut qu'un Polonais de marque, le comte Wielopolski, suppliât M. Gorémykine de prononcer, dans un discours officiel, le mot d'autonomie, contenu déjà dans la proclamation du Grand-Duc. M. Gorémykine n'osait pas aller aussi loin ! *

On croit en général que la bureaucratie russe fut seule responsable de ces fautes. C'est une erreur. Il se peut bien que les fonctionnaires russes en Pologne, maintenus dans leurs prébendes malgré l'évacuation du pays, aient vu dans l'autonomie une menace à leurs intérêts. Mais la nation russe ne pensait pas autrement. Les libéraux eux-mêmes—M. Milioukof, par exemple, dont le souvenir est chargé de tant d'erreurs—se refusaient à considérer la question polonaise sous son angle international. Ils n'y voyaient qu'un problème interne de politique russe, analogue à la question juive ou arménienne ; et ils entendaient se servir des revendications polonaises dans un but de politique intérieure. Rien ne pouvait faire plus de tort aux droits des Polonais.

Entre les conceptions de la nation polonaise, basées sur la liberté, et celles de l'Etat russe, basées sur la coercition, il y avait donc contradiction insoluble. Des trois choses que réclamaient les Polonais—la reconnaissance de leur unité, de leur indépendance, et du caractère international de leur cause—le gouvernement

* Le 26 avril 1916, encore, on assiste à ce fait inouï : le ministère russe de l'intérieur publie un mémoire dirigé contre les sujets polonais du Tsar, et dont presque toutes les données, fausses pour la plupart, sont tirées de sources allemandes ou autrichiennes.

tsariste n'admit la première qu'avec des réticences singulières, de nature à entretenir des soupçons légitimes sur ses intentions à l'égard de l'Allemagne; * il ne concéda la seconde qu'après la révolution, et refusa toujours, même alors, de reconnaître à la question polonaise un caractère international. Sur ce point la Russie se montra intraitable. Mais les Polonais ne pouvaient pas l'être moins, car renoncer à leur prétention, c'eût été se livrer, pieds et poings liés, à la générosité du Tsar et renoncer d'avance à tous leurs espoirs.

Entre ces exigences contradictoires, les Alliés se montrèrent tiraillés et impuissants, pendant les années 1915 et 1916. Dès 1915, les commissions parlementaires à Paris et la diplomatie française insistèrent pour qu'un 'pacte de Pétrograde,' joint au pacte de Londres, vint accorder aux promesses du Grand-Duc une garantie collective; mais la Russie refusa constamment d'entrer dans cette voie. Toute générosité à l'égard de la Pologne fut systématiquement écartée par le gouvernement russe, qui préféra laisser aux Allemands l'initiative—et, disait-il, l'odieux—de concessions nécessairement insuffisantes et décevantes pour les Polonais. Les Alliés, qui avaient des raisons de manquer de confiance dans la Russie et ne pouvaient pas alors se passer de son aide militaire, durent céder; et c'est ainsi que les défenseurs de la liberté et du droit des peuples se laissèrent devancer, dans la reconnaissance de l'indépendance polonaise, par les puissances impérialistes.

Sans s'embarrasser de principes contraires à ses propres tendances, le gouvernement allemand a immédiatement compris que la Pologne représentait une force, tant au point de vue moral qu'au point de vue politique, économique et militaire, et qu'il était désirable de gagner cette force. C'était le seul moyen d'affaiblir la Russie et de morceler ce 'contrepois' oriental, tout en évitant que la force nationale des Polonais ne se tende en un irrédentisme antiprussien. Le droit des peuples, proclamé par l'Entente, devint, dans les mains de l'Allemagne, une arme contre la Russie. Chaque fois que l'Allemagne eut le désir ou l'espoir de s'entendre isolément avec la Russie,

* Voir, dans la 'Revue Politique Internationale' (No. 28, avril 1917), l'article instructif et captivant de M. Simon Askenazy, sur 'la Pologne et la Paix.'

elle laissa tomber ses projets de reconstitution polonaise ; elle n'hésita même pas, à diverses reprises, à proférer contre les Polonais des menaces destinées à faciliter un rapprochement avec les sphères russes. C'est seulement lorsqu'eurent échoué toutes les tentatives de paix séparée ou de rapprochement germano-russe, et lorsque l'idée de les reprendre parut chimérique, que l'Allemagne songea sérieusement à libérer la Pologne.

La politique de M. de Bethmann-Hollweg envers la Pologne a été soumise, en Allemagne, à des critiques passionnées. Les militaires, les pangermanistes, les agrariens, tous les partisans d'un rapprochement avec la Russie—il y en a encore aujourd'hui—et même des pacifistes comme le prince Lichnowski, ont prononcé, pour des raisons diverses, le même jugement. Les uns ont redouté un affaiblissement stratégique de l'Empire ; les autres ont craint la concurrence industrielle de la Pologne ; d'autres encore se sont imaginé que la reconstitution de la Pologne rendrait la paix plus difficile, soit à l'est, soit à l'ouest. Tous ont senti confusément qu'entre une Pologne forte et libre et la Prusse, suzeraine de trois millions de Polonais opprimés, il ne pouvait y avoir d'autre relation que l'inimitié. C'est ce qu'exprimait jadis Bismarck, lorsqu'il disait : 'Si jamais l'aigle blanc ressuscite, malheur à l'aigle noir !' Un conventionnel de 1848, Wilhelm Jordan, avait dit aussi : 'Le premier jour d'une Pologne vraiment libre serait le premier jour d'une lutte à mort contre nous !'

M. de Bethmann-Hollweg n'a pu ignorer complètement ces enseignements et ces avertissements ; il n'a pu ignorer que, si la question polonaise était pour la Russie un '*noli me tangere*,' elle l'était dans une mesure plus grande encore pour l'Allemagne. S'il a cependant passé outre, après mille hésitations, il a dû y être poussé par des motifs puissants. Le premier fut sans doute l'impossibilité de supprimer la question polonaise, le second la nécessité de ménager l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La question polonaise a, en Autriche, un caractère accentué de politique intérieure. Les cent-dix députés rath de la Galicie peuvent faire au Reichsrat, à leur gré, la majorité avec ou contre les Allemands, pour ou contre le gouvernement. Le besoin de les ménager, pour se les concilier, est une nécessité de l'État, ce qui fait du

gouvernement autrichien le porte-parole naturel des aspirations polonaises.

Les Polonais d'Autriche n'ont fait, nous l'avons dit, aux nécessités de l'alliance avec l'Allemagne qu'un seul sacrifice. Ils se sont abstenus, pendant assez longtemps, de parler de l'unité de la Pologne et de réclamer l'incorporation dans le nouvel Etat du Grand-Duché de Posen. Mais, comme leurs frères de Varsovie ou du dehors, ils ont exigé l'indépendance absolue de leur pays, et l'union sous un sceptre polonais de la Galicie et du Royaume. Ils ont ainsi posé la question polonaise avec force dans le domaine international ; et l'on est obligé de reconnaître qu'à ce point de vue les puissances centrales se sont trouvées dans une position plus facile que les Alliés. La question polonaise était pour elles, par définition, un problème international, puisqu'elles y étaient intéressées toutes deux de façon immédiate. L'Autriche et l'Allemagne ont cependant, en apparence, tenté de résoudre isolément ce problème, mais sans doute moins pour en interdire la discussion aux Alliés que pour placer ceux-ci devant un fait accompli, et pour posséder un gage en vue des négociations ultérieures. De ces préoccupations est sorti l'acte du 5 novembre 1916.

Le proclamation des deux empereurs fut moins un acte en soi, générateur d'un Etat, que l'exposé des intentions des monarques alliés à l'égard de la Pologne. Elle prévoyait la création d'un royaume constitutionnel et héréditaire, lié aux puissances centrales par des conventions militaires et économiques. Par une contradiction qui ressemble à une ignorance et trahit une improvisation, la proclamation, tout en instituant un *Etat*, lui garantit *l'autonomie*. Ces termes révèlent les hésitations des gouvernements. Tandis que l'Autriche réclamait la création d'un Etat souverain, réuni avec la Galicie et lié à la Monarchie par une union personnelle, c'est la solution allemande qui avait triomphé. L'Etat n'était pas créé ; il était simplement en devenir. Dans sa forme volontairement imprécise, l'acte du 5 novembre était inapte à régler une fois pour toutes la question polonaise ; il avait un caractère provisoire, et laissait en suspens les difficultés les plus importantes. Loin de résoudre la question polonaise, on peut prétendre sans paradoxe que l'acte du 5 novembre l'a seulement posée.

Son importance historique n'est cependant pas contestable. Elle résulte du fait que cette proclamation était le premier acte international reconnaissant l'existence d'une question polonaise, et aussi de ce fait que les solutions esquissées étaient évidemment un minimum, en deçà duquel aucun gouvernement, aucun congrès, ne saurait demeurer.

L'opinion polonaise, avec un sens politique affiné, comprit à la foi cette importance et cette insuffisance. L'acte des monarques fut salué dans toute la Pologne avec une satisfaction que la presse occidentale eut tort de méconnaître, mais en même temps avec une réserve marquée. Le peuple polonais comprit qu'on ne lui offrait pas un édifice tout agencé, dans lequel il aurait à s'installer, mais un sol nu sur lequel il le devait bâtir.

Les difficultés qui ne tardèrent pas à s'élever au sujet de l'application de l'acte du 5 novembre, tant entre les Polonais et les occupants qu'entre ceux-ci, sont une preuve évidente de l'insuffisance de ce document. L'acte du 5 novembre créait entre les deux puissances centrales un *condominium* de droit, avec toutes les difficultés inhérentes à ce genre de souveraineté. En pratique, il ne fit pas cesser, malgré les réclamations des Polonais, le régime des deux zones d'occupation ; et il accentua, en diverses matières, les tendances divergentes des autorités militaires allemandes et austro-hongroises. De l'une à l'autre, des froissements, des différends continuels s'élevèrent. Moins de six mois après le 5 novembre, les difficultés devinrent si aigues que la circulation des journaux entre la zone allemande et la zone autrichienne fut interdite.

Tandis que les fonctionnaires autrichiens, polonais pour la plupart, prenaient au pied de la lettre la proclamation de novembre et faisaient de réels efforts pour gagner la population, deux tendances se manifestaient parmi les Allemands. Les uns, Hakatistes ou Pangermanistes, dont le porte-parole était le chef de l'administration civile, M. de Kries, avaient blâmé la faiblesse de leur gouvernement et faisaient tout leur possible pour en annuler les effets, en prodiguant à la population les vexations et les provocations. Les autres, plus politiques, et parmi eux, le gouverneur, le général de Beseler, s'efforçaient bien d'entrer dans l'esprit de la proclamation du

5 novembre, mais ils s'étonnaient de n'en pas voir les fruits mûrir immédiatement. Ils s'indignaient de l'ingratitude et de la froideur des Polonais. De là des frottements, dont quelques uns dégénérèrent en conflits graves, marquant rapidement la faillite et du *condominium* et de la liberté polonaise.

Les Polonais, enfin, de leur côté, s'efforcèrent de tirer le plus grand parti de la proclamation du 5 novembre. Mais des divergences se manifestèrent entre eux. Les uns, les Activistes, auraient voulu voir leur pays s'organiser immédiatement et contracter une alliance militaire avec les Empires centraux ; les autres, les Passivistes, préféraient patienter et réserver l'avenir ; ils refusèrent toute collaboration militaire aux Allemands, qui se vengèrent en mettant des obstacles infinis à l'organisation de l'Etat polonais. Très vite, on dut se convaincre de part et d'autre que les espoirs du 5 novembre avaient duré ce que durent les roses, l'espace d'un matin.

L'année 1917 s'ouvrit sur ces entrefaites. On peut dire, bien que ce ne soit pas strictement exact au point de vue chronologique, qu'elle fut marquée, pour la Pologne, par trois grands événements—l'accession au trône de Charles I^{er}, la révolution russe, et l'intervention des Etats-Unis.

L'acte du 5 novembre, si contraire en apparence aux tendances générales de la politique allemande, semble avoir causé à Pétrograde un profond étonnement et un certain désarroi. Les manifestations de la politique russe, pendant les mois qui suivirent, furent désordonnées et contradictoires. La déclaration de M. de Stuermer du 16 novembre était nettement insuffisante ; mais, le 2 décembre, M. Trepoff, qui venait de prendre la tête du gouvernement russe, déclara à la Douma que la Russie se devait 'de reconstituer la Pologne libre dans ses frontières ethnographiques.' Puis le Tsar lui-même affirma, dans un manifeste à ses troupes de terre et de mer, que l'un des devoirs de la Russie était 'la création de la Pologne libre, composée de ses trois parties, jusqu'à présent séparées.' Le 5 janvier 1917, Nicolas II reçut en audience le comte Wielopolski et lui renouvela ces assurances. 'Je suis autorisé,' déclara ensuite le comte, 'à affirmer qu'au cours de mon audience j'ai été informé

que la Pologne unie, dont parle l'ordre du jour de l'empereur, obtiendra un gouvernement parlementaire, avec une diète polonaise et une armée nationale.' Le tsar aurait même été plus précis encore ; son idée était, dit-on, de ne laisser subsister, entre la Russie et la Pologne, qu'une union personnelle.

Malheureusement, au même moment, la réponse des Alliés au président Wilson déclarait simplement que la question polonaise serait résolue 'selon les intentions de S. M. l'empereur de Russie.' C'était ravalier le problème au rang d'une question intérieure russe, et manquer la première occasion qui se présentait de donner aux Polonais des certitudes de libération. Car les intentions de S. M. l'empereur de Russie, quelle qu'en fût l'excellence, étaient soumises à trop d'influences et de fluctuations pour offrir aux espoirs de la nation polonaise une base solide. La réponse à M. Wilson a fait beaucoup de mal à la cause des Alliés en Pologne ; et le discours de M. Bonar Law, prononcé peu après, ne contribua pas à effacer cette fâcheuse impression. Heureusement l'histoire est plus forte que les hommes ; et les causes justes se défendent elles-mêmes lorsque leurs chevaliers les abandonnent. Le secours vint à l'Entente du dehors.

Les premières nouvelles de la révolution russe et l'arrivée au pouvoir de M. Milioukof, qu'on savait médiocrement disposé pour la cause polonaise, ne parurent pas, tout d'abord, extrêmement rassurantes. Mais le gouvernement provisoire, logique avec les principes dont il était né, ne tarda pas à effacer cette impression par un acte de haute politique et de haute portée, qui modifia, de la façon la plus heureuse, les bases mêmes de la politique des Alliés en Pologne. La proclamation du gouvernement provisoire du 30 mars ne laissait rien à désirer par la largeur des termes et leur précision ; elle reconnaissait un Etat polonais indépendant, souverain et unifié, ayant à déterminer lui-même, par la majorité, et ses frontières et sa forme de gouvernement. Les Alliés, enfin déliés du poids que faisait peser sur eux la politique polonaise du gouvernement tsariste, s'empresèrent d'adhérer officiellement et solennellement à la proclamation du gouvernement provisoire, afin de lui donner le caractère international et contractuel auquel les Polonais tenaient tant et pour de si bonnes raisons.

‘Les Alliés (déclarait la note officielle publiée à ce sujet) ont tenu à affirmer devant l’opinion publique et devant le peuple polonais tout entier qu’ils se sentent solidaires avec la Russie dans la pensée de faire revivre la Pologne dans son intégrité.’ M. Albert Thomas, en mission en Russie, déclarait de son côté, ‘au nom du gouvernement français,’ en présence du Comité national polonais de Pétrograde : ‘Pour nous la question polonaise est une question internationale, une question européenne.’

Toutefois, le caractère éminemment provisoire du gouvernement russe n’était pas sans affaiblir la portée de ces manifestations aux yeux du peuple polonais ; et, le 6 avril, le Conseil d’Etat polonais avait cru devoir, par égard pour les autorités d’occupation, protester contre la proclamation du 30 mars. Mais bientôt la situation des Alliés fut considérablement renforcée par l’appui que vint lui prêter le président des Etats-Unis.

Dès le 22 janvier, le président Wilson, dans son message au Sénat, avait parlé de la question polonaise dans des termes dont l’ampleur et la justesse dénotaient une connaissance parfaite du problème, et des revendications de la nation polonaise. L’insistance que mettait le président américain à affirmer la nécessité de l’unité polonaise commença à rendre de la force aux espoirs assombris d’une partie de la nation. Le soir où le message fut publié à Varsovie, des manifestations enthousiastes eurent lieu devant le consulat des Etats-Unis. La rupture des relations diplomatiques et la guerre entre l’Allemagne et les Etats-Unis vinrent conférer au langage du président une force persuasive qui n’a cessé de s’accroître, à mesure que se développait l’effort militaire de l’Amérique. Dès ce moment, et bien davantage depuis que, sur le front d’Occident, la victoire paraît sourire au drapeau étoilé, le peuple polonais acquit la certitude que son point de vue serait traduit et soutenu, au congrès de la paix, non seulement par une Russie affaiblie, une Autriche vaincue et une Allemagne hostile, mais encore par le chef d’une grande puissance aux forces inépuisables, à la volonté de fer, et pour lequel le droit des peuples et l’équilibre européen sont de véritables commandements bibliques.

Dès ce moment, on recommença à parler, même en Galicie, de l’unité de la Pologne—ce qui, dans cette lutte

morale, est l'atout des Alliés. Le 28 mai 1917, une réunion des élus de la Galicie, à Cracovie, émit une résolution qui est depuis lors la charte des Polonais d'Autriche, et dans laquelle se trouvent ces mots : ' L'effort unanime du peuple polonais tend à la restauration d'une Pologne unie et indépendante, ayant libre accès à la mer.' Dans cette formule, qui est celle même des Polonais de Russie, et qu'on n'avait jamais osé, jusqu'alors, exprimer sur le sol autrichien, est contenue une véritable déclaration de guerre à l'Allemagne. Elle est le symptôme du mouvement d'idées provoqué par la révolution russe, encouragé par l'intervention américaine et l'avènement de Charles I^{er} sur le trône des Habsbourg.

François-Joseph était mort le 21 novembre 1916, deux semaines après la proclamation polonaise, qui fut le dernier acte de son règne. Le jeune homme qui lui avait succédé était un inconnu, appelé à la dignité impériale par le hasard de circonstances tragiques. Il ne tarda pas à révéler le trait fondamental de son caractère, la haine de l'Allemagne, et son dessein d'imprimer un nouveau cours à la politique austro-hongroise. Charles I^{er} vit dans l'acte du 5 novembre signé par son grand-oncle moribond ce qu'elle était en effet—une capitulation des Habsbourg devant le Hohenzollern, une défaite de la conception autrichienne de la question polonaise. Il considérait que la Pologne devait revenir un jour à sa couronne, et ne s'accoutuma pas sans impatience à un *condominium* moral, qui lui paraissait une méconnaissance de ses droits légitimes.

Subissant fortement l'influence d'une femme ambitieuse, de culture purement italienne, le jeune empereur s'entoura de tout le personnel qui avait gravité autour de l'archiduc François-Ferdinand. Son confident intime, le comte Polzer, était purement tchèque de sentiments. Toutes les pensées et les affections de Charles I^{er} le portaient vers ses peuples slaves, et lui conseillaient une réorganisation fédérative de son empire.

Il fut encouragé dans cet état d'esprit par la révolution russe, qui délivra la monarchie du péril slave et manifesta, d'autre part, le danger pour les trônes d'une politique hostile aux peuples. Charles I^{er} rêva de faire de son pays le centre d'attraction du monde slave, et de transporter à Prague ou à Varsovie le centre moral de sa

politique. Une œuvre pareille était peut-être chimérique. Le souverain eut du moins la perception nette de ces difficultés et du moyen le plus propre à les vaincre. Il comprit que l'Autriche-Hongrie ne pouvait être régénérée que par une infusion de sang nouveau, et que ce sang devait être polonais. L'incorporation de la Pologne à la monarchie, sous quelque forme que ce fût, aurait en effet provoqué un tel ébranlement du compromis de 1867 que toute la situation constitutionnelle aurait dû être réglée à nouveau. Enfin Charles I^{er} espérait qu'une réunion de la Pologne et de l'Autriche, en introduisant un élément de trouble dans ses relations avec l'Allemagne, en augmentant à l'intérieur la force de la population slave, en favorisant la réforme constitutionnelle, et en facilitant, par compensation, des cessions territoriales à l'Italie et à la Roumanie, permettrait à l'Autriche-Hongrie un rapprochement avec les Alliés et la signature d'une paix honorable.

Ainsi l'empereur d'Autriche considéra, dès le jour de son avènement, la solution austro-polonaise comme la base de sa politique tant intérieure qu'extérieure, et il en fit le but de ses efforts. On sera sans doute étonné, lorsqu'on connaîtra tous les documents, de voir la place que le problème polonais a tenu, pendant toute l'année 1917, dans les préoccupations de la cour de Vienne.

La solution austro-polonaise pouvait offrir aux Alliés, à condition qu'on sût l'entourer des garanties nécessaires, des avantages sérieux. L'intérêt de l'Europe et le souci de l'équilibre politique exigent que la Pologne soit aussi indépendante et aussi forte que possible. Or, l'union avec les Habsbourg, par des liens personnels ou politiques, eût assuré à la Pologne l'appui de la force militaire incontestable que représente encore, malgré toutes ses défaites, l'empire austro-hongrois ; elle réalisait immédiatement et sans secousse l'union du royaume et de la Galicie ; à l'égard de l'Allemagne, cette solution assurait, mieux qu'aucune garantie contractuelle ou juridique, l'indépendance de la Pologne ; et elle assurait à l'irréductibilisme polonais une base sur la Posnanie. Ce n'est pas sans d'excellentes raisons que la *'Deutsche Tageszeitung'*, parlant d'une union possible de la Pologne et de l'Autriche, a pu écrire : 'Une semblable solution de la question polonaise introduirait un tel élément de trouble dans les

relations entre l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'on devrait la considérer comme le commencement de la fin de l'alliance entre les deux empires.' Dès l'été 1917, un ambassadeur de l'Entente, et non l'un des moindres, déclarait à son gouvernement: 'Entendons-nous avec l'Autriche et donnons lui la Pologne!' Agir ainsi, ç'eût été, selon nous, asseoir à tout jamais l'irrédentisme polonais sur la Posnanie et les Bouches de la Vistule, débouché nécessaire vers la mer; ç'eût été, en un mot, brouiller définitivement l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie. L'Entente ne l'a pas voulu, ou n'a pas cru que ce fût possible; et elle a rejeté ainsi Charles I^{er} dans la voie des négociations avec l'Allemagne.

Pour l'Autriche, la question est vitale et pressante. Vitale, parce que la Monarchie ne possède pas une force d'attraction nationale suffisante pour disputer la Galicie à une Pologne entièrement indépendante; pressante, parce que la reconstitution de la Galicie, dévastée par la guerre, exigeait une avance de fonds immédiate de quatre milliards, et que le gouvernement autrichien tenait à savoir à qui il concédait cette avance. Le projet d'abandonner la Galicie à la Pologne, intimement lié à la solution austro-polonaise, courut pendant toute l'année. En mai, on crut que la chose était acquise, et que l'archiduc Charles-Etienne allait devenir roi de Pologne et recevoir la Galicie comme don de joyeux avènement. Mais on s'aperçut bientôt que rien n'était fait. Les négociations durèrent tout l'été. L'Autriche finit par entrer dans la voie des concessions économiques à l'Allemagne.

C'est alors que prit corps le projet d'Europe centrale. Pour abandonner la Pologne le gouvernement allemand ne demandait pas seulement l'assurance que le pays resterait lié économiquement à l'empire, il demandait en outre des privilèges économiques dans toute la Double-Monarchie. Le solution austro-polonaise, sous cet aspect nouveau, loin de demeurer un gage d'équilibre pour l'Europe, devenait au contraire une menace à l'Europe.

Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas là tout ce qu'exigèrent les Allemands. La question polonaise leur fut bonne pour tout ce dont ils eurent besoin; ils l'invoquèrent, vis-à-vis de leurs Alliés, à tout propos et hors de propos. Ils demandèrent l'envoi de troupes autrichiennes sur le front

d'Occident. Puis ils exigèrent que l'Autriche cédât immédiatement la Galicie à la Pologne, et trouvèrent pour cette prétention de l'appui auprès des partis allemands d'Autriche, trop contents d'être enfin débarrassés des cent-dix députés de la Galicie au Reichsrat, et avec eux de la majorité slave. Mais l'Autriche refusa de se lier ainsi, et dit : 'Cédez vous-même la Posnanie!'

Après mille hésitations et mille marchandages, l'Allemagne finit par donner son adhésion à la solution austro-polonaise. Mais le haut commandement, sans qui rien ne peut se faire en Allemagne, n'avait pas été consulté par M. de Kühlmann ; et le Kronprinz demanda immédiatement la convocation d'un Conseil de la Couronne, qui se réunit au château de Bellevue, à Berlin, le 5 novembre 1917, jour anniversaire de la pseudo-indépendance polonaise. L'œuvre savamment échafaudée par MM. Czernin et Kühlmann, et dont l'Autriche se croyait déjà sûre, fut remise en question. La déception fut amère à Vienne, où l'on en garda une vive rancune. Par une coïncidence qui n'était peut-être pas fortuite, ceci se passait le jour où, à Pétersbourg, les maximalistes venaient de s'emparer du pouvoir par un coup d'audace. Pendant toutes ces négociations, et à mesure que l'on approchait, en apparence, de leur dénouement, la politique allemande à l'égard de la Pologne prit un cours de plus en plus hostile, et les avanies à la population se multiplièrent.

Les Allemands ont considéré la Pologne comme une terre conquise ; ils lui ont envoyé des fonctionnaires hakatistes, comme le sinistre M. de Kries ; ils ont ruiné le pays économiquement, et ont fini par lui imposer une opération financière qui équivalait à un véritable brigandage. Ils ont traité leurs amis mêmes comme des ennemis, et ils auraient voulu pousser ce peuple à la rébellion qu'ils n'auraient pas agi autrement. Les perquisitions, les arrestations en masse se multiplièrent ; des bruits de haute trahison furent systématiquement répandus par la presse allemande, tandis qu'en Prusse le régime imposé aux Polonais devenait de plus en plus dur.

Les discours de M. de Loebell, ministre de l'intérieur, de M. Eisenhardt-Rothe, de M. de Kleist, du bourgmestre de Thorn, du prince de Salm, à la Diète prussienne, ne laissaient aucun doute sur les sentiments du gouvernement et de la caste dirigeante en Prusse à l'égard de la

nation polonaise. Les députés de la Pologne n'ont d'ailleurs cessé de protester contre cette attitude, avec un courage et une ténacité dignes d'éloges. Du chef de la fraction polonaise, on disait couramment à Berlin, 'il se conduit comme une grande puissance ennemie.' C'était bien cela, en effet; et M. Korfanty le disait aussi, dans les termes suivants: 'Sans la nation polonaise, vous n'auriez pas pu soutenir cette guerre. Si vous n'aviez pas eu les énormes approvisionnements que vous avez tirés du royaume et que vous vous êtes approprié d'une façon que je ne saurais qualifier d'une expression parlementaire, il y a longtemps que la parade allemande aurait pris fin.' Et une autre fois, le même orateur s'écriait: 'Nous ne nous étonnons point que, pendant cette guerre, vous ayez voulu traiter les Polonais comme des Albanais.'

L'attitude énergique des chefs polonais eut naturellement pour premier effet d'exaspérer l'opinion allemande et de l'exciter contre le peuple polonais. C'est alors que la chambre de commerce d'Oppeln en Silésie émettait un vœu demandant la réunion à l'Allemagne du district houillier de Dombrowa, et que les organisations allemandes de Lodz adressaient au Chancelier un mémoire réclamant l'annexion à l'Allemagne des gouvernements de Kalisz, de Plock et de Piotrkov; c'est le moment aussi où les journaux pangermanistes, directement inspirés par l'état-major allemand, réclamaient à grands cris des 'sûretés stratégiques' en Pologne, c'est à dire l'annexion à l'Allemagne de la ligne de la Naref, qui permettrait à l'armée allemande de tenir Varsovie sous le feu de ses canons; le moment encore où l'un des députés les plus radicaux d'Allemagne et, en apparence, les moins enclins à l'annexionnisme, exigeait que l'Allemagne gardât, en tout cas, l'administration des chemins de fer polonais et qu'elle les joignît au réseau prussien. Le Dr Stresemann, de son côté, s'écriait, en parlant des Polonais: 'Moins il y en aura, mieux cela vaudra.' Et ainsi de suite; les sentiments vrais et profonds de l'Allemagne à l'égard de la Pologne et ses intentions se sont révélées sans fard pendant cette période, et l'idée de s'entendre avec la Russie sur le dos de la Pologne gagna des adhérents à Berlin.

Le conflit entre les autorités polonaises et l'Allemagne

devint aigu dans la question de l'armée. Le projet primitif de la proclamation du 5 novembre ne faisait pas mention, dit-on, de la question militaire. Mais le quartier-général et les pangermanistes posèrent comme condition de leur adhésion que le gouvernement allemand obtiendrait l'alliance militaire de la Pologne. Au fond, le gouvernement impérial semble s'être rendu compte immédiatement qu'il ne trouverait jamais une aide utile dans une armée polonaise. Par contre, une partie importante de l'opinion polonaise désirait ardemment l'organisation d'une armée, soit par haine de la Russie, soit pour affirmer par ce symbole la renaissance de l'Etat polonais.

Contrairement à ce qu'on crut longtemps dans les pays alliés, les obstacles au recrutement en Pologne vinrent moins des Polonais que des Allemands. Ou, si l'on veut, ils furent réciproques, parce que les deux pays n'arrivèrent pas à s'entendre sur les modalités et la portée de ce recrutement. Des raisons personnelles, comme la rivalité entre Pilsudski et Sikorski, la discussion sur les mérites des légions et ceux des milices—tout cela paralysa l'organisation de l'armée du côté polonais. Au lieu des milliers de soldats que certains militaires allemands avaient espéré tirer de la Pologne, il y eut, en tout et pour tout, 328 engagements, dans un pays occupé, avec tous les moyens de pression que cela comporte. Ce chiffre paraît incroyable ; il est authentique. Des officiers polonais prisonniers en Allemagne reçurent des congés afin de s'engager dans les légions. A l'expiration du congé, tous rentrèrent dans leur camp d'internement. L'Allemagne n'eut en Pologne que des déboires, ce qui explique sa colère.

Aussi, après avoir été pressée de déterminer la formule de serment de l'armée polonaise, l'Allemagne se mit subitement à élever des difficultés et à présenter sans cesse de nouvelles exigences. Au printemps de 1917, après six mois d'efforts, la question n'avait pas avancé. Enfin, au début de juillet, une formule fut trouvée. Elle ne contenait pas d'engagement vis-à-vis des souverains centraux, comme le demandait l'Allemagne, mais les soldats polonais devaient cependant jurer 'de conserver, dans la guerre actuelle, la fraternité d'armes aux armées d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie.' Cette phrase détermina

une crise. Sur le conseil de leur commandant, le général Pilsudski, qui, après avoir été le chef du parti activiste, avait été rejeté dans l'autre camp par la révolution russe, la plupart des légionnaires refusèrent le serment qu'on leur demandait. Le nombre de ceux qui le prêtèrent fut infime. Aussitôt les autorités allemandes internèrent les légions qui devaient former les cadres de la future armée et incarcérèrent le général Pilsudski. La réponse du peuple polonais fut la révolte ouverte, et presque l'insurrection. Des manifestations eurent lieu dans les rues, et au Conseil Municipal de Varsovie ; et le Conseil d'Etat, organe provisoire de l'Etat polonais, après avoir en vain essayé de conjurer la crise, dut donner sa démission. Depuis lors, l'histoire de l'armée polonaise et des légions n'a cessé de se trainer dans les conflits et les discussions. Internées, les légions ont été ensuite vidées de tous les ressortissants austro-hongrois, puis dissoutes. L'armée polonaise se trouvait ainsi sans cadres, et elle n'a pu encore être formée. Elle figure toujours au programme du gouvernement polonais, qui voit dans la formation d'une armée le moyen d'abréger l'occupation étrangère et ses hontes, de prévenir le bolchévisme agraire, et de paraître au Congrès de la paix comme un véritable Etat. Mais l'Allemagne, qui ne peut plus ignorer maintenant l'impossibilité d'obtenir sur le terrain militaire un concours utile des Polonais, ne semble pas décidée à permettre l'organisation d'une force armée avec laquelle elle devra compter sans pouvoir compter dessus, à moins d'obtenir des garanties précises, de nature politique.

Ainsi, la politique allemande était anti-polonaise, en Prusse et en Pologne. Elle ne l'était pas moins en Ukraine et en Lituanie, où les Allemands n'ont cessé d'attiser contre les Polonais les haines nationales et sociales. Les Polonais dans ces pays limitrophes sont en général grands propriétaires terriens ; ils ont supporté presque tous le poids des troubles agraires qui ont accompagné la démobilisation de l'armée russe, d'autant plus que le mouvement national lui-même a été dirigé contre eux plus encore que contre les Russes. En Lituanie, malgré les efforts d'un nombre important de personnalités tendant à une union fédérative, l'influence de l'Allemagne s'exerça de tout son poids dans le sens

opposé. Le mémoire présenté par le baron de Ropp au commandement suprême de l'armée allemande est caractéristique à cet égard.

Le fédéralisme, c'est-à-dire une union politique, sur pied de parfaite égalité, peut seul sauvegarder l'avenir des deux peuples. La Pologne ne peut prospérer sans un débouché vers la mer, condition absolue de son indépendance économique ; et, en dehors de la Prusse, la Lituanie seule peut lui en assurer un. De leur côté, les Lituanais, qui possèdent la côte, ne peuvent vivre sans son *hinterland*, qui appartient à la Pologne. Enfin, les deux peuples élèvent des prétentions sur le même sol, notamment sur la ville de Vilna, qu'ils se disputent à coup de statistiques. La population y est, semble-t-il, lituanienne de race et d'origine, polonaise de langue et de civilisation, ce qui rend les discussions extrêmement confuses et vaines. Ces revendications conduiront les deux peuples à une haine et à des luttes inexpiables si l'on renouvelle là-bas la faute des Balkans, et si l'on n'établit entre eux, de prime abord, des liens de droit qui rendent les guerres sinon impossibles, au moins très difficiles. De plus, leur union peut seule les rendre l'un et l'autre assez forts pour assurer à l'Europe le contre-poids oriental dont elle a besoin.

Mais c'est précisément ce que ne veut pas l'Allemagne. Diviser les peuples, les affaiblir les uns par les autres, les pousser dans des conflits qui les épuiseront, les châtrer économiquement pour les tenir tous dans sa dépendance—telle est la clé de sa politique orientale. C'est pourquoi, tandis que les autorités militaires excitaient par tous les moyens les Lituanais contre les Polonais, les diplomates créaient entre l'Ukraine et la Pologne la question de Cholm et poussaient les Polonais à s'étendre en la Russie blanche, où ils se heurtent aux revendications russes.

Le début de 1918 vit dans l'orient de l'Europe une situation toute nouvelle. Les maximalistes, qui venaient d'arriver au pouvoir à Pétrograde par un coup de force, s'appliquaient à détruire la Russie ; et ils y parvenaient avec une rapidité surprenante. De plus, leur hostilité à l'égard de la Pologne était bien connue. A la veille du coup d'Etat, le soviétique de Pétrograde avait formulé un programme de paix, qui restait en deça, en ce qui concerne

la Pologne, des plus pâles concessions du tsarisme défunt. Ainsi, de ce côté, tout contrepois à l'Allemagne faisait brusquement défaut ; et les peuples de l'Est, sentant les Alliés lointains, hésitants et désorientés par l'écroulement brusque de la puissance russe, s'habituerent à penser que l'Allemagne était désormais la seule force humaine qui leur pût du bien ou du mal.

Cette impression fut confirmée et accentuée par l'abaissement progressif de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Le cabinet de Vienne ressentit aussi le contrecoup de l'avènement de Lénine. Dès ce moment, une divergence croissante sépara la politique du comte Czernin de celle de l'empereur. Le ministre, acceptant le fait accompli, chercha à en tirer le plus d'avantages possibles, et il se mit à la remorque de l'Allemagne pour partager sa victoire. L'empereur au contraire, moins souple, continua sa politique personnelle, comme si rien ne s'était passé, et entra en conflit latent avec le Ballplatz.

Le fruit de la division, c'est la faiblesse. Le traité de Brest-en-Lituanie, fut un succès pour l'Allemagne et un grave échec moral, une véritable défaite, pour la Monarchie. Ce traité, conforme à toute la politique allemande, et dicté par le grand quartier-général, sacrifiait la Pologne, protégée de l'Autriche. Déjà, le comte Czernin n'avait fait aucun effort sérieux pour obtenir la participation des délégués polonais aux négociations. Des questions intéressant éminemment la Pologne et son avenir furent réglées à une portée de voix de Varsovie, sans que les autorités polonaises fussent admises à exprimer leur avis. Le résultat fut que les traités continrent deux clauses funestes pour la Pologne. L'art. III de la paix du 3 mars, entre la Russie et les puissances centrales, enlevait, en fait, à la question polonaise son caractère international, auquel les Polonais tiennent tant et à juste titre. De son côté, la paix du 9 février avec l'Ukraine séparait de la Pologne la province de Cholm, dans laquelle les Polonais forment l'élément principal de la population, et qui appartient à la Pologne par droit historique. Dans ces deux clauses combinées et éclairées l'une par l'autre, les Polonais virent non seulement une injustice, mais une menace, l'intention de préparer, selon les vues de l'Etat-Major allemand, un nouveau démembrement du leur pays.

Il faut ajouter qu'un traité secret parait en outre avoir été conclu à Brest entre l'Allemagne et les maximalistes, dont l'existence est à vrai dire contestée, mais qu'on a force raisons de croire réel. Ce traité contiendrait les clauses suivantes : 'Art. I : La politique polonaise est conduite par le gouvernement allemand. II : Le gouvernement russe se désintéresse des questions relatives à l'organisation du royaume de Pologne et s'interdit de protester contre une séparation du bassin métallurgique et houillier de Dombrova. . . .' D'autres limitations des droits de la Pologne étaient encore prévues et approuvées par les bolcheviks ; et, en retour, l'Allemagne promettait de laisser la propagande maximaliste s'exercer en Pologne.

Ce traité secret n'était pas encore connu à Varsovie au moment où fut signée la paix de Brest. Mais on le pressentait ; et les clauses publiques du traité parurent assez graves pour déterminer dans tout le pays une vive agitation et une violente explosion de colère. Les théâtres furent fermés ; les gens prirent le deuil ; l'état de siège dut être proclamé dans une grande partie du territoire ; les fonctionnaires se mirent en grève ; et, enfin, le gouvernement de M. Kucharzewski se vit obligé de donner sa démission en signe de protestation contre l'annexion du pays de Cholm à l'Ukraine.

Cette irritation se tourna en première ligne contre l'Autriche-Hongrie. De l'Allemagne, les Polonais n'ont au fond jamais rien espéré de bon ; mais il croyaient avoir dans la diplomatie autrichienne une amie et une protectrice. De là leur déception, lorsqu'ils virent que le comte Czernin ne faisait pas le moindre effort, ni pour obtenir que la Pologne fût représentée aux négociations de Brest, ni pour assurer ses intérêts les plus légitimes. Les Polonais se crurent trahis. Leur colère eut une répercussion immédiate dans la politique intérieure de l'Autriche et contribua à affaiblir la Monarchie, tant au dedans qu'au dehors. Le Club polonais de Vienne fut poussé à des méthodes d'opposition violente, et les tendances radicales prirent le dessus dans son sein. C'est alors que se forma la coalition parlementaire qui a abouti récemment à la chute du ministère Seidler.

Le traité de Brest ne fut pas, à vrai dire, la seule cause de la nouvelle attitude des Polonais envers

l'Autriche. Des questions proprement galiciennes jouèrent un rôle important en cette affaire. On estime à plusieurs milliards les dégâts qui ont été occasionnés à la Galicie par le passage réitéré des armées russes et centrales. Mais l'Autriche, n'étant pas sûre de conserver cette province, ne veut pas faire en sa faveur les dépenses urgentes. De là naquit un projet d'autonomie, dont le but principal était de faire supporter au budget provincial les frais de restauration du pays. Naturellement, les Polonais n'en voulurent pas entendre parler. Ils apprirent d'autre part que, par un traité secret avec l'Ukraine, le gouvernement austro-hongrois avait promis un partage de la Galicie entre les Polonais et les Ruthènes—partage dans lequel la ville de Lemberg eût naturellement fait partie de la Galicie ruthène. C'est là une idée à laquelle les Polonais ne sauraient s'habituer. Au lendemain du traité de Brest qui avait arraché Cholm à la Pologne, au moment où arrivaient d'Allemagne les menaces les plus précises contre l'intégrité de leur pays, les Polonais virent dans ce projet de partage l'effet d'une véritable conjuration contre eux.

En même temps, la publication de la lettre de Charles I^{er} à M. Poincaré porta au prestige et à la popularité de l'empereur un coup sensible, et rendit, par réaction, les nationalités plus hardies dans leurs revendications. Dès le lendemain de la publication de la lettre impériale on put s'attendre à la reconnaissance solennelle, par l'Entente, des aspirations nationales des peuples austro-hongrois. Cette déclaration fut différée, mais, en ce qui concerne la question polonaise, la déclaration interalliée de Versailles du 3 juin contient la satisfaction des revendications essentielles du peuple polonais. De plus, la formation d'une armée polonaise et les paroles solennelles avec lesquelles M. Poincaré lui remit les drapeaux offerts par les villes de Paris, Verdun, Nancy et Reims, vinrent prouver au peuple polonais que l'Entente portait désormais à son sort un intérêt inaltérable.

Nous n'avons envisagé jusqu'ici la question polonaise que sous son angle international. Mais on ne saurait en négliger complètement l'aspect intérieur. La Pologne n'est pas seulement, en Europe, un problème ou une pièce sur l'échiquier diplomatique. Elle est avant tout

une nation, un peuple qui veut vivre et qui vit. On ne doit pas l'oublier.

Depuis l'acte du 5 novembre 1916, il existe à Varsovie des corps constitués qui font figure et fonction de gouvernement. Les Polonais exilés se refusent, pour la plupart, à reconnaître l'autorité de corps qui n'existent que par la volonté des occupants. Il n'est que trop vrai que les hommes d'Etat polonais ne jouissent pas de la liberté complète de leurs déterminations. Mais il y aurait à le leur reprocher et à les ignorer systématiquement de l'injustice et du danger. Une injustice, tout d'abord, parce que les hommes qui, à Varsovie, ont, dans des circonstances adverses, accepté la charge du pouvoir, l'ont fait, pour la plupart, non par sympathies germanophiles, mais pour rendre service à leur pays. On ne peut reprocher à la nation polonaise, privée depuis plus d'un siècle des libertés les plus élémentaires, de n'avoir pas repoussé les libertés encore limitées que lui offrait l'Allemagne; on ne saurait exiger d'elle qu'elle eût laissé tomber en quenouille des biens, objets de ses vœux séculaires, uniquement parce qu'ils étaient encore incomplets. On peut raisonner avec désintéressement au loin; mais à Varsovie, au milieu des troupes allemandes victorieuses, alors que le seul allié à portée était la Russie, décevante, oppressive et d'ailleurs vaincue, on raisonnait autrement.

Les hommes qui ont accepté, en 1917, le pouvoir des mains de l'Allemagne n'ont pas abdiqué pour cela leur patriotisme polonais. Ils ont voulu rendre service à leur pays, en lui permettant de profiter du rayon de liberté qui lui était offert; ils ont espéré que la logique de l'histoire les agrandirait peu à peu, et qu'en luttant ils obtiendraient de nouvelles concessions. Ils ne se sont pas complètement trompés. Les hommes d'Etat polonais n'ont pas craint, à plusieurs reprises, d'entrer en conflit avec l'Allemagne. Le 1^{er} mai 1917, le premier Conseil d'Etat a adressé aux autorités d'occupation un véritable ultimatum; en juillet, il a démissionné en bloc pour manifester contre l'incarcération du général Pilsudski; après la paix de Brest, le ministère Kucharzewski se retira pareillement pour protester contre la mutilation du territoire. Ce ne sont pas là des manières de plats valets. D'ailleurs, ces crises n'ont pas été inutiles; elles

ont posé la question polonaise devant la conscience universelle avec une force chaque fois accrue. Le gouvernement n'a pas obtenu tout ce qu'il demandait—loin de là; mais ses conquêtes ont la grande valeur d'être définitives, car il sera impossible à l'Allemagne de revenir jamais en deça des conditions faites. A ce point de vue, les autorités polonaises ont fait, plus qu'on ne croit, œuvre durable. Elles ont reçu la Pologne grevée d'hypothèques; mais le terrain leur appartient, et les charges qui pèsent sur lui s'effritent peu à peu.

Ce qui contribue à troubler l'opinion occidentale au sujet des autorités polonaises, c'est que certains hommes ont une tendance à transporter dans le domaine international des préoccupations de politique intérieure. Il est légitime, il est nécessaire, qu'une opposition se manifeste au dedans; et cette opposition n'a pas manqué aux différents gouvernements, dans les partis de droit, dits passivistes, tout d'abord, puis dans les partis de gauche, rejetés par la révolution russe et leurs sympathies révolutionnaires dans le camp des adversaires de l'Allemagne. Il se peut même que l'opposition ait rendu au gouvernement un réel service en le détournant de faire aux occupants des concessions exagérées. Mais ce serait aller trop loin que d'identifier ses vues, en toutes choses, aux intérêts de la nation. Transporter ces jugements et ces préventions, dont plusieurs se rapportent à des problèmes politiques et sociaux purement intérieurs, dans le domaine international, c'est rompre l'unité morale de la Pologne vis-à-vis de l'étranger et affaiblir son action de reconstruction nationale.

Enfin, cette œuvre n'est pas sans danger, parce que les Alliés risquent d'être égarés par cette confusion de préoccupations intérieures et extérieures et la nation polonaise risque, elle aussi, d'être trompée en retour, dans ses sentiments à l'égard de la cause alliée. On crée ainsi des malentendus réciproques, dont les conséquences pourront être funestes; on rejette sans le vouloir dans les bras de l'Allemagne, pour la défense des résultats déjà obtenus, le gouvernement, dont la position est si difficile, et, chose plus grave, la nation elle-même.

Jusqu'ici la Pologne a eu trois gouvernements. Le premier fut le Conseil d'Etat provisoire, organisé par l'arrêté du général Beseler, en date du 12 novembre, 1916,

et qui entra en fonction le 16 janvier suivant. C'est l'organe qui, le 1^{er} mai, 1917, suspendit ses fonctions pour obliger les Puissances à élargir les compétences de l'Etat polonais, et qui finit par démissionner le 25 août, à la suite des incidents qui avaient marqué la prestation de serment des légions. A la suite de négociations laborieuses, les puissances centrales finirent par se rallier aux grandes lignes du projet d'organisation provisoire de l'Etat polonais, tel que l'avait préparé le Conseil d'Etat. Un Conseil de régence, dans lequel entrèrent le prince Lubomirski, maire de Varsovie, Mgr Kakovski, archevêque de Varsovie, et M. Ostrovski, entra en fonction en octobre 1917 et choisit un ministère responsable devant lui et présidé par M. Kucharzewski. Ce gouvernement se retira à la suite du traité de Brest, et fut remplacé par un ministère Steczkovski, qui vient de démissionner.

Au mois de décembre dernier enfin fut décidé la création d'un organe législatif provisoire. Ce fut la troisième étape dans l'organisation politique. Ce Conseil d'Etat est composé de membres de droit, de membres élus par les conseils communaux, et de membres désignés par les régents. Ce n'est pas, à proprement parler, une représentation nationale; mais son existence a déjà eu pour la Pologne des conséquences heureuses. D'abord le conseil des ministres est responsable devant lui, ce qui a augmenté sa force vis-à-vis des régents irresponsables et donné une influence plus grande à l'opinion publique. Ensuite, au sein du Conseil d'Etat et dans une collaboration quotidienne, un rapprochement s'est opéré entre les partis, la violence de l'opposition a diminué, et un certain nombre de députés réalistes hostiles à la politique des régents se sont peu à peu ralliés. Enfin, le Conseil d'Etat a jeté les premières bases de la future constitution. En résumé, le Conseil d'Etat ne doit pas être considéré comme une représentation sincère et adéquate de la volonté du pays, mais plutôt comme une émanation de l'opinion publique générale; il peut, à ce titre, rendre de réels services, tant à la nation qu'au gouvernement, vis-à-vis des occupants.

Ces résultats sont minces encore, mais non négligeables; et, lorsque les Alliés pourront à leur tour exercer une influence positive sur les destinées de la Pologne, ils devront tenir compte de ce qui existe et construire sur

ces bases l'édifice du nouvel Etat. Les ignorer serait s'exposer à des mécomptes. Si les puissances centrales ne sont pas parvenues encore à se mettre d'accord sur le chef de l'Etat, et se sont montrées avares de compétences pour les autorités polonaises, du moins ont-elles organisé une armature, créé un pouvoir exécutif et un embryon de pouvoir législatif. L'âme manque encore, mais le corps est là ; et ce sera l'œuvre généreuse des Alliés de lui infuser la vie et l'esprit.

La situation actuelle de la Pologne telle que la font apparaître les derniers événements est pleine d'espérances et de dangers. Des puissances centrales, les Polonais ne peuvent attendre une véritable et pleine résurrection. L'Autriche-Hongrie est de plus en plus affaiblie, et son appui diplomatique a perdu, entre les mains du comte Burian, la plus grande partie de sa valeur. La solution austro-polonaise ne présente d'ailleurs plus les avantages que nous lui avons reconnus dans le passé, car ce ne peut être un sort enviable pour une nation forte qui aspire à de nouvelles destinées que de s'unir à un pays vieilli que menacent les crimes et peut-être la dissolution.

Le gouvernement polonais l'a d'ailleurs reconnu et s'est orienté de plus en plus, depuis quelques mois, vers l'Allemagne, avec laquelle il aspire à régler directement certaines questions litigieuses. Tel est le sens de l'entrevue que le prince Radzyvill et le comte Ronikier ont eu à Spa, le 13 août, avec les hommes d'Etat de l'empire allemand. Reprenant les termes du mémoire qu'ils ont adressé aux occupants le 29 avril dernier, les ministres polonais ont exigé et obtenu l'intégrité du territoire polonais, la neutralisation de la Vistule et de Dantzig—c'est à dire un débouché direct à la mer Baltique et certaines garanties d'ordre constitutionnel. Ils auraient obtenu aussi, à ce qu'il semble, une solution favorable de la question lituanienne.

Il est évident que les Polonais n'ont pas enregistré toutes ces concessions sans faire, de leur côté, de lourds sacrifices. L'Allemagne connaît son importance en Orient ; elle tient entre ses mains les destins, non seulement de la Pologne, mais encore de la Lituanie, de la Russie-Blanche, de l'Ukraine. Elle sait ce que vaut son amitié et ce qu'elle peut la faire payer. En Allemagne,

les courants hostiles à la Pologne sont puissants. C'est aujourd'hui l'Etat-Major qui gouverne presque sans conteste. Or les militaires veulent réaliser de larges annexions dans l'Est; ils veulent y joindre des annexions économiques et empêcher de toute façon la naissance d'un irrédentisme oriental ayant son foyer dans une Pologne forte. Ils n'hésitent même pas à introduire en Pologne la propagande maximaliste pour ruiner les bases de l'Etat et le détruire par l'anarchie. S'il est vrai que, dans ces conditions, l'Allemagne a promis à la Pologne l'intégrité de son territoire et une influence prépondérante en Lituanie, il n'y a guère de doute que les Polonais ont dû, de leur côté, donner à l'Allemagne des garanties précises de leur docilité et de leur fidélité. Les Allemands ne feraient pas une politique polonaise si la Pologne ne faisait pas, de son côté, une politique allemande.

Les membres du gouvernement polonais sont très préoccupés des dangers intérieurs qui menacent l'Etat naissant, et, en particulier, de la possibilité d'une révolte agraire. Ils tiennent, en vue de cette éventualité, à être armés et à posséder eux-mêmes la force publique nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre. C'est la raison qui les pousse à s'entendre avec l'Allemagne pour l'organisation d'une armée. Les Polonais ne croient plus à la victoire allemande. Mais ils pensent que, même vaincue, l'Allemagne demeurera leur principal marché, leur débouché naturel, leur entrepôt; et qu'ils devront traiter avec elle. Aussi envisagent-ils, en ce moment même, la possibilité d'un accord qui répondrait chez eux surtout à des besoins intérieurs.

Cependant, il semble bien que, sur un point, les hommes d'Etat polonais aient résisté aux prétentions allemandes. Ils n'ont pas encore renoncé officiellement à la solution austro-polonaise, c'est-à-dire à la réunion de la Galicie et de la Pologne sous un même sceptre. Ils ne peuvent pas, d'ailleurs, y renoncer, sans soulever contre eux l'unanimité de la nation polonaise. La candidature de l'archiduc Charles-Etienne, quelque sympathique que soit aux Polonais la personnalité de l'archiduc, est inacceptable pour la Pologne si elle doit signifier la renonciation à la Galicie, et inacceptable pour l'Autriche-Hongrie si elle signifie le démembrement de la Monarchie. Il y a là une double impossibilité, telle que l'entente entre

l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie apparaît extrêmement difficile.

Au reste, ces choses-là, espérons-le, n'auront pas un caractère durable. Il est évident, pour qui sait comprendre le sens profond de la guerre, que la Pologne ne peut espérer son salut véritable que de la défaite de l'Allemagne et du triomphe des puissances libérales. Les victoires de France sont, pour la Pologne, le gage le plus sûr de la résurrection. Mais les Alliés sont éloignés. Ils n'arriveront à Varsovie qu'en passant sur le corps de l'Allemagne, qui paraît encore solide ; et c'est un magnifique acte de foi que l'histoire demande à la nation polonaise. Aucun peuple au monde ne fut jamais mieux préparé par son histoire à un semblable effort moral et spirituel.

P.S.—Depuis que cet article a été écrit, des faits importants d'ordre militaire et politique sont venus modifier la situation générale. Ils se sont cristallisés, en Pologne, dans la démission du ministère Steczkowski et le retour au pouvoir de M. Jean Kucharzewski. Celui-ci est considéré comme très favorable à l'Entente et passe pour le plénipotentiaire désigné de la Pologne au Congrès de la Paix. C'est dire qu'il ne fera assurément rien qui puisse compromettre sa situation personnelle vis-à-vis des Alliés. Sa politique, à l'égard de l'Allemagne ébranlée et bientôt vaincue, sera l'expectative et la temporisation. On voit que, pour les Alliés, les fruits de la victoire ont mûri rapidement sur les bords de la Vistule.

WILLIAM MARTIN.

Art. 18.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

DURING the first half of July events on the western front continued to follow the unostentatious course on which they had entered when the enemy, foiled in his schemes for the overthrow of the French and Italian armies, abandoned the offensive. Superficially, the general situation exhibited no obvious change. Here and there minor enterprises, which need no detailed description, continued to give back to the Allies portions of the ground they had lost; while the Germans, resolved, to all appearance, on a purely passive defence, continued to accept these local reverses with unwonted humility.

But all the time causes were operating to effect a change in the tide of war, which was destined soon to carry the Allied armies forward on an ever-widening wave which has swept the enemy back to, and in places beyond, the low-water mark of last year's retreat. The American Army, which had already attained a high state of efficiency from the practical experience of war, was rapidly becoming formidable in numbers; and the units which, for training purposes, had originally been brigaded with British divisions, had been brought together, and organised in separate divisions and armies. The Allied forces, as a whole, were recovering the cohesion which had been sacrificed to the necessity of breaking-up formations to meet urgent calls for reinforcements in unexpected quarters. The centring of the supreme command in the hands of General Foch—now a Marshal of France—which was in itself a factor of strength, both facilitated the disentangling and re-grouping of the scattered units, and ensured the redistribution of the armies to the best advantage with a view to combined action, whether in attack or defence. The replacement of lost material was proceeding apace; and, in respect of *moral*, the Allied troops were rapidly recovering from the effects of their retreat, while the enemy suffered the discouragement incidental to failure.

As time went on, and the Germans remained inactive, it was generally supposed that they had finally relinquished the initiative; and it was somewhat a surprise when, on July 15, they opened a general attack on a front of fifty miles extending from Château Thierry to

the Main des Massiges, at the eastern limit of the old Champagne battle-field. Throwing numerous bridges over the Marne, eight divisions, under cover of smoke-clouds, forced the river between Fossoy and Verneuil, and, in the first rush, gained the heights south of Dormans, which overlook the valley. Between the Marne and the Ardre the Allied line was forced back a distance of three or four miles; and east of Reims the first line of defence was captured, including the heights of Moronvillers, which had been the scene of fierce battles last year. The Germans, however, do not appear to have made any serious attempt to follow up their advantage; and they were unable to maintain their position on the heights south of the river against the French counter-attacks, which developed on July 16 and 17, while, on the remainder of the front, their advance was brought to a standstill.

This spasmodic attack was evidently in the nature of a demonstration, the object of which is, however, a matter of conjecture. According to unofficial report, the Germans employed only thirty divisions on the fifty-mile front; and did not engage their reserves. Moreover, their heavy artillery, without which they could not hope to make any substantial progress, or even to maintain their footing south of the Marne, was left behind. The force which had crossed, being only lightly equipped, subsequently effected its retreat without serious accident—a result to which the covering fire of the heavy guns on the north bank doubtless contributed. An advance in force across the Marne would have been strategically unsound; for it would have accentuated the danger of the enemy's salient position between Soissons and Reims, by lengthening the lines of communication, which were liable to be cut by an Allied advance between the Aisne and the Marne, and by exposing the advanced force to the risk of defeat with the river in its rear.

That the Germans were fully aware of the disadvantages of the situation is proved by their persistent efforts, in the early part of June, to throw General Mangin's army back on the Soissons—Château Thierry front; and, if they had contemplated a serious offensive, they would probably again have been disposed rather to extend the occupied area north of the river than to incur

risks which, in the meantime, had been accentuated by the growth of the Allied Armies in numbers and efficiency. The positions as they existed were, indeed, hardly tenable as a line of defence; and the enemy no doubt realised that, in the end, withdrawal would be the only alternative to a successful offensive. It is possible that they had already decided to adopt the former course, rather than to wait until it should be imposed upon them; and that the widely-extended attack of July 15 was intended to disguise their design, and to facilitate the operation by inducing the French to disperse their reserves to strengthen threatened points. Or, alternatively, they may merely have intended to dislocate the plans of the Allied Generalissimo by breaking up the force which, as they were doubtless aware, he had concentrated south of the Aisne. In either case the result was ineffective; for the Allies, being forewarned of the attack, disposed of it with the troops already in the line, and proceeded to carry out their plans without delay or modification.

Before proceeding to sketch the operations which followed, it may be convenient to the reader to indicate their various phases; premising that any such division is, of course, artificial, the offensives of the different armies being episodes in one great preconcerted operation. The first phase opened between the Aisne and the Marne, where General Mangin's 10th Army, with American and British troops, began the attack on July 18; the battle subsequently extending to General Dégoutte's front south of the Marne, and involving also the eastern flank of the German salient, where General Berthelot's 5th Army was supplemented by American, British, and Italian troops. In the second phase, which began on Aug. 8, the 1st French Army (Debeney), and the 4th British Army (Rawlinson), advanced on the front Braches—Morlancourt. Four days later the offensive front was extended to the Oise by General Humbert's 3rd Army; and on Aug. 17 General Mangin co-operated by setting his left wing in movement between the Oise and the Aisne. The third phase, which was opened by General Byng's 3rd Army, was introduced, on Aug. 21, by an attack on a front of

about ten miles north of Beaumont sur Ancre; but, on the following day, the offensive spread southwards to the Somme, thus joining up with General Rawlinson's operations; while, to the north, there was a gradual extension of the battle-area to a point beyond the Scarpe, involving General Horne's 1st Army. By the end of August the battle was continuous from Lens to Reims, a front of one hundred and twenty miles.

The Allied attack on July 18 took the enemy completely by surprise; for, although the move was not unexpected, there was no preliminary bombardment to indicate that it was imminent. A strong force of British tanks contributed largely to the success of the first day's operations. Progress was most marked on the left wing, between Amblény and St Pierre Aigle, where General Mangin had made use of the period of stagnation, by a series of well-planned but unobtrusive local operations, to get clear of the forest and broken country, and so to prepare for taking the offensive. By nightfall the French were in possession of the heights which overlook Soissons on the south-west and stretch southwards to the east of Chaudun. The right wing, which was involved in the difficult country bordering the forest of Villers Cotterets, made less progress; but on the second day it fought its way against stubborn resistance, and came into line with the remainder of the army not far from the Soissons—Château Thierry main road, parts of which were under the fire of the Allied guns. On the Ourcq—Marne front good progress was made on the 18th; and in the evening the German force south of the Marne, realising the danger of the situation, began to fall back towards the river, which it recrossed during the night of the 19th, closely pressed by General Dégoutte. Strong opposition was encountered between the Marne and Reims, where General Berthelot took the offensive on July 19; and throughout the operations the enemy took full advantage of the defensive possibilities of the wooded and hilly country on this flank of the salient to hold back the advance during their withdrawal from the Marne.

On July 21 the Allies entered Château Thierry; and on the following day the capture of Epieds, eight miles to the north-east, both threatened the flank of the hostile forces which, by furious counter-attacks, were

endeavouring to stem the advance of the Allied troops between the Marne and the Ourcq, and made the Germans anxious for the safety of the road from Jaulgonne to Fère en Tardenois, which was one of their main lines of retreat from the Marne. In face of this menace, which was the more disturbing because General Dégoutte, having crossed the Marne, was pressing forward at all points, the Germans were forced to turn their attention to the region of Epieds, where they counter-attacked in force on July 24, and seized the village, which, however, was recovered by the Americans before nightfall. The fighting was also exceptionally severe on this day north of Dormans, where the main road to Fismes crosses the Marne, and in the direction of Reims, where British and Italian troops gained possession of Vrigny.

In the meantime General Mangin's advance north of the Ourcq had been retarded by the enemy's stubborn resistance; but in the evening of July 25 French troops entered Oulchy le Château and Villemontoire, the capture of which places had an important effect on the operations by securing the flanks of an easterly advance along the intervening high ground against the heights north and north-east of Grand Rozoy, which formed the main bulwark of the enemy's defence between the Ourcq and the Crise. On July 27 the Germans began to fall back on a wide front before the armies of Generals Dégoutte and Berthelot, covered on their right by stiff rearguard fighting on the Ourcq, the brunt of which was borne by the Americans; and, by the close of the day, the Allied forces arrived within three miles of that enemy's principal line of resistance in the area enclosed by the Ardre, the Vesle, and the Ourcq, which was situated on the so-called 'Tardenois plateau,' stretching from Fère en Tardenois to Ville en Tardenois. The last three days of July were signalised by fierce fighting for the possession of the plateau, in which a desperate struggle round Sergy, between an American division and two German divisions (one of the Prussian Guard), was a striking incident. The village, after changing hands repeatedly, remained in the possession of our Allies.

While these events were proceeding on his right, General Mangin was engaged in making his dispositions

for the assault of the formidable position on the Grand Rozoy heights, which the Germans were endeavouring to cover by a series of violent counter-attacks. Among the troops employed were two British divisions, which were moved forward on either side of the heights, and took a leading part in the attack on Aug. 1, fighting in the neighbourhood of Hartennes and Beugneux. The result of the battle was decisive; for, though the enemy still clung to the Tardenois plateau, they gave way to the French attacks on the following day, and the whole line made a speedy movement towards the Crise and the Vesle. Before evening French troops had entered Soissons, and the pursuit was carried beyond the line of the Crise. On Aug. 4 American troops occupied Fismes, and patrols made their way at several points to the right bank of the Vesle, where the Germans were found to be holding the heights in force. This stage marked the close of the Allied offensive south of the Aisne; for, though intermittent fighting has since taken place on the line of the Vesle, from Reims to its junction with the Aisne, and the Germans ultimately continued their retreat, the Allies made no serious attempt at the time to carry the advance further. During the operations the Germans engaged 74 divisions (out of a total of 201 divisions in France), of which ten were drawn from Prince Rupprecht's army-group, while others were brought from the Verdun front, and from Alsace and Lorraine. Their losses numbered some 40,000 prisoners and 500 guns, of which over 8000 prisoners and 130 guns were taken by the Americans.

Towards the end of July the Allies carried out two minor enterprises, north and south of the Somme, which had some bearing on the operations now to be described. The first was an attack by the French north of Montdidier, which gave them possession of the enemy's first line through Mailly Raineval and Aubvillers. Later, Australian troops, by a night attack, pushed the Germans back between Morlancourt and the Somme. The enemy, as a result of these incidents, found themselves at a disadvantage in view of the Allied offensive, which they doubtless anticipated, and they took steps to rectify their positions. On Aug. 4 they withdrew their line, on a front of ten miles northwards from Montdidier,

apparently in order to avoid being forced to fight close in front of the Avre, yielding to the French the left bank of that river from Braches to Morisel. On the Somme they elected to attempt the recovery of their lost position, and, with that view, attacked with a fresh division at dawn on Aug. 6, but with only trifling success, which was nullified by a counter-attack on the following morning.

At dawn on Aug. 8 the offensive proper was launched by Sir Douglas Haig, the 4th British Army attacking on a front extending from Morlancourt to the neighbourhood of Morisel, whence the line was prolonged southwards by the 1st French Army. South of the Somme the British troops, assisted by a large number of tanks, swept over the German lines, and reached their final objectives at an early hour. Then the cavalry, with light tanks and motor machine-gun batteries, passing through the infantry, took up the pursuit, riding down the German transport, cutting telephone-wires, surrounding and capturing villages, and taking many prisoners. North of the Somme more stubborn resistance was encountered; but after severe fighting the enemy's defence was overcome, and the appointed goal was reached before evening. On the right the French, forcing the passages of the Avre, captured Pierrepont, and made good progress further north. Before nightfall the Allied troops had reached the line Pierrepont—Arvillers—Rosières—Rainecourt—Morcourt, having captured 17,000 prisoners and over 200 guns.

On the second day of the offensive General Debeney extended his attack beyond the apex of the German salient, and striking towards Montdidier from the south and south-east, reached Faverolles. To the north Davenescourt fell to his troops; and on Aug. 10 Montdidier, being threatened with envelopment, was evacuated by the enemy. General Humbert, with the 3rd French Army, began to move forward on General Debeney's right. At the end of the day (Aug. 10) the Allied front was defined by Elincourt—Conchy—Laboissière—Andéchy—Fresnoy lez Roye—Lihons—Proyart. The Germans, threatened with the loss of Chaulnes—an important centre of roads and railways, and replete with stores of every kind—began, on Aug. 11, a series of violent counter-attacks in the region of Lihons, delivered by divisions

freshly drawn from the reserves, which, though successfully resisted, delayed the British advance for some days. General Humbert, however, made progress in the hilly country south-west of Noyon, and, on Aug. 14, captured Ribecourt; while General Debeney pressed forward to envelope Lassigny on the north and south. At the end of the first week's fighting the toll of captures amounted to 28,000 prisoners and 600 guns.

There was little change in the general situation until Aug. 17, when General Mangin captured a section of the German line near Autrechies, subsequently extending his offensive to embrace the whole area between the Aisne and the Oise, and reaching, on Aug. 21, the Soissons—Noyon main road. Aided by this movement, the progress of the 1st and 3rd French Armies was expedited, the conquest of the Thiescourt forest was completed; and, on the last-named date, Lassigny fell. Two days later General Mangin was in possession of the left bank of the Oise as far as the confluence of the Ailette, and of the latter to a point opposite Coucy le Château. Subsequently there was little change in the situation south of the Somme till Aug. 27, when the enemy gave way on a wide front, yielding to the unrelenting pressure of the French armies, and influenced by the striking achievements of Sir Julian Byng, now to be described.

Shortly before 5 a.m. on Aug. 21 the 3rd Army advanced to the attack on a ten-mile front, from the Ancre to Moyenneville. No preliminary bombardment heralded the assault, which was led by a strong force of tanks, concealed by mist which hung heavily over the battle-field till mid-day. The leading troops, having penetrated deeply into the hostile positions, were relieved by fresh divisions, which passed to the front, and fought their way as far as the Albert—Arras railway, encountering strong resistance, especially about Achiet le Grand, where the Germans counter-attacked in force. On Aug. 22 the right wing came into action, recaptured Albert, and carried the German positions between the Somme and the Ancre to a depth of two miles. The third day's fighting covered the whole front from Lihons to within five miles of Arras, General Rawlinson's left wing joining in the battle, and forcing the enemy back between Herleville and the Somme. On the left General

Byng's troops overcame the hostile defence on the Albert—Arras railway north of Achiet le Grand, and reached the Bapaume—Arras road between Ervillers and Boiry Becquerelle, both of which fell to their assault. Later in the day the left centre attacked and carried the ridge above Irles, captured Achiet le Grand, and secured the intervening positions.

On Aug. 24 the advance proceeded in the face of strong hostile reinforcements. On the right Braye was taken; and the right centre, entering upon the Somme battle-field of 1916, proceeded eastwards astride of the Thiepval ridge, capturing La Boisselle, Thiepval, Grandcourt, and other well-remembered villages and farms. Opposite the left centre, Miraumont made a desperate defence, until it was outflanked on the north by New Zealand and British troops, which carried Irles, Loupart Wood, and other strongly defended localities, and reached Biefvillers and Avesnes, on the outskirts of Bapaume. Further north St Léger and Henin sur Cojeul were taken; and, beyond the Scarpe, the Germans were driven from a section of their front line north-east of Fampoux. At this stage the Germans, having assembled strong forces, counter-attacked fiercely on the 25th and 26th at various parts of the front; but, though the general advance was retarded, High Wood, on the Somme battle-field, and Monchy le Preux, south-east of Arras, were secured—points of some tactical importance which, in the past, had been hotly contested on several occasions. On Aug. 27 Sir Henry Rawlinson drove the enemy back on the whole front between Chaulnes and the Somme. South of Bapaume, Longueval, which had been taken and lost on the previous day, was captured, together with Delville Wood and other strong localities. Between Bapaume and the Scarpe progress was marked, our troops passing, at several points, beyond the line held by the Germans last spring. North of the Scarpe the battle extended nearly to Lens, Arleux being occupied, as well as Roeux, Greenland Hill, and Gavrelles—points which defined the limits of our advance last year. The enemy reacted violently, especially between the Sensée and the Somme, actuated, it would seem, more by the desire to gain time than by any expectation of stopping our advance.

For on this day, as already stated, the Germans hastened their retreat between the Somme and the Oise. A glance at the map will suggest reasons for their anxiety. It will be seen that the main roads in the region converge on St Quentin, and the railroads on La Fère. These means of communication and retreat were threatened from the south by General Humbert, advancing between Noyon and Roye, and by General Mangin, who was maintaining his pressure in the valley of the Oise and the Ailette. Rawlinson was approaching the passages of the Somme about Brie; while Byng's right was near Peronne. The Allied commanders were no further from St Quentin than were the Germans about Chaulnes, and all were steadily gaining ground. The Noyon—La Fère railway had probably already been put out of action by the guns of the 10th French Army, and that through Nesle was obviously in danger. The Germans, therefore, according to their own account, 'withdrew to a distance from the enemy, giving up, without fighting, the ruin-heaps of Chaulnes and Roye.' On Aug. 28 the French gained the heights on the west bank of the Somme north-east of Nesle, and reached the Canal du Nord between Nesle and Noyon, capturing some forty villages, and a large quantity of material. On the following day they took Noyon, in spite of a stubborn defence, and advanced some way to the east; while General Mangin crossed the Ailette in the region of Folembray. After this date there was little change for some days in the situation between the Somme and the Oise; for the Germans, feeling more secure on their straightened front, stiffened their resistance, and the Allies were too prudent to waste their resources in costly attacks. But General Mangin made some progress east of the Ailette and north and north-east of Soissons, capturing Crécy au Mont, Juvigny, and Crouy.

Meanwhile things were going well on the British front north of the Somme. On Aug. 29 Bapaume fell to the New Zealanders; and the enemy gave way on the ridge east of Longueval, where our troops reached the line Combles—Morval. On the two following days progress continued in this quarter, as well as on the Somme, where the capture of Mont St Quentin made

the fall of Péronne imminent; while, north of Bapaume, Bullecourt and Hendecourt were finally won.

The early days of September saw new developments on the flanks of the battle-front. On the 2nd the 'Drocourt—Quéant switch-line' was broken on a front of six miles astride of the Arras—Cambrai road, 10,000 prisoners being taken. Next day the Germans evacuated Lens. Continuing their advance between Quéant and Cambrai, our troops captured Inchy on Sept. 4, entered Mœuvres, and, further north, reached the Canal du Nord at several points less than seven miles from Cambrai. From the canal the front lay north-westwards through Etaing, Gavrelle, and Arleux, to Lens; and southwards along a direct line including Ytres and the River Tortille, the passages of which had been forced on a wide front. On this day the Germans gave way before General Humbert, withdrawing up the Oise to within four miles of Chauny, and abandoning Guiscard. They also began to fall back from the line of the Vesle, pressed by the Americans, who reached the Aisne between Condé and Villers. Two days later the enemy abandoned the line of the Somme above Peronne; and, by the evening, General Rawlinson's troops had proceeded seven miles east to the river on a twelve-mile front astride of the Amiens—St Quentin road. The French advanced beyond Ham, and, on the Oise, passed Chauny. Further south they occupied the Lower Forest of Coucy, and approached Landri-court and Vauxaillon.

Thereafter the retreat between the Oise and the Cambrai front proceeded for some days without any incident needing special notice; though local fighting continued intermittently, which resulted in the enemy being driven back, by Sept. 10, to the general line of defence held by them before the March offensive. Sir Douglas Haig marked the occasion by a special order congratulating the troops on the magnificence of their achievement, and announcing that, during the month's fighting, they had captured 75,000 prisoners and 750 guns. The Allies, however, were not content to rest on their laurels. The French continued their advance north of the Aisne, in the face of determined counter-attacks, capturing Vailly, and making progress east of Allemant towards the western end of the Chemin des Dames ridge.

About St Quentin they won the heights between the Crozat Canal and the Oise, and, in conjunction with Rawlinson's right wing, penetrated by enemy's positions north of the town. Further north, as far as Mœuvres, our troops gained ground in a series of engagements, of which the most important was fought on Sept. 18, when, attacking on a front of sixteen miles south of Gouzeaucourt, they forced their way into the enemy's positions on the line Pontru—Hargicourt—Lempire, advancing nearly to Bellicourt in the centre, and, on the left, reaching the outskirts of Villers Guislain.


While these events were proceeding in the south, the northern part of the front, in the neighbourhood of the Flemish frontier, was not unaffected.* The operations, though of a minor character in comparison with those on the main battle-front, need passing notice, as they resulted in our front being re-established north of the La Bassée Canal, where it had been deeply indented by the German offensive, and thus cleared the right flank of the great advance which developed in the Ypres sector towards the end of September. In the early days of August the official reports referred, on several occasions, to the activity of our patrols in the area between the rivers Clarence and Lawe, south-east of St Venant. These tentative movements soon developed into general pressure on the salient between Bailleul and the La Bassée Canal, under which, about Aug. 8 (the date of General Rawlinson's offensive) the Germans began to give way. Local fighting was also reported about Kemmel and Voormezele, where the enemy, during the first half of the month, made several demonstrations, probably in the hope of relieving the pressure further south. On Aug. 18 a local operation between Vieux Berquin and Bailleul, in which 700 prisoners were taken, gave us possession of several defended localities, including a village. This success was steadily followed up, in the face of counter-attacks; and the front of the advance was extended to the Lys, where our troops captured Merville after sharp fighting. The enemy then gave way on the whole front between Ypres and Givenchy. By the beginning of September

* Vide map published in the 'Quarterly Review' last July.

Kemmel Hill and Bailleul had been re-occupied ; and our front was defined by the general line Voormezeele—Neuve Eglise—Steenwerck—Estaires—Givenchy. On Sept. 4 we attacked and captured Ploegsteert, and Hill 63, between that place and Messines ; and, from Fauquissart to Givenchy, we regained the line held before April 9.

To bring this outline of events down to the commencement of the general attack on the defensive system within which the Germans had taken refuge, it remains to sketch the brilliant and skilful attack delivered by the 1st American Army, in conjunction with French divisions, on the enemy's positions in the region of St Mihiel. Coming, as it did, at the moment when the armies grouped, under Prince Rupprecht and the German Crown Prince were, no doubt, congratulating themselves on having found a secure refuge in the Hindenburg defences, the Germans must have been disagreeably surprised at finding themselves assailed in a fresh quarter, where, for four years, they had remained practically undisturbed. It may be recalled that, in September, 1914, after several fruitless attempts to break through the chain of barrier forts which crown the heights of the Meuse from Verdun to Toul, they ultimately gained a footing at Hattonchatel, whence they pushed forward in the direction of St Mihiel, attacked the forts of Paroches and Camp des Romains, which dominated the town on the north and south respectively, and established a small bridge-head on the left bank of the Meuse, from which they failed to debouch. The sharp salient thus created seemed an inviting objective ; but, though the French on several occasions made local attacks in the region of Apremont, and at various points in the Woeuvre, and gained partial successes, they have been too much occupied in other quarters to spare the forces necessary for operations on a scale large enough to secure decisive results.

The recent operation was well-planned, and carried out with precision. The weather, on the whole, favoured our Allies. A light rain, which had been falling for some days, hampered the action of the tanks ; and low clouds embarrassed the airmen, who had the superiority ; but the sodden state of the roads, in conjunction with the converging fire of the guns, which swept the entire



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salient, made it impossible for the enemy, in the short time allowed them, to save their heavy artillery and the large quantity of material accumulated behind the lines. The German troops, who, it is said, had been warned to expect attack on Sept. 15, were taken by surprise when, at 5 a.m. on the 12th, after an intense bombardment lasting four hours, the American infantry assailed their positions on a front of ten miles, from the Moselle to the Rupt de Madt at Xivray, and, encountering little resistance, made rapid progress. At the same time French troops, advancing from the region of St Mihiel, carried the heights, and covered the American flanks. Later, at 8 a.m., a third attack was made on the western flank of the salient, between Les Eparges and Seuzey, which, though strongly opposed, gained its objectives early in the afternoon. The Allied forces continued to press forward on both flanks. Thiaucourt was taken in the evening; and, by 8 o'clock on the following morning, the advanced troops operating from the south-east and north-west had joined hands at Vigneulles. 15,000 prisoners and over 200 guns were captured. On the subsequent days the advance proceeded in a north-easterly direction, meeting ineffective counter-attacks about Jaulny and St Hilaire; and the enemy's retreat became general between Bezonvaux and Norroy. By the evening of Sept. 15, the Allied forces had passed the line Villecey—Haumont—Doncourt—Fresnes—Abaucourt; and the fortress guns of Metz had come into action.

During the closing days of September events marched with breathless rapidity. On the 26th the first of a series of great combined attacks, which shook the enemy's entire front from the Meuse to the Yser, was delivered by the 1st American and 4th French armies, advancing, respectively, east and west of the Argonne Forest. General Liggett's army quickly overran the positions on the west bank of the Meuse established by the Germans during their attack on Verdun in 1916, and, by the end of the month, had penetrated the enemy's fortified zone on the entire front of attack to a depth of seven miles. West of the forest General Gouraud was equally successful, his troops making light of the obstacles which had brought the Champagne offensive of September 1915 to a standstill, and carrying their front beyond the line

Condé—Séchault—Aure—Somme Py, a general advance of six to seven miles. In the intervening region the Germans were evacuating the forest under the direct pressure of the Americans.


The second great blow followed on Sept. 27, when portions of our 1st and 3rd armies attacked in the Cambrai sector, American troops prolonging the offensive front southwards beyond Le Catelet. Two days later the 4th Army came into action between Le Catelet and St Quentin. Our troops won back the whole of the Cambrai battle-field, gained the right bank of the Canal about Crèvecœur, occupied the western suburbs of Cambrai, and, further north, reached Blécourt. North of St Quentin the 4th Army fought its way as far as the line Lavergies—Estrées, three miles east of the Canal. On Sept. 30 General Debeney, cooperating with Rawlinson's right wing, attacked St Quentin and the adjoining defences. Two days earlier, General Mangin carried the heights of the Chemin des Dames as far eastwards as the Vailly—Laon road; and, by Sept. 30, the battle spread to the region between the Vesle and the Aisne, where the enemy began to fall back on the entire front west of Reims.

On Sept. 28, the Belgian Army, with General Plumer's forces, under the command of King Albert, assailed the German positions from Dixmude to Ploegsteert.* Dixmude and the whole of the Messines and Passchendaele ridges (including the Zandvoorde and Moorslede spurs) were captured, and Ledeghem was occupied, British and Belgian troops, respectively, reached the outskirts of Menin and Roulers, and, in the interval, advanced beyond the railway. Influenced by the attacks at Cambrai and Ypres, the Germans show signs of giving way on the intervening front.

Thus, at the end of September, the whole front from the heights of the Meuse to the swamps of Flanders was in violent oscillation; and the enemy, who had already suffered heavily,† was throwing division after division

* Vide maps published in the 'Quarterly Review' for January and July last.

† The British armies, alone, during July and August, took 123,618 prisoners and 1400 guns. In the last five days' fighting between the Sensée and St Quentin they defeated 36 German divisions.



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into the fight, in the endeavour to maintain the stability of his positions. The Allies' combined offensive, which, in its scope and significance, is the greatest of this great war, is as yet in too early a stage to admit of its ultimate result being conjectured. The Germans rely not on a few parallel lines of defence, but on a fortified zone of unknown depth, only the fringe of which has been penetrated; and it is not to be supposed that the fighting can be maintained indefinitely at the present high pressure. In fact, victory will be won, not by the capturing positions, but by breaking the spirit of the German army and the German nation. What is apparent at the moment is that the Germans have been deprived of their lateral communications through Roulers, Douai, and Cambrai; that they have been relegated to the railway system centring on Valenciennes; and that their facilities for transporting reinforcements and distributing supplies have, in consequence, been curtailed.

The main causes of the Allies' success have already been epitomised. Chief among these have been the remarkable achievements of the United States in raising and transporting troops. According to official statements, there were 1,000,000 American troops in France at the beginning of July.* Over 300,000 men crossed the Atlantic during that month; and the rate of transport has since increased. The intervention of an entirely fresh force of such magnitude at the present stage of the war, when the original combatants are more or less exhausted, might be expected to exercise a decisive influence on the course of the campaign. In conjunction with the Austrian defeat in Italy, it probably decided the Germans to return to the defensive; and, even from the brief allusions which have been made above to the performances of the American troops, it may be seen that, without this accession of strength, Marshal Foch could hardly have hoped to take the offensive with success. The German plans were, in fact, based on a complete misconception of what America could accomplish; and not only have those plans failed, but the future course of the war has assumed a new aspect.

* It has recently been announced that the number exceeds 1,700,000.

Germany has been counting, at the worst, on the war being brought to an end by mutual exhaustion; a state of things in which she expected to have the advantage on account of the strategical and political position which she had attained in Russia and the Near East. She now knows that, as General March, the Chief of the American General Staff, has stated, she will have to deal next year with an American army four millions strong; that her dream of a decisive victory in the field has vanished; and that the best she can hope for is the termination of the war in her favour by indirect methods.

But the value of numbers depends on the power they confer being effectively controlled and directed. The influence of unity in the chief command has been manifested in various ways: in the presence of reserves where they were wanted to strengthen the defence or to confirm a success; in the prompt seizing of opportunities, and the timely delivery of blows in fresh quarters where weakness was disclosed; in the precision attained in combined operations, which did not always exist when plans were evolved as the result of discussion and agreement between commanders of equal status. It is hardly necessary to say that the defects of execution which used to appear were not attributable to the jealousy or want of accord which, in former wars, had often marred combined operations, for the Allied commanders of all grades have been conspicuous for loyalty to each other; but, when opinions differed, agreement could only be effected by discussion or mutual concession; and thus delay was inevitable, when promptitude was all-important.

A marked advance has been observable in tactical methods. For example, machine-guns have been more extensively and more effectively used in attack and pursuit. The improvement appears to have been partly due to organisation, which has enabled the guns to be employed in batteries or companies, each with an allotted rôle, in close cooperation with the other arms. Given a suitable organisation, effective action depends on tactical skill in the selection of advantageous positions; and in this respect a marked improvement is manifest. With regard to the infantry attack, the 'leap-frog' method of advance, described in the 'Quarterly

Review' for April last, seems to have been adopted. There has also been less rigidity in the advance, with the result that the normal attack has proceeded more rapidly. More distant objectives have been assigned; and, on many occasions, the attack has been carried far beyond the objectives originally appointed, without the ill results observable earlier in the war. In fact the troops have profited much from the experience gained during the German offensive; and more skilful leadership has given the attack greater flexibility, with the result that pre-arranged plans, instead of being rigidly adhered to, have been modified by the troop-leaders to meet unexpected situations. Thus strongly defended localities which would formerly have defied direct assault, or would only have fallen after severe and costly fighting, have been taken, with trifling loss, by outflanking or converging attack.

The rapid recovery of the Allied Armies after the ordeal through which they had passed in the first three months of the campaign, is one of the wonders of the war. The long and rapid retreat, the disorganisation which prevailed in some quarters, the losses sustained, and the anxieties of a situation which, on several occasions, was distinctly menacing, might well have depressed the *moral* of the best soldiery that ever took the field. Yet the troops never lost heart; and, when the occasion was ripe, they took the offensive with unsubdued spirit and undiminished confidence in themselves and their leaders. It is no disparagement to the Allied Armies to recognise that the Germans had decided to fall back from their advanced positions. When, and how far, the enemy had intended to retire is their own secret; but—apart from the pains at which inspired German apologists have been to find plausible excuses—the course of the operations provides ample evidence that they were allowed to choose neither their own time nor the manner of their retreat. On many occasions they were forced to fight desperately in defence of vital positions, the premature loss of which often disorganised the plan of retreat and led to the capture of vast quantities of material which they were given time neither to remove nor to destroy. Their movements were governed more by the will of the Allied commanders than by their

own volition. It is only necessary to compare their losses in prisoners, guns, and material with those incurred in last year's retreat, to recognise the difference between an orderly and regulated movement and one executed under compulsion. With these reservations, the retreat may be said to have been skilfully effected; and there is no evidence of panic except in minor instances, or of any abnormal disorder among the troops. The evidence points to the Germans having, on the whole, fought well—in many instances exceedingly well; and the rapidity of their retreat was due, not to demoralisation, but to the skill which characterised the Allied operations, and to the energy and bravery which animated the Allied troops.

Turning now to the situation in the east, we find that the Allied operations have been of two kinds: the first, offensive, aim at disposing of Germany's minor allies; the second, mainly defensive, are designed for the protection of threatened territory and communications.

The first event to be noticed is the Allied offensive in Macedonia. It had been believed for some time that the Bulgarians, war-weary, jealous of the Turks, and dissatisfied at having been refused the possession of Salonica, were wavering in their allegiance to their German masters. The Greek army, some 150,000 strong, being ready for the field, the occasion seemed ripe for striking a blow which might loosen Germany's grip on Bulgaria and the Balkans. Here, then, the main offensive was opened on Sept. 15 by French and Serbian troops, who attacked the Bulgarians in the frontier region of Dobropolje, east of Monastir, on a front of nine miles, which, by the extension of the flanks, was widened, on Sept. 17, to twenty miles. After three days' heavy fighting, the left wing reached the Tchernia, five miles north of Grunishta, while the right wing captured the heights north of the Gradeshnitsa river. German reinforcements were put to flight; and cavalry, thrown forward on the right, approached Prilep. On Sept. 18 a fresh attack was opened on both sides of Lake Doiran, where British and Greek troops gained some ground against stubborn resistance; while the main advance made rapid progress in a northerly direction between

the Vardar and the Tcherná, the Bulgarians having, apparently, been so completely demoralised by the loss of their strong positions in the mountains that the efforts of German reinforcements failed to stay their flight. On Sept. 21 the infantry reached the Vardar in the direction of Negotin and Demir Kapu, cutting the railway communications of the enemy on the Doiran front, and outflanking their formidable positions in the bend of the Tcherná, from which they began to fall back, pressed by the Italians, who had taken the offensive on the previous day. The Bulgarian retreat then became general on a front of 100 miles, and soon degenerated into a rout, which the so-called 11th German Army (Bulgarians, with a German stiffening and German officers) was powerless to stay. The enemy's front was broken, the right wing being driven towards Albania. Prilep was occupied on Sept. 24, and Veles on Sept. 26. Greek and British troops, crossing the Belashitsa range, seized Strumnitza; and Serbian cavalry, pressing forward through Kochana, reached the Bulgarian frontier. On Sept. 30 it was reported that Bulgarian envoys had arrived at Salonica, bearing proposals for an armistice.

Almost simultaneously with the attack on the Bulgarians, the Turks in Palestine were subjected to another crushing defeat. The Turkish forces were distributed on either side of the Jordan, the 4th Army on the east, the 7th and 8th Armies on the west, where they were opposed by French and British troops on a front lying approximately east and west through El Ballutah. Preparatory to the main attack, a force advancing on the night of Sept. 18-19, between the river and the Jerusalem—Shechem road, got astride of the road from Shechem to the Jordan, thus interposing itself between the two parts of the Turkish army. On the following morning the main attack launched on a sixteen-mile front adjoining the coast, and assisted by the fire of naval guns, quickly overran the Turkish positions, and, in the afternoon, captured the enemy's advanced base at Tul Keram (on the railway, twenty-five miles north-east of Joppa)—an advance of twelve miles in as many hours. The Turks being in flight on the whole front between the Jordan and the sea, mounted troops were sent forward in two bodies, of which one, proceeding north of

Shechem, intercepted large numbers of the enemy; while the other reached the railway from Haifa to Damascus at El Afuleh, 50 miles north-east of Joppa.

These initial advantages were swiftly followed up. The passages of the Jordan were seized; and the 7th and 8th Turkish Armies, being thus deprived of their last means of escape, lost all their artillery and transport, and were virtually destroyed. East of the river, mounted troops, closely supported by infantry, seized the Hedjaz railway at Amman; while Arab forces of King Hussein occupied Maan (70 miles south of the Dead Sea) and, advancing northwards along the railway, drove before them the greater part of the 4th Turkish Army, which thus found itself between two fires. The situation of the remainder of this army, dispersed along the railway south of Maan, is equally unpromising; and it seems unlikely that any appreciable fraction of the Turkish armies in Palestine and Syria will continue to exist as a fighting force. The captures reported down to Sept. 27 amounted to 50,000 prisoners and 325 guns, besides a large quantity of material and rolling stock.

Passing to the Allies' defensive measures, it may be recalled that allusion was made, in the July number of this Review, to a movement of Kurdish irregulars towards the Caspian after the Turks had occupied the southern Caucasus. This movement subsequently developed into a Turkish advance on Baku, to oppose which, as well as to counteract German activities in the direction of Afghanistan, a force was sent from Baghdad through Persia to Enzeli, on the south-western shore of the Caspian. From this point two detachments were despatched; one eastwards, to co-operate with an Indian force which was working along the Trans-Caspian railway from Meshed; the other to aid in the defence of Baku, which was held by about 10,000 Russians and Armenians. On being closely pressed, the Armenians, numbering some 7000, deserted to their homes. The British force, after repelling determined Turkish attacks on three occasions, evacuated Baku on Sept. 14, and rejoined the main body at Enzeli.

Of more moment is the situation—as yet only vaguely defined—in northern Russia, where the Germans, with the aid of Finnish and Bolshevist troops, aim at gaining

possession of the railway communications with Archangel and Katerina; and that in Siberia, in which the dominating factor is the Siberian railway. On Aug. 2 an Allied force of French, British, and Americans landed at Archangel—at the request of the inhabitants, who had deposed the local Soviet—and moved along the railway towards Vologda, 400 miles distant, encountering Bolshevik forces, said to number 8000, which were defeated and driven back on Oboserskaya, 100 miles south of Archangel. Another force, which disembarked on the western shore of the White Sea, is reported to have occupied Kem, on the Murman railway, 250 miles from the terminus at Katerina harbour. The serious factor in the situation is the presence of strong German forces in Finland, where the enemy have been endeavouring to organise two expeditions, composed of German-led Finnish troops, with Katerina and Kem as objectives. Such, broadly, was the situation about the middle of August, since which period no information about the course of events has been published.

The conclusion of peace at Brest-Litovsk was followed by the formation, in eastern Siberia, of armed forces composed of released German and Austrian prisoners, which, with the local Bolsheviks, threatened to gain control of the railways between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok, and to dominate Siberia in the German interest. To meet this menace, and to cover the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks who, under Colonel Dieterichs, were desirous of forming a junction with Colonel Gaida's force, operating west of Lake Baikal, the Allies decided, after prolonged discussion, to send a force to occupy Vladivostok. When General Otani, the commander of the Japanese contingent, and subsequently Commander-in-Chief, arrived at Vladivostok on Aug. 16, the situation was as follows. The Bolshevik forces were in possession of the Amur railway from Khabarovsk to its junction with the main line near Chita, and of the main line from Irkutsk to the Chinese frontier-station at Manchurie. The Czecho-Slovaks in the Usuri province had been driven back between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok to within 100 miles of the latter; and Colonel Semenoff, who with 2000 Cossacks, had been endeavouring to advance from Manchurie towards Chita, had been obliged to

fall back into Chinese territory. Gaida's force was in jeopardy west of Lake Baikal; and the line from thence to the Volga was in the possession of the Czecho-Slovaks, against whose main forces, on the middle Volga, German and Bolshevist troops were concentrating. It had become plain that the Allied force could not remain inactive at Vladivostok; and the British contingent had already started for the Usuri front. It was decided to send French troops forward forthwith, and to despatch part of the Japanese force as soon as it disembarked.

The gradual influx of these reinforcements resulted, after some vicissitudes, in the defeat of the Bolshevists, 8000 strong, and their retreat to Khabarovsk, which was occupied on Sept. 5 by the Allies, who found the railway bridge over the Amur intact. Meanwhile the general situation had undergone an important change. The Bolshevist forces had been attracted from all quarters to the Usuri front, where they arrived too late to influence events; while the weakening of the forces opposed to Semenoff and Gaida enabled these commanders to take the offensive. Semenoff, supported by a Japanese detachment, which had hastened to his aid *via* Kharbin, resumed his advance; and Gaida, defeating the forces opposed to him, commenced his eastward march. On Sept. 2 a junction was effected at Olovyanna, on the River Onon, completing the occupation of the railway from Vladivostok to the Volga. But, while the position in Siberia has been secured, the situation on the Volga is disquieting. Down to the middle of September the main army, under the Czech General Syrový, held, approximately, the line Kazan—Simbirsk—Samara—Volsk. Volsk, Simbirsk, and Kazan have since been lost; and it is evident that the Germans are resolved on the destruction of the Czecho-Slovaks, who are ill-furnished with the material requirements.

The significance of these various side-shows lies in their influence on the situation in the west—the only quarter in which, since the defection of Russia, the Allies have been in contact with the enemy's main forces. That Germany finds the presence of an Allied force on the Murman coast inconvenient is admitted by her offer to abstain from attacking eastern Karelia if the Allies withdraw from that region. She already

has in Russia nearly 40 divisions, besides a number of Austrian divisions which have been fully employed on police duties, to which has now been added the burden of a campaign against the Czecho-Slovaks, the magnitude of which cannot be foreseen. Although his troops are poorly equipped for fighting, General Syrový has the whole expanse of Asiatic Russia behind him, with complete control of the Siberian railway. While his present position is perilous, exposed, as he is, to attack from various directions by superior forces, if his army should have the manœuvring power to retire along the railway while avoiding a serious engagement, it might lead the Germans a dance from which they would derive neither pleasure nor advantage. The increasing dearth of communications would cause them to be more and more tied to the railway, restricting their manœuvring power, and limiting them to frontal attack. Assistance in the form of material, if not of men, would ultimately reach General Syrový from the east; his forces would grow—for the inhabitants have been glad enough, when possible, to rid themselves of the Bolshevist yoke, and local governments have already raised forces at more than one centre in Siberia—and his position would become more secure. The Germans, on the other hand, would drag behind them a lengthening chain of communications, which might break at any moment unless supported by larger forces than they can spare from those at present in Russia to keep order in their rear. With such possibilities in view—for the Germans do not overlook possibilities—it is not surprising that they should be anxious to escape from further complications on the White Sea coast, to unravel which they had originally thought it necessary to invite, or requisition, the assistance of the reluctant Finns.

Since the Germans made their conditional offer to stay their hand in Karelia, the Allied attacks in Macedonia and Palestine have introduced a new factor in the problem they have to solve. Although the collapse of Russia has opened a new way to the east, the Germans have no mind to relinquish the old road *viâ* Constantinople, with the advantages it confers of commanding the exit from the Black Sea, and of threatening the Suez Canal, which Bismarck described as 'the neck of

the British Empire.' Apart from these considerations, the abandonment of their vaunted position in the Balkans would be a long step towards admitting defeat, and would be a fatal blow to their prestige in Russia, and among the small peoples who have fallen under the sway of Germany. They cannot, therefore, afford to look on at the collapse of Bulgaria and Turkey, on whose maintenance in the field their position in the Balkans depends. The shortening of their front in France by the recent retreat will enable them temporarily to withdraw a few divisions for employment elsewhere ; but, with the prospect of an unrestful winter on the western front, the indefinite requirements of the situation in the east may impose a severe strain on their resources.

Events in Palestine, in the Balkans, and in France cannot, in fact, be correctly viewed as disconnected episodes. Each has its place in the general perspective ; and it is impossible, at the moment, to assign to each its relative importance. It is not by accident that Germany's minor allies have been attacked at the time when the situation in the west demands all her attention. The conjecture put forward more than two years ago, that the force at Salonica might find its opportunity 'when the enemy, having been weakened and reduced to the defensive, is being driven back on the main fronts,' does not seem to have been wide of the mark.* Since this article went to press the surrender of Bulgaria has been reported ; and it is an open question whether Turkey, staggering under accumulated defeats, and isolated from Germany except by way of the Black Sea, may not follow suit. Germany has lost the old road to the east ; and she must either cut the loss, or attempt to retrieve it before the Allies consolidate their military position in the Balkans. Such an attempt could only be made at the expense of the position in the west ; and, to offer a prospect of success, it would need a far greater expenditure of force than the Germans might have deemed sufficient had the Bulgarian army kept the field.

W. P. BLOOD.

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